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Abstract 
 
For a long time, the European Parliament (EP) was viewed as a lobbying 
sideshow mainly to be targeted if interest groups were unsuccessful at getting 
their demands included in the European Commission’s proposal. Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs) have a reputation for being particularly open 
to diffuse interests who, due to their limited resources, use ‘friendly’ MEPs to 
put pressure on the European Commission and the Council. The notion of the 
EP representing diffuse interests conflicts with the broader political science 
literature on interest groups, which dwells on business bias. There are, however, 
good reasons to doubt the EP’s reputation as a defender of diffuse interests. 
Much of our current knowledge about the EP’s interest group politics stems 
from a time when the EP’s legislative powers were more limited. Within the last 
twenty years, the EP has evolved from a ‘multilingual talking shop’ to a genuine 
co-legislator with the Council. The increased powers of the EP raise the question 
of whether EP interest group politics has normalised, whereby the assumptions 
of the interest group literature would seem to reflect the reality of the EP. A 
common assumption in the interest group literature is that diffuse interests 
carry limited weight in decision-making because their resources and interests 
remain subordinate to that of business. However, business influence differs 
across policy fields depending on how the costs and benefits related to policies 
are distributed. The aim of my thesis is to investigate how the distribution of 
costs and benefits of legislative proposals influence interest groups’ likelihood of 
winning particular conflicts in the EP. This is done by examining four legislative 
dossiers in the areas of employment, consumer, and environmental policies. The 
thesis draws on the process-tracing of EU documents, and 144 interviews with 
MEPs, EP officials, and interest groups. 
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Introduction: Interest Group influence in the European Parliament 
 
Until recently, studies on lobbying in the European Union (EU) have paid little 
attention to the European Parliament (EP) and the many ways to influence it. 
Instead, scholars have focused their research lens on the European Commission, 
arguing that this is the most important lobbying addressee in the EU due to the 
Commission’s agenda-setting role. In contrast, the EP has often been depicted as 
a lobbying sideshow mainly to be targeted if interest groups are unsuccessful in 
getting their demands included in the European Commission's proposal 
(Lehmann, 2009, p. 39). Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have a 
reputation for being particularly open to diffuse interests1, who - due to their 
limited resources - use ‘friendly’ MEPs to put pressure on the European 
Commission and the Council of the European Union (hereafter the Council). The 
notion of the EP, representing diffuse as opposed to business interests, conflicts 
with the broader political science literature on interest groups which dwells on 
business bias.  
 There are, however, good reasons to doubt the EP's reputation as a 
lobbying venue for weak interests. Much of our current knowledge about the 
EP's interest group politics stems from a time when the EP's legislative influence 
was relatively limited. As a result of several formal treaty changes and the EP’s 
creative use of its own Rules of Procedures to boost its competences, the EP has 
managed to ‘haul itself up sufficiently to enjoy the status of the European 
Union’s budgetary and legislative authority’ (Westlake, 2007, p. 341). With the 
entry into force of the Lisbon treaty on 1 December 2009, the co-decision 
procedure has now become ‘the ordinary legislative procedure’ covering almost 
all areas of EU law. Arguably, as the powers of the EP have increased, so has the 
attention it gets from interest groups. Few interest groups risk leaving the 
parliamentary arena to their opponents and most interest groups adopt a belt-
and-braces approach in which the institutional trio (the European Commission, 
                                                 
1 Diffuse interests are used to refer to interest groups who either face diffuse benefits or cost 
from legislation, as diffuse interests never face concentrated costs or benefits.  
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the Council of the EU, and the EP) is lobbied throughout the policy process 
(Mazey & Richardson, 2006, p. 260). 
 The increased powers of the EP have led some EU scholars to call it one 
of the most powerful legislatures in the world both in terms of its legislative and 
executive oversight powers (Hix, 2008). EU scholars are increasingly referring 
to the EP as a normal parliament rather than a sui generis institution (Hix, 
Roland, & Noury, 2009). This is because MEPs’ legislative behaviour is mainly 
structured around the classical left-right dimension found in national politics. 
The four largest EP groups display very high levels of cohesion, and MEPs 
predominantly vote along trans-national political lines rather than national lines 
(Hix & Niury, 2009; Kreppel & Tsebelis, 1999; Scully, Hix, & Farrell, 2012). The 
purported normalcy2 of the EP’s power and legislative powers raises the 
expectation that its interest groups’ politics might also have normalised, 
whereby the assumptions in the interest group literature would seem to reflect 
the reality of the EP. A common assumption in the interest group literature is for 
diffuse interests (such as environmental and consumer groups) to carry limited 
weight in decision-making because their influence remains subordinate to 
business interest. However, business influence tends to vary across policy 
domains according to the cost/benefit profile of legislative proposals (Olson, 
1965, Wilson, 1974), the salience of issues (Baumgarter, Berry, Hojnacki, 
Kimball, & Leech, 2009a), and the informational and legitimacy needs of 
decision-makers (Bouwen, 2002, 2004, Coen & Katsaitis, 2013). In order to 
account for different patterns of interest group influence across policy domains, 
the research question this thesis asks is:  
 
How does the distribution of costs and benefits of legislative proposals 
influence interest groups’ likelihood of winning particular conflicts in the 
European Parliament? 
 
                                                 
2 Normality is, however, difficult to sustain when looking at the EP’s control over the executive, 
the European Commission. The European Commission is not dependent on a continued 
majority in the EP, and no EP political group holds the majority in the EP. The EP lacks the cut 
and thrust of a governing party and no government is formed following EP elections. 
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Theoretically, the thesis draws on Wilson’s politics of policy typology, which 
assumes that the mobilisation of interest groups and their likelihood of winning 
particular conflict differ across policy domains. Underscoring my research 
question is the enquiry into whether some policy areas are more susceptible to 
interest group influence than others. In order to answer the research question, 
four recent legislative dossiers in the areas of employment, consumer, and 
environmental policies are examined. The cases include proposals for:  
 
 A regulation on setting emission performance standards for new light 
commercial vehicles as part of the EU's integrated approach to reduce 
CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles (the vans regulation) 
 A regulation on the provision of food information to consumers (the 
food labelling regulation) 
 A directive on the organisation of working time: persons performing 
mobile road transport activities (the road transport working time 
directive) 
 A directive on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers 
and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (the 
maternity leave directive).  
 
The above dossiers were chosen for their diversity in the distribution of costs 
and benefits of cases studied in order to properly assess the extent to which 
policy shapes politics in the EP. The cases were studied using process-tracing of 
EU documents and lobbying letters, observations of EP committee meetings, 
and 144 interviews. I spent one and a half years in Brussels, which made it 
possible to follow meetings in the EP and talk both formally and informally with 
interest group representatives, MEPs, EP officials, and MEP assistants. During 
that period, I spent most days in the EP conducting interviews, attending 
committee meetings, public hearings, and lobbying receptions. My access to the 
EP premises gave me a unique opportunity to observe the daily routines of 
4 
 
MEPs and to talk informally to people working in Parliament over lunch or 
coffee. Some MEPs invited me along to political group meetings (which are 
usually closed to the public) or to their meetings with interest groups. The thesis 
is based on a qualitative comparative case study approach, which draws on 
process-tracing integrated with typological theory (e.g. Wilson’s policy of politics 
typology). The combination of the two is useful for bringing to light the causal 
mechanism at work in my four case studies and the interaction effect between 
the independent variable (policy type) and the dependent variable (interest 
group influence). 
 The thesis makes a distinct contribution to the EU public policy 
literature, as well as the general interest group literature in a number of ways. 
Firstly, few scholars have studied the extent to which interest groups’ lobbying 
activity and likely influence varies across policy domains (for an exception see 
Coen & Katsaitis, 2013). While scholars have characterised the EU interest 
intermediation system overall as being élite pluralist (see for instance Coen 
1998; Eising, 2007), important variation is likely to exist across policy domains 
and EU institutions. Secondly, few scholars attempt to assess the influence of 
interest groups over EU policy outcomes (for some exceptions, see Bernhagen & 
Bräuninger, 2005; Klüver, 2013). A small number of academic articles and 
textbooks have provided a general overview of EU lobbying without touching 
upon the question of interest group influence (Aspinwall & Greenwood, 1998; 
Coen & Richardson, 2009; Eising & Kohler-Koch, 2005; Greenwood, 2011; 
Mazey & Richardon, 1993). Instead, scholars have focused their attention on the 
Europeanization of national interest groups (Bache & Jordan, 2008; Coen, 1998; 
Coen & Dannreuther, 2003; Quittkat, 2006), classifying interest group 
populations (Berkhout & Lowery, 2008, 2010), discussing when interest groups 
use access and voice strategies (Beyers, 2002; Coen, 1998; Eising, 2004), 
examining under what conditions interest groups gain access to the EU 
institutions (Beyers, 2004; Bouwen, 2002, 2004b; Broscheid & Coen, 2003a; 
Marshall, 2010), and discussing whether the EU system of interest group 
intermediation can be pigeon-holed as pluralist, corporatist, or neo-pluralist 
(Aspinwall & Greenwood, 1998; Claeys, Gobin, Smets, & Winand, 1998; 
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Greenwood, 2011; Schmitter & Streeck, 1991). Others have preferred to address 
the issue of interest group influence from a theoretical viewpoint, but their 
hypotheses remain largely unexplored (Bernhagen & Bräuninger, 2005; 
Broscheid & Coen, 2003a; Henning, 2004).Rather than tackling the question of 
influence head-on, researchers have used the level of access to decision-makers 
(i.e. face to face meetings) as a proxy for influence (Bouwen, 2004b; Eising, 
2007). However, access to MEPs does not necessarily translate into influence 
because policy outcomes may not reflect interest groups’ desired results, and 
competing interest groups might enjoy equal access to MEPs. 
 Thirdly, the thesis adds to our understanding of the role and influence of 
interest groups in the EP, which has until now remained undeveloped. Only a 
handful of studies have focused on EP lobbying (Bouwen, 2004b; Crombez, 
2002; Earnshaw & Judge, 2006; Kohler-Koch, 1998; Lehmann, 2009; Marshall, 
2010, 2012; Smith, 2008; Wessels, 1999). Research on EP lobbying has mainly 
examined whether interest groups target legislative friend, fence-sitters and/or 
foes (Crombez, 2002; Marshall, 2010), and to whom MEPs give access (Bouwen, 
2004b; Kohler-Koch, 1998; Smith, 2008). Scholars have not studied interest 
group influence in the EP. My study therefore fills this gap by addressing the 
question of interest group influence in the case of the EP.  
Fourthly, much of the existing research on the EP focuses solely on 
outcomes to the detriment of processes, such as studies on MEPs’ legislative 
behaviour during roll call votes (see, for example, Hix, et al., 2007; Hix, et al., 
2009; McElroy, 2006; Yordanova, 2011). This has left us with a limited 
understanding of policy deliberations which take place before a dossier is voted 
upon at plenary and interest groups’ influence on MEPs' preference formation 
(Ringe, 2010, pp. 1-5). However, the nature of influence in the EP involves much 
more than final roll call votes. Influence can be exerted throughout the EP’s 
legislative process through the inclusion or exclusion of amendments in the 
report of the responsible committee (Sorauf, 1992, p. 168).   
Lastly and more generally, my research provides important insights for the 
EU legislative politics literature (such as Thomson, 2011; Tsebelis & Garrett, 
2000) and for debates on the democratic legitimacy of the EU (such as Follesdal 
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& Hix, 2006; Majone, 2000; Moravcsik, 2002; Rittberger, 2005). Most studies 
on EU legislative politics seek to explain EU policy outcomes with reference to 
the bargaining between the EU institutions, while disregarding the role interest 
groups play in shaping these preferences (Crombez, 2002;  Thomson & Hosli, 
2006; Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000). Understanding the influence of interest groups 
on decision-making is important for understanding EU policy outcomes. 
Moreover, studies on interest group influence can cast light upon the democratic 
potential of interest group involvement in EU policy-making. If certain policies 
are frequently biased in favour of some interest groups to the disadvantage of 
others, the democratic legitimacy and accountability of the EU is severely 
weakened (Klüver, 2010, p. 3).  
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 1 sets up the theoretical 
framework by addressing the question of how interest group influence might 
vary across policy domains. The chapter discusses, in particular, the extent to 
which Wilson’s politics of policy typology, developed in an American 
congressional context, can be applied to the EP. This is done by discussing 
Wilson’s framework in the light of MEPs’ informational and legitimacy needs, 
and the type of information provided by different interest groups.  
Chapter 2 presents the research design of the thesis and develops an 
analytical framework for assessing interest group influence. I outline the 
rationale of case selection, the operationalization of Wilson’s framework, and 
the utility of using the method of process-tracing to answer my research 
question. It is important to point out that this thesis does not advocate a 
quantitative approach that would ‘measure’ interest group influence in a 
positivistic manner. Instead, I provide an assessment of interest group 
influence, based on a combination of different types of evidence used to indicate 
interest group influence.  
Chapters 3-6 constitute the empirical core of this thesis. Chapter 3 
examines the environmental case study – the vans regulation – and discusses 
whether the EP can still be regarded as an environmental champion, or if it 
simply reinforces the advantages of businesses (the automobile industry). The 
regulation represents a typical entrepreneurial politics case, in which the costs 
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are concentrated on the automobile industry and the benefits of cleaner air 
widely dispersed, increasing the risk of regulatory capture. The chapter shows 
that while the EP has in the past been seen as an environmental champion 
advocating the views of environmental groups, it now appears to be more of an 
environmental pragmatist. This has, in turn, reduced the privileged position 
once held by diffuse interests, and provided business groups with a more 
favourable EP arena in which they can advance their demands.   
Chapter 4 analyses the food labelling case – the regulation on food 
information to consumers - which contains a number of interesting policy issues 
engendering different types of politics. The case shows that one dossier can 
contain a large number of issues mobilising a large and diverse set of interest 
groups. While there were clear lobbying winners and losers on specific issues of 
the dossier amounting to business capture, the overall policy outcome largely 
reflects a compromise between opposing views. It is shown that interest group 
influence is dependent on the level of linkages between issues, the saliency of an 
issue, and the unity within a lobbying spectrum.  
Chapter 5 presents an employment case – the road transport working 
time directive – which constitutes a classic interest group politics case pitting 
special interests against special interests. The expectation from the interest 
group literature is to see compromises between opposing groups whenever both 
the costs and benefits of legislation are pinned to specific segments of society. 
However, compromises between opposing groups do not necessarily happen in 
the EP because employers' associations often find it difficult to have their voices 
heard in the EP whenever dossiers go to certain committees.  
Chapter 6 presents the last empirical case – the maternity leave 
directive – which, at first glance, appears to engender interest group 
competition (concentrated costs/concentrated benefits) but, on closer 
examination, represents an entrepreneurial politics case with concentrated cost/ 
dispersed benefits. Again the expectation from the literature is to see policy 
outcomes favouring the cost-bearers (in this case, employers' associations) to 
the detriment of diffuse interests (labour unions and women's rights 
organisations). The case shows that policy only shapes politics in the EP under 
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certain conditions as interest group influence is dependent on the unity within a 
lobbying spectrum and the EP committee in charge of a dossier.  
Building on the in-depth analysis of the four case studies, Chapter 7 
takes a broader view of the empirical studies and discusses the theoretical and 
empirical implications of the different case studies. I conclude that the 
distribution of costs and benefits arising from legislation only explains interest 
group influence under certain conditions. The extent to which interest groups 
manage to leave their fingerprints on EP reports is contingent upon both a 
number of actor-level and institutional level factors. 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Expectations about Interest Group Influence  
 
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework of the thesis by addressing the 
question of how interest group influence might vary across policy domains. The 
common assumption of business dominance in policymaking is challenged by 
literature examining variation across policy domains (i.e. Lowi, 1964; Wilson, 
1980). The basic tenet of this chapter is that, while business groups might 
dominate politics at a systemic level, variance in business influence exists across 
policy domains. Each policy domain deals with a distinct arena in which 
different interest groups mobilise in the policy process, and form different 
cleavages and coalitions (Pollack, 1994). The chapter focuses the lens on 
Wilson’s ‘policy defines politics’ framework, which forms the theoretical 
framework of the thesis. The chapter discusses, in particular, the extent to which 
Wilson’s framework, formulated in an American congressional context, can 
travel to the EP institutional context. This is done by linking Wilson’s framework 
with theoretical considerations of input/output legitimacy, the kind of 
information provided by different types of interest groups, and MEPs’ 
informational needs. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
examines common assumptions about interest group influence, and particularly 
draws attention to the importance of studying interest group influence across 
different policy domains. The second section discusses how well Wilson’s 
politics of policy framework might apply to the EP by looking at the 
distinctiveness of EU policies, European interest groups, and the EP. The last 
section discusses how the EP’s internal organisation influences where and how 
lobbying takes place.  
 
1.1 Common assumptions in the interest group literature 
 
One of the most widely accepted theoretical assumptions of public policy is that 
business groups carry more weight in decision-making than diffuse interests 
(such as consumer groups, human rights groups, and environmentalists). 
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Business interests are assumed to dominate policy-making at the expense of 
diffuse interests because they are better organised, hold technical information of 
great relevance to policy-makers, and play a key role in the economy in terms of 
employment and economic growth (see for instance, Baumgartner & Leech, 
1998; Olson, 1965; Salisbury, 1984; Schattscneider, 1960). 
Firstly, small groups with a concentrated stake in an issue are able to 
mobilise more easily than diffuse interests. Faced with the Olsonian collective 
action dilemma, the interest of the broader public often remains unorganised as 
there are no rewards associated with active group participation. Without 
selective incentives - benefits that contributors and only contributors enjoy - 
individuals are tempted to free-ride on the efforts of others. Diffuse interests can 
neither prevent nor punish free-riders from enjoying group benefits should they 
come to fruition. The diffuse group identity of large groups means that it is 
difficult for contributors to identify free-rider and, therefore, diffuse interests 
often struggle to mobilise at all and remain latent. In contrast, small 
concentrated groups find it easier to mobilise their members because individual 
participation is directly linked to potential benefits received. Moreover, smaller 
groups allow for identification and sanctioning of free-riders (Olson, 1965; 
Schattschneider, 1960; Shepsle, 2010).  
Secondly, business groups possess technological knowledge (such as 
expert knowledge about markets) and superior resources, which diffuse interests 
often find difficult to match (Kerwin, 2003: 183). Business groups are in a 
dominant position when it comes to defining what is seen as technologically 
feasible, and in shaping the perception of economic costs of process and product 
change. Legislation is often highly complex and decision-makers rely on the 
expertise of business groups to understand the technical nature of policy 
problems, as well as the likely consequences and effects of the different policy 
options being discussed (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 74). As a result, business 
groups supply policy-relevant information that decision-makers need in order to 
make effective policy decisions. The informational superiority of business 
groups is a key source of political influence (Broscheid & Coen, 2007, p.348). 
The asymmetry in resources between business groups and diffuse interests 
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increases the risk of regulatory capture in which the policy outcomes are biased 
towards the preferences of the regulated industry (Bernstein, 1955; Stigler, 
1971). At worst, business dominance in policymaking may lead to situations 
where ‘regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated 
primarily for its benefit’ (Stigler, 1971, p.3). 
Lastly, business groups hold a position of structural power because their 
investment decisions play a vital role for the performance of the economy. This 
view was put forward in particular by Charles Lindblom in Politics and Markets 
(1977), in which he argues that business interests occupy a privileged position in 
capitalist democracies because their investment decisions are of key importance 
to public welfare. Policymakers are frequently pressured to defer to the 
preferences of large corporations because of their threat of exit and threat to 
withhold additional investment unless their demands are met. However, 
Lindblom’s structural power concept did not go without criticism. Quite to the 
contrary, his notion of structural power held by large corporations set in motion 
an avalanche of criticism from the academic community, most notably from 
David Vogel (1987) and most recently from Hacker and Pierson (2010) and 
Culpepper (2011). Lindblom’s critics took issue with him for only addressing 
why business wins, but failing to explain why, if business is so influential, it still 
loses so many legislative battles (Wilson 1980; Vogel, 1987). While scholars 
disagree on the degree to which business dominates politics, they do agree that 
business carries significant weight in decision-making owing to its comparative 
advantage regarding mobilisation, expertise, financial resources, and economic 
clout (Yackee & Yackee, 2006).  
 
1.1.1 The EU as an élite pluralist system 
 
Similar to business dominance accounts, EU scholars have characterised the 
EU’s interest group system as élite pluralist, in which an elite trust-based 
relationship between insider groups and EU officials has developed (Coen, 
2009, p. 152). The élite pluralist concept is heavily weighted towards the 
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European Commission, where business groups (large firms and European 
business federations) are found to have invariably better access to the 
Commission’s consultative committees than diffuse interests and national 
associations (see for instance Brosheid & Coen, 2007; Coen, 1997a, 1997b, 1998; 
Eising, 2007). Insider status is granted to business groups who have developed 
pan-European credentials and established a political reputation as a provider of 
credible information (Coen, 1997; Eising, 2007). Elite pluralism entails access to 
European Commission forums and committees being limited to a few interest 
groups, ‘for whom membership is competitive and strategically advisable, but 
not compulsory or enforceable’ (Coen, 1997b, p. 20). The emergence of élite 
pluralism needs to be seen in tandem with the mushrooming of interest groups 
in Brussels since the late 1990s and the resultant lobbying overload. This has 
allowed the European Commission to be more selective in according access to 
interest groups (Coen, 2009, pp. 151-2).  
Although most EU scholars use élite pluralism as a label to refer to the 
insider status of large firms and European business federations in the European 
Commission’s forums and committees, the label can also be applied to diffuse 
interests. The European Commission actively funds diffuse interests and sets up 
forums that provide diffuse interests with access to the EU policy process. In 
order to qualify for funding, applicant organisations are required to be operating 
at a European level either alone or in the form of several coordinated 
associations with a membership base including, as a minimum, three EU 
member states, and activities should mainly be at a European, rather than at an 
international, level (European Commission, 2011a). These requirements have in 
effect created insider and outsider groups both among and between diffuse 
interests and businesses (Hix & Høyland, 2011 p. 173). Among diffuse interests, 
only groups fulfilling the European Commission’s criteria are given funding and 
access to the Commission’s consultative committees, which puts national diffuse 
interests at a disadvantage, particularly those who are not members of European 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Likewise, business groups with a pan-
European perspective are favoured over businesses without a European outlook. 
Between business and diffuse interests, business groups with European 
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credentials generally enjoy better access to the European Commission than 
European NGOs.  
The emergence of élite pluralism in the EU sits well with the interest 
group literature’s general assumption of business dominance in policymaking. 
However, the assumption of business dominance needs to be qualified in three 
regards. Firstly, not all business groups enjoy privileged access to the European 
Commission. Only business groups who fit the Commission’s access criteria (the 
development of a positive reputation and pan-European credentials) are 
perceived as important policy players (Coen, 2009, p.151). Secondly, the EP is 
often portrayed ‘as a champion of the environment, consumers, women, and 
other diffuse but electorally popular causes’ (Pollack, 1997, p. 581), and ‘an ally 
for groups having no other access to the decision-making process of the EU’ 
(Kohler-Koch, 1998, p. 6). The reputation of representing diffuse interest goes 
against the common assumption in the interest group literature of business 
dominance. Lastly, while the EU’s interest intermediation system might be 
characterised overall as élite pluralist, variation is likely to exist at the sub-
system level (Coen & Katsaitis, 2013). Lowi (1964; 1972) and Wilson (1974, 
1995) in particular have argued that not all types of regulations are prone to 
capture as different types of policies produce different patterns of politics. ‘Each 
[policy] arena tends to develop its own characteristic political structure, political 
process, elites, and group relations’ (Lowi, 1964, pp.689-90). The likelihood that 
regulation reflects business dominance - and at worst regulatory capture - is 
expected to vary across policy domains.  
The preponderance of business interests in the policy process is assumed 
to be most prevalent when the benefits arising from legislation are concentrated 
on a small group and when the costs are widely dispersed, leading to what 
James Q. Wilson calls ‘client politics’ (Wilson, 1974, 1995). Middle-range 
theories (such as Lowi’s and Wilson’s policy typologies) emphasise that there 
may not be only one policymaking process at play, but instead ‘numerous 
relatively narrow and self-contained policymaking systems with distinct actors, 
issues, and processes’ (Freeman, 1985, p. 483). Policies are affected by the kind 
of interest group coalitions that oppose and support a proposal and different 
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coalitions may form on different issues. As Wilson maintains, 'on any given 
issue, one or another interest group might be powerful, but no group is powerful 
across all issues' (Wilson et al., 2012, p.333). Drawing on Wilson’s politics of 
policy typology, the following section highlights the importance of studying 
interest group influence from a subsystem politics perspective.  
 
1.1.2 Policy determines politics 
 
The question of ‘who gets what and how’ is decisive in shaping the reactions of 
interest groups to a given policy. As Lowi (1964) and Wilson (1974) argue, the 
type of policy shapes the policy arena and the actors who mobilise to mould 
legislation. Political action is easier to stimulate when the benefits to be 
maintained or the costs to be avoided are concentrated on a particular group. It 
is generally maintained that, ‘since people are more sensitive to losses than 
gains, losers are more likely to mobilize politically than winners’ (Daugbjerg & 
Svendesen, 2001, p. 134). In the EU, the type of policy also influences the choice 
of decision-making rules and the relative power between the EU institutions 
(Wallace, Pollack, & Young, 2010, p. 50).  
One attempt to develop a causal link between the nature of public policy 
and the particular patterns of political conflict associated with them is that of 
Lowi (1964).3 His argument is that different types of policies impose different 
kinds of constraint on decision-makers and mobilise different sorts of interest 
groups, which then results in different patterns of politics (Lowi, 1964, p. 482). 
Lowi distinguished between three main types of policies (distributive, 
regulatory, and redistributive) each of which is characterised by different types 
of politics. In later publications, Lowi added 'constituent policy' to his typology, 
referring to procedural decision-making rules and the constitutional legal order 
of a political system, such as reappointments or setting up a new agency (Lowi 
1972). In distributive policies (such as the common agricultural policy), the 
                                                 
3
 The idea that the attributes of policies shape the nature of (government) decision-making is not 
entirely new as Schattschneider first suggested this in Politics, Pressure with Tariff 
(Schattschneider, 1935). 
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benefits of legislation are concentrated on a specific group while the costs are 
widely spread. In such a scenario, diffuse interests tend to succumb to interests 
facing the prospect of gaining concentrated benefits. Distributive politics is 
associated with iron triangles, clientalism, pork-barrel spending, and logrolling 
between politicians representing different constituencies. Distributive policies 
are usually discussed and adopted with little political conflict because 
beneficiaries face limited (if any) organised opponents seeking to stop spending. 
In his book The End of Liberalism (1979), Lowi finds distributive politics 
particularly problematic in a democracy because decision-makers are more 
interested in pandering to specific interests than in acting in the public interest.  
Lowi describes critically American politics as 'interest group liberalism' – a 
system constructed to distribute benefits to many specific groups, while 
disregarding the trade-offs inherent in the distribution of benefits (Birkland, 
2011, p. 212).  
Regulatory policies are usually intended to govern the conduct of 
business, and these policies bring winners and losers into direct confrontation. 
Ripley and Franklin updated Lowi's typology in 1991 by dividing regulatory 
policies into two categories: protective regulatory and competitive regulatory 
policies. Protective regulatory policies refer to policies that aim to protect the 
public from negative side-effects of private activity, such as air pollution, unsafe 
consumer products, and contaminated food. Competitive regulatory policies 
refer to policies that restrict the provision of goods and services to one or a few 
providers, such as television franchising and licensing. Lastly, redistributive 
policies (such as progressive taxation, labour market policies, and civil rights for 
racial and social minorities) involve the transfer of resources from one group to 
another and are often highly controversial. Redistributive policies are often 
difficult to pass because of significant polarisation between winners and losers 
as a result of redistributive policies’ unequal allocation of costs and benefits.  
The value of Lowi's typology is that it enables us to better foresee the 
sorts of policy conflict that is likely to precede a policy’s enactment. The 
prominence of Lowi's typology is to be understood in light of the time in which it 
was formulated. At this time political science was highly influenced by Easton's 
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(1965) model of a political system, in which the policy-making process was 
black-boxed between input (demands and support from citizens) and output 
(adopted policies). Policy processes were largely unanalysed; Lowi's focus on 
how policies, not institutions, shape politics was therefore a significant 
departure from political science thinking at the time.  
Despite its prominence, Lowi’s policy categorisation has been widely 
criticised for the difficulty of assigning policies to just one category. Most policy 
domains have both redistributive and regulatory features (Freeman, 1985). For 
example, regulation of consumer product safety that redistributes the 
responsibility for risk from the consumer to the manufacturer can be regarded 
as both a regulatory and a redistributive policy depending on how one looks at it 
(Birkland, 2011, p. 215). As a response, Wilson (1974) has developed a more 
nuanced typology that rejects ambiguous policy types based on the distribution 
of anticipated costs and benefits. As Wilson argues 'the costs and benefits may 
be monetary and nonmonetary, and the value assigned to them, as well as the 
beliefs about the likelihood of their materialisation can change' (1980, p.366). 
By focusing on both monetary and nonmonetary costs and benefits, Wilson 
expands Olson's conception of selective incentives to not only include material 
payoffs, but also non-material payoffs, such as respect and honour, the personal 
feeling of doing ‘the right thing’, and the communal gratification of doing things 
together.  
 In spite of Wilson’s critique of Lowi’s typology, he builds on Lowi's basic 
idea that the type of policy studied tells us something important about the 
politics associated with it. There are some similarities between Wilson’s and 
Lowi’s typologies. For example, Wilson’s client politics is closely associated with 
Lowi’s distributive policy type, in which a well-delineated segment of society 
may gain benefits at the expense of general tax-payers. The novelty of Wilson's 
typology is that he classifies policies in terms of the distribution of their costs 
and benefits. Wilson argues that legislators and officials can be confronted with 
four kinds of political environments, each of which results in different 
politicking through which policy outcomes are agreed (Permanand, 2006, p. 
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84). As illustrated in table 1, Wilson calls these four environments: client, 
majoritarian, interest group, and entrepreneurial politics. 
 
Table 1.1: Costs, Benefits, and Group Mobilisation 
Costs and Benefits Mobilization 
Concentrated benefits/ 
diffuse costs 
  
Client politics: close clientele relations between 
decision-makers, regulators, and the regulated 
industry are likely to occur. Interest groups with a 
concentrated stake in an issue are expected to 
prevail over diffuse interests. 
 
Diffuse benefits/ 
diffuse costs 
Majoritarian politics: interest group influence is 
expected to be minor. 
 
Concentrated benefits/ 
concentrated costs 
 
Interest group conflict: at least two opposing 
interests are expected to clash, limiting the 
influence of any individual groups. 
 
Diffuse benefits/ 
concentrated costs 
 
Entrepreneurial politics: mobilisation of cost 
bearers and loose temporary coalition of advocates 
for benefits, likelihood of legislature activism and 
scope for policy entrepreneurship. 
 
Source: Derived from Wilson (1974, pp. 332-337). 
 
Client politics engender concentrated benefits for a small well-defined group of 
society (for example an industry), while the costs are borne by a large number of 
people (for example tax-payers). Because the recipients’ benefits are large, they 
have great incentives to organise and press the enactment of a proposal. 
Subsidies paid to farmers, tax shelters, and regulations restricting the import of 
foreign goods are classic examples of client politics. The EU’s expenditure 
policies, such as the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), Cohesion Policy 
spending, and spending on investment in scientific research and development, 
are clear examples of what Wilson calls client politics (equivalent to Lowi’s 
distributive policy category). Beneficiaries from the EU expenditure - such as 
farmers, depressed regions, and researchers - constitute well-delineated 
constituencies reaping significant economic benefits from these policies. On the 
other hand, taxpayers who indirectly pay into the EU budget represent a diffuse 
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group. Client politics are often associated with quiet lobbying, quick passage of 
regulation with limited (if any) public discussion, and close clientele relations 
between regulators and the regulated industry (Wilson, 1980, p. 369). Client 
politics might look like a powerful force, but occasionally it does get changed 
when people find that a certain product is unwanted or deem beneficiaries of a 
certain policy illegitimate (Wilson et al., 2012, pp. 360-1). Recent examples 
include the phasing out of subsidies to tobacco farms in the US and the EU. The 
support for tobacco farm subsidies began to crumble with the increased 
awareness of the health risks associated with smoking. This made it easier for 
health groups to organise and get support for their lobbying cause because 
people were no longer insouciant about subsidies to tobacco farmers (Wilson et 
al, 2012, p. 330). However, in the absence of public interests or 'watch-dog' 
organisations, client politics produce politics that are most prone to capture 
(Stigler, 1971; Wilson, 1980).   
In majoritarian politics, both costs and benefits of a regulation are 
dispersed; the chances of reaching a policy outcome are slim because no-one has 
the incentive to push for its realisation. A policy resolution will only take place 
when there is sufficient political and popular support. Lobbying is expected to be 
marginal because no small definable segment of society (such as a specific 
industry, locality, and occupation) reaps the benefits or shoulders the costs. 
Wilson mentions the example of the US congressional discussions on whether or 
not to maintain a large standing army just before and after the Second World 
War (Wilson, 1980, p. 367). When on the brink of a war, interest groups are not 
crucial for support; what matters are public sentiments and political ideology 
(Wilson, 2012, p. 329). Other examples of majoritarian politics include social 
security, Medicare, abortion issues, and civil rights acts.  
Interest group politics occur when both costs and benefits are narrowly 
concentrated. Interest group conflict becomes prominent because the benefits of 
regulation flow to a relatively small number of interests and are paid for by a 
small segment of society. In interest group politics at least two rival groups are 
expected to clash, limiting the influence of individual groups. Both the likely 
beneficiaries and the likely cost-payers have strong incentives to press their 
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demands due to the significant costs or benefits at stake. Not only are rival 
groups’ lobbying efforts likely to counter each other, but politicians will also be 
inclined to seek compromises between opposing groups. Typical examples of 
interest group politics include the conflict between management and labour, 
wholesalers and retailers, and companies providing similar services (such as the 
fight between cable and phone companies to connect home computers to the 
internet). 
Entrepreneurial politics pit the general public against special interests by 
distributing benefits widely, while more narrowly concentrating the costs, such 
as health and environmental policies. In this situation, opponents have strong 
incentives to block the regulation, while beneficiaries have few incentives to 
press for its enactments. As Wallace summarises, ‘policy will be blocked by the 
vested interests that benefit from status quo, unless a policy entrepreneur can 
mobilise latent public support for a policy change’ (2010, p. 51). Wilson argues 
that policy entrepreneurs ‘can mobilize public sentiment (by revealing a scandal 
or capitalizing on a crisis), put the opponents of the plan publicly on the 
defensive (by accusing them of deforming babies or killing motorists), and 
associate the legislation with widely shared values (clean air, pure water, health, 
and safety)’ (1980, p. 370). In such cases, the policy entrepreneur acts as a 
vicarious conduit for immobilised diffuse interests. Sometimes the advent of a 
focusing event (i.e. a sudden event that sparks intense media and public 
attention in a certain issue) can create a broad upsurge in the public’s interest in 
a previously ignored issue and make it politically salient - a phenomenon 
referred to as ‘policy intrusion’ (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). Focusing events 
are likely to open a policy window for policy entrepreneurs and mobilise 
sufficient public and political support for a policy change (Kingdon, 1984; 
Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).  
The role of focusing events in fostering policy change is also considered by 
more recent interest group scholars, such as Culpepper (2008) and Michalowitz 
(2007). They find that public support for a policy change that goes against the 
regulated industry is easier to mobilise when issues are highly salient. If a policy 
issue is highly salient, many interest groups will try to shift a policy outcome 
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towards their ideal point and politicians may be tempted to be seduced by the 
media. For instance, a scandal that will evoke antibusiness sentiments (such as 
the British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexican) or increased media 
attention of an issue may be enough to set the cat among the pigeons and turn 
an issue into a moralistic crusade. In this situation, politicians may seek to build 
a reputation for being a tribune for the people and try to ward off the pressures 
of the cost-bearing industry. However, as argued by both Bernstein (1955)  and 
Wilson (1995) such situations are often short-lived as decision-makers may find 
themselves facing an environment where much of the technical information they 
need is in the hands of an interest opposed to its goals. The influence of diffuse 
interests is, therefore, expected to be momentary, facilitated by the media, and 
involving entrepreneurs (politicians or bureaucrats), who only temporarily 
identify with and surf on the public wave. But when the wave hits the coast, only 
ripples remain in the water. Public interest fades and special interests recapture 
politics as politicians are tempted to dance to the tune of the regulated industry 
in the long run (Kingdon, 1984). Thus, business influence is likely to vary 
according to the levels of salience and technicality of an issue. Similarly, 
Culpepper (2008) argues that: 
 
Certain policy areas are of great interests to firms and their 
managers, but of relatively less interest to the electorate at large. 
Such issues are of low political salience – most people do not care 
about them, most of the time […] High salience issues, such as 
redistribution through the tax system, do matter to most people most 
of the time; elections are fought on such high salience issues 
(Culpepper, 2008, p. 7).  
 
The quote above highlights an important premise in Wilson’s typology, namely 
that interests carrying concentrated costs or reaping concentrated benefits are 
particularly likely to ‘win’ on low salience and highly technical issues. When 
issues have little political salience, decision-makers have ‘little to gain and much 
to lose by opposing business interest’ (Culpepper, 2008, p. 7). Business groups 
with concentrated interests in an issue are particularly likely to be influential on 
low salience issues, or what Culpepper calls ‘quiet politics’. This is not to say, 
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however, that business groups are never influential on highly salient issues. Just 
as national armies use different tactics when engaged in inter-state warfare 
compared with guerrilla warfare, business groups are expected to use different 
strategies when faced with low versus high salience issues. Lobbying battles 
fought on highly salient issues are difficult to win without forging broader 
alliances with other interest groups and framing issues in ways that appeal to 
the broader public. Failure to do so is one of the reasons why business groups 
are less influential under conditions of high salience compared with low salience 
conflicts (Smith, 2000). When faced with battles that business groups have little 
chance of winning, they may be better off conserving their resources, or shifting 
venue from formal (politically elected) to informal institutions (such as 
bureaucracies), where attention and lobbying may be less intense. For instance, 
Culpepper argues that business groups' ability to exert disproportionate 
influence increases if they can ‘ride out the storm of public attention and shift to 
a technical battle over bureaucratic regulations that is uninteresting to 
newspaper readers’ (2011, p. 190). Likewise, interest groups will seek to increase 
the attention given to an issue if they think the populace will be on their side 
(Kollman, 1998).   
Crises or increased salience do not, however, always precede policy acts that 
confer significant costs on a specific industry. Wilson (1980) gives the examples 
of the US’s environmental protection laws and occupational safety and health 
acts, in which no major crisis or increased public attention to these issues 
precipitated the adoption of these acts. Instead, these policies were driven 
forward through spill-over effects of existing regulatory policies, that is to say, 
one regulatory policy prepared the way for the passage of another policy 
(Wilson, 1980). This is particularly likely in the EU, where the process of 
positive spill-over effects, which are inherent in the single market, mean that 
integration in one area (such as Schengen with its abolition of internal market) 
creates strong incentives for integration in related areas (such as Frontex, a 
common external border control). Furthermore, entrepreneurial politics often 
depend heavily on the position of third parties given that the reaction of the 
regulated industry will most certainly be unfavourable to the entrepreneur's 
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view. Third actors include various political elites – influential journalists and 
academics, civil servants, and political protesters – unaffected by the policy that 
the entrepreneur is advocating (Wilson, 1980, p. 371).  
To sum up in Wilson's own words, 'the politics of regulation follows different 
patterns, mobilizes different actors, and has different consequences depending, 
among other things, on the perceived distribution of costs and benefits of the 
proposed policy’ (Wilson, 1980, pp. 371-2). The value of Wilson’s typology is not 
in the labels of the different categories. Instead, Wilson argues that we should 
see the distribution of costs and benefits as tendencies or as ends of two 
continua rather than two dichotomies, resulting in a four-fold typology since 
there might be in-between cases (Birkland, 2011, p. 217). Although not all 
policies fit perfectly into well-delineated categories, Wilson's framework 
provides a helpful way of thinking about the underlying politics of policies with 
different cost-benefit allocations. 
It is important to note that the distribution of costs and benefits ‘may be as 
much a social construction as the result of a real calculation of costs and 
benefits’ (Birkland, 2011, p. 218). Benefits or costs do not have to be real to 
stimulate political action; the mere perception of costs is enough to engender 
lobbying activity. If the distribution of costs and benefits are so prone to 
perception, then what is the value of dividing policies into different categories? 
The answer can be found in an article by Lowi in which he argues that ‘it is not 
the actual outcomes but the expectations as to what the outcomes can be that 
shape the issues and determine politics’ (1964, p. 707). Thus, the distribution of 
costs and benefits arising from policies may only gain meaning when groups 
give them meanings and act upon their perceptions (Birkland, 2011, p. 218). 
Perceptions of costs and benefits arising from policies are of key relevance for 
the policy process and outcomes. Strategic policy actors - interest groups, 
politicians, bureaucrats, etc. - may increase their chances of shaping the policy 
process and outcome directly by influencing the way in which policies are 
framed; a point also emphasised by Baumgartner (see for instance, Baumgartner 
& Mahoney, 2008; Rose & Baumgartner, 2013).   
 Furthermore, lobbying is not necessarily to be seen as an individual 
23 
 
endeavour, but rather as a collective enterprise including multiple interest 
groups lobbying at the same time to push a policy outcome towards their 
preferred position. Interest groups are often part of a lobbying camp defined as 
‘a set of actors who share the same policy goal’ (Baumgartner et al. 2009b, p. 6). 
As argued by Klüver, ‘lobbying as a collective enterprise does not require formal 
co-ordination and co-operation between different interest group’ (2012a, p. 7). 
As long as interest groups pursue the same objective, they can be seen as a 
lobbying team.  
The analytical value of Wilson’s politics of policy typology is two-fold. 
Firstly, it draws attention to the way in which the nature of political conflicts 
varies considerably across policy domains. No interest group is expected to 
dominate across all policy areas; the incentives to mobilise and the likelihood of 
winning on particular issues depend on how the costs and benefits of legislation 
are distributed. Secondly, Wilson’s typology incorporates (and in some 
circumstances, develops further)4 many of the factors mentioned in the interest 
group literature as being important for lobbying success, such as the role of 
collective action (Olson, 1965), framing/issue relabeling (Baumgartner et. al 
2009), and issue salience (Downs, 1972; Culpepper, 2008, 2011). What is 
needed now is a discussion of how well Wilson's typology, developed in an 
American congressional context, travels across the pond to the EP. This is 
important because policies cannot be properly understood without also 
attending to the institutional arena in which they are played out and the actor 
constellation to which they are related. The following section discusses Wilson's 
typology in light of the distinctiveness of EU policies, the concepts of resource-
dependency and the exchange models used by EU interest group scholars, and 
the institutional dimension of EP legislative politics.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 One example is Wilson’s expansion Olson's notion of selective incentives to cover not only 
monetary factors but also nonmonetary factors. 
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1.2  Wilson’s policy of politics framework applied to the EP 
 
Lobbying does not take place in an institutional vacuum since the EP as a polity 
may privilege some groups over others, regardless of the policy issue at hand. 
Given that Wilson's framework is formulated in an American context, to what 
extent might it tell us something about interest group influence in the EU? Even 
though the EP’s functions are not (yet) as developed as the US Congress, the EP 
is more similar to the US Congress than to any European national parliaments.  
The US House of Representatives bears many similarities with the EP both in 
terms of its composition, functions, and strong committee system. While the EP 
has many similarities with the House of Representatives in the US – from which 
Wilson's typology derives – key differences persist, most notably that: 
 
 The EU is a functionally restricted polity mainly engaged in economic 
integration with limited responsibility for taxation and social distribution, 
limiting the types of policy conflicts to mainly regulatory and distributive 
policies (Pollack, 1994; Reh, 2012). Furthermore, the EP cannot formally 
initiate legislation.  
 The Olsonian collective action dilemma is less severe in the EU because 
the European Commission has deliberately set up and provided funding 
for a number of societal and environmental groups to ensure balanced 
interest group representation (Greenwood, 2007). 
 The EP lacks a clear electoral connection and MEPs are not dependent of 
corporate funding for their (re-)election. The main currency of lobbying 
in the EU is information rather than campaign contribution or political 
patronage (Broscheid & Coen, 2002: 170). 
 
The above three examples of differences between the US and the EU highlight 
the importance of viewing Wilson's typology in light of the nature of EU policies, 
the nature of EU interest groups and their capacity to provide information, and 
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the EP as a distinct lobbying venue. These features will be considered in what 
follows.  
 
1.2.1 The nature of EU policies 
 
The EU is a functionally restricted polity mainly engaged in economic 
integration with only limited responsibility for taxation and social 
redistribution. The EU is often referred to as a ‘regulatory state’ because EU 
policy-making mainly proceeds through the means of regulation (Majone, 1994). 
The idea of the regulatory state implies a focus on liberalisation and the 
privatisation of public services (negative integration), and the up-scaling of 
previously held national competences to the EU-level (positive integration) 
(Lodge, 2008). The EU regulatory regime has both deregulatory and re-
regulatory elements. EU deregulation consists of four components: the single 
market programme, the common competition policy, services integration, and 
the open method of coordination. It is based on the principle of mutual 
recognition (in line with the European Court of Justice’s 1979 Cassis de Dijon 
ruling) and the removal of barriers to market access. National governments are 
prohibited from using trade barriers, state aid, or special operating licences to 
protect their national industries from competition from industries of other EU 
countries (Hix & Høyland, 2011, p. 216). The deregulation of markets has been 
complemented with the re-regulation of product and process standards at the 
EU level, aimed at replacing national rules with common EU rules and 
alleviating the negative side-effects arising from an imperfect market (such as 
pollution and social dumping). Product standards include technical 
requirements for product design or performance prescriptions for manufactured 
goods. Process standards concern the production process in which goods and 
services are made. The EU has been more successful at adopting legislation on 
products standards than process standards. The main reason for this is that 
countries with higher process standards (such as Scandinavian countries) prefer 
to retain their high social standards rather than settling on common EU 
minimum standards. Contrary to this, poorer EU countries (such as in Southern 
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and Eastern Europe) with lower process standards are afraid that common EU 
social standards would make them worse off competitively. Harmonised product 
standards, on the other hand, benefit all member states as transnational firms 
have much to gain from access to a larger market (Hix & Høyland, 2011, pp. 
208-217).  
Initially, EU regulatory policies were intended to complement the 
redistributive policies of its member states. Conflicts concerning redistribution 
were originally confined to the nation state, whereas the EU was seen as a polity 
engaged with efficiency-enhancing market regulation. Although the EU’s 
efficiency-enhancing regulations may have indirect re-distributive knock-on 
effects at the national level, EU regulation was justified with reference to 
positive-sum games and the correction of market failures (Majone, 1994; 
Scharpf, 2002). Today, the nature of EU policies has changed and the EU’s 
regulatory space has expanded significantly. EU regulation is no longer only 
about regulating the conduct of business in the market, but also about welfare 
provisions and, since the creation of the European Monetary Union about 
creating rules that regulate member states’ budgetary policies (Schelkle, 2008). 
The coordination of member states’ fiscal and tax policies questions the 
continued relevance of Majone’s notion of the EU as purely a regulatory state. 
The EU regulatory space has expanded from purely market-enhancing policies 
aimed at efficiency to resource allocation. The EU’s blend of de- and re-
regulation has not resulted in pareto-efficient outcomes as assumed by Majone 
(1994), as EU policies do have distributive effects. The devil of EU legislation is 
in the detail and even small technical changes can have significant distributional 
consequences. EU legislation is about competing values and, albeit small, its 
policies do lead to what Easton (1965) calls a (re)allocation of values that benefit 
some interests over others. However, while EU legislation might ‘give some 
persons access to values and deny them to others’ (Easton, 1965, p. 50), it rarely 
results in big winners and losers.  
The EU’s multiple checks-and-balances and the need for compromises 
between a large number of interests means that EU policy outcomes are seldom 
a zero-sum game. In terms of lobbying, researchers agree that the consensus 
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culture of EU decision making suggests that in ‘Brussels, you must speak softly, 
softly’ (Gardner, 1991, p. 63), and not take up the defensive ‘gangster style’ of 
American lobbyists (Woll, 2012, p. 204). Lobbying is not so much about 
defeating proposals, but about modifying what has been proposed (Thomas & 
Hrebenar, 2009). Unlike the US, most EU legislative proposals are adopted, 
which means that interest groups’ chances of completely killing a proposal are 
slim. On an annual basis, only about 2o per cent of the European Commission’s 
proposals are withdrawn or rejected (Woll, 2012, p. 206). Contrast this with the 
US Congress, where a large number of legislative proposals are never adopted. 
Mahoney (2007) finds that only 306 legislative proposals out of a total of 2764 
suggested proposals were adopted in the US in 2004; a passage rate of 11 per 
cent. The large number of defeated proposals in the US Congress is partly due to 
its filibuster rule, which allows congressmen to delay proceedings by continuing 
debate on an issue. In the US Congress, a filibuster can be overcome if a bill gets 
60 votes in favour out of 100 to close a debate and move to voting on a bill. The 
EP does not have any formal filibustering rules, although the passage of a 
proposal can be delayed if an impact assessment is requested or a proposal is 
referred back to a committee for renewed scrutiny. Referral back to committee 
may be requested by a political group or at least 40 MEPs before the start of the 
plenary debate, before or during a vote (Rules of Procedure of the European 
Parliament, 2012, rule 175). A request to move a proposal back to committee 
needs a simple majority at plenary to be met. Furthermore, EU legislation is 
characterised by ex-post evaluation with the aim of continuously bringing 
existing legislation up to date by subjecting existing legislation to reviews every 
three to five years. This implies that: 
 
The bulk of lobbying is more akin to long drawn-out trench warfare 
than spectacular Pearl Harbour type. The contestants in the EU 
policy process are often like the troops in the First World War, they 
are fighting over a narrow strip of territory which has not great 
interest to mankind as a whole but about which they care very 
intensely (Richardson & Coen, 2009, p. 341). 
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The constant process of fine-tuning past EU legislation means that new lobbying 
winners and losers are constantly made. Interest groups cannot, however, rest 
on their laurels as wins and losses are only temporary until the next revision is 
due. The nature of EU legislation as often being a revision of existing legislation 
has two implications for lobbying. Firstly, interest groups are expected only to 
be able to change legislation on the margins rather than in the core in cases 
where a European Commission proposal is a revision of an existing piece of 
legislation. Contrary to this, completely new proposals leave broader scope for 
interest groups to influence the content of the legislation. Secondly, the constant 
revisions and updating of EU legislation implies that interest groups are 
engaged in reiterated games (as opposed to one-shot games), which encourage 
them to establish a positive and reliable reputation for securing long term gains. 
Interest groups have little incentive to ‘babble’ (situations where lobbyists 
present a biased view on issues), and a high incentive to establish a positive and 
credible reputation with EU decision-makers (Coen & Broscheid, 2007, p. 350).  
 
1.2.2 The nature of EU interest groups and their capacity to provide 
information 
 
In numerical terms, business associations and companies are more numerous in  
Brussels compared with diffuse interests. Despite the numerical strength of 
businesses in comparison with diffuse interests, member states’ diverse 
domestic regulatory systems mean that business groups often find themselves 
battling each other. Producers from different member states often compete with 
each other in the EU policy process due to different domestic regulatory rules 
and competitive advantages (Falkner, 2012). As seen in the previous section, the 
likelihood of conflict within the business sector and between member states is 
higher in areas that regulate manufacturing processes than product standards 
(Coen, 2009, p. 163). This highlights the importance of distinguishing between 
different types of regulations – product versus process standards – when 
assessing under what conditions business groups are particularly likely to exert 
influence over policy outcomes. 
29 
 
 Business groups’ ability to influence EU policy outcomes is expected to be 
constrained by internal business conflict and cumbersome internal decision-
making within European business associations. Contrast this to diffuse interests, 
who often stand more united because they are fighting for the same cause and 
share the same conviction. Diffuse interests’ ideological cohesiveness enables 
them to build large European networks representing a European view. In the 
environmental field, this is witnessed by the Green 10. The Green 10 is a loose, 
but coordinated, network of ten of the largest European green organisations and 
networks active at the EU level, which coordinate joint responses and 
recommendations to EU decision-makers (Green 10, 2011). Usually, the 
relationship among the Green 10 is more harmonious than European business 
federations as they have the advantage of being able to construct and maintain 
more easily broad cross-national coalitions.  
 Despite high ideological cohesiveness among diffuse interests and the 
EU’s funding of diffuse interests, they may still be at a disadvantage compared 
with business interests since diffuse interests often work on the ideas level and 
are less engaged in the specific technical details of policies. Some EU legislative 
proposals may be of such a technical nature that only very few interest groups 
are able to provide decision-makers with the detailed information they need 
regarding the state of the market and the likely effectiveness of a proposal. The 
level of technicality both influences decision-makers’ dependency on outside 
expert information, as well as the number of interest groups holding this 
information. Producers, directly affected by highly technical internal market 
legislation, often possess greater technical expertise compared with diffuse 
interests. Different types of interest groups are expected, therefore, to supply 
different types of information and use different types of tactics to convey their 
lobbying message. The existing interest group literature conceives of lobbying as 
an information exchange, in which access to decision-makers is a result of the 
informational needs of decision-makers and interest groups’ ability to meet these 
needs (Austen-Smith, 1993; Bouwen, 2002; Hall & Deardoff, 2006). In the 
words of Austen-Smith (1993, pp. 799-800): 
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Decision-makers are frequently choosing policies without complete 
information on their consequences, in which case, information 
becomes valuable, and those who possess it are accordingly in a 
position to influence policy.  
 
The access of interest groups to decision-makers can be seen as a demand and 
supply relationship: decision-makers demand information from interest groups 
and interest groups supply highly specialised outside expertise. On the supply-
side of lobbying, two dimensions can be distinguished: the type of information 
communicated to decision-makers, and the tactics used to get their message 
across (Chalmers, 2013, p. 40). Information type can be broadly divided into 
technical information/expert knowledge and politically salient information. The 
former is generally seen to include highly technical and scientifically-based 
information, whereas the latter refers to value-laden claims and information 
about public support (Chalmers, 2013; Mahoney, 2008). Tactics can be divided 
into outside and inside strategies, or what some researchers call voice and access 
strategies (see for instance Beyers, 2004). Outside tactics centre on using the 
media, arranging conferences, and mobilising citizen support through petitions 
or demonstrations. Inside tactics, on the other hand, involve old-fashioned shoe-
leather strategies like letter and email-contact supported by direct contact over 
the phone or face-to-face meetings (Chalmers, 2013, p. 40-43). Outside tactics 
are often regarded as inferior to inside tactics and less efficient (see for instance 
Eising, 2007). However, this view might be as much a reflection of how inside 
tactics are defined rather than an objective view of how things really are. Outside 
tactics are sometimes defined narrowly as protest politics involving disruptive 
tactics, although only very few groups use this type of protest politics. Other 
outside tactics (such as using the media) are used more by a wide range of 
interest groups (Beyers, 2004; Bindekrantz, 2005). Perhaps, as Baumgartner 
and Leech observe, 'the most effective groups may not be those that are the best 
at a given strategy but rather those that have the greatest repertory of strategies 
available to them (1998, p. 148). More importantly, not all issues lend 
themselves to outside lobbying tactics because some issues do not attract great 
31 
 
attention. It is difficult to impassion people about a new tax reform that is only 
going to affect very few companies (Wilson et al. 2012, p. 166). 
 Diffuse interests are generally seen to possess political information, but 
little (if any) technical and expert information (Eising, 2007; Michalowitz, 
2004). Dür and de Biévre (2007) paint a bleak picture when it comes to 
assessing diffuse interests' influence potential in Brussels. They consider diffuse 
interests to be at an informational disadvantage compared with businesses. Due 
to diffuse interests’ purported lack of technical information, they are 'compelled 
to constantly appeal to general principles like equity, social justice, and 
environmental protection', which are of little use for EU decision-makers (Dür & 
de Biévre, 2007, p.82). Diffuse interests are often assumed to be limited to the 
use of outside tactics, lurking around in the edges of the lobbying pitch (Gerber, 
1999). The strength of business lies in its expertise and privileged access to 
decision-makers. Business groups are typically experts in the areas in which they 
operate and decision-makers rely heavily on the information business can bring 
to the table. Therefore, business groups do not necessarily need to resort to 
outside lobbying tactics in order to catch the attention of decision-makers 
(Michalowitz, 2004).   
 It is, however, important to distinguish between different organisational 
forms of business groups. Business lobbying in Brussels takes various 
organisational forms, ranging from direct firm representation through to 
national business associations and to sectoral and general European business 
federations. European industry federations are often described as inherently 
weak due to their inability to reconcile divergent national interests and to arrive 
at anything but the lowest common denominator (Grant, 1993). Consequently, 
many European federations restructured their membership basis in the 1990s to 
allow for both membership of national associations and firms. The hope was to 
become more responsive to EU decision-makers’ informational needs by 
providing more technically sound information, which would represent the views 
of firms and national associations. The mixed membership structure of 
European business federations enabled firms to develop their pan-European 
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credentials and gain better access to the European Commission's committees 
and forums (Cohen 1999).  
 Direct membership of European business federations allows firms to 
monitor a greater number of issues, while at the same time focusing their 
lobbying efforts on issues most important to them. This is because they can 
leave less important issues to their European federation. However, as suggested 
by some scholars (such as Coen, 2011, pp. 161-3), the rationale behind 
companies’ decision to join European federations may be seen more as a way to 
avoid costs from non-membership rather than reaping significant benefits from 
membership . Key differences persist regarding the type of information provided 
by European trade associations and firms, with the latter holding more technical 
information than the former. Scholars have sometimes referred to trade 
association officials as '"industrial civil servants" who lack the expertise to 
inform policy formulation' (Greenwood & Webster 2000, p. 5). European trade 
associations' strength is that they have their finger on the pulse when it comes to 
identifying and communicating the majority view held by their members, i.e. the 
European encompassing interest (Bouwen, 2002, 2004).  
 To sum up, the ability of business groups to dominate the policy process 
is expected to differ across policy domains according to the distribution of costs 
and benefits arising from legislation as well as the type of information and 
legitimacy required by decision-makers. Issues requiring high levels of technical 
and scientific expertise generally require high levels of output legitimacy, 
whereas politically salient issues tend to require high levels of input legitimacy. 
For instance, I expect less business influence on policies that define process 
standards, which is often the case in policy areas characterised by what Wilson 
calls 'interest group politics'. This type of policy domain is likely to draw in a 
wider selection of societal actors and attract more media attention. Different 
types of interest groups are expected to have different levels of access to MEPs 
depending on the policy issue at hand, as well as the informational needs of 
decision-makers. The next subsection focuses on the type of information MEPs 
need in order to fulfil their legislative and representative roles.   
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1.2.3 The EP as a unique lobbying venue 
 
Lobbying in Brussels is often seen to be less aggressive and more consensus 
seeking than the case of Washington, primarily because EU officials and MEPs 
are not dependent on corporate funding for appointment and election. Some 
lobbyists have characterised the EU lobbying scene as ‘a harmonious village 
where everyone looks after one another’ (ALTER-EU, 2010, p. 30). Equating 
Brussels to a cosy and harmonious setting conceals the reality of EU public 
policy making. EU policy decisions have an important impact on the lives of its 
500 million citizens, and businesses mobilise significant resources to ensure a 
favourable regulatory environment for their products. Lobbying is an integral 
part of the EU's political system and a necessity for the functioning of its 
institutions. At their best, interest groups provide decision-makers with well-
researched information and technical guidance on proposed legislation, 
ensuring better informed and more legitimate policy outcomes. While 
theoretically consistent with the ideals of democracy, the influence of interest 
groups can lead, at worst, to political corruption and inequality of 
representation. This was highlighted recently in the EP in March 2011 when four 
MEPs were accused of agreeing to accept money from Sunday Times journalists 
posing as lobbyists, in return for watering down banking reform legislation 
(Insight reports, 2011, p. 20). Presenting themselves as banking lobbyists, the 
journalists contacted some 60 MEPs and attempted to bribe them with offers of 
cash in return for tabling amendments to draft EU legislation. While lobbying 
scandals are by no means a phenomenon solely confined to the EU, it does show 
that lobbying in Brussels is far removed from the image of a quaint harmonious 
village. Much of the lobbying activity taking place in Brussels is hidden from the 
public eye, and extends beyond pure information exchange. A lot of interaction 
between interest groups and MEPs/EP policy advisors occurs on an informal 
basis in more subtle ways, such as receptions, lobbying events and the frequent 
job exchanges between EP assistants and lobbyists – a phenomenon known as 
‘revolving doors’. Lobbying, therefore, raises questions of undue influence and 
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misuse of power, and of how EU decision-makers balance corporate against 
public interests (Nestle, 2007, p. 96). 
 
1.2.3.1 MEPs dependency on interest groups 
 
The challenge of balancing corporate interests against public interests is 
particularly acute in the EP, where no formal requirements are in place for 
MEPs’ consultation of affected interest groups. This stands in contrast to the 
European Commission's wide use of deck-stacking strategies (such as 
consultations and funding of diffuse interests), aimed at alleviating the 
information asymmetry existing between regulators and regulatees. Unlike the 
European Commission, the EP has no formalised deck-stacking strategies to 
ensure a degree of symmetry between competing interest groups. The EP’s 
consultation of stakeholders is not institutionalised as it is to some degree in the 
European Commission, with the social dialogue5 in employment affairs and its 
various committees and experts groups. As one lobbyist lamented: 
When it comes to stakeholder consultations, Parliament is in many 
ways the least democratic EU institution. MEPs can speak to whoever 
they want to talk to, and unlike the Commission, they don’t have an 
obligation to consult stakeholders widely.6 
The lack of mandatory consultations in the EP raises ‘questions about the role of 
rapporteurs and other key MEPs in gathering evidence and committees in 
holding formal or informal hearings’ (Tanaesescu, 2009, p. 48). As in any 
legislature and bureaucracy, a significant resource-dependency exists between 
interest groups and MEPs. MEPs have an extremely busy agenda and spend 
most of their time living out of a suitcase travelling to Strasbourg, Brussels, and 
                                                 
5The European Social Dialogue refers to consultations, negotiations and discussions between the 
European trade union and employers’ associations. It takes two main forms: a tripartite dialogue 
involving the public authorities, and a bipartite dialogue between the European employers and 
trade union organisations. The bi-partite dialogue takes place at cross-industry level and within 
sectoral dialogue committees. European social partners have the right to be consulted by the 
European Commission and may decide binding agreements.  
6 Interview, UEAPME, 15 March 2011 
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their national constituency. Much of the EP’s work involves highly technical 
issues, where expert knowledge is required. MEPs survive with few assistants 
and policy advisors, who are not necessarily experts on the dossier under 
consideration. Each MEP usually has two assistants, one intern, and two policy 
experts in their group secretariat from whom to seek advice. Political group 
policy advisors and committee administrators tend to be generalists within their 
area rather than specialists (Corbett, Jacobs, & Shackleton, 2007, p. 151). MEPs, 
MEP assistants, and EP advisors, therefore, have a strong appetite for 
information and support from interest groups. Rapporteurs and shadow 
rapporteurs rely heavily on interest groups to provide them with information 
and to translate complex and technical information into brief digestible notes 
(Earnshaw & Judge, 2006). The EP’s extensive workload gives room for 
lobbyists to influence MEPs, assistants, and policy advisors. As one policy 
advisor expressed it: 
 
We cannot do our work without the information from interest 
groups. They send us amendments and voting lists prior to the 
committee and plenary votes. Sometimes it is very tempting to copy 
and paste their amendments and voting lists. I mean we are all so 
busy in Parliament.7  
  
The indispensable relationship between interest groups and MEPs is also 
highlighted by Kohler-Koch (1998), who remarks that MEPs are particularly 
open to lobbying due to their information deficiencies and time constraints. 
Most MEPs, assistants, and parliamentary policy advisors cannot imagine doing 
their work without the information from interest groups. As one MEP explained: 
 
The EU legislation is so complicated and technical that I am hugely 
dependent upon interest groups to provide me with an assessment of 
the European Commission’s proposal. I cannot do my work without 
them….It is also my democratic duty, as a politician to consult the 
interest groups that are affected by our decisions.8  
 
                                                 
7 Interview, EP policy advisor, 1 September 2010 
8 Interview, MEP, April 2009 
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While the European Commission often spends three to four years preparing a 
proposal with advice from a large number of expert and high-level groups, a 
rapporteur in the EP only has a few months to prepare a report. Hence, 
committee rapporteurs are particularly prominent lobbying targets and often 
lean heavily on interest groups for information when writing reports. In the 
words of a BusinessEurope representative, ‘the Parliament’s lack of in-house 
expertise leaves a huge space for interest group influence’.9 The ‘huge space’ for 
interest group influence raises the question of what, when, and how interest 
groups are able to influence EP policy outcomes. The following two sections look 
at the nature of EP elections and party composition and the type of information 
required by MEPs. This will provide theoretical expectations for the nature of 
interest group influence in the EP.   
 
1.2.3.2 EP elections and party composition 
 
The conventional knowledge in the EU interest group literature is for diffuse 
interests to enjoy particularly easy access to the EP because they are assumed to 
hold information about public support and to be particularly helpful for re-
election (see for instance, Bouwen, 2002, 2004; Michalowitz, 2004). The 
rational choice assumption that MEPs are primarily driven by re-election 
incentives and wish to satisfy the demands of their constituency is, however, 
highly dubious. It is well known that MEPs are not held directly accountable to 
the public. EP elections are fought on national rather than European issues. 
They are often treated as midterm national beauty contests used as a stick with 
which to beat an incumbent government. The declining turn-out to EP elections, 
as well as the protest votes against parties in government (voters often vote for 
parties in opposition or periphery parties), suggest that Reif and Schmitt’s 
depiction of the 1979 EP elections as ‘second-order elections’ is as true today as 
it was during the first parliament elections (Reif and Schmit,t 1980). The EP ‘is 
largely shielded from direct popular control because EP elections are usually 
                                                 
9
 Interview, Business Europe, 30 April 2009 
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decided on domestic themes and popular interest in the EP’s work remains low 
between elections’ (Princen and Kerremans, 2005: 8).   
 There is no EU-wide media, which makes it difficult to reach a larger 
audience. The EU’s character as a functionally restricted polity, together with 
the EP’s ‘untheatrical way of going about its business, means that the European 
Parliament’s media coverage in most countries is far less than its considerable 
influence deserves’ (Corbett, 2012). When EU affairs are covered in the national 
media, they are given national frames of interpretation, reaffirming the role of 
the nation state rather than legitimising the EU. All these features suggest that 
MEPs might be less responsive to the public than national politicians, as a clear 
link between MEPs and the electorate is missing. Contrast this with the US 
Congress, where both representatives and senators have closer ties to their 
voters and take on a larger number of constituency-related activities through 
‘casework’10. The short mandate of US representatives (two years) leaves the 
House of Representatives in a state of almost constant state of campaigning and 
creates a very different context compared with the EP. Unlike the EP, US 
representatives are constantly under the public eye. EP elections are only fought 
every five years using a proportional voting system, and MEPs are not 
dependent on corporate funding for their (re-)election.  
 While MEPs might be less responsive to their electorates compared with 
US representatives, the current EP centre-right majority suggests that MEPs 
may generally lean more towards the interest of business than that of labour and 
other diffuse interests. This view seems to be confirmed in recent MEP survey 
data conducted by Hix and Høyland (2011). As illustrated in figure 1.1, MEPs 
from political groups on the centre-right have more contact with producer 
groups than political groups on the centre-left. The table shows that MEPs are 
more likely to be in contact with interest groups with whom they share 
                                                 
10 Casework refers to representatives’ assistance to constituents in their dealings with federal 
agencies in cases where individuals or groups have a common concern related to a federal 
problem, rule, regulation, or administrative decision. This may for instance be a Medicare 
reimbursement claim, a rejected veteran’s entitlement, or a delayed social security payment 
(Pontius, 2003).  
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preferences than with interest groups holding opposing views. MEPs from the 
centre-right (EPP members) more often have contacts with interest groups 
representing industry, trade/commerce, and banking/insurance than with any 
other interest groups. Liberal MEPs (ALDE members), have contact with a more 
diverse set of interest groups. Lastly, centre-left MEPs (S&D, Greens/EFA, and 
GUE/NGL), are more often in contact with trade unions, environmental 
interests, and human rights organisations (Hix & Høyland, 2011, p.183). 
However, the diversity of political cultures, parties, and nationalities within the 
EP means that interest groups can find supportive MEPs, groups, and 
committees on almost every issue of interest. 
 
Figure 1.1: MEPs’ contact with interest groups  
 
Source: Hix & Høyland, 2011, p.184  
 
The 2009 EP elections gave a comfortable majority to Parliament’s centre-right 
political parties (the EPP and ALDE) with the EPP becoming the largest group in 
the EP (commanding 265 out of 736 seats). However, no single group holds the 
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majority in the EP and coalitions vary across issues. ALDE and the EPP do not 
represent a stable voting coalition, but are plagued by division both within and 
between them. Recent VoteWatch11 data scrutinising how MEPs vote during roll 
call votes12 shows that the EPP is less often on the winning side in the current 
parliamentary term (2009-2014), compared to the last parliamentary period 
(2004-2009). Although the centre-right (the EPP and the ALDE) commands a 
majority in the EP, they do not always vote together. When a left-right split 
occurs in the EP (which is expected on issues pertaining to employment), ALDE 
is more inclined to vote with the S&D than with the EPP (VoteWatch, 2011b). 
This highlights the ideological diversity of the EP’s political groups, bringing 
together parties from diverse historical and cultural contexts. The EPP, for 
instance, brings together corporatist parties from Benelux, France, Germany and 
Austria and more free market parties from Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. 
This suggests that EPP MEPs from more corporatist parties might be more open 
to trade unions’ demands than the MEPs belonging to the latter group. Fissures 
within the EP political groups mean that businesses are not necessarily faced 
with a friendly lobbying environment despite the EP’s current centre-right 
majority.  
 
1.2.3.3 The type of information required by MEPs 
 
In order to understand under what conditions business interests might be 
particularly likely to shape policy outcomes in the EP, it is necessary to look at 
the type of information needed by MEPs.  For instance, Bouwen (2002, 2004) 
has used the resource-dependency model to examine the informational needs of 
MEPs and the level of access MEPs give to different forms of business interests. 
                                                 
11
 VoteWatch is a public website that monitors how MEPs vote during roll call votes, for more 
information see: www.votewatch.eu. 
12
 Measuring cohesiveness and coalition formation by analysing roll call votes is not without its 
problems. Roll call votes only comprise approximately one-third of all votes in the EP, and may 
reflect a political group’s strategic attempt to secure group discipline and/or reveal that another 
group is internally divided (naming and shaming). Various studies show that roll call votes are not 
called evenly across the full gamut of issues and voting procedures (Carrubba & Matthew 1999; 
Thiem 2006). 
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He distinguishes between European associations, national associations, 
individual firms, and consultants, and argues that each of these organisational 
forms supplies different access goods: expert knowledge, information about the 
European encompassing interest, and information about the domestic 
encompassing interest. In inter-institutional comparison, Bouwen concludes that 
the European Commission is particularly open to companies that can provide it 
with technical knowledge. Meanwhile, the Council, according to Bouwen, is more 
open to national interest groups so as to obtain information on the ‘national 
encompassing interests’. Lastly, the EP requires information that can help it with 
evaluating the European Commission's proposals from a European perspective 
(Bouwen, 2002, 2004). This leads Bouwen to conclude that European 
associations enjoy higher levels of access to MEPs than national associations and 
individual firms. While interesting, Bouwen’s research does not examine 
whether or not interest groups’ access patterns differ across policy domains. His 
findings remain limited to the EP's economic and monetary affairs committee. 
Furthermore, his study only looks at business lobbying and does not take into 
account the level of access other groups enjoy to MEPs, such as labour unions 
and NGOs. It is necessary to distinguish between the types of information 
needed by MEPs in general, as well as how this may vary across policy areas. 
Generally both theoretical and empirical research on EU lobbying focuses mainly 
on business lobbying, while only very few studies focus on diffuse interests (for 
important exceptions, see Beyers, 2004; Chalmer, 2013).  
 The EP has two institutional faces; it is both a legislative branch in EU 
decision-making together with the Council and a public venue for wider political 
debate (Lehman, 2009, p. 55). The EP needs information that allows MEPs to 
understand and critically assess the technical details of the European 
Commission's proposal, while at the same paying attention to issues that are of 
interest to the media and a large number of citizens. The EP is in need of both 
technically and political information, which provides it with output and input 
legitimacy respectively. The EP's internal bifurcation leads to the expectation 
that MEPs are likely to be more receptive to those interest groups that can 
satisfy their thirst for both technical expertise and public support. As Coen 
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notices, business groups often reformulate their arguments when lobbying the 
EP to create wider issue linkages and focus on wider public goods (2009, p. 153). 
It is not enough for business groups to advertise that an amendment has a 
positive effect for some industries in order to be adopted by a majority of MEPs. 
Public goods, such as increased food safety and improved working conditions for 
employees, also need to be part of the equation (Lehmann, 2009, p. 52). 
Framing of issues is expected to be of key importance when lobbying the EP. 
Framing denotes 'subtle alterations in the statement or presentation of 
judgement and choice problems' (Iyengar, 1991, p. 11). Interest groups are likely 
to carry significant weight in the EP if they manage to get their frames parroted 
in the media, increasing the salience of an issue in which the wider public will be 
on their side. The EP is expected to pay particularly close attention to issues that 
receive sudden media attention. Therefore, outside lobbying tactics (such as big 
campaigns and media attention) are expected to attract more attention in the EP 
than in the European Commission and the Council.  
 The intensity of the exchange relationship between interest groups and 
MEPs is, however, likely to differ across policy domains, and the need for 
information varies according to the specific issue context (Klüver, 2013, p. 57). 
Every policy issue has its own characteristics; some issues might be very 
complex and technical whereas others are easy to understand but might be 
politically controversial. Lobbying does not take place in a vacuum, as interest 
groups are embedded in both an institutional and policy issue environment. 
While there might be certain informational needs that cut across policy domains 
in the EP, the type of information required by MEPs is likely to differ across 
policy issues. In line with Wilson’s typology, the characteristics of the policy 
issue in question are expected to affect the ability of interest groups to influence 
the EP’s reports. As highlighted by Klüver (2013, p. 57), ‘the issue context 
defines the environment in which interest groups are competing for influence 
and it can facilitate or hamper their ability to influence European policy-
making’. MEPs’ demand for the expertise provided by interest groups differs 
from policy proposal to policy proposal. Some policy proposals might require 
technical expertise and information about the feasibility of a proposal 
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(associated with output legitimacy), while other proposals require more political 
information, such as information about public opinion (associated with input 
legitimacy). Distinctive interest group constellations are expected to emerge 
across policy issues depending on the informational needs of MEPs for the 
policy proposal at hand.  
 The demand for technical expertise is likely to be higher for EP 
committees dealing mainly with purely regulatory issues concerned with 
product standards. One such example is environmental policy proposals, which 
are often highly complex and require knowledge about technical solutions to 
address the policy problem at hand. For instance, the vans regulation (presented 
in chapter 3) raises technical questions such as: how much air pressure do you 
need in a car tyre for the car to pollute less? And what are the possibilities of 
downsizing car engines to cut CO2 emissions from cars? Other issues are less 
complex, but highly controversial. The maternity leave directive (presented in 
chapter 6) is relatively easy to comprehend but highly conflictual due to member 
states’ very different welfare constellations and provisions when it comes to pay 
during women’s maternity leave. Here the expectation is that MEPs require 
information about public opinion, as well as the situation in their member state. 
The expectation is for regulatory policies dealing with product standards to be 
less politicized than distributive and redistributive policies dealing with process 
standards. The latter two policies typically refer to what Wilson calls client 
politics and interest group politics respectively. Regulatory policies mainly fall 
within Wilson’s entrepreneurial politics category, although it depends on the 
specific cost/benefit profile of proposals. Painting with the broad brush, 
distributive and redistributive policies are expected to be more politicised than 
regulatory policies (Princen & Kerremans, 2008; Scharpf, 2009). This leads to 
the expectation that those EP committees that deal with highly technical and 
complex issues are mainly lobbied by and give deference to business groups. 
Conversely, committees that primarily deal with political issues are likely to 
place greater emphasis on input legitimacy and have a strong presence of 
lobbying from diffuse interests. 
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1.3 Parliamentary pressure points: where does lobbying take 
place? 
 
The last part of this chapter presents the EP’s pressure points in terms of where, 
when, and how lobbying takes place. The EP is a complex institution with 
multiple opportunities for log-rolling and internal veto points for interest groups 
to lobby: the plenary session, the specialized committees, the committee 
secretariats, the political groups, the group secretariat, public hearings, and the 
intergroups. However, not all of these venues are equally important when it 
comes to lobbying. Drawing on what we already know about the EP’s legislative 
behaviour and organization - such as the role of interests and ideology and how 
the EP political groups and committees work - this section shows that lobbying 
is focused on a few key MEPs in the responsible committee(s). Identifying power 
in the EP and the pressure points for interest groups requires a sound insight 
into the formal and informal parliamentary procedures. What appears from the 
outside to be key pressure points is sometimes quite different on the inside.  
 
1.3.1 The EP’s policy process 
 
At first glance, the plenary sessions appear to be the most important venue for 
studying lobbying because the full chamber has the final say on all legislation 
going through Parliament. All proposals need the support of either a simple 
majority at first reading or an absolute majority at second reading to be 
accepted, or rejected. Only decisions reached in plenary have the support of 
Parliament. Despite the plenary’s vital role for passing legislation, all the 
preparatory work takes place in its specialized committees. All legislative 
proposals are referred directly to the responsible committee, which proposes 
amendments to the European Commission’s proposal in the form of a report, 
before forwarding it to the plenary in a more or less ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ form 
(Hix 2005, p. 93). The EP’s position is usually decided in the responsible 
committee ahead of plenary discussions and votes (Mamadouh & Raunio, 2003; 
McElroy, 2006).  
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 When a European Commission's proposal ‘arrives’ in the EP, the 
Conference of Presidents appoints one committee - the responsible committee - 
to be in charge of scrutinising the proposal and one or more (usually not more 
than two) committees as opinion-giving committees. Opinion-giving committees 
may table amendments to the European Commission’s proposal, but the 
responsible committee is not obliged to take opinion-giving committees’ 
amendments on board, although these amendments have to be voted upon. It is 
not always a straightforward task to decide which committee should be in charge 
of a dossier because proposals may cut across the remit of several committees. 
Since 2002, the EP has introduced what is called ‘the reinforced Hughes 
procedure’, which aims at enhancing cooperation between committees when a 
piece of legislation intersects the policy remit of several committees. In cases 
where the reinforced Hughes procedure is invoked, opinion-giving committees 
become ‘associate committees’, indicating that they enjoy almost equal status 
with the responsible committee. The reinforced Hughes procedure involves a 
jointly agreed timetable for examining the legislative proposal in question, and 
for the rapporteurs of the opinion-giving and lead committees to seek agreement 
on the amendments they propose to their committees. The most contentious 
element is that the procedure calls upon the responsible committee to accept 
without a vote the amendments from the opinion-giving committee if they relate 
to its field of jurisdiction. Associate committees have tried to give the procedure 
practical significance by sending the lead committee a list of its adopted 
amendments with an indication of which of these amendments it considers to 
fall within its policy remit. In practice, however, the reinforced Hughes 
procedure has not significantly changed the prime position of the responsible 
committee. This is because the responsible committee may still contest the 
amendments put forward by the opinion-giving committee if the chair of the 
responsible committee does not consider these amendments to fall within the 
competence of the opinion-giving committee (Corbett, et al., 2007, p. 136). 
 Once a report is adopted at committee level, it is put forward to the 
plenary. At the committee stage, all individual MEPs can put forward 
amendments, whereas amendments launched at the plenary must be tabled 
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either by a political group, or at least 40 MEPs. These rather restrictive 
requirements limit the possibilities for MEPs to amend legislation at the plenary 
and for interest groups to convince MEPs to put forward specific amendments. I 
therefore expect lobbying to be concentrated at the committee stage rather than 
at the plenary stage. Table 1.2 highlights the main differences between the first, 
second, and third (conciliation) readings of the ordinary legislative procedure in 
terms of the time limits, possibility to launch amendments, and voting rules.  
 
Table 1.2: Differences between the three readings of the ordinary legislative 
procedure 
 First reading Second reading Conciliation 
Timing No time limits Strict time limit of 
3-4 months for the 
EP, and max 4 
months for the 
Council 
Max 24 weeks 
Who is 
responsible? 
The lead and 
opinion-giving 
committees 
Only the lead 
committee  
Primary 
responsibility lies 
with the EP's 
negotiation team to 
the conciliation 
committee 
What is the 
basis of the 
discussion? 
European 
Commission 
proposal 
Common position Council's common 
position and the 
EP's second reading 
amendments 
Possibility to 
table 
amendments 
Both at the 
committee (any 
MEP) and the 
plenary stage 
(40 MEPs need 
to sign or a 
political groups) 
Same as in first 
reading 
No possibility to 
table amendments. 
The joint text as a 
whole is either 
approved or rejected 
in a single vote 
Required 
majority at 
plenary 
The EP decides 
to either reject, 
approve, or 
amend the 
Commission's 
proposal by a 
simple majority  
The EP approves 
the common 
position by a 
simple majority, 
but rejects or 
amends by an 
absolute majority  
The EP approves or 
rejects the joint text 
by simple majority 
in a single vote 
Source: Adapted from De Cock (2010, p. 200). 
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As can be seen from table 1.2, it is easier to get amendments passed by the EP at 
first reading because the EP only needs to muster a simple majority of MEPs 
present during the vote to adopt amendments. The Council examines the 
European Commission's proposal in parallel to the EP, but it normally only 
confirms its common position formally when the EP has concluded its first 
reading, and the European Commission has issued its amended proposal (for 
more on this, see the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure, 2012). There 
are no time limits laid down in the Treaty for the Council's adoption of its 
common position at first reading, although it takes 15 months on average (De 
Cock 2010, p. 106). When the EP and the Council attempt to reach an agreement 
at first reading, they organise informal trialogue meetings attended by 
representatives from the EP (the rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs), the 
Council (chair of the relevant working group and Coreper), and the European 
Commission (chef de dossier and the relevant Secretariat-General). If agreement 
cannot be reached at first reading, deliberations continue into a second reading. 
Compared with the first reading, rules regarding timing, the type of 
amendments that can be launched, and voting thresholds are more stringent at 
second reading. The EP is given three months to react to the Council's common 
position, and to suggest amendments to it. Amendments must reflect in whole 
or in part amendments put forward at first reading, and therefore no new 
amendments can be put forward unless new facts or legal situations have 
emerged since the first reading.  Unlike the first reading, the text to be amended 
by the EP at second reading is the Council's common position instead of the 
European Commission's proposal, and only the EP's lead committee is involved. 
At plenary during second reading, an absolute majority of the EP's total number 
of MEPs is needed to reject or amend the Council's common position, whereas 
the adoption of the Council's common position only requires a simple majority. 
This rather restrictive rule means that grand voting coalitions between the 
European People’s Party (EPP) and the Group of the Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats (S&D) are an oft-occurring feature of the EP's second 
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reading. Debates in plenary rarely go into detail and rarely introduce completely 
new amendments (Neuhold, 2001). 
 Hageman and Høyland (2010) find that disagreement in the Council 
reduces the ability of the EP to meet the absolute majority voting threshold 
during its second reading. Disagreement in the Council has a tendency to spill 
over to disagreement in the EP. The reason is probably that national 
governments are more likely to put pressure on their national MEPs on highly 
contentious issues than on non-contentious issues. I therefore expect lobbying 
to be less effective on highly conflictual issues – defined as divisions within the 
Council – when MEPs are subject to pressure from their governments, 
particularly for those MEPs whose national party is in government.  
 The stricter rules at second reading means that ‘missing the boat in first 
reading is usually fatal’ (De Cock 2010, p. 108) for interest groups because new 
ideas and amendments cannot be included in the EP's second reading report. 
Lobbying during the EP's second reading is focused on preserving what interest 
groups may have obtained at first reading to make sure that amendments are 
not lost during the horse-trading between the EP's political groups and between 
the EU institutions. Once a proposal goes into conciliation, there is little (if 
anything) interest groups can do to influence the passage of dossiers. Therefore, 
lobbying is expected to be concentrated on the EP's lead committees during the 
first reading of proposals. The key role of committees in the EP’s internal 
decision-making procedure is highlighted by the fact that the plenary cast a vote 
on a committee report rather than the European Commission’s proposal. The 
need to make an early start in beginning lobbying the EP has become even more 
important following the Lisbon Treaty because of the wider application of the 
ordinary legislative procedure and the increased use of informal trialogue 
meetings between the EP and the Council. The treaty has extended the former 
co-decision procedure to 40 policy areas, such as agriculture and the budget as a 
whole (previously, the EP was only a co-legislator on non-compulsory expenses).  
This raises the expectation that the earlier in the legislative process an interest 
group gets involved, the better chances of having an impact on the decision-
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making process. This is because it is more difficult to modify a proposal the 
further along a proposal advances in the decision-making process.  
 
1.3.2 Differences between decision-making procedures 
 
The further extension of the co-decision procedure (now known as the ordinary 
legislative procedure) has not only changed the inter-institutional triangle but 
also brought with it new working methods and norms within the EP. Different 
patterns of behaviour exist under the consultation and the ordinary legislative 
procedure (Burns & Carter, 2009; Maurer, 2003; Ripoll Servant, 2011). The two 
procedures are more than just rules of procedures; they each represent a 
different set of norms that guide legislative behaviour (Shackleton & Raunio, 
2003, p. 172). Different procedures engender different behaviour from both the 
Council and the EP.  
 Consultation tends to encourage free-riding behaviour on the part of both 
the EP and the Council, and both institutions are tempted to ignore the views of 
each other (Jupille, 2004, p. 48). The Council is not required to take the EP’s 
view into account under the consultation procedure and can, therefore, choose 
to completely ignore the EP’s amendments. Since the EP cannot be held 
accountable for the policy outcomes reached under the consultation procedure, 
it is free to take up a more confrontational stance toward the European 
Commission’s proposal without being punished electorally (Scully, 1997, p. 239). 
Furthermore, EP voting coalitions are more flexible under consultation than 
under the ordinary legislative procedure due to the relative low majorities 
required in the EP (simple majority voting). This makes it easier for smaller 
political groups to influence the EP’s report, thus opening up the ideological 
fingerprints of the EP’s report to periphery parties.  
 The ordinary legislative procedure, on the other hand, is generally 
characterised by more consensual behaviour and stable coalitions between the 
main political groups (EPP, ALDE, and S&D), marginalising smaller groups. As 
Hausemer (2006, p. 513) expresses it, absolute majority requirements have led 
to a ‘tyranny of the majority’ in the EP, where smaller groups have been side-
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lined. The high voting thresholds in the EP’s second reading during the ordinary 
legislative procedure has been crucial for internalising the need for compromise 
inside the chamber (Ripoll Servent, 2011). It is widely known that the co-
decision II procedure13 has led to a greater use of informal negotiating channels 
between the EU’s institutional triangle (the European Commission, the EP, and 
the Council) and an increase in legislation finalised at either first reading or an 
early second reading (Settembri & Neuhold, 2009, p. 144). Informal trialogue 
meetings have changed from largely being a mechanism to avoid the laborious 
and often unrewarding conciliation procedure to attaining the status of normal 
behaviour under the ordinary legislative procedure (Burns & Carter, 2009; 
Shackleton & Raunio, 2003). The increased use of early agreements has led the 
EP to ‘acquire a feeling of shared responsibility – revealed in a softer use of 
language and more moderate stances in its reports’ (Ripoll Servent, 2011, p. 60). 
This leads to the expectation that lobbying is most effective when targeted at 
Parliament’s largest political groups, at least when lobbying on co-decision files. 
Under consultation procedure, the EU resembles a unicameral system 
with the Council as the main decision-maker and the EP only having an advisory 
role. In contrast, under the ordinary legislative procedure, the EU resembles a 
bicameral system with equal powers given to the Council and the EP. It is often 
argued that decision-making under bicameralism is more predictable and stable 
than decision-making in unicameral systems (Costello, 2011, p. 122; Hammond 
& Gary, 1987; Riker, 1992; Tsebelis & Money, 1997). This certainly also seems to 
be the case in the EP, where committees primarily operating under the 
consultation procedure take up more extreme and unpredictable positions than 
committees mainly working under the ordinary legislative procedure. 
 Not all committees operate entirely under the ordinary legislative 
procedure. The most extreme case is the foreign affairs committee, which works 
entirely under the consultation procedure. Other committees – such as the 
women’s rights committee (FEMM), the social and employment committee 
                                                 
13 The co-decision II procedure was introduced with the Amsterdam Treaty and states that the 
Council cannot reaffirm its common position following a breakdown of the conciliation 
committee. 
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(EMPL), and the committee on civil liberties, and justice and home affairs 
(LIBE) – work under both the consultation and the ordinary legislative 
procedures. The presence of two distinct procedures in some committees not 
only implies differing legislative powers, but also two different and contradictory 
behavioural logics, creating a state of schizophrenia. As Ripoll Servant (2011) 
shows in her study of the LIBE committees’ voting patterns, policy outcomes of 
committees with dual behaviours tend to be more volatile compared with those 
committees that only work under the ordinary legislative procedure. I expect the 
policy outcomes of committees working under several legislative procedures to 
be less predictable, which might discourage interest groups from investing 
significant lobbying resources in these committees. Furthermore, committees 
are often biased towards their own policy remit and might therefore favour some 
interest groups over others. For instance, McElroy (2006) finds that MEPs from 
the committee of environment, public health, and food safety (ENVI) tend to 
have closer links to environmental groups than other MEPs. Furthermore, 
Kaeding (2004) finds a tendency for MEPs from countries with higher 
environmental standards (such as the Nordic states) to be overrepresented as 
rapporteurs in ENVI. In line with Wilson’s category of entrepreneurial politics, 
this leads to the expectations that ENVI MEPs might be seen as policy 
entrepreneurs for diffuse environmental interests, making it more difficult for 
industry groups to have their voices heard in ENVI. Similarly, other committees 
may be biased towards their policy and have particularly close ties with certain 
interest groups over others.  
 
1.3.3 Key power-holders in the EP 
 
The increased use of informal negotiations has not only brought with it a distinct 
set of norms, but also led to a power shift between parliamentary actors with 
committee chairmen losing influence to rapporteurs and coordinators. Although 
all committee members have potential influence over the committee outcome, 
the greatest influence is wielded by a core group of particularly ‘powerful’ MEPs: 
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 The rapporteur: MEPs with the task of examining a European 
Commission proposal in a committee report. The choice of rapporteur is 
decided with the use of a point system. Each political group receives a 
number of points per committee in proportion to its size, and each report 
gets allocated a certain number of points by the coordinators of each 
committee, allowing the political groups to bid for the report. The 
rapporteur's role includes: presenting a draft report suggesting 
amendments to the Commission’s proposal, presenting the report in 
plenary and negotiating with the Council.  
 The shadow rapporteurs: Once a report has been designated, the other 
political groups designate their own shadow rapporteurs to advise them 
on the draft legislation in question. The shadow rapporteurs also 
establish voting lists for their political group to be used in plenary.  
 Group coordinators (group whips): MEPs with a coordinating role for 
their political group within a particular committee. Each political group 
appoints a coordinator for individual committees. They are their group's 
spokesperson on the specific committee. Coordinators are also 
responsible for negotiating how many points should be given to a report 
and who they will put forward as rapporteur if their group wins the bid, 
or shadow rapporteur if their group loses it. Group coordinators' role 
sometimes overlaps with the shadow rapporteur, especially in small 
groups. The political coordinators together with the shadow rapporteur 
influence the political group’s position during debates and voting in the 
committee and plenary sessions. 
 
Rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs carry considerable weight in deciding the 
passage of a legislative proposal, and MEPs from the EP's biggest political 
groups usually follow the position of their rapporteur or shadow rapporteur. A 
survival tip from many Brussels lobbying guides is therefore ‘to make sure that 
the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs are on your side’ (De Cock, 2010, p. 
51). Farrell and Hertier (2004, pp. 1187-1188) depict rapporteurs as ‘relais 
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actors’ who have ‘quite extraordinary latitude to set the agenda of negotiations’ 
and ‘are particularly powerful when they are closely linked to large political 
groups and power brokers’. The flipside of rapporteurs’ increased power has 
been a dwindling of the power of ordinary committee members and committee 
chairmen. A recent study by Judge and Earnshaw (2011) on the EP’s processing 
of the advanced therapies dossier concludes that the definition of relais actors 
needs to be extended to shadow rapporteurs because they play an increasingly 
active role in early agreement negotiations. The key importance of shadow 
rapporteurs and coordinators has been explicitly acknowledged in the EP’s 
revision of its code of conduct. The EP’s Rules of Procedure, enacted in July 
2009, explicitly state that committees may decide to involve the shadow 
rapporteurs in seeking agreement with the Council in co-decision procedures. 
This confirms the increased influence of key MEPs at the expense of committee 
chairmen and ordinary committee members. Following Farrell and Héritier’s 
(2004, p.1206) basic contention, it is therefore ‘fair to say that early agreements 
have resulted in substantial tension between individual actors within Parliament 
who have lost influence over law-making and relais actors who have gained 
influence’.  
 The importance of lobbying key MEPs is highlighted by the fact that these 
MEPs often serve as the de facto leadership of their group on the specific dossier 
under consideration. The political groups’ positions are usually decided by the 
groups’ expert MEPs of the relevant committee, rather than by the party 
leadership. Due to time and resource constraints, individual MEPs do not have 
enough information on every piece of legislation going through Parliament to 
make an informed choice. Therefore, they are dependent on their EP colleagues 
with expertise in the policy area under consideration to provide them with the 
necessary information. As Ringe (2010) shows in his study of EP party 
discipline, MEPs often adopt the positions of those expert colleagues with whom 
they believe they share preferences. The advantage of being a member of one of 
the larger groups is that MEPs can leave others to look after an issue in the 
expectation that the members of the same group will fight for the application of 
the same policy objectives. As one S&D MEP highlighted, ‘everyone in the EP is 
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so overloaded with work that you just have to trust that your party colleagues 
pursue a social-democratic policy’ (cited in Rasmussen, 2008).  
1.3.4 Influencing committee members 
 
The capacity of ‘regular’ MEPs to obtain information about a specific policy topic 
has, however, been improved through the procedure of public hearings 
organised by EP committees or political groups. The main aim of hearings is to 
invite experts and affected interest groups to participate in structured dialogue 
with committee members. Representatives from the European Commission and 
the Council often participate in these hearings and are frequently prompted to 
respond to the different views raised during hearings. Hearings provide an 
opportunity for MEPs to engage in explorative dialogue with interested parties. 
Although the use and importance of hearings has increased in recent years, their 
importance in terms of lobbying impact remains dubious. While hearings are 
often well-attended by outside stakeholders, few MEPs and assistants 
participate in them. The main information-flow between the EP and interest 
groups happens via informal contacts during the committee stage. The EP 
committees’ decision-making procedure provides interest groups with three 
main entry points to influence committee members: 
 
1. The rapporteur’s draft report phase. The rapporteur writes a draft report 
suggesting amendments to the Commission’s proposal. MEPs rarely have 
detailed expert knowledge of the specific proposal under scrutiny and 
therefore interest groups serve as the main information source. Interest 
groups often send position papers and amendments to the rapporteur during 
his/her report drafting.  
 
2. The amendment phase. The rapporteur presents his/her draft report, which 
is then discussed by the committee as a whole. A deadline for amendments is 
set, where all committee members (and all other MEPs) can propose 
amendments to the rapporteur’s report. Interest groups who have been 
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unsuccessful in getting their views reflected in the draft report now have a 
chance to influence all committee members and to convince ‘receptive’ 
committee members to launch amendments in the interest group’s favour.  
 
3. The voting phase. At a following meeting, proposed amendments are voted 
upon by simple majority. Any adopted amendments are included in the final 
committee report. This report is hereafter submitted to the plenary, where it 
is formally adopted by Parliament. Interest groups often send out voting lists 
to committee members prior to the committee vote, indicating how they 
would like MEPs to vote.  
 
Interest groups adept at playing the EP lobbying game are aware of the 
committees’ power distribution, deadlines, and formalistic requirements for 
submitting amendments. Indeed, as a representative from the Social Platform 
highlighted:  
 
You have to know the deadlines and procedures of Parliament. When 
we draft amendments to MEPs, we use the European Commission’s 
proposal as a benchmark by using the exact same text but altered so 
it fits our position. We also send voting recommendations. The idea is 
to get Parliament’s own voting list template, change the title so it says 
the Social Platform and indicate with plus and minuses how we 
would like MEPs to vote. If you want to influence an MEP, you need 
to talk their language.14 
 
Interest groups usually give priority to key MEPs and their assistants. Just like 
any other legislature, MEPs rely heavily on their parliamentary assistants and 
the policy advisors. As one EP committee administrator explained, ‘amendments 
are hardly ever written by the members themselves, either they come from 
outside Parliament or are written by administrators in the responsible 
committees’.15 Most interest groups acknowledge that the MEPs’ assistants are 
as important to lobby as MEPs (if not more important). The assistants serve as 
                                                 
14
 Interview, the Social Platform, 20 April 2010 
15 Interview, EP committee advisor, 21 September 2010 
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the MEPs’ gate-keepers, and any meetings set up with MEPs usually go through 
the assistants. Knowing an MEP’s assistant personally helps in terms of gaining 
access. This is something greatly acknowledged by lobbyists, who often invite 
assistants to informal drinks and food receptions in one of the numerous bars on 
Place Luxembourg (the square outside the EP). The importance of assistants is 
highlighted by the fact that it is often the assistants who hold meetings with 
interest groups on behalf of their MEP. Assistants and MEPs rely on assistance 
from the committee secretariat and their group advisors. The committee 
secretariat takes part in background research for the rapporteurs and is often 
involved in the drafting of reports. Despite the committee administrators’ key 
role in writing amendments, they are rarely subject to intensive lobbying. 
Rather, interest groups call them up to ask for procedural information, which is 
often of great annoyance to committee administrators: 
 
They [lobby groups] treat me as a service bureau like a library. Quite 
often, they want practical information, or documents, such as voting 
results from the committee. Many of the questions relate to 
procedures. Sometimes, they try to influence me, though, by asking 
questions, such as: are you sure this and this is a good idea?16  
 
MEPs, assistants, and policy advisors frequently interact with interest groups in 
Parliament’s so-called intergroups (for a detailed study of intergroups, see, 
Ringe, Carman, & Victor, forthcoming). Intergroups are informal cross-party 
groups consisting of MEPs from different political groups with an interest in a 
particular political theme. EP intergroups can be compared to All-Party Groups 
in the House of Commons. In the EU, intergroups are often established by 
interest groups - mainly by European Associations - who run the secretariat, 
provide the members with expertise and fund MEPs’ activities. Intergroups are a 
valuable and timesaving lobbying option for interest groups because it is 
possible for them to target a whole group with their arguments at once, rather 
than approaching MEPs one at a time. There have been concerns that some 
                                                 
16 Interview, committee administrator, 16 April 2010  
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intergroups are too closely linked with certain lobbies. As a result, intergroup 
chairmen are obliged, under Rules of Procedure 9 (1), to declare any support 
(both financial and secretarial assistance) provided by interest groups. 
Currently, 24 intergroups are registered and officially recognised in the EP. 
However, I have estimated the unofficial number of intergroups to be over 80. 
Whenever I interviewed MEPs, MEP assistants, and EP policy advisors, I would 
show them a list of intergroups and ask if they knew of any intergroups, which 
were not on the list. This helped me to identify the large number of unofficial 
interest groups in the EP. The unregistered intergroups are not covered by the 
EP’s rules. There is a huge lack of transparency surrounding their membership, 
activities, and funding sources. Many interest groups assert their non-partisan 
credentials and reject involvement in lobbying activities, although they run the 
intergroup secretariat and often produce detailed policy papers reflecting the 
interest groups views. While the political groups support some of the 
intergroups, others receive funding from the European Commission or directly 
from the industry. Interviewees included in my study saw intergroups as a way 
to build trustworthy long term relationships with MEPs, which come in handy 
when lobbying on specific dossiers.  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
The central argument of this theoretical chapter is that while business groups 
are likely to dominate politics at a systemic level, important variation is expected 
to occur on the sub-system level. While business groups may be powerful on 
some policy issues, they are unlikely to be dominant on all policy issues. 
Business interests are less likely to be influential in majoritarian and 
entrepreneurial politics than in client politics and (to some extent) interest 
group politics. Business influence is particularly likely to be restrained when 
business groups are faced with a strong counter-lobby (interest groups politics), 
when it has few stakes in an issue (majoritarian politics), and when issues are 
subject to increased media coverage and salience that goes against the views 
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held by business (entrepreneurial politics). On the other hand, business groups 
that operate in highly technical areas (usually that of product standards) subject 
to little public attention are likely to be particularly influential in leaving their 
fingerprints on the EP's reports. Therefore, I expect to find significant 
divergence in interest groups’ lobbying activity levels and influence across policy 
domains.  
Different types of policies require different types of information and 
legitimacy. Highly technical and complex policy issues are expected to require 
high degrees of technical information associated with output legitimacy, 
whereas more political and salient policy issues require more input legitimacy. 
Generally, diffuse interests are expected to provide information that is seen as 
political, whereas business interests provide information that is regarded as 
technical. This does not mean that diffuse interests never supply technical 
information or that business groups never offer political information. Nor does 
it mean that the categories of technical and political information provision are 
mutually exclusive. Rather it suggests that different types of interest groups hold 
different informational goods. 
Interest groups with a concentrated stake in an issue are particularly 
likely to exert influence over policy outcomes of issues that are highly technical 
and have low salience. Highly salient issues bring attention to policy subsystems 
that might not normally receive a lot of attention, increasing the pressure for 
policy change. The ability of business groups to dominate policy outcomes on 
highly salient issues depends on their ability to forge alliances with other 
interest groups, such as diffuse interests, and to frame issues in a way that 
appeals to the broader public. Due to the EP’s political rather than non-
majoritarian agency structure, the EP is expected to be more susceptible to 
increased media pressure and public opinion than the European Commission 
and the Council. The EP has two institutional faces, which might give rise to 
some inherent tensions. It is an effective branch of the EU’s legislative arm 
together with the Council, as well as a public arena for wider political debates. 
Just like the European Commission, technical information is an important 
currency of influence in the EP. On top of that, interest groups are also required 
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to provide MEPs with political capital that can improve their political standings 
nationally. This leads to the expectation that interest groups are more likely to 
be successful in the EP if they manage to link issues to wider public goods. It is 
not enough for business groups to highlight that a proposal has a positive effect 
on some narrow industry in order to find support among a majority of MEPs; 
issues also need to be linked to a public good. The framing of issues is, therefore, 
expected to play a key role in interest groups’ ability to shape policy outcomes in 
the EP. 
MEPs and EP policy advisors/assistants are dependent on interest groups 
to translate often complex and highly technical information into brief digestible 
notes. The EP's increased workload leaves room for interest groups to influence 
MEPs. Lobbying is expected to be particularly intense during the EP's 
committee stage at first readings, and mainly targeted at a handful of key MEPs. 
Influencing key MEPs is just a derived goal for interest groups. Ultimately, the 
interest organisations are concerned with influencing the outcome of the overall 
EU policy process. Formulating amendments to key MEPs and shaping the 
content of a committee report are crucial for determining the EP’s, policy 
outcome and in the end, the EU’s legislative outcome. Significant differences in 
interest groups’ lobbying activities and influence potentials might occur across 
decision-making procedures. As seen in this chapter, researchers find that 
different procedures – consultation and the ordinary legislative procedure – are 
associated with a different set of norms and working procedures. The EP tends 
to be more consensus-seeking and pragmatic under the ordinary legislative 
procedure and more confrontational under the consultation procedure. Under 
the ordinary legislative procedure, lobbying is expected to be most effective 
when targeted at the EP’s largest political groups, whereas fringe groups are 
subject to more lobbying under consultation. Although my four case studies only 
include dossiers subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, it is still possible 
to examine to what extent large political groups are a more favoured lobbying 
addressee than fringe groups during this procedure. In the next chapter, I 
present the considerations underpinning my selection of cases, as well as 
discussing the methods used to assess interest group influence.  
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Chapter 2: Interest Group Influence – a Framework for Analysis 
 
Is researching interest group influence ‘like looking for a black cat in a coal bin 
by midnight’ (as expressed by a lobbyist, cited in,  Loomis, 1983, p. 184)? This 
thesis is premised on the idea that although interest group influence is difficult 
to assess, it is simply too important to be ignored. Understanding interest group 
influence is essential for understanding how EU policy outcomes come about. 
Moreover, the impact of interest groups on EU policy outcomes is central to 
debates on the EU’s democratic legitimacy (Dür, 2008b, p. 573). Improvement 
in our understanding of how and under what conditions interest groups manage 
to leave their fingerprints on EU policy outcomes rests on shrewd reflection of 
the definition of influence and how influence might be identified. Without a 
clear understanding of what is meant by influence and how influence can be 
identified, findings become rather meaningless, and difficult to compare with 
other studies (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 68).  
The problem with much of the existing literature on interest group 
influence in the EU is that the indicators used for interest group influence may 
not constitute an apt proxy for influence. Most studies use interest groups’ 
activities (such as submission of information to decision-makers), access to 
decision-makers, and interest groups’ resources to assess influence (see, for 
instance, Beyers, 2002; Bouwen, 2004b; Broscheid & Coen, 2003b; Eising, 
2004). Whilst access to decision-makers, lobbying activities, and resources are 
often a prerequisite for influencing policy outcomes, they only tell us how 
interest groups seek to influence the EU policy process, but not what impact 
they have had. As highlighted by Grant (1989, p. 113), ‘any study of pressure 
groups must be concerned not only with how they operate, but also with what 
they are able to achieve’. Examining interest groups' lobbying activities, the level 
of access to decision-makers, and their resource arsenal only accounts for part of 
the story of interest group influence; they show how interest groups seek to 
influence. In order to get a fuller picture, it is necessary to analyse decision-
makers’ responses to interest groups' lobbying activities, access and resources, 
and to ask if lobbying has changed anything. In this chapter, I present an 
60 
 
analytical framework for assessing interest group influence and the research 
design used in the thesis.  
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents the 
considerations behind the selection of the thesis’s four case studies. 
Furthermore, I discuss how the costs and benefits arising from the European 
Commission’s proposals are assessed. The second section presents my analytical 
framework for assessing interest group influence. This involves a presentation of 
the type of information collected (i.e. how Wilson’s typology is operationalized), 
the information sources used, and the methodological approach taken. My 
research is based on a qualitative comparative case study approach, which uses 
process-tracing integrated with typological theory. The combination of 
typological theory and process-tracing is useful for uncovering the interaction 
effects and causal mechanism at work in my four case studies (George & 
Bennett, 2004, p. 255). Wilson's typology helps to deductively chart the 
interactions and causal mechanisms that I expect to find in different categories 
of politics, and process-tracing makes it possible to examine if the theoretical 
expectations hold up empirically.  
 
2.1 Case selection 
 
The main criterion guiding case selection should be a case's relevance to the 
research objective. The chosen case(s) should offer the type of variation needed 
to answer the research question. My choice of case studies was guided by three 
considerations. Firstly, I wanted cases that represent common policy areas of 
EU decision-making and that are subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, 
in which the EP is a co-legislator with the Council. While it is often difficult to 
generalise from case study findings, the choice of typical cases increases the 
external validity of my findings and serves as a reasonable indicator about 
anything lying outside the borders of the cases. This is because the cases selected 
are representative of a wider population.  
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Secondly, I wanted the cases to be either on-going (but adopted at the 
EP’s first reading during my PhD research), or recent (a maximum of six months 
old) in order for interviewees to be able to recall the details of the cases. Memory 
is often a conundrum when conducting interviews. If a case is too old, 
interviewees will often have difficulties recalling the facts and details of the case. 
On the other hand, if a case is too recent, interviewees may be ‘clouded by 
personal impressions and, oddly enough, by the very recentness of the episode’ 
(Robert Rhodes James quotes in Seldon, 1988, p. 6). In the context of the EP, a 
case dating back more than a few years may already be too old due to the 
frequent turn-over of staff in the EP and MEPs’ enormous workload, which 
means that the details of past cases might easily be forgotten. For all of my four 
case studies, I conducted interviews when the dossiers were on-going and 
shortly after they had been voted upon in plenary. This had the advantage of 
respondents being able to remember the details of the cases, but at the same 
time their answers might have been measured to avoid conveying sensitive 
information. Therefore, I always started off by telling the interviewee that they 
would remain anonymous and that I did not pass on information from one 
interviewee to another. Anonymity and confidentiality is an important aspect of 
research ethics.  
Lastly, I wanted to choose cases representing different types of policies so 
as to have cases in which the distribution of costs and benefits flowing from 
proposals differs. The four case studies were chosen on the basis of the 
theoretical expectations in Wilson’s typology and represent different 
configurations of the typology. The cases, thus, constitute most-likely cases for 
the four categories. Wilson's typology offers a clear set of expectations about 
how and under what conditions interest groups are likely to become active in the 
policy process and are able to shape policy outcomes. It identifies the 'pathways 
through which particular [policy] types relate to specified outcomes' (George & 
Bennett, 2004, p. 235). Interest groups faced with a prospect of shouldering 
concentrated costs or reaping concentrated benefits are expected to be more 
active in the policy process and more successful at leaving their fingerprints on 
the EP’s reports than interests facing diffuse benefits or costs (Wilson, 1974).  
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A common dilemma when using methods such as case studies, thick 
description, and qualitative research more generally is data overload, in which 
the researcher might run the risk of losing sight of the bigger picture (Dunn, 
2006, p. 375). Theoretical models and typological theories serve the role of 
guiding the research in terms of indicating the boundaries of investigation and 
data collection. Theoretical models help to identify the mechanisms to be 
investigated, and to link the observations made to theoretical concepts. Wilson’s 
typology provides a conceptual map that helps to organise the empirical 
information ‘into meaningful narratives, capable of conveying a coherent and 
convincing explanation’ (Ripoll-Servent, 2011b, p.19). Table 2.1 shows how my 
chosen cases fit into Wilson’s typology of the politics of policy. Although I only 
have four case studies, each case contains several issues and for some cases, 
several types of politics. As will be seen in chapter 4, different aspects of the food 
labelling regulation have different cost-benefit distributions and numerous 
politics. This highlights the importance of obtaining an in-depth knowledge of 
each case studied in order to be able to categorise cases more correctly and to 
understand the underlining causal mechanisms at play. The distribution of costs 
and benefits arising from the European Commission’s proposals of my four 
cases are more thoroughly discussed in the empirical case study chapters. 
 
Table 2.1: The four case studies and the politics of policy typology 
 Diffuse benefits Concentrated benefits 
Diffuse cost Majoritarian politics 
• Food labelling regulation 
Client politics 
• Food labelling regulation 
Concentrated 
costs 
Entrepreneurial politics 
• Vans regulation 
• Maternity leave directive 
• Food labelling regulation 
Interest group politics 
• Road transport working 
time directive 
• Food labelling regulation 
 
The four case studies also represent different types of EU standard-setting: 
product and process standards. The vans regulation and food labelling 
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regulation represent cases of product standards, whereas the road transport 
working time directive and the maternity leave directive are dealing with process 
standards. This allows me to test the theoretical proposition that business 
groups are likely to be more united when lobbying on product standards than on 
process standards. As business groups operate under different national 
legislation, prior to EU harmonisation, some businesses may stand to win from 
EU harmonisation and others to lose. It cannot, therefore, be assumed 
automatically that all business groups will be on the same side in Wilson’s 
category. Wilson’s typology leads to the following expectations for each of the 
cases studies: 
 
 Vans regulation. The car industry is expected to be particularly active 
during the EP’s processing of the regulation to reduce CO2 emissions 
from vans and more influential in shaping the policy outcome, unless 
MEPs act as environmental entrepreneurs and mobilise public support 
for a policy change. This may happen if environmental groups 
successfully manage to increase the salience of the issue in the media.  
 Food labelling regulation. The overall characteristic of this regulation is 
that of entrepreneurial politics. The food industry is expected to have 
greater incentives to lobby the EP and be more influential than consumer 
groups. However, interesting variation exists on sub-issues within the 
regulation that amounts to client, interest group, and majoritarian 
politics. 
 Road transport working time directive. This directive represents a 
typical interest group politics conflict with labour unions favouring strict 
regulation of working time to avoid social dumping, and self-employed 
truckers fearing that a restriction on their working time will hamper 
competitiveness and income. In this scenario both labour unions and 
employers’ associations are expected to have strong incentives to become 
active on the issue. No single interest group is expected to dominate as 
the lobbying efforts of opposing groups are likely to counter one another. 
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 Maternity leave directive. Similar to the vans regulation, interest groups 
facing concentrated costs - in this case employers’ associations - are 
expected to be more influential than labour unions and women’s right 
organisations representing diffuse interests. 
 
I use Wilson's typology to explore and speculate on what impact different 
interest groups have on the EP’s policy outcomes. This does not mean that I am 
blind to other possible explanations of interest group influence. It is important 
to go into the empirical field fairly open-minded. This means that I do not solely 
ask questions in my interviews that would elucidate Wilson’s propositions. If so, 
this would run the risk of leading to a ‘premature closure of the mind with 
anything not specified in theory being ignored, whatever its palpable 
significance’ (Rose, 1991, p. 448).  
 
2.1.1 Assessment of the distribution of costs and benefits  
 
The assessment of the distribution of costs and benefits arising from the 
European Commission’s proposals is based on the Commission’s impact 
assessments and interviewees’ perceptions of the cost/benefit profile of the 
proposals. Impact assessments form part of the European Commission’s 
preparation of new policy proposals, in which a systematic examination of 
various policy solutions (options) to a policy problem is undertaken. The EP has 
limited ability to conduct ex-ante and ex-post impact assessments of legislation 
although the EP’s new Directorate for Impact Assessment may improve the EP’s 
ability to conduct them. The EP is slowly starting to develop impact assessment 
functions independently from the impact assessments carried out by the 
European Commission (see, European Parliament, 2010j). At the heart of 
regulatory impact assessments is the attempt to assess the likely impact of the 
different regulatory solutions to the policy problem under consideration. They 
usually include concrete steps for desk officers in the European Commission to 
follow when drafting legislation, such as consultation of affected stakeholders. 
The European Commission’s impact assessments include a comparison of the 
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different options under consideration and an assessment of the economic, 
societal, and environmental impact of the various policy options. However, it is 
often easier to estimate short-term, tangible, and economic costs and benefits 
(such as compliance costs of business) than it is to assess the long-term 
environmental and societal consequences of policy options. The Commission’s 
impact assessments are often criticised for placing too much emphasis on 
tangible economic costs and benefits, while disregarding the long-term more 
diffuse societal impact of proposals. In the words of a representative from the 
European Heart Network (EHN): 
 
It is difficult for proposals that include objectives to improve health to 
make it through the impact assessment panel and the College of 
Commissioners. This is because the process is skewed in favour of the 
costs a policy option may infer on the regulated industry, while it is 
immensely difficult to put an economic value on the costs imposed on 
society as whole.17  
  
 
The quote shows that some interest groups see the European Commission’s 
impact assessments as exhibiting a bias towards cost-overestimation due to the 
difficulty of quantifying more diffuse long-term benefits. It is important to note 
that the definition of costs and benefits constitutes an arena of contestation 
because costs and benefits of regulation are often difficult to assess. The 
empirical chapters sketch the cost-benefit profile of the four dossiers as 
enumerated in the Commission’s impact assessment, as well as interest groups’ 
own perception of the costs and benefits of the proposals.  
 
2.2 Analytical framework for analysing interest group influence 
 
Before turning to the research design, I find it necessary to briefly present the 
definition of influence and the philosophical approach used in the thesis. The 
lack of research on the influence of interest groups is primarily a result of the 
difficulty to define, operationalize, and measure empirically the concepts of 
                                                 
17 Interview, EHN, 6 April 2011 
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power and influence (Dür & de Bièvre, 2007, p. 2). Early studies of interest 
group influence in the US (such as Dahl, 1957, 1958, 1961; Polsby, 1960) were 
criticised for not taking into account different dimensions or faces of power. 
These studies - representing the first face of power - conceived of power as an 
observable behaviour occurring when one actor convinces another actor to do 
something that they would otherwise not have done. This pluralist vision of 
power was, however, criticised for not taking into account that power can also be 
exercised at the agenda setting stage when the powerful manage to keep 
unwelcome issues off the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1969). Later, criticism 
centred on the neglect of power that involves shaping actor’s preferences in a 
way that is contrary to their own interest. Lukes (1974) argued that the most 
effective and insidious use of power is to prevent conflict from arising in the first 
place. Power involves situations where the powerful secure the compliance of 
the powerless by controlling their thoughts and desires through manipulation. 
Yet, other scholars (such as Giddens, 1986; Lindblom, 1977; Foucault, 1980) 
have argued that power might not only be relational (as is the case of the first 
three faces of power) but also structural. Power may be seen as a resource, such 
as the possession of economic resources as the medium through which power is 
exercised (Giddens, 1986; Lindblom, 1977). Power can also be understood as a 
productive and omnipotent force derived from constructive invisible institutions 
reflecting general consent and obtained through socialisation and discipline 
(Foucault, 1980, 1986, 1987).   
With the theoretical literature on power and influence becoming more 
elaborate, it is increasingly difficult to study the concepts of power and influence 
without being criticised for violating certain aspects of them. Given the 
importance of different dimensions of power, no single analysis has to 
necessarily consider all of them. Studying the second and third faces of power is 
extremely difficult. How can we know what the ‘genuine interest’ of an actor is, 
when it is already difficult to determine actual preferences? Rather than 
conceding to defeat in the face of these difficulties, I consciously focus on 
specific aspects of the concepts, making it amenable to my empirical research. I 
draw on both a relational and structural definition of power combining Robert 
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Dahl’s one-dimensional view on power with Anthony Giddens’ emphasis on 
resources as the medium through which power is exerted. I assume that there is 
overt conflict between opposing interest groups, that interest groups hold clear 
and relatively stable policy preferences, and that business may be in a privileged 
position compared with diffuse interests due to its economic and technological 
power. Interest group influence is, thus, defined as: the achievement of an 
interest group’s goal in decision-making, which is caused by the interest 
group’s own intervention (lobbying activity) and/or MEPs’ anticipation of the 
group. It is also possible to rewrite this definition in terms of the counterfactual 
in that a policy outcome is more in line with particular interest groups’ 
preferences than would have been the case if they had not intervened or if MEPs 
had no anticipated them. Preference attainment is not a sufficient condition for 
influence in itself, as interest groups' goals and the policy outcome may coincide 
due to other factors unconnected to interest groups' lobbying activities.  
Epistemologically, my thesis departs from a critical realist perspective by 
taking  a scientific outlook that assumes ‘a knowable world out there […], a 
world whose workings are not [necessarily] transparent and which invites 
exploration to discern their deeper and truer contours’ (Galanter & Edwards, 
1997, p. 377). I am committed to ontological realism by assuming that there is a 
reality ‘out there’, which is layered and exists independently of the human mind. 
The reality might not be immediately and empirically accessible. Rather the 
world is seen to be composed of multiple layers of reality, including not only 
observable events and perceptions, but also underlying structures. Beneath our 
empirical observations, there is a level of reality, ‘where the mechanism that 
instigates [observable] events exists’ (Moren & Blom, 2003, p. 44). Of particular 
use for my study is the focus in critical realism on the link between human 
agency and structures. This link throws light upon underlying structures that 
cause particular events, and is known as generative mechanisms. In the case of 
the EU, underlying structures may be structural and technological power held by 
businesses, or wielded by decision-making rules precipitating certain behaviour. 
Structures may not always be manifest in experience and may not even be 
realised. Business holds structural power because it may threaten to close down 
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workplaces, relocate factories and investment abroad, even if this is not 
actualised. Structures, such as rules and resources, are ‘capable of producing 
patterns of events’ (Carlsson, 2003, p. 4). Critical realism sits well with my 
definition of influence, which highlights how influence might be a result of both 
interest groups’ own lobbying effort (relational influence) and MEPs’ 
anticipation of interest groups (structural influence). 
Given the definition of interest group influence and my epistemological 
and ontological position, I now turn to the type of evidence needed to establish 
interest group influence. Studies examining interest group influence in the EU 
can generally be divided into two strands. The first strand uses interest groups' 
access to decision-makers as a proxy for influence (such as Bouwen, 2002, 
2004). The second strand focuses the research lens on the policy outcome and 
the extent to which interest groups have their preferences reflected in the final 
policy outcome, while black-boxing the process preceding the outcome (such as 
Klüver, 2013). My research builds the bridge between those researchers that 
only focus on interest groups’ activities/access patterns, and those that solely 
focus on interest groups’ influence on policy outcomes. Wilson’s typology is 
particularly helpful in this regard as his typology not only provides hypotheses 
about the policy outcome, but also about the policy process leading to the policy 
outcome. This double focus enables me to focus on both interest groups' 
lobbying activities during the policy process and their impact on the outcome. In 
concurrence with Wilson’s dual focus, my assessment of interest group influence 
happens in a two-stage process. Firstly, interest groups must transmit their 
position to MEPs/EP policy advisors, and secondly, this information supply 
must subsequently lead to an alteration in the behaviour of MEPs/EP policy. 
 I do not attempt to conduct a quantitative measure of interest group 
influence. Quantifying influence may run the risk of giving a ‘false impression of 
measurability for a phenomenon [influence] that is highly complex and 
intangible’ (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 80). Instead of seeking to quantify 
influence, I provide a qualitative assessment of interest group influence by 
drawing on different types of information to assess if, and under what 
conditions, interest groups in my four cases studies managed to influence the 
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EP’s policy outcome. Table 2.2 presents the analytical framework which I have 
used to study interest group influence in the EP, which is discussed in what 
follows. In the table, I distinguish between three main dimensions: information 
type, information source, and methodological approach. The type of information 
concerns the operationalization of Wilson’s framework. This entails the 
formulation of interview questions that shed light on both the policy process and 
the policy outcome. The information source refers to the evidence used to assess 
interest group influence. Lastly, research methods refer to the methods used to 
analyse interest group influence.  
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Table 2.2: Framework for analysing interest group influence 
 Intentional transmission of 
information 
Behaviour of decision-
makers 
Information 
type 
Interest groups’ preferences 
and participation 
 
Goal attainment 
 
Process: 
Did MEPs discuss issues 
proposed by particular        
interest groups (or cease to 
discuss) issues opposed by 
interest groups? 
 
Did any interest groups coin 
terms that became part of 
the jargon among MEPs? 
 
Outcome: 
Does the final policy 
outcome contain text 
drafted by interest groups? 
 
Does the final outcome 
reflect the preferences of 
particular interest groups? 
 Activities: 
What did interest groups do to 
pass on information to 
decision-makers? 
 
Access: 
What opportunities did        
interest groups have to     
communicate this 
information? 
 
Resources: 
What sources of leverage did 
interest groups use to 
communicate their position? 
Information 
source 
Primary texts: EU documents and lobbying material 
 
Secondary texts: press releases and media reports 
 
Interviews: 144 interviews with interest groups, European 
Commission officials, MEPs, and MEP assistants/EP advisors 
 
Observation: committee meetings, lobbying receptions,     
hearings and meetings between MEPs and interest groups 
Research 
methods 
Process-tracing: What were the causal mechanisms linking 
interest group participation with their influence?  
 
Counterfactual analysis: What would have happened if some 
interest groups had not lobbied the EP? 
 
Attained influence: To what extent are interest groups’ 
preferences reflected in the final policy outcome? 
 
Attributed influence: To what extent do interviewees perceive 
certain interest groups to have shaped policy outcomes? 
Source: Adapted table from Betsill & Corell (2001, p. 79). 
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2.2.1 Information type 
 
The type of information needed in my study to answer my research question 
relates to the empirical application of Wilson's typology. The theoretical 
framework needs to be operationalized to guide the analysis of the case studies. 
This involves ‘moving from the theoretical level to the question of relevant 
indicators’, and linking the theoretical concepts to observational properties 
(Adler-Nissen, 2009, p. 141, Isaak, 1985, p. 76). This section presents the 
interview guide and the logic behind the questions posed. It also deals with 
issues of validity and reliability. The full interview guides used in interviews with 
interest group representatives and MEPs/EP advisors can be found in the 
appendices 1-2. As can be seen from appendices 1 and 2, most of the questions 
cover elements of the theoretical framework. I asked the same questions to 
interest group representatives and key MEPs/EP advisors in all of my case 
studies. This is important in order to make the cases comparable. Without 
asking the same questions, the results cannot be satisfactory compared and 
systematically analysed. 
As can be seen from the interview guides in appendices 1 and 2, each 
main question is followed by a number of sub-questions. The purpose of the 
sub-questions is to give the interviewees the opportunity to elaborate upon their 
answers. While conducting the interviews, I would also formulate follow-up 
questions or follow-up comments on the fly to validate and dig deeper into the 
interviewees’ answers. The follow-up questions were not prepared beforehand 
but formulated on the basis of the responses to the interviewee’s answers. They 
were aimed at making the interview more like a conversation rather than being a 
barrage of questions. The interviews can be characterised by something which 
seems like a conversation, but really is a quasi-monologue on the part of the 
politicians prompted by my comments (Dexter, 1970:56). As Berry (2002, p. 
679) says about interview skills: ‘the best interviewer is not one who writes the 
best question. Rather excellent interviewers are excellent conversationalists. 
They make interviews seem like a good conversation among old friends’. I 
attempted to make the interview situation more relaxed and conversational by 
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allowing the interviewees to wander, but corralling them back if they went off on 
a tangent. All of the interviews were carried out in a semi-structured way, so that 
similar interviewees were subjected to the same interview questions. Some 
questions were open in order to encourage the interviewees to focus on what 
they found relevant and important rather than being dictated by my own 
preconceived ideas about what was important (Berry, 2002, p. 681).  
 In order to ask questions that shed light on Wilson's expectation to 
different policy types, it is necessary to gather information about interest groups 
and MEPs' preferences, interest groups' lobbying activities, and their ability to 
shape the policy outcomes of the four cases studied. The first type of question 
relates to interest groups’ and MEPs’ position on the dossier in question. Prima 
facie, it seems straight forward to establish interest groups' positions on the four 
dossiers studied. Most of the interviewed interest groups upload position papers 
on their website, where they spell out in detail how they would like the EP to 
amend the European Commission’s proposal of relevance to them. Establishing 
their preferences should, therefore, appear to be straightforward. However, 
when interest groups were asked about their preferences during the interviews, 
they often stated a position which was less ambitious to the one stated in their 
position papers. This indicates that they see themselves as part of a bargaining 
game, where it is strategic to present a more extreme position to MEPs in order 
to push the outcome in a certain direction. It is important to note that interest 
groups’ official position cannot necessarily be taken at face value. There is often 
a discrepancy between interest groups’ public demands and what they are 
privately hoping to attain. NGOs are notorious for taking up extreme positions 
to pressurise decision-makers. Moreover, interest groups may change their 
position throughout the policy process to adapt to a new situation or for 
strategic reasons. As a representative from a European employers’ federation 
expressed during interview, ‘one thing is what we fight for in the first reading, 
another thing what we do in the second reading. To be honest with you, we take 
quite an extreme position now, but we will soften up later’. 18 This highlights the 
                                                 
18
 Interview, UEAPME, 8 April 2010 
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importance of distinguishing between an interest group’s daydreams (often 
reflected in their position papers), nightmares (worst case scenario), and 
bottom-line position (often revealed during interviews). Decision-makers 
(politicians and bureaucrats) may also exaggerate their demands. For instance, 
the European Commission might toughen up its white paper to have something 
to give away later in the process. Similarly, MEPs may take up a position which 
is slightly more extreme to their own position in order to push a decision in a 
certain direction.  
The second type of question in the interview guides refers to interest 
groups’ lobbying strategies and activities during the policy making process. 
Although my study focuses mainly on the EP as a lobbying venue, my questions 
were not only limited to the EP. It is important to shed light on the entire EU 
decision-making process to understand interest groups’ lobbying strategies 
towards the EP. For instance, an interest group might not lobby MEPs if they 
have already managed to get their views included in the European Commission’s 
proposals. Furthermore, the intricacies of lobbying the EP can only be 
understood by comparing it with the other EU institutions. Questions about 
interest groups’ lobbying activities during the EP’s policy process centred on the 
type of information put forward to MEPs, the tactics they used and the timing of 
lobbying, as well as who they contacted (see appendix 1). In all interviews with 
interest groups, I showed them a list of all committee members from the 
responsible and opinion giving committees and asked them to indicate whom 
they had contacted/been contacted by, and the nature of the contact (such as 
email correspondence, face-to-face meeting, one way email contact). I also asked 
interest groups about their cooperation with other interest groups, and the 
working division between them and their European federation. MEP and MEP 
assistants/EP policy advisors were asked a range of questions about what 
interest groups they found to be particularly active in lobbying the EP on the 
dossier in question, and what role interest group information played in their 
work on the dossier. I also showed MEPs and EP advisors a list of interest 
groups, which I had identified to be active on the issue at hand, and asked them 
to indicate with whom they had been in contact and if any groups were missing 
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from my list. This also gave me the opportunity to ensure that I had interviewed 
all the relevant stakeholders.    
The last type of interview question concerned the influence of interest 
groups on the policy outcome. This entailed asking interest groups about their 
perceived influence on the dossier in question, as well as their perceived 
influence on others. Similarly key MEPs were asked why they decided to put 
forward specific amendments and if their draft report would possibly have been 
any different had they not had the opportunity to consult affected interest 
groups (see appendix 2). In some of my case studies, it was possible to detect a 
change of heart among key MEPs. In these cases, I asked MEPs why they 
changed their mind on certain aspects of the European Commission’s proposal. I 
also asked them to what extent the information provided by interest groups 
pointed to new angles in the Commission’s proposal, of which they had been 
previously unaware.  It is important to distinguish between influence exerted 
during the policy process and influence on the final outcome (as adopted by 
plenary). Interest group influence may be observed at different stages of the EP's 
policy process. They may have been successful at launching a debate about a 
particular issue during the committee debates, or managed to convince MEPs to 
put forward their favoured amendments. Due to the high number of veto points 
in the EP, amendments included in early committee draft reports may be voted 
down or lost at a later stage.  
When analysing material gained from interviews, a number of questions 
regarding validity are important to pose. For example, how do we know if the 
interviewees are telling the truth? Can we tell what the interviewees really 
believe by counting on a few questions put to them in the interviews? The 
answer is ‘no’, since this assumes that the interviewees possess some sort of 
underlying attitude to which they are firmly committed.  It also assumes that if 
interviewers use good enough interview techniques, we can make the 
interviewees spill the beans and reveal their real attitude (Dexter, 1970: 119). 
However, this is rarely the case as interviewees might have conflicting opinions 
and be inconsistent with their answers. When analysing interviews, we have to 
acknowledge that the interview answers are not objective, but rather 
75 
 
demonstrate the interviewees’ own picture of the world as they see it. Even 
descriptive answers about how interest groups go about contacting MEPs 
represent the unique perceptions of the interviewees. The interviewees’ answers 
may well be coloured by desires to represent themselves in a good light. In 
between the request for an interview and the actual interview, interviewees will 
have thought about what to say either consciously or subconsciously (Berry, 
2002, p. 680). As an interviewer, it is important to bear in mind that it is not the 
responsibility of the interviewees to be objective and provide us with the truth (if 
a truth is believed to exist). Just like researchers, interviewees have a purpose in 
the interview and something they want to say. They may want to talk about their 
work, justify their actions, and present themselves and their organisation in a 
good light. Interviews might also be affected by extraneous factors, such as 
people talking in the background or the phone ringing. Under other 
circumstances, the information given might have been different as interviews 
are highly situational. Given this, there are two questions, which are important 
to have in the back of our minds when analysing the responses: What light do 
the interview answers throw on the subjective attitudes of the interviewee? And, 
how much do the interviewees’ answers correspond with ‘objective reality’? As 
an interviewer it is important to know in what respect the interviewee’s answers 
must be taken as a reflection of their own opinion or perception, or as a 
reasonable description of how things actually are. Put in another way, the 
reliability and validity of the interviews have to be determined in order to 
evaluate their usefulness.  
  Validity and reliability are rooted in a positivist tradition, and to an 
extent, positivism can been viewed as a theory of validity and reliability (Kuzel, 
1999, pp. 33-45). Validity determines whether the means of measurement are 
accurate and whether the research truly measures that which it was intended to 
measure. Reliability indicates whether the result is replicable, i.e. that the same 
conclusions could be found if the research was repeated. It is debatable whether 
the concepts of validity and reliability can be understood and grasped in the 
same way for both quantitative and qualitative research. In quantitative research 
of a positivist nature, it is often assumed that an external reality can be 
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objectively observed and measured. Validity and reliability can be calculated by 
applying statistical tools and thereby calculating how close the research results 
are to the ‘real’ world (Mose et al, 2002). In qualitative research, we cannot 
apply statistical tools to measure and estimate whether interview answers are 
true or false with respect to an assumed external reality. Therefore, from a 
qualitative perspective, we need to view differently the concepts of validity and 
reliability (Kirk & Miller, 1986, p.19).  
How, then, can we determine validity and reliability? Qualitative scholars 
have created alternative validity criteria which can be used to examine how well 
methods explore research aims. Lincoln and Guba (1985), for instance, assess 
validity through credibility. Credibility is assessed on prolonged engagement 
with the research field, triangulation, and reflexivity (Seale, 2004, p. 77).  I have 
engaged with these criteria through the use of process-tracing and triangulation 
of the information gathered through interviews, written material, and 
observations to present a credible account of interest group influence 
(Seale:1999). Reflectivity was an essential component of this process.  
Reflexivity means thinking critically about the research experience and process, 
and considering influences on the research process which affects how well I have 
been able to gather information. Researchers are not neutral data collectors, and 
interviewees are not inanimate objects as they may try to set the agenda 
themselves. Interviews rest on social relationships; they are shaped by 
interpersonal dynamics, and the interviewer and interviewees co-produce social 
encounters. This requires researchers to be reflective about their appearance in 
the interview situation and the information gathered from the interviews. 
During and after each interview, I paid close attention to how interviewees 
reacted to me (e.g. openness, closeness, suspicion, or trust) and to the dynamic 
between me and the interviewee (e.g. relaxed/tense, friendly/unfriendly, or 
rushed/not rushed). After the interview, I also considered to what extent the 
interview was generating reliable and valid information, if there was any 
internal contraction in the interviewees’ answers or behaviour, if I had 
understood what the interviewee had told me, and if I was missing any 
information. I would always email the interviewees after the interview to thank 
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them for their time and help, and ask any questions that I might have missed out 
on in the interview.  
I assessed the validity of my interviews by paying close attention to the 
consistency of interviewees’ answers. It is important to be aware that 
respondents do not necessarily possess a consistent set of opinions as they 
might have conflicting opinions and be inconsistent with their answers; this 
does not necessarily invalidate the interviewee’s responses (Dexter, 1970: 120-
122). Furthermore, whenever possible, the information provided by interviewees 
was cross-checked using additional sources, such as the information provided by 
others and written material (for example newspaper articles, reports, and 
amendments). If the majority of participants interviewed for one case all painted 
the same picture of the role and influence of lobbying, it seems reasonable to 
believe that it is a reflection of what actually happened. My use of process-
tracing and different sub-approaches to study interest group influence – 
counter-factual analysis, attained and perceived influence – made it possible to 
triangulate the findings from the different sources. 
Determining the reliability of qualitative interview is a little trickier 
because it is not possible to achieve the exact same interview answers if the 
interviews were repeated either by me or by another researcher. Interviews are 
not neural tools of information gathering but highly situational and influenced 
by the relationship and atmosphere created between the interviewer and 
interviewee. An interview situation must be seen as just one of many situations 
in which the respondent may tell their story in different ways. However, by 
conducting each interview in the same way and by making sure that the 
questions are neutral and non-leading, the reliability of the interviews increases.  
 
2.2.2 Information source 
 
Any reliable assessment of interest group influence must rely on a variety of 
sources. As indicated in Table 2.2, I rely on four main information sources. 
Firstly, I use primary texts, which include interest groups’ position papers and 
letters/emails send to MEPs as well as EU official documents, such as European 
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Commission proposals and impact assessments, Council minutes, EP reports 
and opinions, and various internal documents. The EU’s official documents are 
particularly useful for tracing back the legislative processes and identifying the 
changes introduced to the Commission’s proposal during the different stages of 
the EP's decision-making procedure. Interest groups’ position papers and 
amendments sent to MEPs were important in order to identify interest groups’ 
preferences on specific aspects of a dossier, as well as their preference 
attainment. Most lobbying position papers are available on interest groups’ 
websites, whereas amendments and emails send to MEPs were obtained during 
interviews. The second category of information includes secondary texts, such as 
newspaper articles and press releases. Press releases include those released by 
interest groups and EU institutions. Interest groups’ press releases say 
something important about interest groups’ reaction to changes of a proposal 
during the decision-making process and form part of their ‘outside’ strategies to 
lobby the EP. Newspaper articles are important to understand the frames used 
to understand issues as well as the salience of issues.  
The third informational source includes my own observations of 
committee meetings, lobbying receptions, hearings, and meetings between 
MEPs and interest groups. During my fieldwork in Brussels, I attended all the 
EP committee meetings in which my four case studies were debated and 
attended numerous lobbying receptions and events organised by interest 
groups. During my fieldwork in Brussels, I had a visitor pass to the EP, which 
allowed me to enter the EP’s premises whenever needed. I spent many days 
attending and observing committee meetings, political group meetings, interest 
group hearings, and lobbying receptions. The committee and political group 
meetings gave me a valuable insight into the debates and controversies 
surrounding each of my four case studies, as well as the importance MEPs 
attached to different aspects of the dossiers. The lobbying receptions and events 
gave me first-hand experience with how interest groups seek to nurture their 
long-term contacts with MEPs. These events raise awareness about interest 
groups’ existence and position on specific policies, which are useful when 
lobbying on specific dossiers. One such example was a lobbying event organised 
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by the Warner Brothers, which I attended in November 2010. The Warner 
Brothers invited MEPs along to a food and wine reception followed by a pre-
screening of the latest Harry Potter movie. Before the movie started, a 
representative of Warner Brothers briefly explained their position on an on-
going directive on copyright rules. While MEPs and assistants present at the 
event were aware that they were being lobbied, they would most likely 
remember to consult this lobby group next time the EP deals with copyright 
rules. Raising awareness and visibility is often the purpose behind interest 
groups giving MEPs small gifts, such as free cinema tickets and dinner. I did not 
only attend lobbying events organised by the interest groups included in my 
study, but also those organised by other groups to see how MEPs/EP policy 
advisors generally interact with interest groups on a daily basis. Lobbying 
receptions are very common in Brussels, and interest groups frequently invite 
MEPs and their assistants to events in one of the numerous bars on Place 
Luxembourg, the square in front of the EP in Brussels. I attended many of these 
events and spoke informally to both the organisers on what they hoped to get 
out of these events and with the participants on why they attended the events. I 
became aware of these events through people I knew working in the EP and 
flyers hanging in the EP advertising these receptions. When seeking to gain 
access to these lobbying receptions, I would explain to the organisers that I was 
doing research on interest groups’ contact patterns with MEPs and their staff, 
and I was therefore interested in attending their event.  
The last category of information includes interviews with interest groups, 
European Commission officials, MEPs, and MEP assistants/EP advisors. Table 
2.3 shows the number of interviews conducted for each case study; 144 in-depth 
interviews were conducted between April 2009 and October 2011. During this 
period I was based in Brussels as a visiting researcher at the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS). Appendix 4 provides a complete list of all the 
interviewees in anonymised form. The majority of the general interviews were 
conducted at the beginning of my PhD as a pilot study used as a broad 
exploration of my topic. Two of the general interviews included interviews with 
members of Jerzy Buzek’s cabinet (President of the EP from 2009 to 2011) on 
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the EP’s revision of its lobbying rules following the cash for laws lobbying 
scandal in March 2011.  
 
Table 2.3: Number of interviews conducted 
 Vans 
regulation 
Food 
labelling 
Working 
time 
Maternity 
leave 
General 
interviews 
MEPs 4 1 4 6 2 
EP policy 
advisors/ 
Assistants 
6 9 18 19 4 
Business groups 10 11 6 11 4 
Labour unions - - 2 4  
NGOs 2 5 - 6 1 
European 
Commission 
officials 
2 - 1 2 2 
Permanent 
representations 
2 - - 1 - 
Total 25 26 31 49 13 
 
All interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewee and then 
transcribed in full. This painstaking work has its benefits as it makes it easier to 
compare answers to different questions. A tape recorder gives a complete record 
of the interview; however, it might also inhibit the interviewees from being as 
frank as they would have been if the conversation was not recorded. At the 
beginning of each interview, I would tell the interviewee that they could tell me 
to switch off the tape recorder at any time during the interview. Towards the end 
of each interview, I turned off the tape-recorder and asked the interviewee if I 
should have asked them any questions that I did not ask them. This gave the 
interviewee the possibility to talk about aspects of the case they might have felt 
uncomfortable talking about while being recorded. Most interviewee did not 
seem to be bothered by being recorded. Furthermore, the interviewees were 
given the possibility to read the interview transcript and comment once I had 
transcribed it. When sending transcriptions to interviewees, I would always 
write that if they had any comments, I would appreciate that they get back to me 
before a specified date. Most interviewees did not object to any of the 
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transcriptions. Instead they were helpful in elaborating their answers further 
and in adding certain aspects, which they felt had been left out.  
Each interview usually lasted one and a half hours with the shortest 
interview lasting forty minutes and the longest five hours. As indicated by the 
small number of MEPs interviewed, it was extremely difficult to get interviews 
with MEPs, but MEP assistants and EP policy advisors were usually open to 
being interviewed anonymously. The interviews with the assistants and the EP 
officials were generally more useful because they proved to be more open to 
talking about lobbying than MEPs. In many ways, MEP assistants and EP policy 
advisors act as the ‘de facto’ legislators of the EP because they often write the 
reports and amendments on behalf of their MEPs. As one assistant explained to 
me in interview: 
 
Usually my MEP leaves it to me to write the report and I negotiate 
with the assistants from the other political groups to find a 
compromise…later in the process, you try not to make your MEP too 
interested in the dossier as he may destroy the deal that has been 
sealed if he suddenly starts paying attention.19 
 
MEP assistants and policy advisors are as much, and often more, involved in the 
scrutiny of a proposal as key MEPs. Often MEP assistants hold meetings with 
interest groups on behalf of their MEP and draft amendments. This means that 
the low number of MEPs interviewed for my study is not likely to have 
influenced my conclusions as I had access to assistants and policy advisors of 
key MEPs. Moreover, politicians are not always the most useful informants 
because they are experts in holding back information about their intentions and 
perceptions (Neumann, 2005). As the American philosopher Will Durant once 
remarked, ‘To say nothing, especially when speaking, is half the art of 
diplomacy’ (Adler-Nissen, 2009, p. 151). This art was unquestionably also 
practiced during my interviews with MEPs. For instance, when I asked the 
question, ‘what interest groups have you consulted on this dossier’, they would 
usually reply that they talk to everyone who wants a meeting with them, when in 
                                                 
19
 Interview, MEP assistant, 15 April 2010 
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fact many interest group representatives had told me that the particular MEP 
had refused to talk with them. However, when talking about their colleagues and 
lobbying in general, they would be much more open. Politicians are experienced 
interviewees and often careful about how they answer questions. Their answers 
may reflect their desire to appear accountable to the public (Dexter, 1970). Many 
of the interviewed MEPs gave measured answers, and no particularly 
controversial material was gained from these interviews. Before turning to my 
methodological approach, I want to elaborate on how I identified the universe of 
relevant interviewees in my four case study arenas to which the next subsection 
turns. 
 
2.2.2.1 Identifying the universe of interviewees 
 
All dossiers go through an arena full of critical stakeholders (interest groups and 
decision-makers). An arena is not a physical place, but a listing of all 
stakeholders and their interests at stake on a specific dossier. Just like a 
professional lobbyist, I need to know who to contact. The best way to go about 
this depends on the specific dossier and the specific arena. Van Schendelen’s 
(2010) advice to lobby groups on how to scan an arena and prudently prepare 
for the EU lobbying battlefield is highly relevant for my preparatory homework 
of identifying the stakeholders involved and the issues at stake in my four case 
studies. Inspired by Van Schendelen’s book More Machiavelli in Brussels - The 
Art of Lobbying the EU (2010), I divided each of the arenas of my four case 
studies into three components: stakeholders, issues, and arena boundaries (Van 
Schendelen, 2010, pp. 158-179).  
After having studied the changes the EP introduced to the European 
Commission’s proposals (i.e. changes introduced in the rapporteur’s first draft 
report, the final committee report and the plenary report at both first and 
second readings), I drew up a long list of all the possible stakeholders involved 
in each of my four case studies. This inventory of stakeholders included all the 
interest groups that had given contributions to the European Commission’s 
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consultations, interest groups I had found to be active during the policy-process, 
the European Commission’s chef de dossier, key MEPs, and assistants and 
policy advisors to key MEPs. For each of my four case studies I came up with an 
enormous list of potentially relevant interviewees. Thereafter, the identified 
stakeholders were assessed in terms of their relevance and importance. I define 
a relevant stakeholder as someone who is actively involved on a dossier. The 
stakeholders were placed along two continua: one ranging from weak to strong 
influence potentials, another from passive to active (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 
1997). The first continuum - weak to strong influence potentials - covers my 
theoretical expectations about the influence potentials of different interest 
groups, and refers to an interest group’s resources (expertise and staff size) and 
type of interest group (labour union, NGO, firm, European federation etc.). The 
second continuum covers the interest groups, MEPs, and EP policy 
advisors/assistants active in the policy process of my four case studies. It was 
not an easy task to identify which interest groups to contact as the number of 
active interest groups is countless, including European federations, national 
associations, European NGOs, national NGOs, public affairs consultancies, 
companies, and institutional lobbyists (member states and their permanent 
representations). The European Commission’s list of consulted stakeholders 
amounted to around 60 interest groups per dossier included in the 
Commission’s impact assessment. In order to get an overview of the most 
affected and active groups, I started by interviewing the European Commission’s 
chef de dossier. This also proved extremely helpful for understanding the 
controversies surrounding each of my case studies at its early stages (between 
the European Commission’s green paper and white paper), and to see how the 
views of different interest groups had been incorporated into the European 
Commission’s formal proposal.  
I also phoned up the stakeholders listed on the European Commission’s 
consultation list to ask them how active they had been on the file in question and 
to find out how relevant they were to interview for my research. It quickly 
turned out that only around 20 key interest groups remained active on each of 
the dossiers once the proposal had been formally put forward to the EP. Many 
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interest groups limited their lobbying activity to submitting a position paper in 
response to the European Commission’s online consultation. This raises the 
question that if interest groups see the European Commission as the main 
lobbying addressee, does this relegate the EP to a lobbying sideshow? When 
asked why they had not lobbied the EP, interest group representatives usually 
gave two answers. Firstly, that they lacked the necessary resources to lobby 
actively, and/or that the specific issue was not important enough for them to 
invest time and money to continue the lobbying. They all found that it took 
fewer resources to send a short position paper to the European Commission 
than to actively engage in lobbying the EP. When the European Commission 
publishes its white papers, it is usually more tightly focused on a few issues than 
its initial green papers, where it is trying out various ideas and seeking 
inspiration from stakeholders. This means that during a dossier's lifetime, many 
stakeholders become part of a larger coalition and most issues part of a smaller 
package. Active interest groups’ preferences were identified based on their 
position papers and specific amendments sent to MEPs, as well as their position 
submitted during the European Commission’s public consultation. Identifying 
the relevant stakeholders in the EP proved to be a much easier task. As seen in 
Chapter 1, only a few MEPs are active on a dossier due to the workload in the EP 
and the working division within the EP’s political groups. My list included key 
MEPs (rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs, coordinators and particularly active 
MEPs), together with their assistants and the EP officials working on the dossier 
in question.  
All the relevant stakeholders identified were divided into stakeholders of 
primary and secondary importance. The most relevant are the primary 
stakeholders, which are identified as both highly active and potentially highly 
influential. The list of stakeholders of secondary importance are not discarded, 
but saved on a memory list in case they join the primary group later in the 
legislative process. An interest group may seem passive but may actually be like 
a seemingly sleeping cat on a roof watching birds. Vice versa, the noisiest 
interest groups may be like barking dogs that do not bite (Van Schendelen, 2010, 
p. 165). An interest group may be passive at the EP’s committee stage, and 
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become active prior to the plenary, or be passive in the first reading, but active 
in the second reading. It is important to be aware that the composition of an 
arena is not static, like still photography, but often takes unexpected twists and 
turns. A researcher, therefore, needs to ‘film’ an arena constantly and keep an 
eye on the ‘boundary traffic’ to update the stakeholder list. Just as the arena 
changes over time, so does its composition. New issues can be introduced, and 
new stakeholders can be attracted. A dossier that attracts increased media 
attention is likely to attract new stakeholders and issues. Interest groups can 
also leave an arena, for example, because their attention shifts to another 
dossier (Van Schendelen, 2010). The remainder of this chapter zooms in on the 
methodological approach used in the thesis. 
 
2.2.3 Methodological approach 
 
Wilson’s politics of policy typology is particularly useful for bringing to light the 
causal mechanism that links the independent variable (policy type) with the 
dependent variable (interest group influence). The working assumption is that 
cases falling within the same category have similar outcomes. It is, however, 
important to be sensitive to the presence of equifinality, which means that even 
though the outcome of different cases belonging to the same category might be 
the same, the process to the outcome may differ significantly. Using process-
tracing, researchers can analyse how cases that belong to the same category 
arrived at the same outcome through different paths (George & Bennett, 2004, 
pp. 161-162). If the research findings show that cases assigned theoretically to 
the same category have different empirical outcomes, the hypothesised causal 
relationship is called into question. Additional variables may then need to be 
taken into account in order to advance the theory, or specify under what 
conditions the theory holds up. I use process-tracing as my primary method to 
examine interest group influence combined with the (sub-)methods of 
counterfactual analysis, attained influence, and attributed influence. Process-
tracing can be seen as the overall methodological approach that includes the 
other three (sub-) approaches.  
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The purpose of process tracing is to ‘assess the causality by recording 
each element of the causal chain’ (Zurn, 1998, p. 640), and uncovering the 
various factors leading to a specific policy outcome. Gerring (2007) has defined 
the method of process-tracing as getting ‘inside the box’ by meticulously 
examining the mechanisms and events that shape policy outcomes. Process-
tracing allows the researcher to ‘peer into the box of causality to the 
intermediate causes lying between some cause and its purported effect’ (Gerring, 
2004, p. 348). Similarly, Roberts (1996, p. 66) describes process-tracing as ‘the 
minute tracing of the explanatory narrative to a point where the events to be 
explained are microscopic and the covering laws correspondingly more certain’. 
Methodologically, I draw on what Hall (2003, p. 394) calls systematic process 
analysis, where ‘the point is to see if the multiple sources and statements of the 
actors of each stage of the causal process are constituent with the image of the 
world implied by each theory’. The assessment of interest groups’ influence 
involved a close examination of the changes MEPs introduced to the European 
Commission’s proposal, and investigating how these changes came about. This 
detective work was done by scrutinising active interest groups’ preferences 
closely, their influence attempts, MEPs/EP policy advisors’ response/non-
response to these influence attempts, interest groups’ preference attainment, 
and interviewees’ perception of interest group influence. The base point for the 
process-tracing (t0) was the European Commission’s formal proposal and the 
end point was the final report (t1) adopted by the EP at either first or second 
reading, depending on the length of the process. 
The in-depth gestalt-oriented nature of process-tracing highlights the 
importance of paying close attention to the process preceding the policy 
outcomes. This involves asking questions about what issues were discussed, and 
what terminology (frames) were used to discuss the issue in question. 
Disregarding the policy process prior to the policy outcome may result in the 
risk of overlooking examples of interest group influence. Interest groups may 
have been successful in raising a debate about an issue or managing to get MEPs 
to pay closer attention to an issue than they would otherwise have done. Interest 
groups may also have influenced the jargon used during policy debates in the EP 
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committees and plenary. As Bettelli et al (1997) show, green NGOs have been 
particularly successful at inventing the term ‘hot air’ in Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations.  
Process-tracing is not just a detailed description of the mechanism and 
events shaping policy outcomes, but it also allows the researcher to analyse 
these phenomena with reference to external criteria. In my case, process-tracing 
enables me to examine if, and under what conditions, policy shapes politics in 
the EP. Since process-tracing takes a narrative shape, the number of falsification 
points are maximised and spurious correlations between events can more easily 
be uncovered (Young, 2010, p. 58). This makes it possible to examine to what 
extent interest groups’ preference attainment was due to their lobbying efforts 
or simply pure luck. The main strength of process-tracing is that it provides the 
researcher with detailed knowledge of the different factors leading to a policy 
outcome. Process-tracing provides high internal validity and makes it possible to 
test rival theories and advance existing theory. The method is particularly useful 
for generating and examining causal mechanisms. The close attention to the 
process leading to the outcome reduces the risk of inferential errors that arise 
from studies that only look at the extent to which interest groups have their 
preferences reflected in the final policy outcome.  
Despite its advantages, process-tracing also suffers from some 
limitations. Firstly, process-tracing is extremely demanding empirically given 
the number of causal steps in a chain that require empirical examination, 
together with the plethora of actors and interactions involved. These heavy 
empirical demands may make it difficult to cover all the steps in a causal chain 
from interest group activities to policy outcomes. This may result in an 
underestimation of influence if the method is used too strictly as ‘the absence of 
proof may be taken as proof of absence’ (Dür, 2008, p. 563). It can be tempting 
for a researcher to conclude that no influence was exerted if a link in the causal 
chain cannot be identified when, in fact, the researcher is confronted with 
insufficient sources to establish a link. For example, lobbying that is hidden, 
with no detectable lobbying activities, may lead a researcher to conclude that no 
influence has been exerted. The second weakness of process-tracing is that the 
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heavy empirical demands involved in the method makes it most suitable for 
small N-studies. This raises the question of generalisability, i.e. to what extent it 
is possible to generalise the case study findings beyond the cases studied. Case 
studies may present the problem of generalisability because the limited number 
of cases studied may render the generalisation of findings unreliable. However, 
since the aim of my research is to understand under what conditions policy 
shapes politics in the EP, case studies can be used to uncover or advance a 
theory about a particular causal mechanism (Lijphart, 1971: 691). Case studies 
are particularly well-suited to deal with complexity because they are ideally 
situated to explore the sequence of events bringing about a certain outcome 
rather than only focusing the research lens on the outcome (Peters, 1998, p. 
141). Case studies are useful for the development of contingent generalisations 
that can explain well-defined cases. However, this often comes at the expense of 
the parsimony and wide applicability of research findings (George & Bennett, 
2004, p. 31). This does not mean that one cannot say anything beyond the 
borders of a small N-study. Generalisation can be made possible if selecting 
cases that represent least-likely or most-likely cases, and cases that are 
‘especially representative of the phenomenon under study or choosing “crucial” 
cases’ (Gerring, 2004, p. 347). The detailed knowledge gained about case studies 
when using process-tracing makes it possible for the researcher to identify 
underlining causal mechanisms at work, which is likely to be applicable to a vast 
number of cases with similar characteristics. My cases constitute most-likely 
cases of Wilson’s different politics categories. 
Counterfactual analysis constitutes my second methodological approach 
to assess interest group influence. Counterfactual analysis is an imaginary 
construct that emphasises the importance of imagining what might have 
happened if one or more variables were removed from the chain of events 
(Biersteker, 1995, p. 318). This involves asking interviewees how they think the 
policy process and outcome would have looked in the absence of lobbying. 
Although such an imaginative thought construct can only be based on guesswork 
- because we do not have the alternative scenario of no lobbying to compare with 
- it does highlight interviewees' perception of the impact of lobbying. 
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Counterfactual analysis is similar to the method of attributed influence because 
it relies on interviewees’ perceptions of events or non-events.  
The third and fourth approaches used in the thesis to assess interest 
group influence in the EP are that of interest groups’ attained and perceived 
influence. Attained influence involves analysing to what extent different interest 
groups have their preferences reflected in the final policy outcome. This 
approach has the advantage of capturing all aspects of influence, and also those 
that are not easily observable, such as lobbying taking place behind closed doors 
or structural power at work (Klüver, 2013, p. 61). However, the approach also 
has its weaknesses. Goal attainment does not necessarily indicate causation 
between an interest group’s lobbying activity and the policy outcome because 
preference realisation may be due to sheer luck rather than influence (Barry, 
1980a, 1980b). Furthermore, preference attainment neither takes into account 
‘piggy-backing’ on the influence of other interest groups nor the event of 
counter-lobbying. Even if an interest group does not have its views reflected in 
the policy outcome, it may have been successful in avoiding an even worse 
outcome by engaging in counter-lobbying (Austen-Smith & Wright, 1994). In 
order to dig deeper into the process preceding the policy outcome, I asked 
interest groups to assess their own influence, as well as their perception of the 
influence of others. It is important to note that the answers obtained when 
asking interviewees to assess their own and others’ influence is a reflection of 
perceptions rather than influence per se. Interest groups may for instance 
exaggerate their influence (to legitimise their activities for their members), or 
downplay their influence (to avoid counter-lobbying). This problem can be 
solved by cross-checking with assessment provided by other interviewees. 
Interest groups' claims of influence were strengthened by using the methods of 
process-tracing and counterfactual analysis, both of which allowed me to focus 
on the causal mechanisms linking interest groups’ preferences with possible 
influence. However, the weaknesses of each of the four methods used were 
overcome when used in the combination and triangulating them against one 
another.  
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2.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explained the method used in the present study. I have outlined 
the rationale of case selection, the operationalization of Wilson’s framework and 
its application to the empirical world, and the utility of using process-tracing to 
shed light on the research question. The chapter has developed an analytical 
framework for analysing interest group influence, which uses multiple 
information types, information sources, and methodological approaches. The 
framework is not only confined to the EP, but can be used in other institutional 
settings. I contend that the assessment of interest group influence has two 
important dimensions: (1) interest groups need to communicate information to 
decision-makers; (2) decision-makers need to alter or establish their position as 
a response to that information. This double focus allows me to focus on the type 
of information transmitted by interest groups and their lobbying tactics, as well 
as whether or not MEPs responded by altering their behaviour. Wilson’s 
typology is particularly helpful in this regard because it not only provides 
hypotheses about the policy outcome, but also the process leading to the 
outcome. I use the method of process-tracing to create a logical chain of 
evidence of interest group influence; I have gathered information on the 
lobbying activities of interest groups, their access to MEPs, to what extent MEPs 
responded to the information supplied by interest groups, and whether these 
responses were in line with certain interest groups’ position (Betsill & Corell, 
2001). These various types of evidence enable me to make qualitative 
judgements on the levels of interest group influence.  
The combination of process-tracing and typological theory is particularly 
useful for uncovering the interaction effects and causal mechanism at work in 
my four case studies. Wilson's typology helps to deductively outline the 
interactions and causal mechanisms I expect to find in each of the categories in 
Wilson’s four-fold typology. Process-tracing makes it possible to examine if the 
theoretical expectations hold up empirically. The method of process-tracing 
provides me with a rich empirical account of the different factors contributing to 
the policy outcomes in the four case studies. Wilson’s typology offers a 
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conceptual map that helps to organise the empirical findings into meaningful 
narratives. As such it provides a theoretical lens through which the empirical 
findings are analysed and allowed me to peer into the box of causality. The 
analytical framework presented in this chapter makes it possible both study 
interest group activities and influence.  
The next four chapters are devoted to presenting my analyses and 
findings of my four case studies; each chapter deals with a separate case. The 
chapters follow a similar structure by first introducing the European 
Commission’s proposal and the cost/benefit profile of the proposal as specified 
in the Commission’s impact assessment. I then present the positions and 
strategies of the involved interest groups. This is followed by an overview of the 
changes introduced to the Commission’s proposal at the different stages of the 
EP’s decision-making procedure. Lastly, I discuss the factors contributing to the 
policy outcomes.  
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Chapter 3: Regulating CO2 Emissions for vans. Is the European 
Parliament Still a Defender of Environmental Interests?  
 
In February 2011, the EP adopted legislation to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 
(CO2) from light commercial vehicles (known as the vans regulation) after 
reaching a first reading agreement with the Council. The EP agreed to a text that 
watered down the European Commission’s proposal by voting to lower CO2 
emission targets proposed for vans and by reducing penalties for non-
compliance. While the majority of MEPs took the view that ‘the van industry's 
dire economic situation and long production cycles merit more carrot and less 
stick’ (EurActiv, 29 September 2010), environmental organisations and several 
MEPs criticised the EP for caving in to lobbying pressure from the automobile 
industry and voting against the interests of consumers, small businesses, and 
the environment.  
 The vans regulation is a typical example of entrepreneurial politics, in 
which the costs of tightening environmental standards are concentrated on a 
specific and easily identifiable group (the automobile industry), and the benefits 
widely distributed to society as a whole. In such a scenario, the general 
expectation is for opponents to have strong incentives to mobilise in order for 
their burdens be reduced or at least not increased, whereas those benefiting 
from a policy lack selective incentives necessary for overcoming typical barriers 
to collective action (Olson, 1965). Policy will be blocked, or watered down, by 
vested interests that benefit from the status quo unless a policy entrepreneur 
takes an active role in guiding the legislation towards fruition.  
The EP is often portrayed as a policy champion for environmental groups 
because it generally suggests amendments with a higher level of protection than 
those put forward by the Council. The EP is usually seen as the ‘greenest’ of the 
EU institutions, performing an important leadership role in EU environmental 
policy (Lenschow, 2010; Zito, 2000, p. 4). Indeed, several scholars have referred 
to the EP as an environmental champion (Burns, 2005), and a defender of 
environmental interests (Weale et al., 2000) that is ‘predestined to save the 
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earth’ (Judge, 1992). This reputation has been earned mainly due to the 
activities of the EP’s Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety committee 
(ENVI), which is responsible for drawing up reports on approximately 25 per 
cent of policies proposed by the European Commission under the ordinary 
legislative procedure (Burns & Carter, 2010). Case-study findings from studies 
on auto-emissions (Warleigh, 2000; Pedler, 2002; Wurzel, 2002) and tobacco 
control (Judge & Earnshaw, 2006) find that ENVI is particularly open to the 
views of diffuse interests, and has pushed for policy outcomes favourable to 
environmental interests. Some scholars argue that ‘environmental NGOs have a 
natural ally in the shape of the EP, whose members are quick to take up 
concerns popular with their electorate’ (see for instance Greenwood, 2011, p. 
158).  
The EP’s position on the vans regulation challenges the EP’s reputation as 
a policy champion for environmental interests because the EP did not appear to 
constitute a particularly sympathetic venue for the advancement of 
environmental interests. This chapter aims to explain why the EP accepted a text 
that diluted the environmental ambition of the European Commission’s 
proposal instead of serving as a policy champion for environmental groups. The 
chapter is organised as follows. The following section introduces the vans 
regulation and its background. I then examine the various arguments used by 
the car industry and environmental interests. Lastly, the impact of lobbying on 
the EP’s policy process and outcome is analysed. 
 
3.1 The European Commission’s proposal 
 
While greenhouse gas emissions have been declining in non-transport sectors, 
CO2 emissions from transport have continued to rise. Despite significant 
improvements in vehicle motor technology, in particular in fuel efficiency, CO2 
emissions from vans have continued to rise as a result of increased demand for 
transport and vehicle size (ten Brink, 2010, pp. 179-181). Light commercial 
vehicles are mainly used by businesses, including small and medium enterprises 
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(SMEs), and make up 12 per cent of the EU’s car fleet. Unlike many other 
industries - such as the electricity, steel, and chemical industries - the transport 
industry is not governed by the EU’s emissions trading scheme. Instead, road 
transport is part of the EU’s climate effort sharing agreement (Decision 
406/2009/EC), which sets out a ten per cent reduction of emissions in 2020 
compared with 2005 levels for sectors not covered by the EU’s emissions trading 
scheme, i.e. transport, buildings, agriculture and waste (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union, 2009 ).  
 In November 2009, the European Commission put forward a proposal to 
reduce the CO2 emissions from vans. The need for regulating CO2 emissions 
from both passenger cars and light commercial vehicles arose as a result of the 
automobile industry’s failure to meet its own voluntary targets. The proposal for 
a vans regulation suggested that from 1 July 2013, the average specific emissions 
of new vans registered in the Community should not exceed 175 g CO2/km. This 
target was suggested to be phased in gradually from 1 January 2014 onwards, 
with full compliance of the new light commercial fleet from 2016. The proposal 
also set a long-term target of 135 g/km to be achieved from 2020 subject to 
confirmation of its feasibility on the basis of updated impact assessment results. 
The key aspects of the proposal are: 
 
 It will apply to light commercial vehicles of category N1 (vehicles used for 
the carriage of goods), with a maximum weight of 2610 kg. Emission 
limits are set according to a utility function based on weight (mass), using 
a limit value curve.20 Only the fleet average is regulated, so manufacturers 
are allowed to produce vehicles with emissions above the limit value 
curve as long as the manufacturer’s overall fleet average of 175 g CO2/km 
is achieved.  
                                                 
20 The limit value curve indicates the fleet average to be achieved by all cars registered in the EU, 
which usually allows higher emission for heavier cars and vans than lighter cars and vans as long 
as the overall fleet average is met. 
95 
 
 It includes provisions to promote eco-innovations. Under this provision, 
up to 7 g/km can be deducted from the average of a manufacturer’s 
specific CO2 emissions for innovative technologies that reduce emissions. 
 Producers that fail to comply with these limits have to pay fines that are 
rather low for a slight overshoot, but increase the more a manufacturer 
goes over the target.  
 Flexibility is given to niche manufacturers: manufacturers producing up 
to 22,000 units per year are subject to a small volume derogation, 
whereby they will negotiate an individual target with the European 
Commission.21 
 
The proposal mirrors many aspects of the existing car CO2 regulation in terms 
of the applied utility parameter (weight), phase-in, a short-term and a 2020 
long-term CO2 reduction target, credits for eco-innovations, and super-credits 
(multiple counting of vehicles with particularly low emissions). Table 3.1 
compares the passenger cars regulation with the vans regulation, showing both 
the European Commission’s proposal and the final law as adopted between the 
EP and the Council. Given that many of the modalities were already in place, the 
discussion on the vans regulation focused on a limited number of issues, mainly 
the long-term target and the phase-in period. This meant that there was little 
room for manoeuvre for interest groups to change the thrust of the legislation 
because it had to comply with the basic principles laid out in the passenger cars 
legislation.  
                                                 
21 This derogation was not in the European Commission’s early drafts but was included after 
intense lobbying from Jaguar Land Rover.  
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Table 3.1: The passenger cars and vans regulations compared 
 
Key provisions Passenger cars Vans 
Commission 
proposal, 
19 /12/2007 
Final text, 
23/04/2009 
Commission 
proposal, 
30/09/2009 
Final text, 
11/05/2011 
Utility parameter  Mass Mass Mass Mass 
Slope 60 % 60 % 100 % 100 % 
Short-term target 130 g CO2/km by 
2012 (in earlier 
drafts it was 120 g 
CO2/km) 
130 g CO2/km by 
2015 with phase-
in from 2012-
2015 
(65%/75%/80%, 
100%) 
175 g CO2/km by 
2016, with phase-
in from 2014 to 
2016 (75%/80%/ 
100%) 
175 g CO2/km by 
2017 with phase-in 
from 2014 to 2017 
(70%/75%/80%/ 
100%) 
Long-term aim/target 95 g CO2/km               
by 202022 
95 g CO2/km               
by 2020 
135 g CO2/km               
by 2020 
147 g CO2/km               
by 2020 
The excess premium €95 per gram €95 per gram €120 per gram €95 per gram 
Niche derogation None ≤30,00023 ≤22,000 ≤22,000 
 
Source: European Commission (2007, 2009), European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2009 2011b).  
 
                                                 
22 The proposal included a broad aim for reducing emissions to 95g CO2/km by 2020, although this was not called a target. 
23
 Manufacturers producing less than 30,000 units per year can apply for individual targets. 
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Some of the most controversial points of the passenger cars regulation – such as 
the applied utility parameter and the exact slant of the utility curve – were not 
subject to debate on the vans regulation. CO2 emissions limits for cars and vans 
are differentiated on the basis of an objective vehicle attribute - a utility 
parameter - which might be defined according to vehicle mass (maximum 
payload), footprint (wheelbase are a multiplied by width), and pan area (vehicle 
length multiplied by width). The drawback with using weight as a utility 
parameter is that manufacturers may deliberately increase a model’s weight to 
avoid significant emission reductions. This perverse incentive could result in a 
rise rather than a reduction in CO2 emissions. Footprint utility parameters limit 
the risk of this perverse incentive as there is a limit to how big, as opposed to 
how heavy, a vehicle can be. Although several technical merits spoke for the use 
of footprint during the discussion on the passenger cars regulation, the 
practicability tilted the balance in favour of mass, and therefore mass was also 
used a parameter for the vans regulation (ten Brink, 2010, pp. 42-43).  
During the discussions of the passenger cars regulation in 2008, the exact 
slant of the utility curve was a point of intense debate between car 
manufacturers, pitting low-emitting car-producers (Fiat, Peugeot Citroën, and 
Renault) against German premium brands (Mercedes and BMW). As Porsche’s 
chief executive declared in an interview with the New York Times on 7 February 
2007, ‘[there] is a business war in Europe. It’s the French and Italians up against 
the Germans’ (Bilefsky, 2007). The flatter the utility curve is, the more difficult 
achieving the target becomes for heavier vehicles. Vice versa, the steeper the 
curve, the less effort required. Manufacturers of larger cars wanted a slope of 
nearer 80 %, and those of small vehicles a slope of 20-30 % (Hormandinger, 
2008). However, the slant of the utility curve was not a controversial point 
under the vans regulation because the van market is more homogenous than the 
passenger car market. Although the main thrust of the vans regulation had to 
comply with the passenger cars regulation, lobbying was not rendered 
unimportant. Even small technical adjustments may incur significant costs on 
industry groups. In particular, the European Commission’s long-term 2020 
target of 135 g Co2/km was subject to heated debate in the EP because it 
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imposed significant short- term costs on car manufacturers to invest in new 
technologies and change their production cycle to meet the target.  
 
3.1.1 The cost/benefit profile of the proposal 
 
The European Commission’s impact assessment was conducted by the British 
consultancy company Ricardo-AEA, which specialises in providing analysis and 
advice on economically sustainable solutions for environmental challenges. The 
report was written in cooperation with the consultancy companies TNO and CE 
Delft. The European Commission requested an assessment of the costs of three 
long-term 2020 targets for vans: 125, 150, and 175 g/km. This was assessed by 
estimating the potentials for downsizing and completely hybridising light 
commercial vehicles. The impact assessment considered the feasibility of the 
three CO2 target levels for 2020 and the associated costs (expressed as retail 
price increases using 2007 as the base year). This led to the following average 
cost estimation of relative retail price increases of vans: 
 
 A 2020 target of 125 g CO2/km for new vans was seen as technically 
feasible, assuming that light-weight constructions can be widely used. 
The costs for reaching this target were estimated to lead to a 20 to 30% 
increase in the retail price compared to 2007. 
 A 2020 target of 150 g CO2/km for new vans was estimated to lead to a 
retail price increase between 10 and 14% compared to 2007. 
 A 2020 target of 175 g CO2/km for new vans was estimated to lead to a 
retail price increase between 3 to 4% compared to 2007. 
 
Retail price is inclusive of vehicle taxes but exclusive of VAT. Costs in the petrol 
segment of light commercial vehicles were estimated to be extremely high.  The 
report also stated that petrol vans vehicles make up only 2% of the vans sales in 
Europe and, therefore, manufacturers were assumed not to make a large effort 
in reducing CO2 emissions from their petrol vans. The high additional costs for 
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petrol vehicles were estimated to lead to a shift from petrol to diesel vans. Table 
3.2 lists the costs and benefits mentioned in the impact assessment. The costs 
are mainly concentrated on car manufacturers in terms of increased production 
costs, although some of these costs will result in increases retail price for 
consumers (AEA, 2009).  
 
Table 3.2: Cost/benefit analysis 
Costs Benefits 
 Costs imposed on car-
manufacturers associated with 
downsizing engines, 
hybridisation vans, and reducing 
weights of vehicles 
 Costs for consumers: increased 
retail prices 
 Prevent fragmentation of the 
internal market 
 Prevent a risk of regulatory gap 
 Encourages the automotive sector 
to invest in new technologies 
 Improves fuel efficiency of light 
commercial vehicles and fuel costs, 
and reduces energy consumption  
Source: AEA, 2009  
 
As can be seen from the table, the impact assessment mentioned four benefits 
from setting CO2 emissions standards for light commercial vehicles. Firstly, 
adopting EU targets for new light commercial vehicles is seen as necessary in 
order to prevent fragmentation in the internal market resulting from the 
adoption of different measures in the EU’s member states. Secondly, setting 
CO2 emission standards for new light commercial vehicles prevents the risk of a 
regulatory gap resulting from a certain overlap between the registrations for 
passenger cars and light commercial vehicles. Thirdly, the report stated that it is 
important to encourage the automotive sector to invest in new technologies. 
Lastly, regulation of CO2 emissions from vans reduces energy consumption and 
fuel costs. In the European Commission’s formal proposal, it settled on a long-
term target of 135 g CO2/km. This number was decided by the College of 
Commissioners and was included in the impact assessment.  All the interviewed 
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representatives of the car industry deemed the 135 g CO2/km target unrealistic 
and found it regrettable that this target was not included in the impact 
assessment.  They saw the Commission’s long term target as a tactical approach 
as ‘the Commission knew it would change and  proposed a target that was low to 
make sure that the final target was not too high, but somewhere in the middle’.24 
All interviewed representatives from the car industry found that the impact 
assessment had many mistakes and raised more questions than answers.  
 
3.2 Interest groups’ positions  
 
The vans regulation was mainly of interest to a narrow well-circumscribed 
sector of the society: van manufacturers. Environmental organisations were 
both less numerous and less active in lobbying the EP compared with the 
industry side. In the words of a European Commission official: 
 
It is easy for the NGOs to advocate for a greener environment, when 
they do not have to bear the costs. Contrary to the passenger cars 
regulation, NGOs did not have much of a position on vans and have, 
therefore, been less active in lobbying both European Commission 
and Parliament.25  
 
Only two environmental groups were active on the dossier: Greenpeace and 
Transport and Environment (T&E). However, the dossier was not a lobbying 
priority for Greenpeace, leaving it almost entirely to the T&E to lobby MEPs. 
T&E is the principal environmental organisation campaigning on sustainable 
transport at the EU level in Brussels, and is a member of the Green 10 (see 
chapter 1). The lobbying spectrum on the vans regulations included: car 
manufacturers (such as Ford, BMW, Volvo, Renault/Peugeot-Citroen, Fiat, 
Volkswagen, Jaguar Land Rover (JLR), and Toyota), car associations (such as 
the European Automobile manufacturers associations, ACEA), and a few 
number of environmental organisations (T&E and Greenpeace). There was 
                                                 
24 Interview, car manufacturer, 14 July 2011 
25 Interview, European Commission official, 2 March 2010 
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limited lobbying from member states, who mainly restricted their activity to the 
Council, although the rapporteur (British Conservative MEP Martin Callanan) 
was contacted by the British Permanent Representation to the EU on numerous 
occasions. Some organisations only became active after being prompted by 
MEPs to lobby the EP. For instance, the coordinator of the Group of the Alliance 
of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), British MEP Chris Davies, 
contacted leasing companies and SMEs in support of the European 
Commission’s proposal to encourage them to become active. Prompted by Chris 
Davies, the European Small Business Alliance (ESBA) sent a letter to all ENVI 
members two months before the ENVI vote, expressing its support for the 
European Commission’s proposal. This illustrates that lobbying is not a ‘one-
way alley’ because MEPs may stimulate interest groups to become active on a 
dossier to gain support for their position inside Parliament.  
Table 3.3 shows the position of the car industry and environmental 
groups on key provisions of the vans regulation. As can be seen from the table, 
ACEA lobbied for a short-term target of 175 g CO2/km by 2016 with phase-in 
from 2015 to 2018, and a long-term target of 160 g CO2/km by 2020. On the 
contrary, T&E and Greenpeace lobbied for more ambitious climate targets – a 
short-term target of 160 g CO2/km by 2015 and a long-term target of 125 g 
CO2/km by 2020 – and claimed that the automotive industry was using the 
economic downturn as a green-wash to avoid cutting emissions.  
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Table 3.3: Positions of interest groups 
 
Source: ACEA (2009, 2011); T&E, (2010a, 2010b).  
 
T&E welcomed the European Commission’s proposal, but thought the long-term 
target could be more ambitious and wanted to include speed limiters in the 
regulation. The European Commission’s proposal was supported by leasing 
companies, and SMEs, who believed the proposed emissions target for light 
commercial vehicles would increase fuel efficiency and reduce the costs for small 
businesses using vans. However, car manufacturers did not find that the 
European Commission’s proposal accommodated their views as they thought it 
disregarded the economic reality as well as the specific characteristics of the 
vehicle segment concerned. All the interviewed car manufacturers did not find 
the European Commission’s proposed long-term target of 135 g CO2/g feasible 
Key provisions The car industry: 
ACEA 
NGOs: T&E and 
Greenpeace 
Short-term target 175 g CO2/km by 2016      
with phase-in from 
2015 to 2018  
175 g CO2/km by 2012 
160 g CO2/km by 2015 
Long-term  target 160 g CO2/km by 2020 
 
125 g CO2/km by 2020 
 
The excess premium €95 per gram (same as       
for passenger cars) 
No position 
The possibility of 
pooling between 
passenger cars and 
vans 
Internal division No position 
Speed limiters Internal division Vans should be equipped 
with speed limiters set at 
100 km/h 
Small volume 
derogation (JLR’s 
position, ACEA did not 
take a position on it) 
A derogation for 
manufacturers 
producing less than 
25.000 light 
commercial vehicles 
annually  
No position 
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for bigger vans (the so-called class III vans26), and if adopted, they argued that 
these vans would be discontinued. A discontinuation of class III vans was argued 
to lead to a disproportionate increase in the number of smaller volume capacity 
vehicles (class I and II vans), which would together pollute more than if the class 
III vans, carrying a bigger load, were kept on the market.  
Unlike the passenger cars regulation, there was no business war between 
car manufacturers from different countries because the van market is more 
homogenous than the passenger car market. This strengthened the position of 
the car industry as they could largely speak with one voice on key issues. There 
was, however, disagreement lurking beneath the surface on specific issues, such 
as the possibility of pooling between cars and vans (averaging between distances 
to targets). Some companies were in favour of the possibility of pooling between 
cars and vans (such as Ford), whereas companies producing only cars (such as 
BMW) were against because they feared they would be put at a competitive 
disadvantage and that it would lead to a reopening of the cars regulation. The 
German and French governments in the Council supported the car industry’s 
position. On 7 October 2009, the Italian, Germany, and French government sent 
a non-public ‘non-paper’ letter27 to the European Commissioner for 
Environment, Stavros Dimas, and the European Commissioner for Enterprise 
and Industry, Günter Verheugen, urging the Commission to reconsider its 
launch of the proposal, and take into account the production and development 
cycle of vans.         
 Based on lobbying position papers, table 3.4 presents the arguments 
advanced by the car-industry, as well as the counter-arguments developed by 
T&E. It is not uncommon for diffuse interests to produce what I label ‘myth 
killing reports’, where they point out the flaws in the arguments used by their 
lobbying opponents. Similarly, T&E published a report ‘Vans and CO2 - Analysis 
of automotive industry arguments’ on 30 January 2010, where it critically 
examined the car industry’s lobbying arguments and attempted to present a 
                                                 
26
 Vans are classified into three classes according to their reference mass: class I are vans with a 
RM below 1305 kg, class II with a RM between 1305 and 1760 kg, and class III with a RM above 
1760 kg. 
27
 Available from the author upon request. 
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more balanced view (T&E, 2010b). While car manufacturers argued that it is 
difficult to reduce CO2 emissions from vans as they fulfil a work function and 
already have a high level of diesel penetration, T&E counter-argued that vans 
could take better advantage of fuel efficiency. Without sufficient in-house 
expertise in the EP, however, it is difficult for MEPs and their assistants to 
assess which arguments are most valid.  
 
Table 3.4: Arguments used by interest groups 
 
 
Source: T&E (2010a; 2010b); ACEA (2009; 2011); interviews with ten car 
manufacturers 
 
 Car manufacturers T&E 
Does the vans 
market take full 
advantage of the 
fuel efficiency? 
Yes. The vans market is 
rational as fuel consumption 
is an important purchasing 
criterion for vans. Light 
commercial vehicles are not 
emotional products driven 
by fashion, but for the need 
to fulfil a work function. 
No. Van manufacturers 
do not have to 
communicate CO2 
performance to 
customers, relatively 
inefficient vans may still 
remain on the market.   
What are the CO2 
savings potentials 
for vans? 
Limited. CO2 saving 
potentials for vans are 
limited compared to cars as 
diesel engine penetration is 
above 90%; load volume 
determines aerodynamics 
and design of vehicle; and 
some technologies for cars 
are not applicable or have 
lower CO2 reduction 
potential.  
Significant. The fuel 
saving technologies 
deployed to diesel cars 
can be applied to vans 
without requiring 
excessive technological 
investment as the 
optimisation of engine 
sizing can cut fuel costs 
and cut emissions.  
What is the 
environmental 
impact of vans? 
Limited. Vans only represent 
10 % of the vehicle fleet. 
Significant. Vans emit 
one third more CO2 per 
vehicle per year than cars.  
Is the Commission’s 
proposal feasible 
given the current 
economic crisis? 
No. The production cycle for 
vans is much longer than for 
cars, and the vans industry 
therefore needs longer lead 
time and phase-in periods. 
Yes. The regulation will 
only apply in two years’ 
time when more normal 
circumstances have 
returned.  
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Throughout the EU’s decision-making process, the automotive industry lobbied 
hard for reducing the long-term target, the phase-in period, and the application 
date. They pleaded the EU institutions not to introduce new costly regulation 
during the financial crisis, and questioned the need to regulate CO2 emissions of 
vans right from the beginning. The negotiations on the vans regulation took 
place in a very different political and economic context compared with the 
passenger cars regulation. The passenger cars regulation was part of the EU’s 
energy and climate change package28 adopted in December 2008 to agree on an 
ambitious 2020 EU emissions reduction target prior to the United Nation’s 
conference on climate change in 2009. Without the 15th meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP15) - the highest body of the United Nation’s 
Framework Convention on Climate Change - in the horizon and the media 
attention of the EU’s energy and climate package, the vans regulation did not 
gain the same momentum and media coverage as the passenger cars regulation. 
Furthermore, the economic crisis played a greater role for the discussions on the 
vans regulation because the automotive industry was experiencing drops in 
sales. The economic crisis did not have the same resonance during the 
negotiations of the passenger cars regulation as the crisis was not there to the 
same extent. 
All the interviewed car manufacturers felt that the European Commission 
had already made up its mind before conducting stakeholder meetings.29 The 
car industry found it particularly problematic that the vans regulation – which is 
in theory both and industry and an environmental issue – was only led by 
Directorate-General (DG) for Environment and not jointly together with DG for 
Enterprise. In the words of a representative from Jaguar Land Rover (JLR), ‘the 
                                                 
28
 The EU’s energy and climate change package also included proposals for: revising the EU’s 
emission trading system for the period 2012-2020; reducing national greenhouse gas emissions 
for the non-trading sector; a legal framework for carbon capture and storage, and a revision of 
the renewable energy directive.  
29
 Two stakeholder meetings were held during the drafting of the proposal on 2 September 2o08 
and 9 March 2009. The following stakeholders were present: ACEA, JAMA (Japanese Auto 
Industry), KAMA (Korean auto industry), FIA (Federation Internationale de l'Automobile), JLR, 
SMMT (UK Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders), the European Shippers Council, T&E, 
a German environmental NGO, officials from the Dutch Ministry of Environment, and the 
British Department for Transport were present (European Commission, 2008b). 
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problem was that there was no-one to defend the industry as DG for 
Environment treated the vans regulation as a pure environmental issue’’.30 
Furthermore, the European Commission’s impact assessment was thought to be 
weak and incomplete, suffering from inadequate assumptions and data. Many 
car manufacturers depicted DG for Environment and DG for Climate Action as 
‘confrontational’, ‘evangelical’, and on a ‘moralistic crusade’. As one car 
manufacturer expressed it:  
 
They are getting greener and greener. I think many of them felt that 
they didn’t get what they wanted on passenger cars, and therefore 
went for a bit more on the vans regulation […] sometimes it would be 
nice if the European Commission would put forward more reasonable 
proposals so we don’t have to play heavy and go the top of the 
European Commission.31  
 
One niche car manufacturer, JLR, had to play hardball and lobby at the College 
of European Commissioners intensively to secure its interests before the 
European Commission’s proposal was put forward to the EP and the Council. 
Although JLR secured a derogation for small volume manufacturers in earlier 
drafts of the vans regulation – in which JLR would negotiate an individual CO2 
reduction target with the European Commission – the Environment European 
Commissioner, Dimas, had removed the small volume derogation in his paper 
sent into inter-service consultation. This meant that JLR had to spend the whole 
of August 2009 ‘whizzing around the heads of cabinets to get the other DGs to 
see Dimas’ error’.32 JLR’s sales amounts to less than one per cent of total EU 
sales and primarily include the Defender – a heavy workhorse vehicle designed 
to be operable in all duty cycles regardless of terrain and resistant to damage. 
Owing to the Defenders very nature, JLR finds it difficult to make the Defender 
more aerodynamic and fuel efficient. Therefore, JLR urged the European 
Commission to insert a small volume derogation with a vehicle volume cap of 
25.000. Due to intense lobbying from JLR, the College of European 
                                                 
30
 Interview, car industry, Jaguar Land Rover, July 2011 
31
 Interview, Jaguar Land Rover, 11 July 2011 
32
 Interview,  Jaguar Land Rover, 11 July 2011 
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Commissioners included the small volume derogation in the proposal only a few 
days before the proposal was formally published.  
 
3.3 The lobbying strategies in the EP 
 
Although the car industry was both more numerous and active in lobbying the 
EP than environmental interests, they took up similar lobbying strategies: target 
key MEPs, furnish your legislative allies with facts and arguments, and seek to 
win over undecided MEPs. However, the picture is not as crude as depicted by 
the American signalling literature, where the general consensus is for interest 
groups to primarily lobby their legislative allies, occasionally engage with fence-
sitters, but only rarely approach their opponents (see, for instance, Baumgartner 
& Leech, 1996; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998; Kollman, 1997). In the EP, this 
distinction is less clear as the formal constraints are such that interest groups 
often lobby their opponents (Marshall, 2010). The key is to target those MEPs, 
who are in charge of the dossier: rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs. However, 
most interviewees find that lobbying clear opponents is inefficient and often a 
waste of time; legislative allies need to be furnished with the necessary facts and 
arguments to be able to convince their colleagues, and undecided MEPs are 
important to swing a vote in the preferred direction. As one car manufacturer 
explained: 
 
You shouldn’t try to over-lobby your clear opponents because you are 
just going to irritate them and wind them up. You need to make sure 
that your friends - in quotes because there is no cosy relationship like 
that - have the facts at their fingertips; that you educate them a little 
bit on what the key issues are. In the final analyses, when you are 
lobbying, it comes down to the fence-sitters because they will swing 
the group position one way or the other. It’s a bit crude to say that 
you have friends and foes, but the usual suspects are ‘the people in 
middle.33 
 
                                                 
33
 Interview, car manufacturer, 18 July 2011 
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Crucial to convincing MEPs of one’s position is to ‘find the right way to open a 
person’s mind’ – as one interviewee explained – and frame an issue differently 
when talking to a conservative, liberal of socialist MEP. When approaching an 
MEP from the S&D group, the car industry would often try to focus on the social 
aspects of the vans regulation, such as what impact the dossier would have on 
jobs and SMEs. The German Association of the Automotive Industry, VDA 
(Verband der Automobilindustrie), would, for instance, bring along a member of 
the Betriebsrat34 (German Work’s Council) from one of their member companies 
when lobbying S&D MEPs to show that political decisions in Brussels also affect 
the rights of employees. The industry associations were also highly aware of 
giving an issue a national angle when speaking to MEPs of various nationalities, 
and try to bring along a member from the MEP’s country when meeting an MEP. 
 Both the car industry and the environmental organisations focused their 
lobbying on the rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs from the responsible and 
opinion-giving committees. ACEA first and foremost lobbied key MEPs, while 
encouraging their members to lobby their national MEPs and MEPs from 
countries in which the individual companies have production sites. Generally, 
both the car industry and the environmental groups refrained from lobbying 
MEPs who were vehemently against their views, and MEPs from the fringe 
groups, unless they were seen as paramount for carrying a vote at the committee 
or plenary stage. All the interviewed car manufacturers found it difficult to get 
an informative debate with the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance 
(Greens/EFA) and the Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
(GUE/NGL) as these groups often refuse to get information from the industry.  
 The interviewed interest groups found it particularly important to lobby 
MEPs from ALDE, which was repeatedly referred to as Parliament’s kingmaker 
and fence-sitter. ALDE is often divided between green British and French MEPs, 
and industry-friendly German MEPs. On the vans regulation, ALDE was 
                                                 
34
 The task of a Work Council member (Betriebsrät) is to represent employees in a company.  In 
Germany, general labour agreements are made at the national level by national unions and 
national employer associations, where after local companies meet with Works Councils to adjust 
these national agreements to local circumstances. A Work Council member is usually elected by 
a company for a four year term. 
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completely split during the committee discussions with the shadow rapporteur 
(German MEP, Holger Krahmer) in ENVI siding with the car industry and the 
ENVI coordinator (British MEP, Chris Davies) taking up the views of T&E. 
Whereas Holger Krahmer tabled amendments supporting a long-term target of 
150 g/km by 2020, Chris Davies tabled amendments suggesting a target of 125 
g/km (European Parliament 2010b). The division within ALDE shows that the 
ascendancy of the centre-right majority following the 2009 EP elections - when 
ALDE and EPP vote together - does not appear to have provided industry groups 
with a more favourable lobbying venue.  
 Although environmental issues are not easily incorporated into the 
traditional left-right conflict dimension, parties on the left of the political 
spectrum tend to favour stronger environmental protection than parties to the 
right. However, environmental issues are often seen as a valence issue meaning 
that no party wants to be seen as favouring anti-environment positions. In the 
EP, the heterogeneity of the political groups (especially ALDE), and the shifting 
coalitions mean that policy outcomes are difficult to predict from the outset. 
Recent VoteWatch data shows that the ALDE group is more inclined to vote with 
the S&D group on environmental issues during roll call votes than with the EPP 
group (VoteWatch, 2011b). This suggests, oxymoronically, that the rise of the 
centre-right in the EP is on decline when it comes to environmental issues.  
Throughout the EP policy process, T&E worked closely with Chris Davies 
by providing him with in-depth policy analyses, expertise, and arguments. T&E 
would, for example, send an email to make Chris Davies aware of surveys 
conducted in the German tabloid AutoBild on whether or not people want speed 
limiters for vans, and provide updates on vans regulation in China and the US. 
The T&E, thus, provided political information about public support for speed 
limiters. The close working relationship between T&E and the ALDE 
coordinator amounts to what Hall and Deardorff (2006) would describe as 
legislative subsidy – organised interests take up the role of being a ‘service 
bureau’ or ‘adjuncts’ to staff for carefully selected legislators in support of shared 
policy objectives. As Chris Davies explained when asked how he made up his 
mind on the vans regulation: 
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My support of a long-term target of 125 [g CO2/km] came from the 
T&E. I worked closely with T&E. They helped me build my arguments 
and provided me with research that supported my position. I 
appreciate the T&E’s support, but I don’t know how effective they 
have been in changing people’s minds. What you really want is to 
have a company supporting T&E’s position […] then it would really 
carry weight.35  
 
All of the interviewed car manufacturers saw themselves as engaged in 
educational activity, whereby they had to improve MEPs understanding of 
legislation affecting the car industry. They generally found that they had to pitch 
issues differently when lobbying Parliament compared to the European 
Commission, as they needed to be less technical and more pedagogical when 
talking to MEPs and their assistants. As one interviewee explained: 
 
We don’t make a complete technical argument to an MEP – he will 
not be able to follow you. You just try to explain the principles of 
what you want to achieve. Only very few MEPs understand the 
technicalities of the car-industry […] With the European 
Commission, it’s different… they know what they are talking about.36  
 
By the end of the EP’s scrutiny of the vans regulation, most car manufacturers 
found that, at least, ‘the leads on the issue understood the differences between 
the passenger cars and the vans regulation because there had been enough 
information [from the car industry]’.37  
 
3.4 The EP policy process  
 
The European Commission’s proposal was put forward to ENVI in November 
2009 with the committees of ‘industry, research and energy’ (ITRE) and 
‘transport and tourism’ (TRAN) as opinion-giving committees. ITRE was 
assigned associate committee status following the so-called ‘enhanced’ or 
                                                 
35 Interview, MEP Chris Davies, 14 September 2011 
36 Interview, car manufacturer, 14 July 2011 
37
 Interview, car manufacturer, 18 July 2011  
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‘reinforced Hughes’ procedure, while TRAN was assigned ordinary opinion-
giving status. Many of the policy proposals referred to the environment 
committee have both environmental and competitiveness implications, 
increasing the occurrence of turf battles between the EP’s committees. Similar to 
the European Commission’s DGs, EP committees are often biased towards their 
policy priorities with ENVI often prioritising environmental over industry 
concerns.  
 In several cases, where a legislative proposal has both environmental and 
competiveness implications, the EP’s Conference of Presidents has responded by 
invoking the enhanced Hughes procedure (see Chapter 2 for more on this 
procedure). Owing to the increased cooperation and cooperation between the 
EP’s committees, the car industry generally saw the EP as a better aggregator of 
demands than the European Commission. This was, however, not a view shared 
by the environmental groups as they did not find that the vans regulation 
accommodated their views. As can be seen from the table 3.5, the industry’s and 
green organisations’ preference attainment varied throughout the policy 
process. The European Commission’s proposal was more environmentally 
ambitious than the rapporteur’s draft report, the final ENVI report, and the final 
first reading outcome. Table 3.5 shows that the long-term target was watered 
down in the EP from 135 g CO2/km by 2020 to 147 g Co2/km in the final text. 
The application date for the short-term target was delayed with one year from 
2016 to 2017, and the penalties for not meeting the targets reduced from €120 
per gram to €95 per gram. It is difficult to uphold the EP’s reputation as an 
environmental champion in the face of the vans regulation, where the European 
Commission appeared to be much more ambitious than the EP.  
112 
 
Table 3.5: Key changes to the European Commission’s proposal 
 
 
Document Short-term target Long-term target The excess 
premium 
Other provisions 
The European 
Commission’s         
issue paper,                 
September 2008 
175 g CO2/km by 2012; 
160 g CO2/km by 2016 
Not included €120 per  
gram 
The idea of a  small 
volume derogation (SVD) 
recognised 
The European 
Commission’s        
proposal, 
November 2009 
175 g CO2/km by 2016, 
with phase-in from 
2014 to 2016 
(75%/80%/100%) 
135 g CO2/km  
by 2020 
€120 per gram SVD included 
The rapporteur’s 
first draft report, 
ENVI, April 2010 
Supports the     
European 
Commission’s proposal 
150 g CO2/km              
by 2020 
€95 per gram SVD, speed limiters, 
pooling between vans and 
cars included 
EVNI’s final 
report, September 
2010 
Supports the     
European 
Commission’s proposal 
140 g CO2/km              
by 2020 
€95 per gram SVD and pooling between 
vans and cars included; 
speed limiters excluded 
Plenary vote, 
February 2011 
175 g CO2/km by 2017 
with phase-in from 
2014 to 2017 
(70%/75%/80%/100% 
147 g CO2/km               
by 2020  
€95 per gram SVD included; pooling 
between vans and cars, 
and speed limiters 
excluded 
 
Source: European Commission (200b, 2009); European Parliament (2010a, 2010b, 2010d); European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union (2011b). 
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3.4.1 The rapporteur’s draft report 
 
After much debate between the EPP and ECR coordinators, the report was 
allocated to the ECR group, who appointed Martin Callanan as their rapporteur. 
All the interviewed car manufacturers saw Martin Callanan as an expert on 
issues concerning the car industry due to his background as an engineer and his 
previous work in the EP. In the sixth parliamentary period (2004-2009), he was 
the EPP shadow rapporteur on the reduction of CO2 emission from passenger 
cars - before the British Conservatives broke away from the EPP group - and 
outside his parliamentary work, he co-chairs the Forum for Automobile and 
Society. This forum is an arena for debate bringing together motoring 
organisations (25 members) and MEPs (20 members) to engage in an exchange 
of views on EU legislation affecting the car industry. The views put forward 
during the meetings largely reflect those of ACEA. The organisation is financed 
by its corporate members and MEPs do not pay membership fees.  
 One might question whether or not there is a conflict of interest in 
chairing a forum of the automobile industry, whilst at the same time being a 
rapporteur on a legislative dossier imposing costs on the industry. However, 
most interviewees did not take issue with this as they did not find the forum to 
be a place where deals are struck. However, the rapporteur’s activity in the 
forum illustrates that lobbying is not a single shot game, in which interest 
groups suddenly appear on an MEP’s radar when a specific issue emerges on 
Parliament’s agenda. Rather, MEPs and interest groups are in continuous 
contact with each other through participation in various informal forums. These 
contacts become important when lobbying on specific dossiers as - as one 
interviewee expressed - ‘you don’t suddenly launch yourself into a process 
without any previous contact with MEPs’.38  
Prior to writing his draft report, Martin Callanan consulted a large number 
of affected stakeholders. The British Conservatives is the only party delegation 
in the EP to have introduced an online lobbying contact report, where MEPs list 
                                                 
38 Interview, car manufacturer, 14 July 2011 
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all the organisations to have had ‘sit-down’ meetings with. During the period 
from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2010, Martin Callanan had 41 meetings 
with affected stakeholders on the vans regulation, 32 of these were with 
representatives from the car industry, one with a British SME (Federation of 
Small Businesses, FSB), three with environmental groups, two with postal 
companies (United Parcel Service and Deutsche Post), one with the American 
Chamber of Commerce, and three with journalists from motor magazines 
(Conservatives in the European Parliament 2010). Thus, both the car industry 
and the environmental organisations had meetings with the rapporteur and 
‘access’ was not conferred on a privileged few. Martin Callanan met with most 
interest groups more than once, and was generally seen as open to the views of 
both the industry and green organisation. As he explained: 
 
I met with the environmental groups, and I met with the motor 
manufacturers to hear both sides of views, but I didn’t actively go out 
and consult anybody […] I didn’t write to people and say ‘let me know 
your views’. Many people were happy to give me their views 
voluntarily. They were sending me lots of contributions on it. So I 
received, obviously, lots of submissions.39  
 
Due to the large volume of information sent to Martin Callanan by affected 
stakeholders, he did not find it necessary to actively seek out affected groups. 
This has one obvious flip side in that only those organisations that got organised 
and active on the issue were heard. Martin Callanan started off with a position 
that was slightly sceptical about the need for a vans regulation, arguing that vans 
are bought by businesses that are already conscious of the need for economy and 
fuel efficiency. Because of this, it was his belief that it was necessary to have an 
‘ambitious but realistic long-term target, and an appropriate short-term target 
that takes into account both the need of industry product cycles and the need for 
environmental improvement’ (European Parliament, 2011d). His position 
deviated from the official position of the British Conservative party in the House 
of Commons, who initially supported a long-term target of 135 g CO2/km by 
2022 and later a long-term target of 140 g CO2/km by 2020. The British 
                                                 
39
 Interview, Martin Callanan, September 2011 
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Conservative party does not impose a whipping system on its MEPs. It is, 
therefore, not uncommon for British Conservative MEPs to be out of tune with 
the position taken up by the government in the Council.  
 In his draft report, Martin Callanan expressed doubts about the feasibility 
of the proposed long-term target of 135 g CO2/km by 2020. Given the higher 
costs of reducing CO2 in light commercial vehicles compared to cars, and the 
longer development and production cycles needed, he argued that a target of 150 
g CO2/km would be a more achievable target. Lastly, the draft report included 
two new provisions, which were not included in the European Commission’s 
proposal, although these were considered in its impact assessment: 
 
 The possibility of pooling between vans and passenger cars (averaging 
between distances to targets) for manufacturers that produce both cars 
and light commercial vehicles. Pooling between cars and vans reduces 
compliance costs and provides for flexibility for car manufacturers.  
 The introduction of mandatory speed limiters for light commercial 
vehicles of 120 km/hour as a cheap and effective way of immediately 
lowering emissions (European Parliament 2010b).  
 
All 12 interviewed interest groups perceived Martin Callanan as a person who 
was trying to play the role as a good rapporteur by putting forward a report that 
sought to reconcile diverging views inside Parliament and the Council. The draft 
report was welcomed by ACEA, whereas the environmental organisations 
regretted that the initial European Commission proposal had been weakened. 
Although the rapporteur’s draft report favoured the views of the industry in 
terms of easing the long-term target and reducing the penalty premium, it did 
not give in to industry pressures to delay the phase-in of the short-term target.  
 
 
 
116 
 
3.4.2 The committee report 
 
On 28 September 2010, ENVI voted to weaken the long-term target proposed by 
the European Commission of 135g CO2/km by 2020 to 140g, to suggest more 
modest fines for manufacturers who fail to comply with these rules, and to 
exclude amendments, proposed by the industry and TRAN, to introduce speed 
limiters on vans. The long-term target agreed in ENVI was, however, more 
ambitious than that of ITRE (150 g CO2/km by 2020) and the transport 
committee (135 g CO2/km by 2022). The ENVI report was adopted with 32 
votes in favour, 25 against and one, reflecting a compromise struck between the 
rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs from the ALDE, EPP and S&D groups.  
Prior to the vote in ENVI, significant lobbying had occurred. The 
committee discussions particularly circled around the long-term target and 
whether or not to introduce speed limiters into the scope of the vans regulation. 
During debates in ENVI, discussions on the vans regulation were nationally 
dominated between MEPs from car-manufacturing and non-car-manufacturing 
countries. Czech, French, German, Italian, Polish and Romanian MEPs across 
the political groups were fairly critical of the European Commission’s proposal, 
and sided with the industry view. Many car manufacturers have relocated their 
production plants to Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, it is not uncommon 
to see ‘MEPs from the new member states defending the interests of the car 
industry as they are a massive employment source’.40 Both T&E and ACEA 
emailed word suggestions for amendments to MEPs in the responsible 
committees that they thought would be willing to defend their views. 
Unfortunately, I was only able to get hold of the amendments proposed by ACEA 
as green organisations were unwilling to provide me with the amendments they 
had sent to MEPs. However, several MEPs from the Greens, GUE/NGL, S&D 
and ALDE groups put forward amendments reflecting the views of T&E and 
Greenpeace.  
                                                 
40
 Interview, EP policy advisor,  July 2011 
117 
 
Many MEPs, supporting a green line, took up the same position as T&E by 
supporting the introduction of speed limiters and a long-term target of 125 g 
CO2/km. T&E and Greenpeace managed to keep the issue of speed limiters high 
on Parliament’s agenda throughout the ENVI discussions. Several interviewees 
doubt that the issue of speed limiters would have become so prevalent in 
Parliament without T&E and Greenpeace lobbying so strongly in favour of 
including it within the scope of the vans regulation. T&E was the only 
stakeholder, who suggested an amendment on speed limiters and conducted a 
study on it. Thus, it was the only material around in Parliament to inform MEPs 
and assistants about the benefits of speed limiters. Several MEPs put forward 
amendments supporting the introduction of speed limiters. Particularly the S&D 
shadow rapporteur (Matthias Groote) was a staunch supporter of introducing 
speed limiters into the scope of the vans regulation. Many car manufacturers 
found it perplexing that a German MEP with a past in Volkswagen vehemently 
pushed for the introduction of speed limiters. Within the car industry some were 
in favour of introducing speed limiters into the vans regulation and others 
against. Germany is the only country in the EU not to have speed limiters for 
light duty vehicles. The question of whether or not to introduce speed limiters 
for light duty vehicles has on several occasions been subject to debate in the 
German Bundestag. Some car manufacturers had the impression that ‘knowing 
that Mathias Groote would not get it introduced in Germany, he was trying to 
introduce it through the European Parliament’.41 Several interviewees 
questioned the purpose of fighting for the introduction of speed limiters given 
Germany’s opposition towards it. Although environmental organisations knew 
that amendments introducing speed limiters would be difficult to get through in 
the Council, they hoped that MEPs could at least use it as a bargaining chip 
during the trialogue meetings to secure a more ambitious long-term CO2 
reduction target. As a representative from an environmental group put it: 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 Interview, car manufacturer, 14July 2011 
118 
 
We thought that it would be fantastic to win the issue of speed 
limiters fully and it would be fantastic to have it in the legislation but 
we weren’t quite so reckless in our thinking. It would have been a 
good way to negotiate with the Council.42   
 
The German lobby against speed limiters was very strong and many feared that 
if speed limiters were introduced for light commercial vehicles, it would set 
precedent for introducing it on passenger cars. In the end, the issue of speed 
limiters was defeated during the ENVI vote. The final text, agreed between the 
EP and the Council, included a recital requesting the European Commission to 
investigate the feasibility of extending the scope of another directive (the 
Council Directive 92/6/EEC on ‘the installation and use of speed limitation 
devices for certain categories of motor vehicles in the Community’) to light 
commercial vehicles. ACEA did not focus its main lobbying on the issue of speed 
limiters, but rather focused on easing the long term target. They were successful 
at getting several MEPs from car manufacturing countries to put forward 
amendments drafted by ACEA. ACEA emailed 24 amendments to MEPs in the 
environment committee (ACEA, 4 May 2011), 23 of which were put forward with 
the exact same wording and justification by 11 MEPs from the EPP, ALDE, EFD, 
and S&D groups from the Czech Republic, Italy, Germany, Poland and 
Romania43 - all MEPs from cars and vans-producing countries. In the industry 
committee, ACEA emailed 25 amendments to MEPs in the industry committee, 
twenty of which were put forward with identical wording and justification by 13 
MEPs44 from the EPP, ALDE, ECR, and S&D groups from the Austria, Czech 
Republic, Italy, Germany, Poland and Romania, and Spain. Many German MEPs 
were influenced by the German car industry and supported a long-term target of 
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 Interview, environmental group, 11 July 2011 
43
 Rosario Crocetta (S&D, Italy), Jorgo Chatzimarkakis (ALDE, Germany), Cristian Silviu Busoi 
(ALDE, Romania), Adina-Ioana Vălean (ALDE, Romania), Paolo Bartolozzi (EPP, Italy), Sergio 
Berlato (EPP, Italy), Elisabetta Gardini (EPP, Italy), Licia Ronzulli (EPP, Italy), Salvatore 
Tatarella (EPP, Italy), Miroslav Ouzky (ECR, Czech Republic), Oreste Rossi (EFD, Italy), and 
Bogusław Sonik (EPP, Poland). 
44
 Mario Pirillo (S&D, Italy), Patrizia Toia (S&D, Italy), Ioan Enciu (S&D, Romania), Silvia-
Adriana łicău (S&D, Romania), Teresa Riera Madurell (S&D, Spain), Jorgo Chatzimarkakis 
(ALDE, Germany), Adina-Ioana Vălean (ALDE, Romania), Paul Rübig (EPP, Austria), Aldo 
Patriciello (EPP, Italy), Amalia Sartori (EPP, Italy), Marian-Jean Marinescu (EPP, 
Romania),Konrad Szymański(ECR, Poland), and Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, Czech Republic).  
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160 g CO2/km. Despite of this, one issue played against the effectiveness of the 
car industry’s lobbying: the car industry’s credibility. Some MEPs had the 
perception that the car industry had fought too hard and overachieved on the 
passenger cars regulation. As one car manufacturer explained: 
 
There was a view in the environment committee that the industry had 
somehow misled MEPs and had been too successful on the passenger 
cars regulation, and that there should be a bit of a pay-back this time. 
It was a very clearly stated position that they [MEPs] felt they had the 
wool pulled over their eyes [on the cars regulation] and they didn’t 
want to let that happen again.45 
 
During committee and plenary discussions, several MEPs uttered that the 
European car manufacturers had been able to achieve the EU’s CO2 targets for 
passenger cars several years before the deadline in 2015. Many MEPs took this 
as a sign of manufacturers having exaggerated their demands and been 
dishonest with MEPs during the negotiations on the cars regulation. The 
misgivings toward the car industry might explain why the final ENVI report 
opted for a long-term target that was more ambitious than that put forward in 
the rapporteur’s draft report.  
 
3.4.3 The final policy outcome 
Following the ENVI vote, Martin Callanan and the ENVI shadow rapporteurs 
went into trialogue meetings with the Council. In late November 2010, the 
Council and the EP managed to agree on a compromise package that was less 
ambitious than the European Commission’s proposal on a number of points. 
Full compliance with the short-term target was delayed by one year; the level of 
penalty for non-compliance (the excess emissions premium) was lowered; and 
the ambition of the long-term target was decreased to 147 g CO2/km. The issue 
of pooling between vans and cars was dropped during the trialogue meetings. 
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 Interview, car manufacturer, 18 July 2011 
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On 15 February 2011, a coalition formed by the EPP, ECR, S&D and ALDE 
groups voted in favour of the Council and Parliament’s compromise text. Table 
3.6 shows the voting behaviour of the political groups on the final vote on the 
draft legislative resolution. The cohesion score (also known as the index of 
agreement) denotes how united an EP political groups is in voting situations and 
is calculated on the basis of an agreement index.     
 The EFD, the Greens, and the GUE/NGL groups voted against the 
compromise package reached between the Council and the EP, albeit for very 
different reasons. EFD opposed the compromise package because they believed 
that the economic impact of the regulation is excessive in relation to the 
significant reduction of CO2 at a global level. Furthermore, they denounced the 
agreed long-term target as being political oblivious to real market conditions 
and consumer interests. The Greens and GUE/NGL voted against because they 
did not find the final policy outcome to be environmentally ambitious enough, 
and criticised MEPs for caving in to pressure from car manufacturers. Many 
ALDE and S&D MEPs grudgingly supported the compromise package as they 
feared that a second reading would run the risk of ‘destroying this achievement 
as small as it may be’ (European Parliament, 2011d). 
Table 3.6: Plenary vote on the draft legislative resolution, 15 February 2010 
 
 
Source: Adapted from VoteWatch (2011)  
Politics 
groups 
For Against Abstaining Voting cohesion 
ALDE 74 5 2 87.04% 
ECR 48 0 2 94% 
EFD 3 17 2 65.91% 
EPP 239 0 2 98.76% 
Greens/EFA 1 51 0 97.12% 
GUE/NGL 3 26 1 80% 
NI 4 14 6 37.50% 
S&D 162 4 0 96.39% 
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The ALDE coordinator accused the EPP for ‘talking on behalf of big business […] 
instead of on behalf of all the businesses, which use light commercial vehicles 
and which needs more fuel-efficient technology to drive down costs’ (European 
Parliament, 2011d). Similarly, Corinne Lepage (French ALDE MEP) argued that 
the outcome was a result of the major producing countries, supported by the 
majority of MEPs, being pervious to the industry’s arguments. S&D MEPs 
welcomed the new regulation but regretted that the EU was unable to reach a 
more ambitious target for 2020. In the words of the S&D shadow rapporteur 
Matthias Groote (German MEP), ‘our group tried to push for a faster reduction 
of emissions, but this is the best compromise that we could reach at this point’ 
(European Parliament, 2011d). Martin Callanan, the rapporteur, saw the 
outcome as a good balance between ensuring improved environmental 
standards and giving a realistic and achievable target for the vans 
manufacturing sector. In the plenary debate, he proclaimed that: 
 
The fact that, by reaching this compromise figure, we are being 
attacked on one side as being pro-industry and on the other as being 
too environmentally friendly, suggests to me that possibly, we have 
just got the balance right (European Parliament, 2011d).  
Car manufacturers found the final policy outcome challenging, but more 
realistic than the European Commission’s initial proposal. T&E and Greenpeace 
regretted that the initial European Commission proposal had been weakened 
under pressure from the industry. The first reading agreement meant that there 
was no room for interest groups to influence the outcome of Parliament’s 
plenary vote as MEPs voted, and adopted, the compromise reached between 
Parliament and the Council. Several car manufacturers uttered scepticism 
towards the EU’s institutions ostensibly haphazard manner of striking 
compromises, which appeared to be driven more by pressures to avoid a second 
reading rather than by scientific analyses of what is achievable for the car 
industry.  In the words of one interviewee: 
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[147] is a number based on a compromise. It’s not driven by any 
scientific analysis of what is achievable; it’s a political outcome. I 
think there is a debate to be had whether that is a satisfactory process 
for determining something, which is actually very important and 
deals with issues of climate change, CO2 reduction and the future of 
the automotive industry.46  
 
The long-term target was based on a political compromise between the Council 
and the EP as the Council initially opted for a long-term target of 155 g CO2/km 
and Parliament for 140 g CO2/km. Most interviewees were surprised that the 
Council and the EP managed to strike a first reading deal given the genuine 
disagreement both within and between the two institutions. Germany was 
particularly sceptical about introducing any long-term target below 155 g 
CO2/km. In the end, Germany supported a long-term target of 147 g CO2/km 
because they were offered a concession on the regulation on ‘state aid to 
facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines’ (European Commission 
2010). Germany agreed to a long-term target on 147 g CO2/km on the vans 
regulation in return for pushing the phase-out date on coal mine subsidies back 
by four years from 2014 (suggested by the European Commission) to 2018.47 
The example brings to light the complexity of EU decision making, in which 
numerous factors affect the final policy outcome. Horse-trading, concessions, 
and compromises are key features of EU decision-making and necessities to 
reach agreements across member states and institutions. With its enormous 
diversity of interests, EU policy-making would inexorably result in a deadlock if 
it was not for the extensive use of informal strategies to prevent political 
stalemates. Package deals, based on issue linkage, is a typical strategy employed 
by the EU to prevent stalemate, and ‘constitute a normal lubricant for 
democratic decision-making processes under conditions of diversity’ (Héritier, 
1999, p. 98). 
Paradoxically, Germany and German MEPs are generally seen as climate 
leaders on environmental policies except when it concerns the German car 
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 Interview, car industry, 18 July 2011 
47
 Interview, diplomat from the Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU,  September 2011;   
Interview, diplomat from the German Permanent Representation to the EU, September 2011 
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industry. Germany can, therefore, both be regarded as an environmental ‘trend 
setter’ to use Angela Merkel’s own words and as green car laggard (Hey, 2007, p. 
216)). This contradiction can be interpreted as an on-going battle between two 
advocacy coalitions on the link between competitiveness and environment. Since 
2007, German coalition governments have largely supported the idea of 
ecological modernisation, which assumes that environmental regulation and 
economic competitiveness can be favourably combined. The positive synergy 
between the economy and ecology has been scientifically confirmed, as stated in 
a number of reports of the German advisory Council on the Environment 
(Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen, 2008). The German government has 
put forward policies that reflect a ‘new green deal’ that favours ‘ecological 
industry policy’ (Hey, 2007, p. 216). However, supporters of the old frame – that 
environmental policy kills competiveness – still exist in business and within the 
ministry of economics. This frame came to for among many German MEPs and 
the German government when the European Commission came forward with its 
proposals on reducing CO2 emissions from cars and vans.  
It is too simple to explain Germany’s position solely with reference to the 
importance of its car industry for German employment and growth. The position 
of Germany and many German MEPs has to be seen in the context of the 
specifics of German federalism and its strong corporatist tradition. Germany has 
a federal system with a strong corporatist tradition, granting sectoral employers 
and trade unions privileged and institutional access to the public decision 
making process, while preventing diffuse interests from interfering with policy-
making. Although changes are occurring in the German political system with 
corporatist ties gradually loosening and giving way to a more pluralistic interest 
group system – such as the case of the energy sector48 - corporatism has 
remained strong in the automobile sector. The strong role of the German 
Bundesländer within the federalist decision-making system further strengthens 
                                                 
48
 More pluralism can be seen in the energy sector, where the renewable energy sector has 
become an influential player. Germany’s decision in 2000 to phase out nuclear power shows the 
importance of the green energy sector, and the unwillingness of the German government to 
succumb to pressures from the power sector. Germany upheld its decision to phase out nuclear 
power regardless of a change in government in 2005 even when the green party was no longer 
part of the coalition government (Hey, 2010). 
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the car industry’s influence on German politicians. Many German car 
manufacturers have their production sites in Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg, 
Hessen, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Lower Saxony, which means that ‘the 
presence of a strategic employer is felt more strongly at the local and regional 
levels, closer to the employer, than at a higher level’ (Hey, 2010, p. 224). Many 
of these Bundesländer are swing states in which no single political party has 
overwhelming support, and thus do not dare to risk its majority by losing car 
workers’ support. Therefore, politicians from car producing Bundesländer tend 
to be strong advocates of their local car industry interests. While German EP 
elections are based on a closed party list system and most MEPs, except CSU49, 
are elected from a national list, MEPs residing in Bundesländer with car 
production sites tended to defend the car industry’s interests on the vans 
regulation more strongly than MEPs from Länders without car production sites.  
 
3.5 Discussion: what factors explain why the EP watered down the 
European Commission’s proposal? 
 
The findings from the vans regulation show that the EP no longer appears to be 
a particularly sympathetic venue to environmental groups. This finding is also 
supported by recent findings by Smith (2008) and Burns and Carter (2010), 
suggesting that the conclusions drawn from the vans regulation go beyond the 
specific case. Smith’s (2008) research on the End-of-Life Vehicles Directive and 
REACH shows that the EP’s green credentials is contingent upon the degree to 
which MEPs are exposed to lobbying from both diffuse interests and business 
groups, and the level of overlap between the policy realms of the EP committees. 
Burns and Carter’s (2010) study of whether the EP’s reputation as a green 
                                                 
49 Germany operates with two electoral districts for the purpose of the presentation of ballot 
papers for EP elections (one for Bavaria and one for the rest of Germany), and one single 
national district for the purpose of counting the votes and allocating seats. This way, the CSU 
presents a list of candidates only in Bavaria while the CDU presents a list of candidates in the 
rest of the country. The votes are then pooled nationally, so the CSU have to win more than 5% 
of national votes to win any seats, and the CSU needs to have at least 35 % of the Bavarian 
electorate to pass the national threshold of 5 %. 
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champion is still deserved finds that the EP has toned down its demands for 
stringent EU environmental regulation over time. Similarly, on the vans 
regulation, the EP did not assume the role of environmental policy champion. 
 Why did the EP agree on a text that went against its traditional role as a 
defender of environment interests? Three explanations to this question 
repeatedly came up during the interviews: asymmetric lobbying from the car 
industry, a change in the EP’s negotiating strategy, and increased cooperation 
between the EP committees. The first explanation - asymmetric lobbying - 
relates to the activities of the involved interest groups, whereas the latter two 
relate to the question of how the EP as an institutional venue shape, what 
Scharpf would call, ‘games real actors play’ (1997).50  
 First, all interviewees agreed that the long-term target would have been 
closer to the European Commission’s position without lobbying from the car 
industry. In the European Commission’s mind, there was no doubt that the car 
industry managed to water down the proposal as nobody else, other than the car 
industry, lobbied for less stringent targets. If the car industry had not lobbied, 
there would have been no incentive for MEPs to defend the industry’s view. In 
the words of an ACEA representative: 
 
If we had not said anything that would have meant that we would 
have agreed with what was on the table [the European Commission’s 
proposal]. Either it would have stayed at what the European 
Commission proposed or gone down following lobbying from T&E.51  
 
Legislators that are exposed asymmetrically to industry lobbying on a specific 
dossier are less likely to support ambitious environmental provisions than those 
who are more evenly exposed to lobbying from opposing interest groups. When 
legislators are subject to a variety of alternative understandings of a specific 
policy issue, they are likely to reconsider and mould their support for a specific 
                                                 
50
 By marrying game theory with new institutionalism (rational choice institutionalism), Scharpf 
explores the ways that archetypal games among constellations of actors are structured by their 
institutional settings. According to this logic, political outcomes are not a simple sum of 
preferences, but the result of the specific decision-making rules in play and the efforts of key 
players to take advantage of these rules. 
51
 Interview, ACEA, 13 September 2011 
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policy proposal. However, some MEPs proved to be unwilling to hear both sides 
of the argument, especially Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL MEPs refused to get 
information from the industry.  
 Second, a more compelling, institutional, explanation of why the EP did 
not take up the role as a champion for environmental groups has to do with a 
change in the EP’s negotiating strategy. As one EP committee administrator 
explained, ‘the EP can take two positions: it can propose a very ambitious target 
and have some negotiation margin, or it can propose something that is realistic 
– Martin Callanan took up the last strategy’. 52 All interviewees agreed that the 
rapporteur tried to steer a middle ground between competing demands in 
Parliament, and took up a realistic position that would be acceptable for the 
Council given Germany’s sceptical position. The increased use of informal 
meetings between the EP and the Council from before the first reading means 
that the EP can more effectively predict which amendments have a chance of 
being accepted by the Council. Martin Callanan’s approach can therefore be seen 
as part of a process of anticipatory compliance, whereby the EP moderates its 
demands to increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement with the Council. It 
is widely acknowledged by EU scholars that the introduction of new formal and 
informal decision-making rules has altered the dynamics between the EU 
institutions (see, for instance, Shackleton, 2000; Burns & Carter, 2010) In the 
past, the EP saw itself as part of a long-term institutional game to increase its 
powers and was prepared to adopt challenging amendments or even sacrifice 
legislation to boosts its legislative powers. With the application of the ordinary 
legislative procedure to most areas under the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has won its 
‘battles for more legislative powers’ (Burns and Carter, 2010, pp. 16–18). This 
has in turn led the EP to moderate its demands to be seen as a credible and 
serious legislative player. 
Lastly, several interviewees found that there was better cooperation and 
communication between the EP committees than between the European 
Commission’s DGs, and therefore saw the EP as a better aggregator of demands. 
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It is not unusual for the European Commission to suffer from strong in-fights 
between Commissioners. There are often turf wars between DG for 
Environment/DG for Climate Action favouring environmental concerns and DG 
for Enterprise and Industry advancing industry concerns. Likewise, ‘there are 
often disputes between the environment and industry committees [in the EP] 
with the industry committee supporting a pro-industry line, and the 
environment committee taking up a pro-environment line, although Parliament 
tends to arbitrate between the two lines’. 53  The increased cooperation between 
the EP committees as a result of the introduction of the reinforced Hughes 
procedure in 2002 has led to increased communication and cooperation 
between the EP committees. When the Hughes procedure is enforced, reports 
from responsible committees are less likely to be carried on the floor without 
taking into account the views of MEPs from associate committees. Committee 
members, particularly rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs, act as cue-givers to 
non-committee members, who have less information and often less intense 
preferences (Ringe, 2010). The more committees involved in the scrutiny of a 
legislative proposal, the higher the diversity of cues given from expert MEPs to 
non-expert MEPs, rendering the position of the lead committee more vulnerable 
to changes during plenary. ENVI amendments are thus less likely to be carried 
on the floor without concessions to the competitiveness concerns of ITRE MEPs. 
The increased degree of horizontal policy coordination between the EP’s 
committees has to be seen in tandem with a general change in the EU’s 
environmental regulatory discourse and a change in the saliency of 
environmental policies from silent to salient (Wurzel and Connelly, 2011; 
Wurzel,2012). Until the late 1990s, EU environmental politics was largely driven 
by an environmental advocacy coalition, including the EP’s ENVI committee and 
the European Commission’s DG for Environment (Wurzel, 2012). The sectoral 
autonomy of EU policymaking with weak horizontal policy coordination made it 
possible for the EP’s ENVI committee together with the European Commission’s 
DG for Environment to act as policy champions for environmental groups. 
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However, ‘since 2000 the EP has been increasingly influenced by the EU’s 
general fixation with the Lisbon Agenda’ and its focus on creating a competitive 
economy (Burns and Carter, 2010, p. 15). Environmental legislation is 
increasingly viewed through a competitive lens – rather than merely being 
embedded in an environmental frame – with closer attention paid to the 
competitive implications of environmental policies. The Europe 2020 Strategy, 
replacing the Lisbon Strategy, has become a point of reference for much of the 
EU’s current legislation with the aim of making Europe more dynamic and 
competitive. The increased focus on the Europe 2020 strategy has created 
overlap between policy realms of the European Commission’s DGs, the EP’s 
committees and the Council’s working groups. The increased horizontal policy 
coordination has diminished the EP’s previous role as a defender of 
environmental interests.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Why did the EP accept a text that diluted the environmental ambition of the 
European Commission’s proposal instead of taking up its traditional role as a 
policy champion for environmental groups? This chapter has shown that both 
factors pertaining to the specific case of the vans regulation as well as wider EP 
institutional changes explain why the EP did not act as a conduit for 
environmental groups on the vans regulation. Firstly, MEPs, MEP assistants, 
and EP policy advisors were asymmetrically exposed to lobbying from the car 
industry because environmental organisations were both less numerous and 
active in pressing their demands before the EP. Although the T&E and 
Greenpeace did not have any of their demands included in final outcome, they 
managed to launch and sustain a debate within the EP on the issue of speed 
limiters. Several interviewees doubt that the discussion on speed limiters would 
have been so prevalent in Parliament had Greenpeace and T&E not lobbied so 
strongly in favour of it. Although Greenpeace and the T&E fervently supported 
the inclusion of speed limiters within the scope of the vans regulation, they knew 
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it would be difficult to get through the Council due to the opposition from 
Germany. Nevertheless, they hoped that if Parliament could not get it included 
in the vans regulation during the trialogue meetings, it could at least provide a 
basis for getting concessions on the long-term target. The issue of speed limiters 
show the importance of focusing on both the policy process and the outcome. As 
expected from Wilson’s typology, without increase public attention and a policy 
entrepreneur to represent the general public, interest groups carrying 
concentrated costs are often more influential in decision-making than groups 
faced with diffuse benefits. The assumption from the wider interest group 
literature linking specific information types and tactics to specific groups was 
however not fully supported in this case study. Both NGOs and the automotive 
industry enjoyed direct access to MEPs and none of them used ‘outside’ tactics 
to catch the eyes of MEPs. Furthermore, both the industry and the green 
organisations presented MEPs with technical information, although the T&E 
also provided MEPs with political information about people’s support for speed 
limiters. All interviewed interest group representatives used inside (access) and 
not outside (voice) strategies.  
 Secondly, lobbying on one dossier cannot be seen in isolation from other 
dossiers. The vans regulation closely mirrored the existing legislation on the 
reduction of CO2 emissions from passenger cars. This highlight an important 
premise in Wilson’s typology, namely that strengthened environmental 
regulation often comes about without being preceded by a crisis or increased 
public salience. Rather new regulation is a result of an existing policy preparing 
the way for the passage of another. As all the big dragons had been slain in the 
debate on the reduction of CO2 emissions from passenger cars in 2007–2008, 
lobbying on the vans regulation was restricted to a small number of issues. The 
car industry’s credibility was questioned by several ENVI MEPs, who thought 
the car industry had fought too hard on the passenger cars regulation. This may 
explain why the final committee report suggested a more stringent long-term 
target than the one put forward in the rapporteur’s draft report. Furthermore, 
the very nature of EU legislation as closely mirroring existing legislation means 
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that there is often little room for interest groups to change the thrust of a 
legislative proposal, limiting the risk of business capture.  
 Thirdly, wider institutional changes inside the EP and between the EU 
institutions mean that the EP has sought to moderate its environmental 
demands. These institutional changes relate to increased cooperation between 
the EP committees (responsible and opinion-giving committees), a change in the 
EP’s negotiating strategy, and a change in the EU’s regulatory discourse. 
Although turf wars between ENVI and ITRE are an oft-occurring feature in 
Parliament, the increased cooperation between the two means that policy 
outcomes tend to steer a middle course. The increased cooperation between the 
EP’s committees - following the introduction of the Revised Hughes procedure 
in 2002 - has to be seen in connection with a general change in the EU’s 
environmental regulatory discourse. Environmental legislation is increasingly 
viewed through a competitive lens with closer attention paid to the competitive 
implications of environmental policies.  
In addition to the above, the EP also appears to have changed its strategy 
when negotiating with the Council from being a challenging, and at times 
stubborn, player to becoming a more constructive legislative player. On the vans 
regulation, this was exemplified with the rapporteur taking up a position that 
would serve as a reasonable point of departure for reaching an agreement with 
the Council. Although Parliament has in the past been seen as an environmental 
trailblazer advocating the views of environmental interests, it now appears to be 
more of an environmental pragmatist. This has in turn reduced the privileged 
position once held by green organisations, and industry groups with a more 
favourable European parliamentary arena in which they can advance their 
demands. Thus, the likelihood that ENVI MEPs take up the role as a policy 
entrepreneur for environmental interests has decreased. This has in turn paved 
the ways for interest groups shouldering concentrated costs to push ENVI policy 
outcomes in their favoured direction. However, the nature of EU policies as 
often mirroring existing regulation and the need for compromises in the EU also 
means that industry groups are unlikely to get it all their way. This is consistent 
with Wilson’s (1980) observation that improved environmental regulation is not 
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necessarily preceded by a crisis or increased salience, but may simply be a result 
of spill-over effects of existing regulatory policies, namely that one regulation 
prepares the way for the passage of another regulation. 
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Chapter 4: Food Information to Consumers 
 
Should nutrition labelling be mandatory? What nutritional information should 
be displayed on the packaging of food products? How should nutritional 
information be displayed? These questions have provoked heated debate in the 
EU following the European Commission’s 2008 proposal for a regulation on 
food information to consumers. Food labelling rules are of great importance to 
food multinationals because it ‘affects how their products are perceived by 
consumers and how well they sell’ (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2010, p. 2). 
Mandatory rules for food labelling could potentially discourage consumers from 
buying certain products. Food labelling is a political issue raising the question of 
who decides whether or not a product is regarded as healthy. Food politics 
involves the struggle over how decision-makers weigh business interests against 
public interests. These conflicts come to the fore whenever food industries seek 
to prevent regulation seen as unfavourable to their sales, and when the food 
industry ‘justifies self-interested actions as a defence of freedom of choice or 
exclusion of big brother government from personal decisions’ (Nestle, 2007, p. 
28).  
 The volume of lobbying on the European Commission’s proposal for a 
regulation on food information to consumers has been immense and been 
compared to the lobbying on the REACH (Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and restriction of Chemicals) regulation between 2003 and 2006. 
The European Commission's REACH proposal for improved regulation of 
chemicals sparked, what is regarded as, one of the biggest industry lobbying 
campaigns experienced in the EU (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2010, p. 2). 
Similar to the REACH regulation, MEPs and parliamentary assistants reported 
to have been flabbergasted by the amount of lobbying from the food industry on 
the food labelling regulation. In an interview to the BBC, the ECR shadow 
rapporteur, Struan Stevenson, said that ‘lobbyists have now penetrated the inner 
sanctum of Parliament and they’re walking into our offices very often without 
any appointments at all […] there are armies of them. I’ve never seen anything 
133 
 
like it’ (Hickman, 2010). Despite the overwhelming lobbying from the food 
industry, this chapter shows that consumer and health groups were not 
completely outmanoeuvred by the food industry. However, although consumer 
groups carried some weight during the EP’s policy process, the EP did not live 
up to its previous reputation as ‘a forceful promoter of consumer interests and a 
consistent critic of the European Commission’s failing in the consumer policy 
field’ (Greenwood, 2011, p. 164). 
The overall characteristic of the regulation is that of entrepreneurial 
politics, engendering concentrated costs on the food industry and diffuse 
benefits to consumer and health groups. The food industry is expected to have 
greater incentives to lobby the EP and be more influential than consumer 
groups. However, as this chapter will show, interesting variation exists on sub-
issues within the regulation that amounts to client, interest group, and 
majoritarian politics. The regulation on food information to consumers, 
therefore, represents an interesting case for testing Wilson’s hypotheses about 
interest group mobilisation and influence. 
 This chapter starts off by presenting the European Commission’s 
proposal and the reactions from NGOs and business groups. I thereafter 
examine the EP’s policy process and outcome before turning to the impact 
interest groups have had on the policy outcome. While the food labelling 
regulation can overall be seen as an example of entrepreneurial politics, this 
chapter shows that the case includes several types of politics, including those of 
majoritarian and interest group politics. The food labelling dossier therefore 
provides an interesting case for examining the applicability of Wilson’s politics 
of policy typology to the EP.   
 
4.1. The European Commission’s proposal 
 
In January 2008, the European Commission put forward a legislative proposal 
for a regulation on food information to consumers, which merged two existing 
directives (Directives 90/496/EC on nutrition labelling for foodstuffs, and 
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2000/13/EC on the labelling, presentation and advertising of food) into a single 
piece of legislation (a regulation). The main aim of this new piece of legislation is 
to make food labels clearer and more relevant to consumers, and to set out 
specific mandatory requirements for displaying information on the front of 
packaging. The draft regulation also seeks to provide consumers with the 
essential information they need to make informed and healthy purchasing 
choices. Prior to the EU’s adoption of the regulation on food information to 
consumers in 2011, the food industry was only obliged to include the following 
information on their food labels: the name of the product, the list of ingredients, 
the best before or use-by-date, any special conditions of use, and the name and 
address of the manufacturer. Additionally, there were specific labelling 
requirements for certain foods and substances, such as meat and fish. Until now, 
nutritional labelling has been voluntary, although it has been compulsory when 
a nutrition or health claim is made in labelling, presentation, or marketing of a 
food product. The push for regulating food information to consumers arose as a 
result of patchy implementation of the food industry’s own voluntary guidelines 
agreed in the European Commission’s Platform on Diet, Physical Activity, and 
Health. This platform was established by the Directorate-General of Health and 
Consumer Protection (DG SANCO) in 2005 and brings together representatives 
from the food industry, and consumer and health organisations. The purpose of 
the platform is to address the Europe-wide problems of unhealthy diets, rising 
obesity, and lack of exercise by engaging in concrete actions, such as self-
regulatory commitments by the food industry on (voluntary) rules governing 
food package labels, advertising, and product composition.  
 The food industry’s implementation of its own self-regulatory standards 
is inconsistent. The aim of the draft regulation is, therefore, to provide a more 
uniform situation in products sold on the EU market, which presents consumers 
with reliable and easy to access nutritional information. The European 
Commission’s draft regulation was drawn up following an extensive consultation 
process, such as an online survey consultation and more specific consultations 
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with member states, the food industry, and consumer groups.54 The European 
Commission’s proposal suggested to introducing: 
 
 Mandatory front of the pack labelling for a range of nutrients (energy, fat, 
saturates, carbohydrates and salt) expressed as amounts per 100 g/ml or 
per portion size. In addition, the mandatory nutrients must be declared in 
relation to reference intakes (i.e. guideline daily amount, GDA).  
 A minimum font size of 3mm for lettering on labels and a clear contrast 
between print and the background to improve readability in order to 
avoid important nutritional information being obscured or overshadowed 
by advertising slogans. 
 More protection against allergens by making labelling of food containing 
allergenic substances mandatory for both pre-packed an unpackaged 
food.  
 Member states can adopt national labelling rules governing the manner 
in which particulars are shown. 
 
The labelling requirements cover processed food and drink products and 
exclude non-processed/non-pre-packed food, such as meat and vegetables. 
Alcoholic drinks, such as wine, beer and spirits, are currently excluded from the 
proposal, except ready to drink alcoholic beverages (so-called alcopops, such as 
Smirnoff Ice and Bacardi Breezer).  
 
4.1.1 The cost/benefit profile of the proposal 
 
The European Commission’s impact assessment was based on a public 
consultation by means of a consultative document (see European Commission, 
                                                 
54 For responses to the survey consultation see : 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/labellingnutrition/betterregulation/index_en/htm (last accessed 
23 July 2012) 
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2006), advisory group meetings,55 a qualitative study on labelling carried out by 
an external contractor, and research conducted by the research institute RAND 
Europe. RAND Europe conducted an online consultation of the food industry to 
collect information and data about the possible impacts of the different 
regulatory options considered by the European Commission. The Commission’s 
impact assessment generally stressed the benefits of harmonising food labelling 
rules to provide a level playing field for food companies and to enable 
consumers to make safe and well informed choices. The impact assessment 
highlighted that food labelling legislation is often perceived as politically 
problematic because labelling rules tend to be very detailed and technical, which 
impose administrative and financial burdens on food manufacturers.  Yet, at the 
same time, detailed and harmonised EU rules offer more legal certainty to 
manufacturers because they do not have to make their own labelling rules 
and/or change their labels in accordance with different rules in different 
member states. The European Commission’s proposal was seen as creating four 
main benefits: 
 
 Achieving legal clarity and harmonised implementation; 
 Ensuring the efficient functioning of the internal market; 
 Enabling consumers to make better informed choices when buying food 
products by improving  the legibility and understanding of food labels, 
and avoiding misleading labels; 
 Simplifying technical requirements and removing unnecessary 
administrative burdens (European Commission, 2008h, pp. 7-8). 
 
Table 4.1 shows the overall costs and benefits of introducing mandatory 
nutrition labelling requirements to all food companies operating in the EU’s 
single market.  
 
                                                 
55 The proposal was discussed in the following advisory groups: the Advisory Group on the Food 
Chain and Animal and Plant Health; the European Consumer Consultative Group; the Consumer 
Policy Network of senior consumer officials; and the Health Policy Forum.  
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Table 4.1 Cost and benefits of mandatory nutrition labelling  
 
Level Costs Benefits 
Consumers Not enumerated  Improves 
comparability of 
products 
 Reduces information 
asymmetry between 
consumers and food 
manufacturers 
 Likely to help 
consumers make 
better informed 
decisions about their 
diets 
Food manufacturers  Greater costs for 
SMEs, which might 
compromise their 
competitiveness in 
the food industry 
 Costs to industry 
related to printing 
labels and collecting 
nutrition information 
 
 Improved legal 
certainty and 
harmonised 
implementation 
 Level playing field 
between 
manufacturers 
 Decreasing costs of 
selling products in 
different EU countries 
Member States Not enumerated  Might make 
enforcement easier 
due to 
standardisation 
 
Source: European Commission, 2008h. 
 
As can be seen from table 4.1, the costs of mandatory EU food labelling 
regulation fall primarily at company level, concentrating the costs on the food 
industry and distributing the benefits to consumers. The introduction of 
mandatory nutrition labelling confers clear benefits to consumers because it 
makes it easier for consumers to compare different products on the basis of their 
nutritional quality, and enables consumers to make better informed decisions 
when buying pre-packaged food. It could potentially also have positive impacts 
on public health in the EU. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
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lifestyle diseases cause 77% of the disease burden in Europe. In 2000, the WHO 
estimated that approximately 56 million people died in 2000 in Europe because 
of bad nutrition (out of a total of ca. 136 million people in 2000 dying in 
Europe). Using obesity in the EU’s 27 member states as an example, adult 
obesity occurrence was estimated to be 15.7% in 2005, and costs the public 
purse of EU25 (excluding Bulgaria and Romania) approximately €40.5 billion 
per year (WHO, 2004). On top of this are the costs associated with 
cardiovascular diseases (often caused by obesity), which is estimated to be about 
€168 billion in EU25 on an annual basis (European Commission, 2008h; 
Lankhuizen et al, 2007). Providing more information to consumers about the 
food they eat through improved food labelling is likely, therefore, to increase 
healthy food choices and to improve public health, and in turn to reduce public 
money spent on lifestyle diseases. The European Commission’s proposal is 
unlikely to lead to a significant increase in the administrative burden to 
governments in the EU’s 27 member states, as the new rules are expected to be 
easily incorporated into existing systems of control. 
The introduction of mandatory food labelling requirements to all food 
manufacturers is likely to inflict greater costs on SMEs, which might 
compromise their competitiveness vis-à-vis larger firms. This is because larger 
firms benefit from economies of scale, which lowers the cost per-unit of 
complying with regulation. However, the European Commission’s impact 
assessment finds conflicting evidence for the costs to SMEs. For example, the 
impact assessment mentions a 1995 study of British SMEs, following the 
introduction of EU labelling regulation in 1993, which found no significant 
effects on SMEs’ competitiveness (Cumbers et al, 1995). Contrary to this, a more 
recent study of the US situation finds that the introduction of mandatory food 
labelling increases the probability of SMEs leaving the food market sector 
compared to large companies (Moorman et al, 2005). Overall, the introduction 
of mandatory labelling rules is expected to impose adjustment costs to the food 
industry related to printing new labels and collecting nutrition information. For 
example, the proposed requirement to distinguish between saturated and 
unsaturated fats on food labels might hit sales of food products consisting of 
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high levels of saturated fat. Saturated fats have been shown to directly increase 
cholesterol levels, clog arteries, and increase the risk of developing coronary 
heart diseases or cardiovascular diseases. In lack of clear rules, food companies 
producing food products with high levels of saturated fat might be inclined not 
to distinguish between different types of fat on their food labels.  
Although the European Commission’s proposal introduces costs to food 
companies, companies producing pre-packed food always have costs related to 
food labelling that are not only due to legislative requirements. Companies have 
long used their own labelling schemes and have been obliged to include the 
following information on their food labels: the name of the product, the list of 
ingredients, the best before or use-by-date, any special conditions of use, and 
the name and address of the manufacturer. Labelling changes are caused by 
various reasons, such as changes in regulation, marketing reasons, recipe 
changes, and product reformulation. Food manufacturers change their food 
labels regularly, ranging from several times a year for branded products with a 
high turnover (such as cereal and soft drinks) to every two-three years for 
commodity products (such as sugar, salt and flour). The impact assessment 
estimates that, over a period of three years, about 80% of all companies 
operating in the EU introduce labelling changes as part of their normal business 
cycle. The administrative costs of introducing new food labelling regulation are 
estimated to range from €180 to €913 million, which relate to costs for 
companies for familiarising themselves with new regulation and collecting the 
necessary information to put on food labels. The costs associated with label 
design and approving new labels are estimated to be €2000-4000 for smaller 
changes, and €7000-9000 if full redesign is necessary (European Commission, 
2008i, p. 38). Table 4.2 shows the distribution of costs and benefits of two key 
provisions of the proposal: mandatory nutrition labelling on front of pack with 
inclusion of five nutritional elements and establishing a minimum font size.  
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Table 4.2 Cost and benefits of key provisions 
 
Topic Costs/benefits on 
food 
manufacturers 
Costs/benefits 
to consumers 
Costs/benefits 
on member 
states 
Mandatory 
nutrition 
labelling on 
front of pack 
with inclusion 
of five 
nutritional 
elements 
Benefits: 
Removes 
uncertainty on 
presentation 
 
Costs: 
Greater costs on 
SMEs, which might 
compromise their 
competiveness in 
the food industry 
 
Costs arising from 
changing labels 
 
 
Benefits: 
Helps consumers 
use nutritional 
information by 
providing at a 
glance information 
on nutrition  
 
Leads to greater 
comparability 
between products, 
contributing to 
better consumer 
choices 
 
Costs: 
Not enumerated 
No change in costs 
and benefits of 
enforcement and 
control 
Establish a 
minimum font 
size 
Benefits: 
Not enumerated 
 
Costs: 
Might result in some 
cost for companies 
with multi-lingual 
and small labels 
Benefits: 
Improves 
consumer 
understanding of 
labels 
 
Costs: 
Not enumerated 
 
 
Benefits: 
Easier to 
implement 
detailed regulation 
 
Costs: 
Not enumerated 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission, 2008i. 
 
As can be seen from table 4.2, the inclusion of five nutritional elements 
(calories, fat, saturated fat, sugar and salt) on a mandatory basis would have an 
effect on approximately 80% of all food companies operating in the EU. Around 
half of these companies would need to obtain data on the content of saturated 
fats and sugars, and the other half would need to get information about all five 
nutritional elements. The European Commission estimates that the cost to the 
food industry taken together for collecting this information would range from 
141 
 
€0.7 billion to €2.3 billion (European Commission, 2008i). Nutritional labelling 
on front of pack is likely to have a particularly negative impact on the 
competitiveness of SMEs.  Consumers are expected to benefit from more 
comprehensive information of food products, which is likely to result in better 
informed dietary choices and have a positive impact on public health. 
Furthermore, the regulation would result in more uniform presentation of 
information across different food products, which would make it easier for 
consumers to compare products.  The inclusion of nutritional information on 
front of pack is likely to have a greater impact at the point of purchase decisions 
than back of pack information. Front of pack labelling provides consumers with 
a quick overview of the nutritional components of a given food product. The 
Commission’s impact assessment does not enumerate any costs imposed on 
member states, but states that member states are likely to benefit from 
harmonised EU food labelling rules because it is expected to ease 
implementation and control (European Commission, 2008i).  
 
4.2 Interest group positions and strategies 
 
Stakeholders’ view differ extensively with regard to what kind of information 
should be given to consumers (number of nutrients displayed), how it should be 
presented (nutrition information per 100 g/ml and/or portion size), and where 
it should be displayed on the pack (front or back of pack). The food labelling 
dossier contains many controversial issues drawing in a diverse set of interest 
groups. The debate pits consumer and health groups against the food industry; 
animal welfare and secularist groups against Jewish and Muslim groups; 
consumer groups against the Malaysian government; and industries against 
industries. While the overall nature of the dossier entails a conflict scenario 
envisaged by entrepreneurial politics (the food industry set in opposition to 
consumer and health organisations), specific provisions involve interest groups 
politics (pitting industries against industries), and majoritarian politics (animal 
welfare organisations set against religious groups). This section focuses in on the 
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positions and lobbying strategies of the food industry, and consumer and health 
organisations on the general provisions of the dossier. The specific provisions 
begetting scenarios of majoritarian and interest groups politics are studied in 
more detail later in this chapter. The main lobbying battle on the food labelling 
proposal was fought between the food industry, and consumer and health 
organisations. The NGO side brought together a limited number of 
organisations with small resources to lobby the EP actively throughout the 
entire process. These organisations include the European Consumer’s 
organisation (BEUC), the European Heart Network (EHN), the European Public 
Health Alliance (EPHA), and the European Alcohol Policy Alliance (Eurocare). 
Whereas BEUC and the EHN lobbied the EP actively by meeting MEPs on a 
regular basis, EPHA and Eurocare remained largely silent and confined their 
lobbying activities to sending their position chapter to MEPs rather than having 
face-to-face meetings.  
 Unlike environmental groups in the EU (see Chapter 3), the number of 
active consumer groups has dwindled over the years with BEUC being the only 
active EU-wide consumer group present in Brussels (Greenwood, 2011, p. 161). 
The nature of BEUC as a confederation means that it is less able to act as 
speedily as Green10 NGOs, the latter mainly representing ‘cheque-book 
members’. Similar to many Green10 organisations (with the exception of 
Greenpeace), BEUC receives the bulk of its funding from the EU's budget, 
enabling them to employ 34 full time staff in their Brussels office. It also draws 
extensively upon the resources from its 42 national consumer organisations 
from 31 European countries (BEUC, 2012). During the first reading of the food 
labelling dossier, BEUC's lobbying work towards the EP was mainly undertaken 
by the British consumer organisation ‘Which?’ as the person in charge of the file 
at BEUC was on leave. Compared with lobbying from consumer and health 
organisations, there was ‘an unprecedented amount of lobbying’ 56 from 
                                                 
56 Interview, MEP assistant, 22 February 2011 
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industry.57 The food labelling dossier provided an uneven playing field between 
the food industry and consumer and health organisations. Consumer and health 
interests' resources and lobbying activity paled in comparison with the food 
industry. The consumer and health organisations’ potential to influence the EP's 
report was further limited because they took up a position reflecting their ideal 
outcome, which proved difficult to garner parliamentary support for.  
 The majority of active food and drink industries were both lobbying on 
their own and through their European trade association, FoodDrinkEurope 
(until 2011 known as the CIAA). FoodDrinkEurope represents the largest 
manufacturing sector in Europe, and is a major employer and exporter in the 
EU. Similar to most EU industry associations, FoodDrinkEurope has a hybrid 
organisational structure bringing together 26 national federations, 22 major 
food and drink companies, and 29 European sector associations 
(FoodDrinkEurope, 2012). FoodDrinkEurope closely monitors the EP's activities 
and maintains close contact with MEPs and MEP assistants from relevant 
parliamentary committees, which allow them to inform MEPs about the impact 
EU legislation has on the food industry (Grant & Stocker, 2009, p. 239). 
FoodDrinkEurope has one person employed with the sole responsibility of 
building and nurturing contacts with the EP. 
 
4.2.1 The position of the food industry versus consumer and health groups 
  
The position of the food industry and consumer and health organisations varies 
widely concerning the favoured labelling scheme (GDA and/or traffic light), 
number of nutrient displayed on labels, and country of origin. As can be seen 
from table 4.3, the food industry supports the European Commission's 
suggestion to make it mandatory to include the GDA icon for calories (energy) 
per portion on the front of pack. In contrast, consumer and health groups want 
                                                 
57 The list of active industries is long, including organisations and companies such as the 
Confederation of Food and Drink Industry (FoodDrinkEurope), Unilever, European Association 
of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, European Snack Association (ESA), Ferrero 
Rocher, Kellogg, McDonald, Danone, Nestle, International chewing gum association (ICGA), 
European Wine Spirits Organisation (CEPS), the European Breakfast Cereal Association 
(Ceereal), and European Dairy Association (EDA). 
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to combine GDA with a traffic light label for key nutrients, where key nutrients 
are colour-coded with red, amber and green on the front of packs to show 
whether products are high, medium or low in potentially harmful ingredients. 
Regarding the number of nutrients displayed on front of pack, consumer and  
health groups are campaigning for mandatory front of pack information on 
energy, salt, sugar, total fat and saturated fat expressed per 100 g/ml (but not 
per portion size).  
 
Table 4.3 Positions of interest groups on key provisions 
 
Source: BEUC (2011); BEUC, EHN & EPHA (2008); FoodDrinkEurope (2009a, 2009b, 
2011b). 
 Food industry Consumer and health 
organisations 
Derogations  Exclude all alcohols, 
seasonal confectionary, 
handcrafted food,  non-
pre-packed food, glass 
bottles, and packaging or 
containers of a surface area 
less than 80 cm2 
Include all alcohols 
Nutritional 
information 
Mandatory Front of Pack 
(FoP):  Energy content 
(calories) expressed per 
portion size and per 100 
g/ml 
 
Back of pack (BoP): Big 8 
nutrients (energy, protein,  
carbohydrate, sugars, fat, 
saturated fat, fibre, and 
sodium)  
 
Voluntary labelling of trans 
fats 
Mandatory FoP: Energy 
content,  saturated fat, sugar, 
salt expressed per 100 g/ml 
shown by a traffic light 
labelling scheme 
BoP: Everything that is on 
FoP + protein, total fat, trans 
fatty acids, carbohydrates, 
fibre, added sugar and fibre  
 
 
Mandatory labelling of trans 
fats 
Country of origin Opposed to mandatory 
labelling of country of 
origin for main ingredients 
In favour of mandatory 
labelling of country of origin 
for main ingredients 
A traffic light 
labelling scheme 
Against a traffic light 
labelling scheme  
For a traffic light labelling 
scheme  
National 
labelling systems 
Against For 
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The food industry suggested to only require companies to print information on 
calorie content per portion on the front of pack, and to include the big 8 
nutrients (energy, protein, carbohydrates, sugars, fat, saturated fat, fibre and 
sodium) on back of pack, expressed per 100 g/ml, with the possibility of using 
portion size as additional information. FoodDrinkEurope believes that ‘portion 
sizes are critical to improve consumer understanding and should be addressed 
appropriately by the Regulation based on proposals from industry’ 
(FoodDrinkEurope, 2009b). Consumer organisations contend that providing 
nutritional information according to portion size could leave too much scope for 
variation and, moreover, lead food companies to provide portion information 
using idealistic, rather than realistic, portion sizes.  
 Regarding the issue of trans fat (which raises the risk of coronary heart 
diseases), the food industry is in favour of labelling trans fat on a voluntary 
basis. They referred to findings by the European Food Safety Authority's (EFA), 
which show that trans fat does not pose a public health hazard as ‘most EU 
countries are already below the WHO [the World Health Organisation] 
recommendation of 1 per cent of total energy’ (FoodDrinkEurope, 2011b). In 
contrast to the food industry, health organisations are fervent supporters of 
mandatory trans fat labelling. Lastly, the discussion over whether country of 
origin labelling for all food stuffs should continue to be voluntary or should be 
made mandatory pitted consumer groups against the food industry. The current 
situation is that the origin is only mentioned on a voluntary basis unless the 
consumer is misled without its indication. Country of origin is already 
compulsory for certain foods, such as beef, honey, olive oil, fresh fruit, and 
vegetables. Generally speaking, consumer groups and the agricultural sector are 
in favour of mandatory labelling of origin for main ingredients, while the food 
industry and SMEs are opposed to it, owing to frequent changes in the supply 
chain. A representative from Unilever uttered that mandatory country of origin 
labelling would ‘force us to change our labels every time we switch the origin of 
our ingredients and would generate more packaging waste’.58  
                                                 
58
 Interview, Unilever, 8 February 2011 
146 
 
4.2.2 The strategies used by the food industry, and consumer and health 
groups 
 
Lobbying of the EP was biased in favour of the food industry, who were both 
more numerous and able to hold more events in the EP compared with 
consumer and health organisations. Various industry representatives had stands 
outside the MEP canteen giving out free food and lobbying folders. For instance, 
the European breakfast cereal association (Ceereal) had a breakfast stand in the 
EP, where they gave out free breakfast to anyone passing by as well as a little 
sales talk on why it is important to depict nutrition information by portion size 
rather than by 100g/ml. Ferrero Rocher gave free chocolate boxes to key MEPs. 
One MEP assistant reported that Ferrero Rocher sent his MEP a massive 
chocolate Easter egg. FoodDrinkEurope had a GDA information stand in the EP 
from 10-12 November 2009 (FoodDrinkEurope, 2009a). Prior to the event, the 
public affairs company Fleishman-Hillard (hired to assist FoodDrinkEurope 
with its lobbying activities) sent an email invitation to MEPs with the words: 
The CIAA [FoodDrinkEurope] invites you to visit its GDA 
Information Stand from 10 - 12 November (11am - 3pm) in the ASP 
Building of the EP (ground floor to the right of the entrance).Print out 
the questionnaire via the link below, complete and return it to the 
GDA Stand, and you will be entered into a prize draw to win a hamper 
of GDA labelled food products (FoodDrinkEurope, 2009a).  
Although MEPs are probably unlikely to change their minds upon receiving 
small gifts; free chocolate or free lunches can be used as a hook to catch MEPs’ 
attention and make them come to lobby events. A representative from BEUC 
lamented that, ‘we [BEUC] have nothing to offer MEPs except information; the 
only thing we can give to MEPs is our position and arguments’.59 Although the 
food industry had more physical presence in the EP, MEPs and MEP assistants 
doubted the effectiveness of food stands and goodie-bags. As one MEP assistant 
explained: 
 
                                                 
59 Interview, BEUC, 16 March 2011 
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I don’t think lobbyists’ stands in Parliament are very effective. There 
are so many stands here and assistants just drop by a stand and get 
free food without paying much regard to the issue. If you don’t work 
for the environment committee, why would you pay attention to it? 60 
 
While the food industry was more present in the EP during the food labelling 
discussions than consumer groups, both lobbying camps claimed that their 
positions had scientific grounding. Both industry and consumer groups sought 
to justify their position with reference to scientific studies. The problem is that 
the current scientific studies on consumers' favoured labelling schemes often 
reach contradictory conclusions or are incomparable. Whereas BEUC would 
refer to research that shows that consumers find colour-coding labels and Front 
of Pack nutrition schemes the easiest way to make informed purchasing choices, 
FoodDrinkEurope would refer to studies concluding that GDA labelling 
combined with a nutritional table provided consumers with the best information 
at-a-glance (BEUC, EHN, & EPHA, 2008; FoodDrinkEurope, 2011b; Trollope, 
2011). Research about consumer preferences sits in between, what interest 
group scholars call, technical and political information because it both provide 
scientifically-based information and information about public opinion. Perhaps 
this type of information is better labelled ‘evidence-based information’, as it 
provides decision-makers with data driven arguments, and facts and figures 
about consumer preferences (Chalmer, 2013, 55). The food industries and 
consumer and health organisations’ use of science to support their positions 
show that scientific findings can be regarded as only one of a number of belief 
systems. ‘Like any other kind of science, nutrition science is more a matter of 
probabilities than of absolutes and is, therefore, subject to interpretation’ 
(Nestle, 2007, p. 28). Food industries use science to oppose regulatory measures 
that might affect the sales of their products negatively. Consumer and health 
organisations use science to question the healthiness and safety of food 
products, and to improve consumer comprehension.  
                                                 
60 Interview, MEP assistant, 18 May 2011 
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The food industry’s effort to influence EU food regulations go well beyond 
the day-to-day lobbying of EU decision-makers. As Nestle says, ‘they go right to 
the heart of nutrition as a profession’ (2007, p. 111). The food industry is 
financially involved with academic experts in nutrition and health. Funding 
research, conferences, and academic journals is part of the food industry’s 
corporate strategy. A large proportion of academic research is dependent upon 
external funding, and sponsorship by industry is common. In question is 
whether or not research on health and nutrition is compromised by funding 
from the food industry? A yet more worrying question is if industry funding of 
research affects the type of research being done and the results. The answers to 
these questions are by no means straightforward. Academics often get around 
the issue by disclosing their sources of funding and by subscribing to self-
imposed transparency statements. The food industry uses academic findings, if 
favourable, to promote their products. In the EU, the food industry draws 
extensively on the European Food Information Council (EUFIC) to conduct 
scientific studies. As a representative from Nestle expressed:  
 
The EUFIC research on food information was crucial for our work. 
Robust and EU-wide peer-reviewed consumer research has backed 
up our argumentation. Our role is to show that the evidence is there 
and to inform decision-makers about the evidence. For instance, 
EUFIC conducted a large pan-European survey on consumer 
understanding of GDA and traffic light, which showed that 
consumers found almost no difference between the two.61  
 
EUFIC was set up in 1995 by the food industry to provide the food industry with 
‘science-based information on the nutritional quality of food and safety of foods’ 
(EUFIC, 2012). EUFIC’s research findings are reviewed by a scientific advisory 
board and editorial board of academics prior to dissemination to ensure that the 
information is ‘representative, factually correct and truthful’ (EUFIC, 2012). 
Both the food industry and consumer and health groups drew on outside and 
inside lobbying and provided similar types of information to MEPs. Although 
NGOs are often assumed to be restricted to the use of outside tactics, the 
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consumer and health groups interviewed for this chapter concentrated their 
lobbying efforts on inside tactics and direct contact with MEPs and their staff. 
Outside tactics – such as using the media, arranging conferences, mobilising 
citizen support through petitions and manifestations - were not seen as ‘outsider 
tactics’, nor where they only taken up by consumer and health organisations; 
they were also used frequently, if not more, by the food industry. Both the food 
industry and consumer and health groups used the Brussels newspaper media 
(such as European Voice and EurActiv) to publish position papers, and 
organised workshops inside the EP. None of the interviewed interest group 
representatives mobilised citizen support through petitions or manifestations.  
 
4.3 The EP policy process and outcome 
 
The EP's scrutiny of the European Commission's food labelling proposal went 
through a bumpy road of two parliamentary terms and three years. The proposal 
was examined by the committee of ‘Environment, Food Safety and Health’ 
(ENVI) as the responsible committee and ‘Agriculture and Rural Development’ 
committee (AGRI), and the ‘Internal Market and Consumer Protection’ (IMCO) 
committee as the opinion-giving committees. In the sixth parliamentary term 
(2004-2009), the EP plenary voted to refer the ENVI report back to the 
committee for renewed scrutiny as the number of suggested amendments was 
extremely high. The newly elected parliament therefore started its scrutiny of 
the proposal afresh in September 2009 with the same rapporteur in charge, 
German EPP MEP Dr Renate Sommer. The following sections provide an 
overview of the EP's main changes introduced to the proposal at the different 
stages of the EP's decision-making process in the seventh parliamentary term 
(2009-2014). 
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4.3.1 The EP’s first reading 
 
Both inside and outside the EP, the rapporteur on the food labelling proposal is 
perceived to be very competent and knowledgeable about nutritional issues 
owing to her educational background, which counts a PhD in international 
nutrition and degrees in agriculture. Among the interviewed food industries, 
and consumer and health groups, the rapporteur was thought to be very 
scientific in her approach. The majority of the interviewed interest groups found 
that the rapporteur gave less weight to positions lacking scientific evidence. As a 
representative from UEAPME explained:  
 
Dr Sommer [the rapporteur] asked for a scientific substantiation 
when we put forward our position to her. She would refuse our 
demands if they were only based on wishful thinking rather than 
scientific evidence. She has a science background and work from a 
scientific approach. Yet, other MEPs work from a more populist 
approach concerned about attracting media attention and building a 
public image.62  
 
Despite her scientific background, the rapporteur had earlier made public her 
scepticism to mandatory labelling rules that would ‘nanny and gag consumers’ 
(European Voice, 11 March 2010). Her position, reflected in her ENVI draft 
report, was closer to the views of the industry than that of consumer and health 
groups. She amended the European Commission’s text so that only the number 
of calories had to feature on the front of pack, and she resolutely opposed traffic-
light labels. Table 4.1 shows the EP's changes introduced to the European 
Commission's proposal at the EP's first reading. As can be seen from the table, 
the rapporteur largely supported the industry’s position on key aspects of the 
dossier by accepting that:  
 
 Consumers would be overwhelmed with information if too many 
nutrients were to appear on the front of packaging  
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 The minimum font-size requirements would create bulkier packaging, 
more waste, and potentially larger portions  
 Member states should not be allowed to adopt national rules governing 
the way in which particulars are shown as it would fragment the internal 
market  
 Alcopops should be excluded from the scope of the regulation  
 Country of origin labelling should remain voluntary.  
 
Unlike the food industry, the rapporteur favoured that nutrition information 
should be expressed per 100 g/ml with portion size being additionally. The 
rapporteur’s report recommended deleting entirely an article relating to nutrient 
profiles, and thereby attempting to revoke the present regulation on health and 
nutrition claims. The regulation on health and nutrition claims was passed in 
2006 to ensure that consumers could rely on scientifically accurate information 
regarding any food or drink product on sale in the EU. This regulation requires 
foods to display appropriate nutrient profiles to prove claims such as ‘low fat’, 
‘helps your body resist stress’ or ‘reduces cholesterol’ (European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union, 2006).  However, the rapporteur argued 
that the nutrition profiles described in this regulation were not based on 
scientific findings, but only set arbitrarily by the European Commission and 
should be deleted. According to the rapporteur, arbitrary legislation on food 
would mean more red tape, legal uncertainty, distortions of competition, and 
would jeopardise the balanced nutrition of the population of Europe (European 
Parliament, 2010h, p. 136). The rapporteur’s suggestion to delete the article on 
nutrient profiles was, however, narrowly defeated by the full chamber.  
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Table 4.4: Changes to the Commission’s proposal, first reading 
 
Source: European Commission (2008e); European Parliament (2009c, 2010g, 2010h).
 Commission proposal ENVI  draft report ENVI report Plenary outcome 
Derogations Alcohol, but not 
alcopops 
All alcohols incl. alcopops 
+ non pre-packed food, 
glass bottles, and 
packaging or containers 
of a surface area less than 
80 cm2 
Same as ENVI draft 
report 
 
Same as ENVI draft report  
 
Nutritional 
information 
Front of pack (FoP): 
energy, fat, saturates 
carbohydrates, sugars 
and salt expressed as 
amounts of per 100 
g/ml  
 
BoP: no requirements 
FoP: only energy content 
expressed kilocalories per 
100 g/ml with portion 
additionally. 
 
 
 
BoP: no requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nutrient profiles deleted 
FoP: Only energy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BoP: Other mandatory 
listed ingredients: 
protein, carbohydrates, 
fibre, natural and 
artificial trans fat 
 
 
Nutrient profiles deleted 
FoP: energy, fat, 
saturates, sugars and salt 
expressed as amounts of 
per 100 g/ml 
 
 
 
BoP: Amount of energy + 
other mandatory listed 
ingredients (protein, 
carbohydrates, fibre, 
natural and artificial trans 
fat) 
 
Nutrient profiles preserved 
Traffic light Not included Not included Not included Not included 
National 
labelling 
systems 
Member states can 
adopt national 
labelling rules 
Member states cannot 
adopt national labelling 
rules 
Member states can 
adopt national labelling 
rules 
Member states cannot 
adopt national labelling 
rules 
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The debate on food labelling was beset with misinformation on both the 
modalities of nutrient profiles and the traffic light scheme. For instance, it was 
argued that the packaging of Nutella, the Ferrero hazelnut spread, would have to 
be labelled ‘dangerous for health’ or ‘enhances obesity’.  Consumer and health 
organisations claimed that this information is incorrect. As a representative 
from BEUC explained, ‘Nutrient profiles will neither ban any food, nor oblige 
manufacturers to label them as dangerous. Instead, they will ensure that a claim 
made to promote food is not misleading’.63 The purpose of nutrient profiles is to 
prevent the industry from making exaggerated claims by advertising their 
products as healthy when the product contains high amounts of saturated fat, 
salt or sugar. 
 During the ENVI amendment phase, several MEPs from the Greens, 
S&D, and ALDE groups put forward suggestions to introduce a traffic light 
system. Amendments that suggested to make traffic light labelling mandatory 
were, however, rejected at the committee vote with a narrow margin of 30 MEPs 
voting for and 32 MEPs against. While the final ENVI report clearly favoured the 
views of the food industry, several of the rapporteur’s initial amendments were 
rejected, such as provisions concerning country of origin and national labelling 
systems. The final ENVI report endorsed the European Commission’s line that 
member states are allowed to adopt national labelling rules. Furthermore, the 
committee voted for making country of origin labelling of meat, fish, poultry, 
and dairy products mandatory, even when used as an ingredient in processed 
food.  
The ENVI report was voted on by plenary in June 2010, where MEPs 
rejected the traffic light system, but adopted the European Commission’s 
suggestions to feature mandatory nutritional information and guideline daily 
amounts on front of pack (energy, fat, saturated fat, sugar) per 100 g/ml (and 
not per portion size as favoured by the food industry). The plenary endorsed 
ENVI’s amendment recommending to make country of origin labelling 
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mandatory on meat, fish, poultry, and dairy products, but voted against ENVI’s 
suggestion to allow member states to adopt their own national labelling system.  
Although the EP’s first reading position tilted more towards the 
preferences of the food industry than that of NGOs, the food industry did not get 
it all its way. The food industry was, for instance, not supportive of front of pack 
labelling of the big five (energy, fat, saturates, sugars and salt), and an extension 
of country of origin labelling to meat, fish, poultry and dairy products. While 
policy did not entirely shape politics, the policy process certainly did. The food 
industry was more active during the policy process than NGOs. Several 
interviewees reported that consumer and health groups were more active prior 
to the plenary vote than at the committee stage. As an ALDE policy advisor 
explained: 
 
I felt that there was a lack of campaigning from the consumer side, 
whereas there was excessive lobbying from the industry side. The 
consumer organisations did a big attempt in convincing MEPs about 
the traffic light systems before the plenary vote, but they were not 
that active at the committee stage.64  
 
At the EP's second reading, lobbying from consumer and health organisations 
was even more limited. Generally, lobbying is most intense at first reading. On 
the contrary, at second reading – when no new amendments can be introduced 
that have not been accepted by the EP's plenary at first reading – lobbying is 
usually limited. This was, however, not the case on the food labelling proposal as 
the food industry was lobbying the EP actively at both the first and second 
readings.  
4.3.2 The EP’s second reading and final outcome 
 
It is difficult for interest groups to influence the EP's position during second 
reading. This is because: 
 
                                                 
64Interview, ALDE policy advisor, 23 February 
155 
 
Everyone knows that Parliament only has 3 months to find a 
common position. Even though lobbyists are trying to bring in new 
aspects, they know that they cannot stop the whole process at this 
stage. Conciliation is even worse for lobbyists. In the first reading 
Parliament is more open to lobbying as we are building our position. 
When we are far into the process, we are not interested in lobbying. 
You reach a point where you have to finish and get legislation 
finalised.65  
 
MEPs have usually made up their mind in the EP's second reading, and the main 
role of interest groups is to ensure MEPs do not forget about amendments voted 
through at first reading. Table 4.2 shows the EP’s changes introduced to the 
Council’s common position. As can be seen from the table, the final policy 
outcome requires food labels to state the energy content and amounts of fat, 
saturates, carbohydrates, protein, sugars, and salt in a legible table on the 
packaging, and in the same field of vision. All this information must be 
expressed per 100 g/ml, and may additionally be expressed per portion. 
Labelling may be accompanied by GDA, but unlike the European Commission's 
proposal, this remains voluntary.  
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Table 4.5: Changes introduced, second reading  
Source: Council of the European Union (2011); European Parliament (2011a, 2011b, 2011c). 
 The Council ENVI draft report ENVI  report Plenary 
Derogations All alcohols, and containers 
of with the largest surface 
area less than 10 cm2 
 
All alcohols, containers of 
with the largest surface area 
less than 80cm2 + seasonal 
confectionary, and 
handcrafted food  
Same as ENVI draft 
report 
All alcohols, 
handcrafted food, and 
containers of with the 
largest surface area less 
than 25 cm2 (e.g. 
chewing gums) 
Nutritional  
information 
FoP & BoP: no special 
requirements 
 
 
Mandatory labelling 
anywhere on pack: 
energy, fat, saturates, 
carbohydrates, sugars, 
protein and salt per 100 
g/ml in same field of vision, 
with portion size 
additionally 
 
Other:  Meat from slaughter 
without stunning should 
not be labelled as such  
FoP: energy, fat, saturates, 
sugars and salt expressed as 
amounts of per 100 g/100 ml 
 
BoP: Energy value combined 
with mandatory listed 
ingredients (protein, 
carbohydrates, fibre, natural 
and artificial trans fat) per 
100 g/ml, portion size 
additionally. 
 
 
Other: Meat from slaughter 
without stunning should be 
labelled as such 
FoP: not mandatory   
  
 
 
BoP: same as ENVI 
draft report, second 
reading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other: Meat from 
slaughter without 
stunning should be 
labelled as such 
FoP & BoP: no special 
requirements 
 
 
Mandatory labelling 
anywhere on pack: 
Energy value together 
with the amounts of fat, 
saturates, sugars, and 
salt per 100 g/ml in the 
same field of vision 
 
 
Other:  Meat produced 
from special slaughter 
should not be labelled 
as such 
National 
labelling 
systems 
Deleted Deleted Deleted Allowed  
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The presence and type of vegetable oil (such as palm oil) will need to be 
specified in the ingredient list. Regarding trans fats, the European 
Commission will within three years issue a report on the presence of 
trans fats in food in the EU accompanied by a legislative proposal if 
deemed necessary. Country of origin – which already applies to beef, 
honey, olive oil and fresh fruit and vegetable – is extended to swine, 
sheep, goat, and poultry meat. The EP wanted to further extend country 
of origin to milk and dairy products and other single ingredient products, 
but this was not supported by the Council. In line with common EU 
practice it was decided that the European Commission must conduct an 
impact assessment to consider the feasibility and costs of extending 
country of origin labels to the products suggested by the EP.   
Agreement on a compromise text was reached between the Council 
and the EP on 14 June 2011, which the EP had to ‘rubberstamp’ in 
plenary on 16 July 2011 (EurActiv, 4 July 2011). The compromise 
agreement (text as a whole) was endorsed by the EP with 606 (89%) 
voting in favour, 46 (7%) against, and 26 (4%) abstaining (VoteWatch, 
2011a). FoodDrinkEurope welcomed the vote, but regretted that ‘certain 
issues of importance to Europe’s food manufacturers were not given due 
consideration in the final outcome or that several issues will be decided 
upon only when the implementing rules are established’ 
(FoodDrinkEurope, 2011a). BEUC also welcomed the result, but did not 
think the adopted regulation would enable consumers to choose the 
healthiest products at a glance. They considered the EP’s first reading 
rejection of the traffic light scheme a real blow for consumers (BEUC, 
2011). 
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4.4 Role and influence of interest groups on key 
provisions 
 
Although the EP’s first and second reading outcomes tilted more towards 
the preferences of the food industry than that of NGOs, the food industry 
did not get it all its way. Both the food industry and consumer/health 
groups had some of their views reflected in the position adopted by the 
Parliament, demonstrating that public policy is not a zero-sum game. The 
food labelling regulation is a large piece of legislation including a large 
number of issues. The remainder of this paper focuses in on four specific 
issues, in which both the food industry and NGOs played a key role for 
the EP discussions and outcomes. These are discussions over: a traffic 
light scheme on food labels, exemptions from the regulation, labelling of 
sausage casings, and labelling of non-stunned meat. 
4.4.1 Entrepreneurial politics: the traffic lights versus Guideline Daily 
Amounts  
 
One of the most controversial issues in the food labelling proposal during 
the EP's first reading was whether or not to introduce mandatory 
nutrition labelling using traffic light colour coding. The traffic light 
system allows consumers to see at a glance whether a food product 
contains high, medium or low levels of fat, sugar and salt in a 100 gram 
portion. A red light would be displayed on products high in fat, sugar or 
salt, and amber and green for lower amounts. The European Commission 
had considered, but excluded, a mandatory traffic light system as it was 
concerned it would lead to oversimplification, although its proposal 
allowed for such schemes to run in parallel at national level. Instead, it 
proposed that food labels should feature mandatory nutritional 
information and GDA.        
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 The food industry was opposed to the European Commission's 
proposal to allow for national additional forms of expression as they 
argued it would lead to fragmentation of the internal market. The food 
industry favours labels based on GDA, which tells consumers how many 
calories they get from a portion as a percentage of what a typical healthy 
adult should eat on a 2000 kcal daily diet. GDA is a measure developed 
by the food industry, and does not come without its critics. GDA is based 
on how many calories a moderately active 40 year old woman is 
recommended to eat on a daily basis, and currently there is no GDA for 
children. Furthermore, basing GDA on portion size is problematic as 
portion size may vary from product to product, making it difficult for 
consumers to compare one product with another. Consumer and health 
NGOs have, therefore, campaigned for combining GDA with a traffic light 
label for key nutrients, where key nutrients are colour-coded with red, 
amber and green on the front of packs to show whether products are 
high, medium or low in potentially harmful ingredients. They argue that 
the GDA system on its own does not allow a quick understanding of 
whether a nutrient is present at a low, medium or high level (BEUC, et 
al., 2008).  
 The traffic light scheme is currently being used voluntary by many 
British retailers (such as Waitrose, Sainsbury’s, Marks & Spenser, ASDA 
and Co-opt) and German retailers (such as Frosta), who favour 
introducing it at the EU level. The food industry was, however, strongly 
opposed towards the traffic light scheme due to fears that it would 
demonise food into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ foods and not provide consumers 
with the information needed to choose a balanced diet based on 
individual needs. As a representative from Unilever remarked, ‘if people 
only were to consume green products, they would not have a healthy 
diet’.66 It is, however, in the food industry’s interest to convince 
consumers that there are no such things as good and bad food, and that 
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balance and variety are essential parts of a healthy diet (Nestle, 2007, p. 
21). If any regulatory decisions are likely to hamper the sales of 
companies’ products, they are highly incentivised to lobby decision-
makers intensively to avoid any regulatory shackles. Products that would 
get red lights for most of its key ingredients – if a traffic light scheme was 
adopted – is likely to influence people’s perception and consumption of 
the product, and economically hurt the business selling the products. One 
could easily imagine that a traffic light system would hit lucrative sales of 
junk food. Food producers and certain food retailers' divergent views on 
the benefits of the traffic light system highlight the importance of 
distinguishing between firms operating at different stages of, what 
political economy scholars call, the production chain (Dicken, 2003; 
Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002; Jones, 2005). The 
production chain comprises producers, traders and retailers operating on 
a global scale across national boundaries and in different national 
locations (Falkner, 2009, p. 28). Production chain analysis identifies 
potential sources of tension between actors situated at different stages of 
the production chain. Conflicting economic objectives among members of 
the production chain may give rise to tension and conflict. For instance, a 
retail association may boycott a food producer, who refuses to fair trade. 
Or national retailers may support a traffic light scheme on the products 
they sell in their locality, whereas food manufacturers might fear that it 
will damage the reputation of their products. The example illustrates that 
the a priori assumption of business unity is problematic because 
significant differences may exist between corporate actors at different 
levels of the supply chain. 
 While the European Commission’s proposal did not include 
suggestions for a traffic light, the issue was put back on the agenda in the 
EP. Several MEPs from ALDE, S&D, the Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL 
submitted amendments calling for mandatory front of pack nutrition 
labelling using colour coding. Many of these amendments were a direct 
copy and pasting of amendments presented in position papers to MEPs 
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by consumer and health groups. BEUC and the EHN were able to show 
me a list of amendments they had sent to MEPs, many of which were 
subsequently put forward by ‘friendly’ ENVI MEPs (using the exact same 
wording and justification). Amendments on introducing a mandatory 
traffic light system sparked lively and contentious debate both inside and 
outside the EP, and overshadowed other important issues. Despite its 
prevalence in the media and in the EP committee and plenary debates, 
amendments favouring mandatory traffic lights for foods were defeated 
at first reading by both ENVI  (32 voting against, and 30 for) and the 
plenary  (398 voting against, and 243 for). The EP also opposed the 
European Commission’s proposal to allow such schemes to run in parallel 
at the national level, although this was not supported by the Council and 
excluded in the final legislative act. At the EP's second reading, the 
possibility for national forms of presentation was, however, included.    
 MEPs’ rejection of colour-coded food labels was seen as a major 
victory for the food industry who had lobbied hard to oppose such 
amendments. Consumer and health organisations accused MEPs for 
caving in to industry pressure (EurActiv, 25 June 2010). It is, however, 
dubious whether or not the traffic light scheme would have been adopted 
without the heavy lobbying from the food industry. The plenary vote on 
the traffic light amendments showed that many of the political groups, 
particularly ALDE and the S&D were internally divided on the issue. 
Several S&D assistants and policy advisors claim that some 
representatives from the food industry misinformed on the modalities of 
the traffic light: 
 
There was a lot of misinformation flying around. We wanted 
traffic lights for energy and four main nutrients. There was 
heavy lobbying from the food industry against colour coding – 
and rumours and misinformation were deliberately circulated. 
For instance, it was argued that milk and apple juice would be 
given a red point due to their fat respectively sugar content, 
and that diet coke would be given a green point. However, milk 
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and fruit juice would not have been covered by a colour coding 
regime, but some Members seemed unaware of this.67  
 
Many MEPs questioned its utility right from the beginning because 
mandatory traffic labelling does not exist in any member state, and those 
MEPs in favour of the traffic light system were under pressure to toe their 
EP group line. Rather than influencing the final outcome, ‘lobbying 
helped MEPs forming their arguments, and to alert MEPs to the issue’.68 
Although consumer and health organisations lost the traffic light vote, 
they managed to encourage MEPs to put forward amendments on the 
issue, and thereby prompting a debate. As a representative from BEUC 
explained: 
 
I think the MEPs [favouring the traffic light system] would 
have had a tough time without our support. We have not done 
the work for them, but we helped these MEPs building their 
arguments. We approached MEPs and asked if they would be 
willing to table an amendment on the traffic light. They used 
our arguments and we met with them to provide them with 
arguments.69  
 
Together with legislative allies, consumer and health organisations 
organised an EP event on 3 February 2010, taking place one and half 
month prior to ENVI’s vote on the dossier. The event included speakers 
from BEUC, Frosta (German producer), ASDA (UK supermarket chain), 
AOK Health Insurers (the largest health insurance company in 
Germany), the European Heart Network, the EU Food Law Magazine, 
Glenis Wilmot (the S&D shadow rapporteur), and the EPP rapporteur’s 
assistant. All of the invited interest groups favoured the introduction of a 
colour coding scheme (the traffic light) and presented research, 
conducted by themselves, showing that consumers favour a colour coding 
scheme (EPHA, 2010). The working relationship between consumer and 
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health NGOs and MEPs favouring the traffic light system (particularly the 
S&D, ALDE and Green shadow rapporteurs) amounts to what Hall and 
Deardorff define as a ‘legislative subsidy’ – organised interests play the 
role of adjuncts to staff for friendly legislators.  
 
4.4.2 Client politics: derogations 
 
One area in which direct influence from the food industry on the EP’s 
first and second reading outcomes could be observed was the adoption of 
amendments seeking to exempt specific food and drink products from the 
scope of the regulation. All 26 interviewees in this case study agreed that 
interest groups did not influence the very thrust of the legislation, but 
had an impact on the technical details of the legislation. Lobbying from 
the food industry ‘had a big impact on decisions [to grant exemptions], 
for example, a special exemption for gift-wrapping was not an issue at all 
until we got a lobby letter from the food industry and suddenly it was an 
issue’.70 The issue of exemptions corresponds to Wilson’s client politics 
category, in which the benefits of regulation flows to a small segment of 
society and the costs are widely dispersed. The expectation is for 
potential cost-bearers to be influential, quiet lobbying, and quick passage 
of regulation with limited public discussion.  
 Several products that had not been excluded in the European 
Commission's proposal were granted an exemption in the EP's first and 
second reading reports, such as exemptions for chewing gum packages, 
non-prepacked food, and alcopops. A lobbyist representing Wrigley 
explained how they managed to get the rapporteur to launch an 
amendment seeking an exemption for chewing gum. As the interviewee 
explained, ‘this is a typical lobbying example of how a very small sector is 
completely forgotten by MEPs and, therefore, has to lobby to get an 
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exemption’.71 UEAPME was in the strong opinion that they had managed 
to exclude non pre-packed food from the regulation because of their 
lobbying interventions. As a UEAPME representative explained, ‘I doubt 
that our amendment would have been put forward by the rapporteur and 
other MEPs had we not made so much noise’.72 All 26 interest groups 
interviewed for the food labelling regulation would always lobby the EP 
even though their concerns might already be addressed in the European 
Commission’s proposal, as indicated by the quotes below. 
 
The biggest threat is that it will be forgotten. We regularly call 
MEPs, every other week, before and after the trialogue 
meetings to say that they must remember that they were in 
favour of including cholesterol during the first reading on the 
list of voluntary nutrition labelling.73 
 
We always lobby the European Parliament even if our position 
is reflected in the Commission’s proposal. If you don’t lobby 
Parliament, you may end up losing your case.74  
 
The wine and beer industries were successful at securing an exemption 
from the scope of the regulation during the European Commission's 
drafting of its proposal. Early European Commission drafts of the food 
labelling proposal exempted wine from the regulation's scope but 
included beer. This was strongly opposed by the beer industry, who 
wanted equal treatment of all alcoholic beverages. The Brewers of 
Europe, representing brewers in Europe, had on numerous occasions, 
unsuccessfully, lobbied the European Commission to secure equal 
treatment of wine and other alcoholic beverages. In the words of a 
representative of the Brewers of Europe’s:  
 
None of the officials in the European Commission listened to 
us. In the end, we sent a letter to the College of European 
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Commissioners, where we highlighted why it is a 
discriminatory treatment of beers. Barroso and his team 
recognised why our legal justification was correct, and within 
24 hours the proposal was amended. Had we not managed to 
have our product exempted in the European Commission's 
proposal, we would have had a hell of job lobbying to get 
member state and the EP to exclude beers from the 
regulation.75  
 
Because the Brewers of Europe managed to secure an exemption from the 
scope of the regulation, they were less active in lobbying the EP. This did 
not mean, however, that the lobbying battle for the alcohol beverage 
industry was over as the European Commission's proposal excluded all 
alcohols from the scope of its proposal except alcopops. Both European 
Commission officials and the majority of MEPs were under the 
impression that alcopops are made on a distillate basis (such as vodka 
and whiskey). It was not before the European Spirits Industry (CEPS) 
made the EP’s rapporteur aware that alcopops can also be made from 
beer and wine that the EP put forward an amendment to exempt all 
alcohols including alcopops from the scope of the regulation. CEPS was 
active in lobbying the EP to secure an amendments because they thought 
the European Commission’s proposal would put them at a competitive 
disadvantage compared with the beer and wine industry. CEPS was 
convinced that had they ‘not lobbied for the exclusion of alcopops, it 
would not have been excluded in Parliament’s first reading position’.76 
The outcome of the alcohol battle is that the European Commission shall 
produce a report by mid December 2012, in which it addresses whether 
or not alcoholic beverages should in the future be covered by the food 
labelling regulation, in particular the requirement to provide information 
on the energy value. Furthermore, the European Commission has agreed 
to consider the need for a definition of alcopops.   
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Only one public health organisation lobbied actively for labelling 
alcoholic beverages, namely the European Alcohol Policy Alliance (a 
network of public health organisations working on the prevention of 
alcohol related harm in Europe). Eurocare wants the labels of all 
alcoholic beverages to contain an ingredient list, any substances with 
allergenic effect, relevant nutrition information (such as energy value), 
alcoholic strength, and health warnings. Eurocare believes that such 
information would enable consumers to make informed choices about 
their alcohol consumption (Eurocare, 2011). However, Euorcare’s 
preferences only translated into limited lobbying of MEPs and MEP 
assistants due to limited resources and a feeling of talking to deaf ears: 
 
MEPs are elected to represent the people, but this doesn’t 
always seem to be the case in day-to-day politics of the 
European Parliament. If you follow how they make decisions, 
they very rarely side with NGOs and public health 
organisations, but lean more toward the industry side. We 
don’t have the same means as the industry. We have three 
people, and our demands are unlikely to go through. We got a 
bit discouraged from lobbying Parliament actively as we were 
very active in the beginning and then we got tired as we felt we 
were talking to deaf ears.77 
Eurocare found that MEPs were so focused on discussing the utility of the 
traffic light scheme that it was difficult to attract their attention to other 
issues, such as alcohol labelling. Much to Euorcare's regret ‘MEPs are 
often so overloaded with work that they are less interested in alcohol 
labelling’.78 Eurocare generally found that MEPs were often more 
preoccupied with the economic costs of labelling alcoholic beverages 
rather than taking into account the long term costs paid by society as a 
whole as a result of alcohol abuse, such as costs imposed on the health 
system for treating alcohol-related diseases and for police control dealing 
with drunken people. Despite the alcohol industry’s lobbying success at 
securing a complete exemption of alcohol, they found it extremely 
                                                 
77 Interview, Eurocare, 17 May 2011 
78 Interview, Eurocare, 17 May 2011 
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challenging to lobby the EP. Many MEPs particularly from the S&D, 
GUE/NGL and Greens/EFA groups refused to meet with the alcohol and 
spirits industry because they saw these industries as unethical. In the 
words of a CEPS representative:  
We represent a sector, which is controversial and we have been 
refused access to some MEPs in very hostile conditions. It’s a 
pity not to give us the chance to explain ourselves, and we have 
given up on those ‘Ayatollah’ MEPs. These radical MEPs don’t 
tend to get their views through because they are 
uncompromising. The way we deal with it is that we ask for a 
meeting. If we are not given a meeting, we are not attacking 
them or displaying them in the media that they don’t want to 
talk with us. We just give up and we regret what has 
happened.79 
The alcohol and spirits industry had the rapporteur’s support from the 
outset. The rapporteur is a member of the EP’s Beer Club, whose 
secretariat is run by the Brewers of Europe. The EP’s Beer Club is an 
unofficial intergroup established in 1995 as a forum for discussion and 
information exchange about issues that affect the EU brewing sector. It 
holds bi-annual receptions at the Brewers of Europe premises, ‘at which 
Beer Club Members can sample Beers from the country hosting the 
rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union’ (European 
Parliament Beer Club, 2012). The Beer Club gave the Brewers of Europe 
the possibility to touch upon the exemption of beer from the scope of the 
food labelling proposal. Brewers of Europe found that few MEPs were 
aware that the European Commission’s exemption of beer from the scope 
of its proposal was due to lobbying pressure from the beer industry. As a 
representative of Brewers of Europe put it:  
We didn’t really go and knock on MEPs’ doors [because our 
views were reflected in the European Commission’s proposal]. 
No-one is really aware of all this behind this. As you may know 
Renate Sommer is a member of the beer club – being German 
she is completely aware of the problem of definition. That is 
                                                 
79 Interview, European Spirits Organisation, CEPS, 28 April 2011 
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why she was adamant to have an exemption across the board 
covering all alcoholic beverages.80 
The Brewers of Europe did not find it necessary to lobby the EP because 
they had successfully sought an exemption from the European 
Commission’s proposal before it was formally published. However, other 
industries found it paramount to lobby MEPs to ensure that their 
exempted product would remain exempted. The Union of European Soft 
Drinks Associations (UNESDA) had managed to secure an exemption for 
indelibly marked bottles - glass bottles that are intended for re-use and 
carrying no label, ring or collar - during the European Commission’s 
preparation of its proposal. A representative from UNESDA said: 
 
The exclusion of indelibly marked bottles from the scope of 
the food labelling regulation is an area where we have had a 
direct impact as we alone explained to MEPs the strong 
environmental and economic reasons for such as exemption.81  
 
During the EP’s scrutiny of the food labelling dossier, several EPP and 
ALDE MEPs put forward an amendment - sent to them by UNESA during 
ENVI first and second reading - using identical language and 
justifications. The text below was included in several of UNESDA's 
lobbying letters, and used with identical wording by MEPs82, putting 
forward amendments that sought to exempt indelibly marked glass 
bottles from the regulation’s scope: 
 
Glass bottles intended for reuse, which are indelibly marked, 
are normally sold as single portions (for ex. 200 or 250ml) and 
have only a limited printable area. A full nutrition declaration 
would not fit onto this small printable area. Given the high 
value (in the magnitude of 60 million euros) and the long life 
(up to 8 years) of existing glass bottle fleets in the EU, either 
nutrition labelling should be excluded as a mandatory 
                                                 
80 Interview, Brewers of Europe, 15 April 2011 
81 Interview, UNESDA, 13 April 2011 
82 Bogusław Sonik (EPP MEP), Oreste Rossi (EFD MEP), Corinne Lepage (ALDE MEP), 
and Antonyia Parvanova (ALDE MEP) 
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element, or the transition period of at least 15 years should 
apply to indelibly marked returnable glass bottles’ (UNESDA, 
15 March 2011). 
 
All interviewees found that the EP had been very industry-friendly in 
terms of securing exemptions for the specific products mentioned above. 
The politics of exemptions look a lot like the ‘world of capture’ in which 
regulation does not reflect the public interest but rather the immediate 
concern of specific interests (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012, p. 101). Due to the 
very specificity of the food sectors seeking exemptions, few if any 
consumer and health organisations lobbied against the exemptions as the 
lobbying field on exemptions were solely populated by the food industry. 
In line with the expectations from Wilson’s client politics category, the 
issue of exemptions was characterised by quiet lobbying and limited 
public discussion. The various food and beverage industries managed to 
have their products exempted from the scope of the regulation without 
much media attention and debate in the EP. Following the expectations 
of Wilson (1980) and Stigler (1971), in the absence of public interests or 
‘watch-dog’ organisations, client politics produce politics that are most 
prone to capture.  
 
4.4.3 Interest group politics: the definition of a natural sausage casing 
 
The old Otto von Bismarck adage ‘laws are like sausages – it is best not to 
see them being made’ seems like an apt description of certain aspects of 
the EP’s discussion of the food labelling proposal. One small technical 
amendment creating division within the sausage casings industry was the 
question of how to define a natural sausage casing. The issue pitted the 
natural sausage casing industry against the collagen industry. Thus, it 
represents a typical interest group politics case, pitting special interests 
against special interests.  
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 The rapporteur’s first draft report included a very specific 
amendment concerning the designation of sausage casings. The 
amendment stated that a sausage casing shall be indicated as a ‘natural 
casing’ if the casing used in sausage production is derived from the 
intestinal tract of even-toed ungulates, and ‘artificial casing’ in other 
cases. The inspiration from this amendment came from the European 
Natural Sausage Casing Industry (ENSCA), who found it of utmost 
importance to make a clear distinction between ‘natural’ sausage casings 
and other types of casings (the Natural Sausage Casings Associations, 4 
May 2011). The ‘casing amendment’ was adopted by both ENVI and the 
plenary during the EP’s first reading, and re-tabled by EPP MEPs during 
the EP’s second reading after the Council had rejected it in its first 
reading position.  
 When the casing amendment was re-tabled by ENVI EPP MEPs, 
significant lobbying accrued from the Collagen Casings industry. They 
were strongly opposed to any amendments laying down specific 
requirements concerning the designation of sausage casings. They 
thought that such amendments were misleading, and reflected an 
attempt by the natural sausage casings industry to gain a competitive 
advantage over other sausage casing industries.83 The collagen industry 
maintained that casings made from collagen cannot be described as 
artificial because this term is usually reserved for man-made synthetic 
products. Collagen casings are made from a natural raw material which is 
subsequently processed. The Collagen casings industry argued that 
equating ‘natural’ to ‘animal intestine’ is erroneous as casings derived 
from the intestinal tract of an even-toed ungulate may have been 
bleached and undergone chemical treatment before use. Therefore, they 
saw it as unfair that an intestine processed and then used for making a 
sausage was to be labelled ‘natural’, whereas skin processed and used for 
making a sausage was considered ‘artificial’.  
                                                 
83 Interview, Collagen Casings Trade Association, CCTA,  August 2011 
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 Due to lobbying from the collagen casings industry, MEPs rejected 
amendments from the natural sausage casings industry at second 
reading. Instead, the EP’s plenary adopted an amendment requiring 
sausage casings industries to indicate if a sausage casing is edible. The 
conflict within the sausage casing industry shows MEPs lack of in-house 
expertise to gauge the impact of its amendments, and its dependence on 
the food industry to equip them with information, which is rarely 
impartial. In interview, one assistant to a key MEP was convinced that 
the sausage casing debate and amendments would not have been 
launched without lobbying from the sausage casing industry: 
 
The amendments on sausage casings […] no MEPs would 
have thought this up. There is no way that MEPs would know 
about it – it took me a whole day to do research on it and this 
is only one aspect of a highly complex piece of legislation. On 
the face of it, this amendment sounds quite reasonable. 
Nobody really questioned its validity of this amendment 
before we were lobbied by the Collagen Casings Trade 
Association. Then we became aware of the problems and 
unworkability of this [casings] amendment.84  
 
The sausage casings example also shows that businesses cannot be seen 
as a monolithic force because industries might seek to gain a competitive 
advantage for their products to the detriment of similar products from 
other companies. This corresponds with the expectations arising from 
Wilson’s interest group politics category, in which companies providing 
similar goods or services often compete against one another. Unlike the 
expectations arising from Wilson’s typology, the issue of sausage skin 
labelling did not result in a compromise between opposing groups, but 
instead in clear winners and losers.  
 
 
 
                                                 
84 Interview, ECR MEP assistant, 27 April 2011 
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4.4.4 Majoritarian politics: the morality of meat: halal and kosher  
 
Should meat products derived from animals that have not been stunned 
prior to slaughter (i.e. been religiously slaughtered85) be labelled as 
‘slaughter without pre-stunning’? This question has been subject to 
heated debate both inside and outside the EP after several MEPs from 
across the policy spectrum put forward amendments to label religiously 
slaughtered meat as ‘meat from slaughter without stunning’. The issue 
represents a typical majoritarian politics case, which engender widely 
dispersed costs and benefits. The chances of reaching a policy outcome 
are expected to be slim because no-one has the incentive to push for their 
position. A policy resolution is only likely to take place when there is 
adequate political and popular support. The issue of religiously 
slaughtered meat opposes the meat industry and religious groups (Jewish 
and Muslims) against animal welfare organisations and secularist groups. 
Jewish religious groups consider mandatory labelling of meat 
slaughtered by ritual means discriminatory, anti-Semitic, and prejudice, 
while animal right organisations and secular societies argue that ritual 
slaughters is inhuman and cause animal suffering.  
 The stunning of animals before slaughter has been compulsory in 
the EU since 1979, although most EU countries grant exemptions to those 
religious communities that require animals to be non-stunned prior to 
slaughter according to their religious beliefs. According to existing EU 
legislation on slaughtering practices, animals shall only be killed after 
                                                 
85
 There are two main types of religious slaughter methods: halal slaughter (meat for 
intended for Muslims) and Shechita (kosher meat for Jewish communities). For meat to 
qualify as halal, it must fulfil three conditions: the animal must be alive, healthy and 
uninjured at the time of slaughter; blood must be drained from the animal’s body; and 
the slaughter process must be carried out by a trained Muslim, who begins the slaughter 
by reciting the appropriate Islamic prayer. Both halal and Shechita (Jewish slaughter 
method) slaughter requires a single-cut method of slaughter by which the animal is 
killed with a quick cut to the throat using a sharp knife. This allows the blood to drain 
out and, it is believed, makes the meat cleaner. In comparison, non-religious slaughter 
methods render the animal unconscious prior to slaughter using stunning, electrocution 
or a bolt gun (Hasan, 2006, pp. 20-26). 
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being stunned. Member states are, however, allowed to authorise 
religious slaughter without pre-stunning within their own territory and 
under the supervision of official veterinary authorities (Council of the 
European Union, 2009). Existing EU regulation on slaughtering practices 
is based on two conflicting principles. On the one hand, there is growing 
concern for animal welfare, which has led EU policymakers to ban 
slaughter without previous stunning in order not to cause unnecessary 
pain and distress to the animal. On the other hand, fundamental human 
rights to religious freedom need to be protected, and religious slaughter 
can be seen as a religious freedom right. 
 The European Commission's proposal for a regulation on food 
information to consumers did not touch upon the controversial issue of 
labelling religiously slaughtered meat. The issue was only put on the 
agenda when the European Commission’s proposal was put forward to 
the EP. The rapporteur’s first draft report in the sixth parliamentary term 
did not include any amendments on religiously slaughtered meat. The 
issue was raised during committee discussions in ENVI and AGRI, where 
MEPs from the left-wing and right-wing periphery political groups put 
forward amendments suggesting labelling meat derived from religious 
slaughter. These amendments were adopted by ENVI in the sixth 
parliamentary term, and included in the rapporteur’s second draft report 
in the seventh parliamentary term, after the plenary had voted to refer 
the report back to ENVI for renewed scrutiny. The amendments were 
adopted by the EP at first reading, but were, however, not accepted by the 
Council as the Council did not intend to adopt specific labelling for 
religiously slaughtered meat. S&D, ALDE, and ECR MEPs re-launched 
the amendment during the EP’s second reading, but the amendment was 
taken out of the EP’s report in order to reach an agreement with the 
Council. The final legislative text between the Council and the EP stated 
that: 
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Union consumers show an increasing interest in the 
implementation of the Union animal welfare rules at the time 
of slaughter, including whether the animal was stunned before 
slaughter. In this respect, a study on the opportunity to 
provide consumers with the relevant information on the 
stunning of animals should be considered in the context of 
future Union strategy for the protection and welfare of animals 
(European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2011a).  
 
The outcome reflects a typical EU strategy for dealing with controversial 
issues, entailing the use ‘escape routes’ to avoid ending up in deadlock. In 
the case of the issue of religiously slaughtered meat, stalemate was 
avoided by prompting the European Commission to conduct a study on 
the matter before taking any further legislative steps. Although the issue 
has now been temporarily kicked into the long-grass, the discussions in 
the EP show just how highly charged and controversial the issue of 
religiously slaughtered meat is. So, what is it about religiously 
slaughtered meat that gives rise to tension and controversy?  
 Muslims and Jews believe that religious slaughter is humane and 
pain-free because the animal is rendered unconscious quickly. However, 
the image of blood pouring out from the incised throat of animals has 
been subject to much opposition towards religiously slaughtered meat 
from animals welfare organisations. Animal welfare and secularist groups 
argue that there is a high risk that animals that have not been stunned 
prior to killing feel extreme pain during the cutting of the throat. 
Moreover, not all meat that is religiously slaughtered is consumed only by 
Jewish and Muslim consumers as certain animal parts may not be eaten 
according to religious law. These parts are often mixed in and sold with 
other meat, without necessarily informing the consumer that part of the 
meat derives from animals that have not been stunned. Animal welfare 
and secularist groups urge EU decision-makers to legally require animals 
to be rendered unconscious before killing, or at the very least require 
non-stunned meat to be labelled as such to help consumers make 
informed decisions. They claim that without requiring non-stunned meat 
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to be labelled as such, the meat is being forced upon customers without 
their knowledge and consent. 
 Animal welfare organisations launched a major lobbying campaign 
towards the EP on the food labelling regulation in order to bring back the 
issue on the agenda. The issue was highly politicised in the media and 
became a hotly discussed issue in the EP, engaging MEPs from all 
political groups. MEPs and interest groups in favour of labelling 
religiously slaughtered meat constitute a motley crew, bringing together 
both far-right and far-left political groups, animal welfare organisations, 
and secularist groups (such as the British Humanist Association). 
Secularist groups, such as the British National Secular Society, have long 
pushed for revoking the exemption for religious groups that allows them 
to religiously slaughter animals without pre-stunning. Both animal 
welfare groups and secular groups believe that animals should be 
stunned prior to slaughter, and if slaughter without stunning is still to be 
permitted then no more animals should be slaughtered under the 
exemption than is necessary (National Secular Society, 2012). Lobbying 
from animal welfare groups proved important for convincing mainstream 
EP political groups (such as the ALDE group) to vote in favour of 
labelling of meat derived from animals slaughtered without stunning. As 
an ALDE assistant to a key MEP explained when asked if any interest 
groups pointed towards new aspects of the regulation that he/she had 
previously been unaware of: 
 
Lobbying from secularist groups and animal welfare groups 
influenced our position [on religiously slaughtered animals]. 
They argued that ritually slaughtered meat should be labelled 
as such. This made me change the voting list on this topic and 
to put a plus for voting for the labelling of ritual slaughtered 
meat.86  
 
                                                 
86 Interview, ALDE MEP assistant, 18 February 2011 
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MEPs and interest groups in favour of labelling religiously slaughtered 
meat as ‘meat from slaughter without pre-stunning’ had one big player in 
the palm of their hands: the media. The issue was taken up by several 
national newspapers and was made subject to fear mongering and 
misinformation campaigns, particularly in the UK. On 19 September 
2010, the British tabloid newspaper ‘Mail on Sunday’ brought an article 
entitled ‘Britain goes halal…but no one tells the public: How famous 
institutions serve ritually slaughtered meat with no warning’ (Mcgee & 
Delgado, 2010). The article claimed that restaurants, schools, hospital, 
pubs, and big sporting venues, such as Ascot and Twickenham, are 
‘controversially serving up meat slaughtered in accordance with strict 
Islamic law to unwitting members of the public’. A week later, the ‘Mail 
on Sunday’ brought a new article in which it claimed that ‘70 per cent of 
New Zealand lamb imports to Britain are halal…but this is NOT put on 
the label’ when it is being sold in British supermarkets (Poulter, 2010b). 
The articles insinuated that halal meat is inflicted on ‘innocent, animal-
loving non-Muslim Britons’, who do not know they are eating Halal meat 
(Hasan, 2012, p. 23).  
 Muslim and Jewish groups found that the issue of labelling of 
religiously slaughtered meat was used by the media and right-wing 
politicians as a ‘proxy for much deeper fears and concerns about the 
presence of growing and vocal Muslim population in our midst […] 
Protecting animals is the cover behind which critics of [religiously 
slaughtered meat] often hid’ (Hasan, 2012, pp. 25-26). Interviewees from 
the European livestock and meat trading union thought that opposition 
to religious slaughtering is often due to ignorance of the issue, and 
sometimes used as an indirect way to utter islamophobic and Judaism 
phobic views. The European Jewish Congress considers labelling of non-
stunned meat discriminatory ‘because there is no such labelling for all 
those millions animals killed by electrocution, shooting, gassing or 
clubbing as well as the millions of animals that are mis-stunned during 
the stunning process.’ ‘If the public were to discover that animals were 
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subject to pre-slaughter intervention – like having their skull cracked 
open being electrocuted, or put on gas chamber – they might not like that 
either’ (Hasan, 2012, p. 26). Therefore, Jewish groups argue that 
religiously slaughter methods should not be singled out, but that 
consumers should also be made aware of how animals under 
conventional slaughter methods are rendered unconscious. The 
European Jewish Congress argued that if amendments on religiously 
slaughtered meat were adopted, it could provoke unintended 
discriminatory consequences and could potentially set the ball rolling for 
further stigmatisation of Jewish and Muslim communities. Another 
reason advanced against labelling of non-stunned meat is the potential 
loss of income to the halal and kosher meat industry making it 
commercially unviable. In interview a representative from the European 
livestock and meat trading union argued that many of those opposing 
religious slaughtering have limited knowledge about the slaughtering 
method: 
  
The consumers are entitled to be informed, but in the case of 
labelling of meat coming from ritual slaughter practices, the 
consumers haven’t enough knowledge to understand the 
difference between religious slaughtered meat and non-
religious slaughtered meat. People think that the animals are 
bleeding to death. If the slaughter has been made by a trained 
operator according to the best practices, the difference 
between the two practices is not huge […] if such legislation 
on labelling is adopted, it could lead to massive campaigns to 
boycott meat and meat products derived from religious 
practices. This may lead to stigmatisation of Jewish and 
Muslim communities all over Europe by various kinds of 
organizations, especially extremists of various natures.87 
 
Jewish groups, such as the Jewish Congress, argued that ignorance about 
ritual slaughter practices should not influence purchase decisions. The 
issue of religiously slaughtered meat tells us four things about EU 
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 Interview, the European livestock and meat trading union, 12 April 2012 
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decision-making and interest groups’ ability to influence policy outcomes 
(which will be explored further in what follows): 
 
 Policy issues are inter-linked: if legislators fail to get an 
amendment passed in one piece legislation, they might seek to get 
it passed in another. 
 Some interests groups enjoy privileged access to MEPs because 
they run the secretariat of a parliamentary intergroup. 
 When an issue engenders strong emotions and ethical 
considerations, it is difficult to counter-argue with logical 
reasoning (i.e. scientific arguments). 
 
Firstly, the issue of labelling of religiously slaughtered meat is by no 
means new. It was subject to heated debate in the late 1990s when the 
EP’s AGRI committee gave an opinion on the European Commission’s 
1998 proposal for a regulation on the protection of animals at the time of 
killing. The AGRI rapporteur, ECR MEP Janusz Wojciechowski (former 
member of Union for Europe of the Nations Group, UEN), suggested to 
mandate labelling of religiously slaughtered meat. This amendment was, 
however, not supported at plenary. In a move often used by legislators, 
Janusz Wojciechowski took an amendment not passed in one dossier and 
sought to get it passed in the context of another dossier: the proposal for 
a regulation on food information for consumers. His amendment was 
later incorporated into the ENVI report after several other MEPs from 
the Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL had suggested similar amendments with 
identical wording. As one interviewee pointed out:  
 
The issue of ritual slaughtering was already raised by the EP 
and discussed in the framework of the regulation on the 
‘protection of animals at time of killing’. On that occasion the 
EP already voted against the proposal to label meat produced 
according to religious practices. The issue of ritual slaughter 
was raised once again in the framework of the proposed 
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regulation on food information to consumers and the same 
amendment was put forward by the EP.88  
 
The issue of religiously slaughtered meat did not come out of the blue. 
Janusz Wojciechowski’s political group, the ECR, has close ties with 
animal welfare groups, such as the Eurogroup for animals. The 
Eurogroup for animals is ‘the leading voice for animal welfare at 
European Union level, providing a voice for the billions of animals kept in 
laboratories, farms and homes or living in the wild’ (Eurogroups for 
Animals, 2012) . This leads on to the second factor: privileged access to 
MEPs. The Eurogroup for animals provides the secretariat for the EP’s 
intergroup on Animal Welfare and Conservation, which brings together 
MEPs from all political groups with a particular interest in debating and 
learning about animal welfare issues. Many of the MEPs, who put 
forward identical amendments on the labelling of religiously slaughtered 
meat, are members of the intergroup, and therefore had easy access to 
information from the animal welfare organisations. As the co-chair of the 
intergroup, Greens/EFA MEP Carl Schlyter, explained during interview:  
  
The animal welfare groups helped me regarding information 
on slaughter and on animal transport, but that is because I’m 
the president of the intergroup on Animal Welfare and 
Conservation. We didn’t discuss the dossier in the intergroup, 
but I discussed it with people from the intergroup. The 
Eurogroup for animal welfare provides the secretariat, and 
they are paid for by animal welfare groups in Europe through 
memberships.89 
 
The intergroup provides the Eurogroup for animals with an efficient 
short cut to get easy access to MEPs who are particularly favourable to 
their cause. Janusz Wojciechowski is a member of the intergroup on 
Animal Welfare and Conservation, and his amendment reflected the 
views of the Eurogroup for animals. The meat industry, Muslim and 
                                                 
88 Interview, the European livestock and meat trading union, 12 April 2012 
89 Interview, Green MEP, 25 May 2011 
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Jewish groups do not form part of any intergroups in the EP, and did 
therefore not enjoy the same level of access to MEPs as animal welfare 
organisations.  
Lastly, the example shows that when issues are couched in highly 
emotional and ethical terms, policy issues often become highly salient 
(increased media attention) and draw in many MEPs, who take up the 
role as policy entrepreneurs for the ethical cause. ‘Religious slaughter has 
always been a controversial and emotive subject, caught between animal 
welfare considerations, cultural and human rights issues’ (DIALREL, 
2012). Although the issue of religiously slaughtered meat has been kicked 
into the long grass, pending on a study to be conducted by the European 
Commission, the issue would not have been raised with the same 
saliency, was it not for active lobbying from animal welfare groups.   
The issue of religiously slaughtered meat, to a certain extent, 
tallies with the expectation arising from Wilson’s majoritarian politics 
category. As expected from Wilson’s typology, a policy resolution did not 
take place (other than kicking the issue into the long grass, pending on an 
impact assessment) because there was not enough political and popular 
support to regulate labelling of meat from religious slaughter. Unlike the 
expectations arising from Wilson’s majoritarian politics category, 
lobbying was not marginal. The issue was highly politicised and subject to 
intense lobbying from animal welfare and secularist organisations, 
opposing one another.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The proposal for a regulation on food information to consumers included 
four interest group constellations: entrepreneurial (overall labelling rules 
as well as the discussion over traffic light labelling), client politics 
(exemptions), majoritarian (labelling of non-stunned meat), and interest 
group politics (the definition of a natural sausage casing). Policy did, to a 
181 
 
certain extent, shape politics in the entrepreneurial politics aspects of the 
proposal as the food industry was both more active in lobbying the EP, 
and had more influence over the final legislation. However, business 
interests did not prevail entirely over consumer and health groups. 
Although the media accused MEPs of ‘caving into pressures from the food 
industry and for putting food industry profits before the need to reduce 
spiralling obesity and ill-health’ (Poulter, 2010a), the EP adopted many 
amendments that went against the interest of the food industry. 
Consumer and health groups were instrumental in launching a debate on 
the utility of a traffic light system and in encouraging MEPs to put 
forward amendments on the labelling of trans fats. Rather than 
influencing the final outcome, ‘lobbying helped MEPs to form their 
arguments and to alert them to new issues’.90   
 While the overall policy outcome did not reflect a zero-sum game, 
there were clear lobbying ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ on specific aspects of the 
regulation. The food industry was successful at influencing the technical 
details of the legislation, such as the decision on which food products 
should be exempted from the scope of the regulation. This is in line with 
the expectations arising from Wilson’s client politics category. The 
exemptions of certain products resemble the ‘world of capture’ because 
they reflect the concern of specific food industries rather than those of 
the general public. On many of the highly technical aspects of the 
regulation (such as exemptions and labelling of sausage casings), 
consumer and health interests did not have a view, and therefore the 
lobbying field was left to the food industry.  
 The food labelling case also shows that some issues are what I call 
trump issues, engendering strong emotions among MEPs. As such, the 
issue of whether or not to label meat without pre-stunning was highly 
politicised in the media, and provoked strong emotions among MEPs. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, one would have expected limited lobbying 
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 Interview, ALDE advisor, 23 February 2011 
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from animal welfare groups, secularist and religious groups as they were 
faced with either diffuse benefits or diffuse costs. However, all of these 
groups were highly active in lobbying the EP. Religious slaughter is an 
issue that provokes strong emotions and ethical considerations, and drew 
in many MEPs who took up the role of champions of animal welfare 
organisations. This was of great disappointment to religious groups, who 
thought that the emotive character of the issue made MEPs reluctant to 
consider those scientific findings that show that animals slaughtered 
without stunning do not suffer unnecessary pain and distress. However, 
the final outcome reflects what might be called, ‘a promise of a future 
decision’. Thus, the issue was pushed aside because there was not enough 
political and popular support to regulate labelling of meat from religious 
slaughter. The Council and the EP agreed to let the European 
Commission conduct a study on the issue of whether or not to reduce or 
ban the religious practice of slaughtering without stunning before taking 
any further steps. The example also shows that one piece of legislation 
cannot be seen in isolation from other pieces of legislation. The ‘slaughter 
amendment’ did not appear from out of the blue and had already been 
put forward, but failed to be adopted, in the regulation on the protection 
of animals at the time of killing. 
 Regarding the type of tactics used and the type of information 
provided by interest groups, both the food industry, and consumer and 
health groups drew on outside and inside lobbying tactics, and provided 
similar types of information. Although the expectation from the interest 
group literature is for NGOs to be limited in the use of outside tactics, the 
consumer and health groups interviewed for this chapter primarily drew 
on inside tactics. Similarly, the food industry mainly focused their efforts 
on lobbying MEPs directly, although they also organised several events 
inside the EP and used the Brussels media to advance their position.  
Unlike the expectation from the interest group literature (see chapter 1), 
outside tactics – such as using the media, arranging conferences, 
mobilising citizen support through petitions and manifestations - were 
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not seen as ‘outsider tactics’, but were frequently taken up by the food 
industry, but  only to a limited extent by consumer and health groups. 
The numerous events held by the food industry inside the EP raised their 
visibility with MEPs and perhaps eased their access to MEPs. 
 The information provided by interest groups was very similar, as 
both the food industry and consumer and health organisations provided 
information about consumer preferences for different labelling schemes, 
which drew on academic research and research carried out by public 
authorities (such as the British Food Standards Agency). The EPH 
network provided information about the link between unhealthy eating 
habits and coronary heart diseases. The type of information used by 
interest groups on the food labelling regulation can be seen as falling in 
between technical and political information because it both says 
something about wider public support, as well as the impact of different 
food labelling schemes on consumer behaviour.  
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Chapter 5: Regulating Working time for Self-employed 
Trucker Drivers 
On 16 June 2010 the EP rejected a proposal by the European Commission 
amending the existing Directive 2002/15/EC ‘the organisation of the 
working time of persons performing mobile road transport activities’ (the 
road transport directive). The vote brought to a close a decade of political 
squabbling on what had become a highly contentious issue. The main 
bone of contention was whether or not self-employed bus and lorry 
drivers should be subject to the same restrictions on working hours as 
drivers working for companies. The European Commission proposed to 
exempt self-employed lorry drivers from EU working time rules, but the 
EP voted to maintain them within the existing directive. The battle-lines 
in the EP were largely drawn along the traditional left-right divide. One 
camp, the centre-right, argued that regulating self-employed drivers’ 
working time would hamper their competitiveness and set a dangerous 
precedent for regulating the activities of the self-employed in general. 
The other camp, the centre-left, contended that the lack of such 
regulation would lead to social deregulation of the transport sector, and 
put self-employed drivers at risk of burnout, increasing danger on the 
roads. At the EP’s plenary vote, however, a significant number of national 
EPP delegations opted to support the Socialists and Greens rather than 
toeing the official EPP line to exclude the self-employed from the scope of 
the directive. The upshot of the EP’s vote means that self-employed 
drivers are subject to the same 48 hours average weekly working time as 
staff drivers.         
 All the people interviewed for this case study attributed the ‘swing’ 
to the left of several EPP national delegations to an effective lobbying 
campaign by trade unions, and ‘a text book example of how influential 
lobbyists can be in Parliament’.91 While the trade unions hailed 
                                                 
91
 Interview, key MEP, 16 November 2010 
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Parliament’s rejection of the European Commission’s proposal to amend 
the road transport directive, the outcome was a major thorn in the side of 
many employers’ associations. Employers’ associations saw the inclusion 
of self-employed drivers within the scope of the road transport directive 
as limiting the freedom of self-employed drivers and distorting 
competition. Paradoxically, the outcome of the road transport directive 
goes against general expectations in the interest groups literature for 
compromises to occur between opposing groups when costs and benefits 
of regulation are narrowly distributed. Regulating working time is a 
typical example of ‘interest group politics’ pitting special interests against 
special interests: businesses versus trade unions. In such a scenario, both 
trade unions and employers are expected to have strong incentives to 
press their demands, which often lead to policy outcomes reflecting a 
compromise between opposing groups. Rival groups’ lobbying efforts are 
likely to counter each other and decision-makers are inclined to seek 
compromises between opposing groups.     
 The main question of this chapter is: what factors explain why the 
EP’s policy outcome of the road transport directive favoured the views of 
the trade unions, instead of reflecting a compromise between opposing 
groups (as envisaged by Wilson’s policy shapes politics typology)? This 
chapter is organised as follows. The following section introduces the road 
transport directive and its background. I then examine the positions of 
the trade unions and employers’ associations followed by an analysis of 
the factors accounting for the trade unions’ lobbying success.  
 
5.1 Background of the road transport working time 
directive  
 
The road transport working time directive is a lex specialis to the general 
working time directive 2003/88/EC and supplements Regulation 
2006/561/EC laying down common rules on driving times and rest 
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periods for drivers. The raison d'être of the general working time 
directive is to ensure that salaried workers are protected against adverse 
effects on their health and safety caused by working excessively long 
hours, having inadequate rest, or disruptive working patterns. The 
working time directive provides for a maximum working week of 48 
hours on average including overtime, daily rest breaks of at least 11 
consecutive hours a day, 4 weeks annual paid holidays, and a minimum 
rest period of 1 day a week. When the general working time directive was 
first adopted in November 1993, it included a number of exclusions and 
derogations relating to specific sectors and activities. These were the 
transport sector, sea fishing, offshore work, and the work of hospital 
doctors in training. One of the main reasons behind these exemptions 
was that that many workers from the excluded sectors spend significant 
time away from home - such as people working at sea or in long distance 
transport - which makes it difficult to define the length of a working day 
for these types of work.        
 The exclusion of whole sectors – such as the transport sector – 
did, however, seem rather arbitrary. While it may be difficult to restrict 
the length of a working day for employees spending significant amount of 
time away from home, there is no reason why these workers should not 
have the right to paid annual leave. Furthermore, there is no objective 
justification for treating office workers in the transport sector less 
favourably than office worker in other sectors. The European 
Commission therefore suggested extending the provisions of the general 
working time directive to the excluded sectors. In July 1997, the 
European Commission published a white paper on ‘sectors and activities 
excluded from the working time directive, in which it suggested to extend 
the working time directive to cover the excluded sectors (see, European 
Commission, 1997).   
Regulating working time for the road transport sector, however, 
turned out to be more difficult than in other sectors. The EU social 
partners managed to reach agreements on the organisation of working 
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time in the maritime sector and the rail sector, but failed to find common 
ground on rules governing working time in road transport. This was 
mainly due to disagreement over the definition of working time. The 
European Commission, therefore, decided to put forward its own 
proposal in November 1998, specifying a number of requirements 
relating to working time for workers in the road transport sector, which 
should apply to both employed and self-employed workers. The 
European Commission argued that it was necessary to include self-
employed drivers in order to secure the health and safety of workers, to 
improve road safety, and to prevent the distortion of competition 
(European Commission, 2007b).       
 The European Commission’s proposal to regulate the working time 
of self-employed drivers was received with some scepticism in the 
Council. Whereas the EP was generally supportive of including the self-
employed within the scope of the directive, a majority of member states 
in the Council were vehemently opposed to their inclusion. In an effort to 
avoid deadlock, the European Commission proposed to temporarily 
exclude self-employed drivers from the scope of the directive within the 
first four years of operation. This sunset clause represented a ‘delicate’ 
compromise between the EU institutions in order to solve the 
disagreement over the issue of the self-employed (Rodgers, 2009, p. 
340). The road transport working time directive became applicable in 
March 2005, and includes the following provisions:  
 
 It seeks to regulate the working hours of drivers of vehicles larger 
than 3.5 tonnes. 
 It sets a weekly limit of 48 hours on average, which can rise to 60 
hours, provided the average of 48 hours per week over a four-
month period is not exceeded.  
 It provides a definition of the types of activities that should be 
included in the calculation of working time: driving, loading and 
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unloading, assistance to passengers, cleaning and maintenance, 
and formalities with police and customs.  
 It sets an obligation to take a break after six hours of work in 
addition to the provisions on breaks in Regulation 2006/561 on 
driving hours and rest periods. 
The compromise - to temporarily exclude self-employed lorry drivers 
from the scope of the 2002 road transport working time directive - 
represents a typical strategy employed in the EU to accommodate interest 
diversity. EU policy-making would inevitably result in stalemate if it not 
for the extensive use of ‘informal strategies and patters that circumvent 
political impasses. Stalemate is prevented by agreeing on package deals, 
compensating losers, settling for framework legislation, and 
differentiated solutions, such as inserting a review clause, exemptions 
and/or phasing in of compliance (Héritier, 1999). The ‘delicate’ 
compromise to temporarily exclude self-employed drivers from the road 
transport directive in 2002 was thus one way of overcoming gridlock and 
reaching a temporary compromise. When adopting the road transport 
directive in 2002, the Council and Parliament agreed that the directive 
should in principle apply to self-employed drivers as of 23 March 2009, 
unless the European Commission proposed legislation to the contrary. In 
addition, the European Commission was requested to present a report to 
the EP and the Council at the latest two years before that date, presenting 
the likely consequences of the inclusion or exclusion of self-employed 
drivers from the scope of the directive.      
 The European Commission published its report on 23 May 2007, 
in which it provided an overview of the directive’s implementation status, 
addressed the potential consequences of excluding or including self-
employed drivers from the scope of the directive, and assessed the 
directive’s night-time provisions. The report concluded that there was no 
decisive case for including self-employed drivers under the directive. 
Concerns about the enforceability of the revised directive, its potential 
189 
 
impact on competition, and the difficulty of quantifying the effects on 
road safety were cited as the main reasons for excluding the self-
employed from the scope of the directive. The European Commission 
concluded that the purpose of the road transport directive - namely fair 
competition, improved road safety, and better working conditions - could 
still be achieved without including self-employed drivers within the scope 
of the directive. However, the European Commission was concerned that 
the exclusion of the self-employed could encourage employed workers to 
declare themselves as self-employed to avoid the provisions of the 
working time directive (the issue of false self-employed drivers). The 
report also highlighted the different ways in which the directive was 
interpreted and enforced in the various member states, and pointed out 
that this could lead to distortion of competition and differences in 
minimum standards applied across member states (European 
Commission, 2007b).  
5.1.1 The European Commission’s proposal 
 
The European Commission published a proposal on 15 October 2008 that 
modified the 2002 road transport working time directive. This proposal 
provides for the continued exclusion of self-employed driver from the 
scope of the directive. Furthermore, the proposal addresses the issue of 
falsely self-employed lorry drivers by redefining the definition of an 
employed mobile worker. The 2002 road transport working time 
directive defines a mobile worker as ‘any worker forming part of the 
travelling staff, including trainees and apprentices, who is in the service 
of an undertaking which operates transport services for passengers or 
goods by road for hire or reward or on its own account’ (European 
Commission, 2008d) . The 2002 directive does not, however, account for 
falsely self-employed. Therefore, the European Commission’s 2008 
proposal – revising the 2002 road transport working time directive - 
includes a definition of falsely self-employed workers. A falsely self-
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employed lorry driver is defined as a person, who is not tied to an 
employer by an employment contract or by a hierarchical relationship, 
but: 
 
 who does not have the freedom to organise their working activities 
 whose income does not depend directly on the profits made 
 who does not have the freedom to have several customers 
 
Additionally, the proposal redefines night work, which corresponds to a 
period of work which includes at least two hours’ work (in contrast to the 
directive’s current rules of four hours’ work), performed between 0:00 
hours and 07.00 hours. Lastly, the proposal introduces common 
principles designed to enhance cooperation between member states’ 
enforcement authorities. The proposal contains the possibility to deviate 
from the standard rules by way of Social Dialogue or collective labour 
agreements (European Commission, 2008b). The nature of the European 
Commission’s proposal – as being a revision of an existing directive with 
a review clause – meant that interest groups did not have an impact on 
the agenda-setting stage (i.e. exerting lobbying pressure on the European 
Commission to come forward with a new proposal). As seen in this 
section, the European Commission was obliged to present a report by 23 
March 2009 followed by a legislative proposal, in which it would address 
whether or not self-employed lorry drivers should continue to be exempt 
from the road transport directive.  
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5.1.2 The cost/benefit profile of the proposal 
 
The European Commission’s impact assessment considered four policy 
options:  
 
 Option A: ‘Do nothing’, i.e. the automatic inclusion of self-
employed drivers within the scope of the directive. 
 Option B: Extending the scope of the directive by including all 
self-employed drivers, except for self-employed drivers who are 
only conducting national transport. 
 Option C: Enhanced enforcement of the directive with modalities 
to ensure the inclusion of false self-employed into the scope of the 
directive while keeping the genuine self-employed workers out of 
the directive. 
 Option D: Exclusion of self-employed drivers without taking any 
actions against false self-employed drivers.  
 
The Commission’s proposal includes policy option C, and provides for a 
clearer legal definition of mobile workers, false self-employed, and 
genuine self-employed. However, as will be seen later in this chapter, the 
EP opted for option A. This section, therefore, only considers the costs 
and benefits arising from options A and C, as options B and D did not 
come into fruition. Table 5.1 shows the costs and benefits of option A 
included in the Commission’s impact assessment, whereas table 5.2 
shows the costs/benefit profile of option C.  The costs and benefits were 
mainly provided in qualitative terms due to lack of reliable data or no 
data to make quantified estimates.  
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5.1: Cost/benefit analysis of option A 
 
Benefits Costs 
Level playing field for all persons 
performing mobile road transport 
activities 
Adverse effect on entrepreneurship 
developments as some self-
employed will leave the market due 
to a reduction in their earnings and 
flexibility  
Elimination of false self-employed 
phenomenon 
Increased costs on member states 
connected to establishing 
enforcement systems and carrying 
out checks  
Increase of competitive advantage 
of large companies (only benefit 
for large companies) 
SMEs lose their market power due 
to concentration process 
Protect self-employed drivers 
against adverse effects of working 
excessive long hours on their 
health and safety and to reduce 
fatigue and stress 
Slightly higher costs for employers 
related to monitoring, recording, 
and reporting working time 
 Risk of increase in the final 
consumer prices of freight 
transport services 
 
Source: European Commission, 2008f, pp. 35-35 
 
As can be seen from table 5.1, the benefits of regulating the working time 
of both employed and self-employed drivers are four-fold. Firstly, it 
provides a level playing field for all drivers engaged in mobile road 
transport activities. The exclusion of genuine self-employed drivers is 
sometimes seen as hampering a level playing field in the road transport 
sector because the self-employed can work longer working hours than 
employed drivers. Secondly, it indirectly addresses the problem of low 
compliance of the directive by including both false self-employed and 
genuine self-employed within the scope of the directive, although this 
does not ensure that all drivers will comply with the working time rules. 
On the contrary, it might worsen the general compliance with the 
directive as many self-employed drivers are against having their working 
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time restricted and the rules have so far been weakly applied. Thirdly, it 
will give a competitive advantage to large companies who, due to 
economies of scale, are better suited to adjust to new rules without losing 
business than SMEs. Lastly, regulating the working time of self-employed 
drivers will protect them against the adverse effects of working excessive 
hours on their health and safety, as well as possibly reducing the risk of 
stress and fatigue, provided that the intensity of work does not increase. 
This could improve driving quality and could in turn have a small effect 
on the overall improvement of road safety, although this remains 
speculative (European Commission, 2008f, p. 41).     
The benefits of regulating the working time of self-employed truck 
drivers are off-set by a number of negative factors. Self-employed drivers 
will have to choose between giving up part of their activities resulting in 
decreased income, employing a second driver, or increasing the intensity 
of their own work in order to maintain the same level of freight 
transported. This is likely to incur increased costs for self-employed 
drivers, less flexibility, and increased stress and fatigue. The reduced 
turn-over and income of self-employed drivers are likely to result in a 
slight increase in consumer prices. It is also likely to have unfavourable 
effects on entrepreneurship due to the increased costs of being self-
employed. The European Commission’s impact assessment estimates 
that the weekly profit of genuine self-employed drivers is likely to be 
reduced by more than 72 % on average, which might lead some self-
employed to close down their business (European Commission, 2008f, p. 
30). Option A also imposes increased costs on member states related to 
establishing improved enforcement systems and undertaking checks, as 
well as for the private sector, in relation to the recording, monitoring and 
reporting of working time.  
Instead of regulating self-employed drivers, the European 
Commission proposed to improve the enforcement of the directive, to 
include the false self-employed, and to have a clear legal distinction 
between genuine self-employed drivers and employed drivers. This was 
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argued to lead to a considerable reduction in the number of false self-
employed drivers, at least for those who regard themselves as self-
employed due to incorrect interpretation of the existing directive 
(European Commission, 2008f, p. 34). Yet it will not increase the number 
of bogus self-employed drivers, who consciously play the system. It is 
estimated that the annual costs of inspections for 25 EU member states 
(not including Bulgaria and Romania) will vary from €1, 9 million for 
checking 5% of self-employed drivers to €7,9 million for a 20% target. 
Likewise, the average costs for the private sector in EU25 are estimated to 
be €1.6 million with the following breakdown: €212.556 for additional 
employed drivers, €85.022 for reporting activity, and €73.33 for labour 
costs per man-hour (European Commission, 2008f, pp. 55-59). While the 
Commission’s proposal (policy option C) increases the costs borne by 
employers and national authorities in terms of monitoring, recording, 
reporting, and enforcing the rules, the proposal has several positive 
effects.  
  
 Table 5.2: Cost/benefit analysis of option C 
 
Benefits Costs 
Reduction of the number of false 
self-employed due to expected 
improvement in compliance rate 
Slightly higher costs for employers 
concerning monitoring, recording, 
and reporting working time 
Aligning the conditions of 
competition between salaried 
mobile workers and some false 
self-employed 
Phenomenon of false self-
employed continues in force, albeit 
to a more limited extent  
Harmonised enforcement regimes 
across the EU 
Additional costs of conducting 
enforcement  measures to be 
shouldered by national authorities 
Allows genuine self-employed to 
maintain their income levels and 
competitive position in the sector 
 
 
Source: European Commission, 2008f, p. 38 
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As can be seen from table 5.2, the benefits arising from policy option C 
(the Commission’s proposal) are associated with a reduction in the 
number of false self-employed, aligning the conditions of competition 
between mobile workers and some false self-employed, harmonising EU 
enforcement regimes, and improving the competitive position of the 
genuinely self-employed. False self-employed do not enjoy the same 
employment rights and social protection (such as pension rights, holiday 
entitlements, maternity/paternity provisions) as employed workers. 
Therefore, these false self-employed, who regard themselves as self-
employed due to inaccurate interpretation of the existing directive, are 
likely to become employed and enjoy greater employment rights and 
social protection.  
Furthermore, option C will eliminate distortions of competition 
between companies and drivers who comply with the rules and those that 
break them. The exclusion of the genuinely self-employed enables them 
to retain their income level and their competitive position in the road 
transport sector. Neither option A nor C includes any estimations of the 
impact on road safety. The European Commission maintains that there is 
limited data on causes of accidents, and that no data relates accidents to 
the working hours of professional drivers. Furthermore, data on road 
accidents does not differentiate between employed drivers and self-
employed drivers. Therefore, it is difficult to make firm conclusions on 
what impact the regulation or non-regulation of the working time of self-
employed truckers will have on road safety. As will be seen in the rest of 
this chapter, there is significant disagreement, however, between interest 
groups on the magnitude of the costs and benefits arising from the 
Commission’s proposal. This shows that the definition of costs and 
benefits is in itself an arena of contestation.  
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5.2 The interest group arena 
 
The road transport directive represents a typical example of interest 
group politics, pitting special interest against special interests. The 
lobbying spectrum included two lobbying sides: those for the inclusion of 
self-employed lorry drivers (trade unions and the French government), 
and those against (a large number of employers’ associations and SMEs). 
Lobbying from the trade unions was mainly undertaken by the European 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) and its affiliated unions. ETF is a 
pan-European trade union organisation embracing European transport 
unions, and is also a member of the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC). From the outset, the ETF was resolutely opposed 
to the European Commission’s proposal to exempt self-employed drivers 
from the scope of the road transport directive. The road transport 
directive was, however, characterised by tension between the ETUC and 
the ETF. The ETUC thought the ETF was playing a risky game by going 
for ‘all or nothing’ rather than trying to secure the right of employees in 
the event MEPs would decide to support the European Commission’s 
proposal. As the S&D shadow rapporteur, British MEP Stephen Hughes, 
explained: 
 
We [the ETF and S&D MEPs] could have used more support 
from the ETUC. The ETUC was not behind the ETF on this, 
and somehow I felt that the ETUC hoped that the ETF would 
fail, so they could learn a lesson. I sent a message saying that if 
you’re not going to be helpful on this, just stay out of it. And 
they did stay out of it. The ETUC was mainly dealing with the 
fall-back position [including a thorough definition of the 
working time of employed and self-employed drivers to 
improve enforcement of the rules]. I don’t think we could have 
won it if there had been heavy lobbying for the fall-back 
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position from the ETUC. I felt that the ETUC had let down the 
ETF.92  
 
The ETF did go for an ‘all or nothing’ lobbying gamble, putting all its eggs 
in one basket by solely lobbying for a rejection of the European 
Commission’s proposal without taking into account what would happen if 
they did not succeed. Under the banner ‘fatigue kills’, the ETF launched a 
lobbying campaign highlighting the hazards associated with long working 
hours in the road transport sector regarding the health and safety of 
drivers and road safety in general. The ETF argued that leaving self-
employed drivers outside the scope of the road transport directive would 
potentially introduce an 86-hour working week into the sector, which 
would lead to drivers’ fatigue and undermine road safety. The ETF 
argued that ‘fatigue is a significant factor in approximately 20 per cent of 
commercial road transport crashes. They cited surveys that show that 
over 50 per cent of long haul drivers have fallen asleep at the wheel’ 
(ETF, 2010). The ETF criticised the European Commission for grounding 
its assumptions - that exclusion of self-employed drivers from the 
working time rules would not jeopardise road safety - on inadequate data. 
The ETF stressed that the EU database on road accidents (CARE) has 
been criticised for years for failing to reflect the real situation of road 
safety as the database was argued to produce incorrect lorry accident 
data.          
 Moreover, the ETF argued that the exclusion of the self-employed 
from rules governing working time had created an incentive for the 
industry to convert employed drivers into false self-employed, and 
encouraged exploitation of cheap labour in road transport. The ETF cited 
information coming from its affiliated trade unions and a number of 
company works’ councils according to which, due to the economic crisis, 
many large operators and delivery companies have converted their 
employed drivers into fake self-employed drivers to save on labour costs. 
                                                 
92 Interview, MEP, 31 August 2010 
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This unfortunate development had led to social deregulation in road 
transport sector, depriving drivers of a fair pay and social welfare benefits 
(for ETF campaign material, briefing notes, and statements, see ETF, 
2010). The ETF regretted that the European Commission had not 
consulted the social partners before issuing its proposal, which was 
argued to be grounded on ten year old statistics.   
 Interest groups supporting the exclusion of self-employed drivers 
from the directive included a large number of European and national 
industry associations, such as the International Road Transport Union 
(IRU), BusinessEurope (formerly UNICE, the Union of Industrial and 
Employers' Confederation of Europe), EuroCommerce, the European 
Construction Industry Federation (FIEC), European Express Association 
(EEA), Federation of European Movers Associations (FEDEMAC), the 
European Association for forwarding, transport, logistic, and customers 
services (CLECAT), and SMEs, such as the European Association of Craft, 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (UEAPME), the European Road 
Haulers Association (UETR), the British Federation of Small Businesses 
(FSE), and the European Small Business Alliance (ESBA). All employers’ 
associations recognised the problem of fake self-employed drivers and 
supported the European Commission’s proposal to crack down on illegal 
fake self-employment. They argued that it was unnecessary to include 
genuinely self-employed lorry drivers within the scope of the directive as 
existing EU regulation was found to be sufficient to secure road safety. 
For example, EU rest and driving time regulation limits driving time to 
an average of 45 hours per week (averaged over two weeks), and requires 
a daily driving limit of nine hours as well as a minimum of 45 minute 
break after every period of four and a half hours of driving.   
 Most employers’ associations found statements by trade unions 
that self-employed drivers have the possibility to work up to 86 hours per 
week every week per year, invalid. They argued that the main aim of the 
road transport directive is to protect employees from abuse by their 
employers by limiting working hours and guaranteeing social protection. 
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Therefore, they saw no need to regulate the working time of genuinely 
self-employed people, who set their own work routines and do not need 
protection from themselves. Moreover, it was argued that the current 
economic climate calls for flexibility in the working hours of the self-
employed to keep their business afloat. Including the self-employed in 
the scope of the road transport directive was regarded as setting a 
dangerous precedent of regulating working hours for self-employed 
people, and deprives self-employed drivers of their prerogative to 
organise their work as they see fit. In no other sectors are self-employed 
limited by working time legislation, which is meant for social protection 
of employees (IRU, 2009, 2010).      
 SMEs contended that restricting the working hours of self-
employed drivers would deny them their entrepreneurial spirit, lead to 
loss of competitiveness, and contravene with the EU’s efforts to promote 
entrepreneurship, e.g. the ‘Think Small First’ principle.  The Think Small 
First principle aims to improve the EU’s overall approach to 
entrepreneurship by taking SME’s interests into account when drawing 
up new EU legislation. The principle requires the European Commission 
to ‘seek wherever possible to exempt micro-enterprises from EU 
legislation or introduce special regimes so as to minimise the regulatory 
burden on them’ (European Commission, 2011b). SMEs argued that 
regulating the working time of the self-employed would lead to a loss in 
company formations, which was seen as a regrettable development as 
many of the existing road haulage companies started as sole traders. 
Although employers’ associations were more numerous than the trade 
unions, the IRU was faced with one major obstacle: internal division. 
Some of the IRU’s national member associations (such as its French, 
Portuguese and Spanish affiliates) were for the inclusion of the self-
employed drivers. The IRU’s internal division proved to be one of the 
‘death blows’ to their chances of influencing the EP. 
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5.3 The EP policy process and outcome 
 
Many MEPs had for a long time been against excluding self-employed 
drivers from the scope of the working time directive. On October 2008, 
the EP adopted an own-initiative report that demanded for the full 
inclusion of self-employed drivers (European Parliament, 2008), and 
called on member states to implement the 2002 road transport working 
time directive (i.e. include self-employed drivers as of 23 March 2009). 
The report was written by the S&D MEP Alejandro Cercas, but carried no 
formal legislative weight as the EP’s own initiative reports do not oblige 
the European Commission to act upon them. When the report was 
adopted, the centre-left had the majority in the EP. However, when the 
European Commission put forward its 2008 proposal, the centre-right 
had the majority following the 2009 EP elections. The change in the EP’s 
ideological composition meant that those political groups that had 
previously been against regulating the working time of self-employed 
truckers now held the majority in the EP. One would therefore expect the 
majority of MEPs to support the European Commission’s proposal to 
exclude the self-employed from the working time directive permanently.   
 The European Commission’s proposal was examined by the EP’s 
employment and social affairs committee (EMPL) as the responsible 
committee during the sixth parliamentary term (2004-2009). The report 
was allocated to the EPP group, who appointed Marie Panayotopoulos 
Cassiotou (Greek EPP MEP) the role as rapporteur. She supported the 
European Commission’s approach to exclude self-employed drivers from 
the road transport directive, and to tackle the problem of the false self-
employed. Her report was, however, not supported by EMPL MEPs, who 
adopted an amendment - put forward by GUE/NGL, Greens, and PES 
(now called the S&D group) MEPs - rejecting the European Commission’s 
proposal. EMPL MEPs recommended a rejection of the European 
Commission’s proposal on grounds that it conflicted with the EP’s 
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demands for the full inclusion of self-employed drivers within the scope 
of the road transport directive after the transitional period by 23 March 
2009.  At its plenary session on 5 May 2009, the EP confirmed the 
employment committee vote against the European Commission’s 
proposal to exclude self-employed drivers from the working time rules. 
The EP called on the European Commission to withdraw its proposal to 
amend the road transport directive, and take appropriate steps with 
Parliament to issue a new proposal. The European Commission did not, 
however, withdraw its proposal and the matter was therefore referred 
back to EMPL in accordance with Rule 56(3) of Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedure (European Parliament, 2012). Most interviewees attributed 
the EP’s rejection of the European Commission’s proposal to a lack of 
lobbying from employers’ associations, and the fact that many MEPs 
were not present at the plenary because they were home campaigning for 
the upcoming 2009 EP elections.  
At the start of the seventh parliamentary period (2009-2014), the 
EMPL committee decided to examine the European Commission’s 
proposal anew rather than simply confirming the last Parliament’s 
rejection. As Marie Panayotopoulos Cassiotou was not re-elected, 
Slovakian centre-right MEP Edit Bauer was appointed the role as 
rapporteur for the EPP group. The rapporteur and a majority of the EPP, 
ALDE and ECR members supported the European Commission’s 
approach to tackle the problem of the false self-employed rather than 
bringing genuine self-employed drivers within the scope of the road 
transport directive. The centre-right political groups in the EP argued 
that the driving hours and rest periods of self-employed drivers are 
already regulated, and that setting limits on their hours for activities 
other than driving would be unenforceable in practice. Instead, they 
supported the European Commission’s approach to provide a more 
detailed definition of what constitutes a self-employed driver in order to 
single out those trying to play the system. During the committee 
discussions four arguments were frequently aired by members, who 
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supported the exclusion of the self-employed drivers from the scope of 
the directive: 
 
 No statistics show that self-employed drivers are more frequently 
involved in road traffic accidents than salaried drivers. MEPs 
frequently referred to the latest European Commission’s ‘Truck 
Accident Causation’ statistics show that trucks are involved – not 
responsible – in around six per cent of road accidents (European 
Commission, 2003).  
 Regulating the working time of self-employed truckers is 
impossible to enforce in practice because the amount of hours 
worked outside driving time cannot be checked; only driving hours 
can be directly monitored through tachographs installed in 
vehicles.  
 In the current economic climate, legislators should avoid creating 
unnecessary red tape for enterprises.  
 There is no precedent of regulating working time of the self-
employed. The idea of being self-employed is synonymous with a 
freedom to set your own working hours, and should not be 
tampered with.  
 
The quote below shows a typical argument used by MEPs favouring the 
exclusion of self-employed truckers from the scope of the directive: 
 
There is no data relating accidents to the working time of 
professional drivers and no data distinguishing between 
employed and self-employed drivers. Therefore, we have no 
data on a decision to include self-employed drivers. 
Legislation must be based on sound reliable data. All the 
scaremongering about self-employed drivers working 86 
hours per week and causing accidents is just scaremongering, 
and is not based on any reliable data […]. This legislation, if it 
includes self-employed, will be virtually unenforceable. Are we 
to have an army of inspectors looking over the shoulders of 
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self-employed workers to see if they are performing general 
administrative duties or administration relating to their job 
(European Parliament, 2010f). 
 
MEPs taking the other side of the argument drew on ETF’s line of 
reasoning, citing the risks to road safety if the working time of self-
employed truckers was not regulated. Several MEPs denounced the 
European Commission for taking a U-turn on the directive from initially 
supporting the inclusion of self-employed drivers back in 2002 to 
recommending their exclusion six years later. As the S&D coordinator -
Spanish MEP Alejandro Cercas - expressed during an EMPL committee 
debate: 
 
There is no real openness to any real dialogue…the European 
Commission has broken the consensus that existed between 
the European Commission, the Council, and the European 
Parliament in the past [to include self-employed drivers 
within the scope of the directive]. My hair stands on the end 
that the European Commission says that tiredness has nothing 
to with health and safety. I’m scandalised that the European 
Commission doesn’t find the directive enforceable (European 
Parliament, 2009a). 
 
The debate in Parliament boiled down to one issue: the inclusion or 
exclusion of self-employed drivers in the working time directive. Few 
interviewees thought that there was any room of manoeuvre for a 
compromise in Parliament given the black and white character of the 
issue. ‘The nature of the issue – for or against the exclusion of the self-
employed - made Parliament completely unmovable and really 
gridlocked Parliament’.93 The rapporteur (Belgian S&D MEP Said EL 
Khadraoui) in the opinion-giving committee, TRAN, tried to go some way 
to find a compromise. His report suggested that digital tachographs 
should not only measure driving times and rest periods, but also loading 
and unloading operations, supplemented by an unmonitored fixed time 
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for a number of other activities, such as administrative tasks and 
cleaning.  As he explained: 
 
I tried to make some compromises in my report. I wanted to 
include the self-employed drivers, but I also wanted to pay 
attention to that it’s difficult to enforce. That is why I worked 
on making a different definition of working time for employed 
and self-employed drivers, such as including a weekly fixed 
time covering administrative work.94 
 
Said EL Khadraoui’s report did not, however, garner support by a 
majority of MEPs in TRAN; 21 MEPs voted for his report and 21 against. 
This meant that the report was rejected and that there was no official 
opinion from TRAN. Many of the amendments put forward in EL 
Khadraoui’s draft report were tabled as the S&D’s fall-back position at 
the plenary in the event that the amendment rejecting the European 
Commission’s proposal would not go through. These amendments were, 
however, never voted upon as MEP’s adopted an amendment, which 
recommended rejecting the European Commission’s proposal. At the 
EP’s plenary session on 16 July 2010, a majority of MEPs voted for the 
rejection of the European Commission’s proposal with 383 MEPs voting 
for the rejection, 263 voting against, and 23 abstaining. The upshot of the 
vote meant that self-employed drivers remain within the scope of the 
road transport directive. The winning coalition consisted of the S&D, the 
Greens/EFA, GUE/NGL, and a large number of national EPP delegations 
(France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Belgium). The rapporteur’s 
biggest enemy was her own group with only 30 per cent of EPP MEPs 
toeing the group line. The EPP was more cohesive in the sixth EP than in 
the seventh EP on the road transport directive with 85 per cent of EPP 
MEPs toing the EPP group line in the sixth EP compared with only 30 per 
cent in the seventh EP. 46 per cent of EPP MEPs was re-elected for the 
seventh parliamentary period. 11.5 per cent of the EPP MEPs that 
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supported the European Commission’s proposal in the sixth EP rejected 
it in the seventh EP, showing a significant mind change among EPP 
MEPs (VoteWatch, 2009, 2010b). During the plenary debate on 15 June 
2010, the evening before the vote, the rapporteur was highly criticised for 
flouting Parliament’s operating rules. Several MEPs accused her for 
putting forward her own group’s position during the trialogue meetings 
rather than the EP’s view, as voted in EMPL. As the shadow rapporteur 
from the S&D group, British MEP Stephen Hughes, argued during the 
plenary debate: 
 
We very much regret the confusion the rapporteur appears to 
have encountered in discharging her mandate. Rather than 
reflecting and promoting the clear majority views of members 
of the European Parliament’s employment committee, she has 
actively worked to promote the view of the European 
Commission and the Council (European Parliament, 2010f).  
 
The rapporteur had hoped that her group would support her stance to 
exclude self-employed drivers from the road transport directive. Only the 
evening before the plenary vote, did it become apparent that a large 
number of EPP national delegations had swung to the left following what 
the rapporteur called ‘a text book example of how influential lobbyists 
can be in Parliament’.95 The EP’s rejection of the European Commission’s 
proposal was welcomed by trade unions, but was met with 
disappointment by employers’ associations and SMEs. The IRU saw the 
outcome as a pyrrhic victory for the trade unions rendering the inclusion 
of self-employed drivers within the scope of the directive as 
unenforceable paper law.96  
Through-out the EP’s policy process, it could be observed that 
several EPP MEPs changed their mind from supporting the European 
Commission proposal to opposing it, or from not having a position to 
being for the rejection of the proposal. All the MEPs and EP staff (MEP 
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assistants and policy advisors) interviewed for this case study argued that 
the EPP had reached a ‘critical mass’ of dissident MEPs, where it became 
legitimate to divert from the group line. It is generally considered good 
practice for leaders of national delegation to alert the group secretariat if 
they intend to divert from the group line. This is because differences 
within groups are often sought to be ironed out before plenary votes. 
Group positions are not imposed from the top, but are defined through a 
process of discussion and negotiation, involving the coordinator from the 
relevant committee, the leadership, and heads of the national 
delegations. If common ground cannot be found between a national party 
delegation and the rest of the group, rebel delegations and rebel MEPs 
are expected to notify their group about any departing from the group 
line (Ringe, 2010). In the case of the road transport working time 
directive, only the French EPP national delegation had notified the EPP 
of its departure from the group line. Only on the evening before the 
plenary vote did it become apparent that a considerable number of the 
EPP’s national delegations intended to vote against the official group line. 
As expressed by the rapporteur’s assistant: 
 
The vote was an absolute disaster. The division within the EPP 
was due to lobbying pressure from the trade unions and 
misleading information by some of our MEPs. From the 
beginning, the French delegation was against the formal EPP 
position then the Italians and Spanish delegations followed. 
Hours before the vote this just cumulated and cumulated and, 
in the end, one third of our members either voted against the 
group line or abstained.97 
 
Table 5.1 shows how the EPP national delegations voted at the plenary 
with dissident delegations highlighted in grey. A high number of national 
EPP delegations voted for the inclusion of self-employed lorry drivers in 
the directive, i.e. rejected the Commission’s proposal.  
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Table 5.3: The voting behaviour of the EPP’s national delegations, 16 
June 2010 
EPP For  Against Absent or  did not vote 
Austria 2 4  
Belgium 4   
Bulgaria 6   
Cyprus 1 1  
Czech Republic  2  
Denmark  1  
Estonia  1  
Finland  4  
France 25 4  
Germany 6 36  
Greece 7   
Hungary 3 11  
Ireland 1 4  
Italy 26 3 6 
Latvia 1 2  
Lithuania 2 1 1 
Luxembourg 2 1  
Malta  2  
Netherlands  4 1 
Poland  25 3 
Portugal 6 2 2 
Romania 5 7 2 
Slovakia  6  
Slovenia 1 1 1 
Spain 14 4 5 
Sweden  5  
Total 112 95 21 
Source: VoteWatch (2010b). 
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The official line of the EPP was to exclude self-employed drivers from the 
scope of the directive. French MEPs were opposed to the European 
Commission’s proposal from the outset because their government 
supported the inclusion of the self-employed in the regulation. Belgian, 
Greek, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish MEPs followed suit because of 
lobbying from trade unions.  
The MEPs and assistants from the S&D and the Greens as well as 
the French EPP delegation formed a lobbying coalition with the ETF in 
which they sought to lobby wavering MEPs by applying both internal 
pressure from MEPs and external pressure from the trade unions. This ad 
hoc lobbying coalition met frequently during the EP’s processing of the 
road transport directive to coordinate their strategies. As a representative 
from the ETF explained ‘we met with them [the French EPP delegation], 
they told us who to lobby and we passed this information on to our 
affiliates, the affiliates then reported back to us and we reported back to 
the Parliament’.98  The remainder of this chapter discusses the various 
factors influencing the policy outcome and explains how the trade unions 
managed to divide the EPP group, and secure a rejection of the European 
Commission’s proposal. 
 
5.4 What factors explain the outcome?  
 
Rebel EPP delegations voted against the official EPP line for various 
reasons. Italian EPP MEPs’ rejection of the Commission’s proposal was 
inextricably tied to what several interviewees referred to as ‘the Slovenian 
problem’. North Italy faces a problem with unfair competition from 
Slovenian drivers, who are willing to work longer hours for lower pay. In 
Italy the government as well as employers and trade unions agree that the 
directive should cover the self-employed, putting Italian MEPs under 
pressure to follow suit. The ETF together with legislative allies in the EP 
                                                 
98
 Interview, ETF, 20 July 2010 
209 
 
were acutely aware of playing on country specific circumstances in order 
to win over wavering MEPs. As a representative from the ETF explained: 
We knew, for example, that North Italy has a problem with 
unfair competition from self-employed drivers from other 
member states, and many independent operators have already 
been out of business because of this cross-border competition. 
We therefore put pressure on Italian social partners to lobby 
Italian EPP MEPs.99 
 
In Spain, the government was in favour of rejecting the European 
Commission’s proposal, although they were speaking out less strongly 
than the French government. Similar to the case of Italy, Spanish social 
partners were for the inclusion of the self-employed within the 
legislation. However, according to the EPP rapporteur, Spanish EPP 
MEPs were initially supporting the European Commission’s proposal, but 
changed their minds following lobbying from Spanish trade unions and 
pressure from Spanish socialist MEPs. Several of the interviewed EPP 
MEPs and policy advisors found that the assistant of the S&D EMPL 
coordinator was very influential in convincing Spanish EPP MEPs to vote 
against the EPP group line. As one interviewee explained:   
 
In terms of the position of Spanish EPP MEPs….a lot was due 
to some excellent contact from the socialist office of Mr 
Cercas. His assistant has excellent contact to all levels in 
Spain, and here I would really say that it’s the individual that 
makes the difference. She has enormous influence, and she 
has direct contact into the EPP Spanish delegation, the 
government, state secretary etc. She launched a major 
lobbying campaign towards Spanish EPP MEPs with Spanish 
trade unions. As far as I’m concerned, she organised calls from 
Spanish social partners to Spanish EPP members. She 
contacted the Spanish trade unions and encouraged them to 
lobby Spanish EPP members.100  
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The example highlights that MEPs and assistants also initiate contact 
with interest groups, especially those interest groups they already know 
support their views. As Hall and Deardorff (2006) note, legislative offices 
often contact likeminded interest groups for support. Contrary to 
conventional understandings of lobbying ‘interest groups sometimes feel 
pressured from legislators to produce’ (Hall & Deardorff, 2006, pp. 77-
78). The lobbying pressure exerted by the ETF and its legislative allies in 
the EP is one key factor attributing to the split within the EPP group. 
While employers’ associations also targeted key MEPs and assisted the 
rapporteur in writing her report, none of them engaged in a strategic 
lobbying coalition with MEPs. Four explanations for the trade unions’ 
lobbying success were frequently mentioned during interviews, each of 
which is elaborated further in the remainder of this chapter:   
 They were faced with low resistance from the employers’ 
associations because the employers’ associations were internally 
divided. 
 They managed to shape MEPs’ interpretation of the European 
Commission’s proposal from an early stage.  
 They used a combination of lobbying techniques that appealed to 
MEPs and made the issue visible in the media, amongst the EU 
citizens and in the EP. 
 EMPL MEPs are generally more open to the demands of trade 
unions than employers’ associations. 
 
5.4.1 The employers were divided  
 
The International Road Transport Union (IRU) was internally divided 
because their Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese associate members were 
in favour of regulating the working time of self-employed bus and lorry 
drivers. Many interviewees generally described the IRU as inherently 
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weak due to their oft-occurring inability to reconcile divergent national 
interests and to arrive at anything but a lowest common denominator. 
Owing to internal rife and cumbersome internal decision-making 
procedures, the IRU only started lobbying MEPs when EMPL had 
finished its deliberations on the dossier. This was a major disadvantage 
for the IRU because they could not lobby MEPs from an early stage. The 
IRU obtained a mandate from the majority of its members in February 
2010. At this point, the deadline for suggesting amendment to the 
rapporteur’s report in EMPL had been exceeded, and the position of 
many MEPs and political groups had already become entrenched.  
Danish and Dutch members of the IRU found that the IRU is a very 
bureaucratic and inflexible organisation, ill-suited to act swiftly. The IRU 
holds bi-annual meetings with its member associations, aimed at 
obtaining lobbying mandates from its members. This puts the IRU in an 
awkward position because these meetings are not tailored to meet 
important deadlines in the EU policy process (such as deadlines for 
amendments in the EP), and sometimes prevent them from becoming 
active early on in the policy process. The split within the IRU worked in 
favour of the ETF, who could lobby MEPs from the beginning of the EP 
policy process without much competition from employers’ associations: 
 
We were really lucky that the employers were divided. We 
cannot match their resources. We only have two people 
working on this issue at the ETF. It would definitely have been 
more difficult if the employers had been united. Both the IRU 
and SMEs have a vast number of people working on this 
dossier. We had to prioritise this issue. We left everything else 
to deal with this issue. It was of prime importance to us.101 
 
As indicated by the quote above, the ETF focused all of its attention on 
the road transport working time directive. This is not an uncommon 
strategy amongst trade unions because labour interests often have a 
narrower focus and greater homogeneity than businesses (Greenwood, 
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2011, p. 121). The greater homogeneity amongst trade unions makes it 
easier for them to gain a mandate from their member associations than 
businesses (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985; Traxler, 1991). Labour unions 
often share a common belief system and a high degree of union solidarity, 
which ostensibly makes it easier for trade unions to influence the position 
of their members than the case of employers’ associations (Offe, 1981). 
This does not mean that the European trade union federations always 
display internal unity as they are also, from time to time, hostage to 
national division owing to the diversity in member states’ social models. 
 Although the IRU was divided, the ETF did not have the EP 
lobbying arena all to themselves as several national employers’ 
associations in favour of the European Commission’s proposal lobbied 
Parliament. Six of the IRU’s member associations for road hauliers from 
Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, Sweden, Finland, and Germany 
formed a lobbying coalition, urging MEPs to support the rapporteur and 
not reject the European Commission’s proposal. As a representative from 
Transport en Logistiek Nederland (TLN) explained:  
 
We [the IRU] disagreed amongst ourselves and that was the 
deathblow to our chances of influencing Parliament’s 
position. We [TLN] therefore joined forces with five other 
IRU associations. The six of us wrote joint lobbying letters 
and went to see MEPs together to show MEPs that we were 
united, and represented a significant number of industry 
associations. Because I devoted so much time on lobbying 
Parliament, I saw the outcome as a personal defeat.102 
 
Much to the surprise of Dutch and Danish IRU members, ‘the IRU 
appeared less divided than initially anticipated once it had finished its 
internal procedure for obtaining a mandate from its members’.103 In the 
end, only Spanish, French and Portuguese IRU members were against the 
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IRU’s common position, and Danish and Dutch members regretted that 
the IRU had not managed to obtain a mandate at an earlier stage.  
5.4.2 The ETF managed to set the discourse in Parliament 
 
The ETF had a very clear and simple message: say no to an 86-hour 
working week for professional drivers as it undermines safety on the 
roads for all of us. The ETF used politically charged slogans, which struck 
a clear cord with MEPs, who were sensitive to the trade unions’ 
arguments of road safety. As seen in Chapter 4 on the food labelling 
regulation, MEPs have a tendency to vote with their hearts when interest 
groups manage to couch debates in terms of ‘ethics’ and ‘emotions’. In 
the case of the road transport working time directive, once the ETF’s 
argument of road safety was rooted in the EP, it was difficult for 
employers’ associations to sell their arguments about avoiding burdening 
the private sector during the economic downturn. As a representative 
from the IRU explained:  
 
For us the directive is a pure labour market issue focusing on 
the potential economic consequences. That side of the coin 
was somewhat ignored. Once the idea of road safety was 
entrenched in the EP, it was difficult for us to reason 
otherwise. ETF build their campaign around fear, the fear of 
road safety, everyone can be a victim.104   
 
Employers’ associations found it immensely difficult to counteract the 
ETF’s arguments of an 86-hour working week. In retrospect, many of the 
interviewed employers’ associations regret that they did not develop 
more cogent arguments earlier in the process. Many MEPs and trade 
unions found the arguments put forward by the employers’ associations 
to be vague. In a hearing organised by the EPP and the ECR group on 12 
May 2010, a month before the vote in plenary, employers’ associations 
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were - according to the ETF - unable to counter the ETF’s arguments in 
any convincing way:  
 
We [the ETF] only had one slot out of eight speakers, all 
employers’ associations, and they were not able to counter-
argue with our arguments. EPP MEPs were mainly asking us 
questions, and you could see that many EPP MEPs were trying 
to make up their mind.105 
 
Many of the employers’ associations and MEPs in support of the 
European Commission’s proposal saw the ETF’s campaign as a 
scaremongering campaign: if you don’t reject the European 
Commission’s proposal, even more people will die on the roads. The ETF 
managed to change the framing of the directive from a labour market 
issue to a public issue of road safety. Whilst the road transport working 
time directive is a typical interest group politics case, the ETF managed to 
frame it as an entrepreneurial politics case, in which regulating working 
time of self-employed truckers would benefit the wider public in terms of 
safer roads. 
 
5.4.3 The trade unions had a more successful lobbying approach 
 
The trade unions were more successful in their lobbying approach than 
employers’ associations because they used a more varied lobbying 
approach combining direct lobbying (meetings with MEPs and targeted 
lobbying letters) with demonstrations and lorry convoys outside the EP in 
Brussels and Strasbourg. Inside the EP, the ETF and its national member 
associations worked closely with MEPs supporting their views. By 
providing arguments and figures to friendly MEPs (allies) and lobbying 
unconvinced MEPs, they managed to gather a large majority in favour of 
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rejecting the European Commission’s proposal. As a French EPP 
assistant told me:  
 
The ETF was doing miracles in Parliament. We told them who 
to lobby and they provided us with crucial figures and 
arguments. In the beginning it was only the French delegation 
within the EPP that was against, but with the help from the 
ETF we managed to convince the Italian, the Spanish, the 
Greek and the Belgian delegation.106  
 
A key S&D MEP confirmed the crucial role played by the ETF:  
 
I don’t think we could have won the vote in plenary without 
the ETF. They played a very crucial role and we had a very nice 
team-work. It was thanks to pressures coming from the 
outside [the trade unions] and from the inside [MEPs] that 
brought us the victory.107  
 
The ETF’s close lobbying coalition with MEPs and staff from Parliament’s 
French EPP delegation, S&D group, and the Greens/EFA is crucial to 
understanding the voting outcome in Parliament. The road transport 
working time directive provides an excellent example of what Hall and 
Deardorff (2006) would describe as ‘legislative subsidy’ – organised 
interests take up the role of being a service bureau or adjuncts to staff for 
carefully selected legislators in support of shared policy objectives. 
Lobbying as legislative subsidy is regarded as: 
  
A matching grant of policy information, political intelligence, 
and legislative labour to the enterprises of strategically 
selected legislators. The proximate political objective of this 
strategy is not to change legislators’ minds but to assist natural 
allies in achieving their own, coincident objectives […] Interest 
groups freely but selectively provide labour, policy 
information, and political intelligence to likeminded but 
resource constrained legislators, and expand legislators’ effort 
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at making progress toward a policy objective that interest 
groups and MEPs share (Hall &Deardorff, 2006, pp. 69-75). 
 
The trade unions were particularly astute at providing political 
intelligence to their legislative allies so that the latter could exert lobbying 
pressure on their colleagues. According to Hall and Deardorff (2006), 
lobbying should be regarded as a ‘matching grant’ rather than a ‘simple 
grant’ as legislators ‘bring something to the endeavour that interest 
groups cannot’ (Hall & Deardorff, 2006, pp. 75). While interest groups 
can furnish legislators with issue-relevant expertise and experience, 
MEPs and assistants can draw on their institutional access to the policy 
process, their legislative contacts and political capital with colleagues to 
influence the policy outcome. Thus, merely providing ‘info-drops’ is not 
sufficient for interest groups to be influential, but the ETF was 
particularly effective as they worked through legislative allies’ offices.  
 One parliamentary forum proved particularly fruitful for the ETF’s 
ability to influence MEPs on the road transport directive: the trade union 
cooperation intergroup (see Chapter 1 for more information about the 
EP’s intergroups). The secretariat of this intergroup is run by the ETUC 
together with two MEPs from the S&D (Spanish Alejandro Cercas) and 
the EPP group (French Elisabeth Morin-Chartier), and they meet once a 
month to discuss on-going legislation. The intergroup is shrouded in 
secrecy because some of its meetings are closed and by invitation only. 
The intergroup meetings are divided into open plenary debates held in 
Strasbourg and closed bureau meetings held in Brussels.  
 The trade union cooperation intergroup provides a potent link 
between the European trade unions and MEPs favourable to their cause. 
This ‘special relationship’ has led the former UNICE (now 
BusinessEurope) Secretary General, Zygmunt Tyszkiewich, to criticise the 
intergroup for providing the trade unions with a ‘privileged relationship 
with the European Parliament which shares its objectives and 
consistently passes resolutions by a large majority, advocating social 
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policies that business finds unacceptable’  (Stern, 1994, p. 141). On the 
road transport directive, the intergroup provided the ETF with a unique 
opportunity to influence key MEPs’ interpretation of the European 
Commission’s proposal.108 While the influence of intergroups is difficult 
to ‘measure’, all EP interviewees saw them as immensely important for 
building long term relationship with MEPs and their EP staff. Much to 
the regret of some of the IRU members, the IRU is not active in any 
parliamentary intergroups.  
Outside the EP, the ETF organised demonstrations raising the 
awareness of the issue in the media. In February and March 2010, the 
ETF organised a European truck-convoy, crossing several EU countries 
before ending its journey in Brussels. This convoy aimed to raise public 
awareness of the impact of drivers’ fatigue on road safety. On 28 April 
2010 - the date of the EMPL committee vote - another lorry convoy, 
organised by the ETF, took place in Brussels’ European district to protest 
against the introduction of an alleged 86-hour working week for self-
employed drivers if Parliament did not reject the European Commission’s 
proposal. For one hour, 15 lorries and busses drove around the buildings 
of the EP, the European Commission, and the Council. Trade union 
activists from throughout Europe joined the convoy (see ETF, 2009). The 
simplicity of the road transport working time directive - for or against the 
inclusion of the self-employed - made it easy for the ETF to mobilise its 
rank and file members. A representative from the ETF explained that the 
simplicity of the issue was important for mobilising their members: 
 
What really made it stand out, compared to other directives, 
was that it was a clear-cut issue. It had a simple message, 
which made it easy to transmit our message to the rank and 
file members. You cannot do the same thing on other more 
complicated issues as you then need to devote more time to 
explaining the issue. The fact that we could mobilise the rank 
and file member had a clear value for our lobbying. Within a 
year and a half we were able to organise three demonstrations 
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and one lobby convoy. When we have the revision of the digital 
tachographs, it will be much more difficult to mobilise our 
members as it is a very complex issue. On this issue, we need 
to organise our campaign in a different way, and it will be 
more focused on direct lobbying.109 
 
The simplicity of an issue has a clear impact on interest groups’ chosen 
lobbying strategy. The easier the lobbying message is, the easier it is to 
mobilise national members of European federations, provided that unity 
between national affiliates can be found. One thing missing from the 
employers’ associations lobbying arsenal was demonstrations. Both the 
rapporteur and EPP advisors urged the IRU to arrange demonstrations 
outside the EP to increase their visibility. However, the IRU did not want 
to use demonstrations as part of their lobbying strategy:   
 
We in the IRU have a policy of being against demonstrations, 
especially if they cause a disruption to free movement of 
traffic. Our members simply haven’t got the time to come onto 
the streets en masse. They’re businessmen, who are working 
and they can’t be taken away from their jobs very easily.110 
 
Several members of the IRU as well as SMEs found it illogical that 
employers’ associations did not want to engage in demonstrations as they 
would have had more visibility if they had also ‘gone to the streets’. One 
Italian interviewee from the European Road Hauliers Association 
(UETR) thought that employers’ associations in Brussels had a very 
different attitude to demonstrations than the case of Italy:   
 
In Italy employers’ associations frequently demonstrate. In 
Brussels employers’ associations take a different approach ‘we 
are lobbyists, we have a tie, and we don’t get our hands dirty’. 
It’s nonsense. It’s not easy to convince an entrepreneur to do a 
demonstration for one or two days as they will lose money, but 
you can do if you present him or her with the situation. The 
working time directive in road transport is really something 
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 Interview, ETF, July 2010 
110 Interview, IRU, 17 August 2010 
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that impact on self-employed drivers’ future economic activity, 
you can engage them.111   
 
Not only did employers’ associations refuse to do demonstrations, the 
IRU’s lobbying approach was also seen to be rather unfortunate at times. 
One IRU member association criticised the IRU for sending too long 
position papers to MEPs: 
 
3-4 pages are just too much. No-one is going to read them […] 
The IRU mainly lobby Parliament on specific dossiers rather 
than constantly building and nurturing contacts with MEPs 
and their assistant. I would like the IRU to engage more in 
what I call ‘narrative’ lobbying by continuously trying to 
enhance MEPs’ understanding of the transport sector.  It’s of 
little use to contact MEPs when the fat is in the fire! It’s the 
long-term contacts that matter as you can draw on these in 
specific situations.112  
 
The same interviewee thought that the IRU sometimes uses 
inappropriate names for its lobbying activities towards the EP. At 
Parliament’s plenary setting in June 2010, the IRU had arranged an 
event with a number of MEPs in Strasbourg prior to the vote on the road 
transport directive. Initially the IRU called this event a ‘reception’, but: 
 
Luckily we managed to change the wording to ‘a briefing’ 
instead of a ‘reception’. The road transport directive is a 
directive with an enormous financial impact on road hauliers 
across Europe. We cannot give our members the impression 
that we spend our time drinking cocktails with MEPs at fancy 
receptions.113   
 
The failure of the IRU to lobby the EP successful is to be seen as a 
combination of different factors including slow internal decision-making 
procedures, internal disagreement, unwillingness to use outside lobbying 
strategies (such as demonstrations), and an unfortunate lobbying 
                                                 
111 Interview, UETR, 27 September 2010 
112 Interview, DTL, 10 November 2010 
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approach (such as sending too long position papers to MEPs). Contrary, 
the ETF’s approach of engaging in a close lobbying coalition with 
legislative allies in the EP combined with visibility in the media through 
demonstrations and convoys, and a short and simple lobbying message 
proved to be very efficient for its ability to influence MEPs’ position on 
the road transport working time directive. Additionally, the trade unions 
were faced with a friendlier lobbying environment because the EP’s 
EMPL committee is regarded as particularly open to the views of 
employees.  
 
5.4.4 Contextual factors: MEPs are more favourable to the views of 
employees than employers 
 
All the 31 interviewees for this case study found that EMPL MEPs tended 
to be more favourable to the views of employees than that of employers. 
This is not only the case for the road transport working time directive, 
but also for other recent legislative dossier, subject to the ordinary 
legislative procedure. EMPL’s position on other recent dossiers - such as 
the revision of the general working time directive (European Commission 
2004)  and the temporary agency work directive (European Commission 
2008g) - was more favourable to labour unions than to employers’ 
organisations. The EP also tilted more towards the views of trade unions 
than employers’ associations on the EU’s recent (failed) attempt to revise 
the general working directive; MEPs did not want to give any room for 
manoeuvre on on-call time, rest periods, and the possibility of opt-outs 
(ETUC, 2008; EurActiv, 17 December 2008). All interviewees of this case 
study thought that most EMPL MEPs are drawn to the committee 
because they have a genuine passion for improving the rights and 
conditions for employees. EMPL’s bias towards labour unions has 
prompted many employers’ associations to divert their attention away 
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from the committee to the plenary. As a representative from UEAPME 
said:  
 
It is really difficult for us to get our views across in the 
employment committee […] we are much more powerful in the 
plenary sessions. Here we can really play on the group system 
and the group discipline. This is our best chance, and this is 
what we are exploiting.114  
 
This does not mean that employers’ associations have a tough time in the 
EP on all policy issues. The openness to labour unions seems to be 
particularly prominent on issues relating to working time, and health and 
safety at work. UEAPME found that they were better heard by the 
Council than by Parliament on social and employment affairs. Most 
interviewed employers’ associations thought that the EP’s voting outcome 
on the road transport working time directive would have been different 
had TRAN been the committee in charge of scrutinising the 
Commission’s proposal instead of EMPL. All interviewees viewed TRAN 
MEPs as more open to industry demands because the committee was 
seen to pay closer attention to transport matters than social matters. This 
was also a view held by the ETF, who found TRAN members to be more 
conservative than EMPL members: 
 
The transport committee is much more conservative in their 
views in terms of issues pertaining to the internal market. 
They tend to focus on liberalisation, rather than social issues. 
In that sense, we were lucky that the issue went to the 
employment committee, who are more concerned with social 
issues. In the transport committee, they took issues on 
administrative burden much more on-board. In the Council, 
the issue was dealt with by the transport Council and in the 
European Commission by the transport DG. It is a bit of a 
conundrum that the issue went to the employment committee 
in the Parliament, which was probably to our benefit.115  
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 Interview, UEAPME, 8 April 2010 
115
 Interview, ETF, 13 October 2010  
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As seen in Chapter 4 on the regulation on the reduction of CO2 emissions 
from vans, turf wars between different EP committees is an oft-occurring 
feature of the EP. Similar to the division between the European 
Commission’s DG for Enterprise and Industry, and DG for Environment, 
DG for Mobility and Transport is seen to be more industry-friendly than 
DG for employment. As a representative from the ETF explained: 
The European Commission’s DG for Transport has an agenda 
that reflects the liberalisation and the internal market policies. 
In the Council, you have the governments, and now with the 
economic crisis, it doesn’t help at all to have a social debate. 
They are very worried about everything that entails 
administrative burdens. The only institution that remains 
open to lobbying is Parliament.116  
 
The quote shows that the revision of the working time directive in road 
transport in 2008 took place in a very different context (the financial 
crisis) than when the original directive was first formulated in 2008. In 
1998, when the European Commission first proposed a sectoral working 
time directive for the road transport sector, the dossier was dealt with by 
DG for Employment and Social Affairs. However, when the European 
Commission proposed to revise the road transport working time directive 
in 2008, DG for Mobility and Transport was in charge. This might help 
explain why the European Commission made a U-turn on the dossier 
from supporting to opposing the regulation of the working time of self-
employed bus and lorry drivers. Several of the interviewed employers’ 
associations thought that the European Commission should have put 
more pressure on MEPs to support their proposal, and been more active 
in contacting MEPs. As a representative from the Danish Transport and 
Logistics Association (DTL) explained:  
 
The European Commission is bad at keeping full accounts of 
its proposals. They did a poor job of selling their working time 
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in the road transport proposal to MEPs. They didn’t manage to 
take up the battle with the EP. I think the outcome might have 
been different had the European Commission been more 
active.117 
 
On 13 October 2010, ESBA sent a letter to the European Commission 
signed by 100 MEPs, urging the European Commission to bring the issue 
back to the EP in a redrafted form by specifically dealing with the issue of 
false self-employment (ESBA, 2010). While the majority of employers’ 
associations regretted that the European Commission’s proposal was 
rejected in Parliament, trade unions gathered their legislative allies from 
the EP for a reception on 29 September 2010 to celebrate the outcome 
and acknowledge their hard work and teamwork. As a representative 
from the ETF expressed, ‘I was almost saddened when the battle was over 
as our working relation [between EP legislative allies and the ETF] had 
been so nice.118   
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The road transport directive is not characterised by a compromise 
between employers’ and employee associations. Rather, employees tend 
to prevail over employers. Policy did not shape policy as expected by 
Wilson’s typology. This then raises the puzzle: why do common 
expectations about public policy in social and employment affairs not fit 
the EP? Why do employees prevail over employers’ associations? The 
road transport directive shows that costs and benefits flowing from 
legislation do not operate in a vacuum because:  
 
 Interest groups need time to mobilise. 
 Some lobbying strategies are more successful than others. 
                                                 
117
 Interview, DTL, 10  November 2010 
118
 Interview, ETF, 13 October 2010 
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 Institutional characteristics pertaining to the EP committees make 
MEPs more receptive to some interest groups over others. 
 The nature of a policy issue – whether it addresses the question of 
‘more-or-less’ or ‘either/or’ – means that compromises on some 
policy issues are easier to obtain than on others.  
 
Firstly, interest groups need time to mobilise, and obtain a mandate from 
their member organisations. The costs of obtaining internal unity within 
an interest group can be significant and explain why Wilson’s typology 
does not always match the empirical reality. While most business actors 
are likely to support market liberalisation and unnecessary burdensome 
regulation, the a priori assumption of a uniform business interest is 
problematic, especially when it comes to setting EU process standards. 
On the road transport working time directive, the ETF was faced with low 
resistance from the employers’ associations because the employers’ 
associations were internally divided. The split within the IRU worked in 
favour of the ETF, who could lobby MEPs from an early stage without 
facing much competition from employers’ associations. 
 Secondly, the ETF lobbying strategy of combining voice (lorry 
convoys and demonstrations outside Parliament) and access strategies 
(building alliances with key MEPs) was more successful than the 
strategies employed by employers’ associations. The ETF was particularly 
influential because they worked through the offices of carefully selected 
MEPs (i.e. French EPP delegation and S&D MEPs) rather than merely 
providing ‘info-drops’. The ETF’s long term contact with MEPs through 
its participation in the trade union cooperation intergroup proved to be 
very fruitful for its lobbying on the road transport working time directive 
because they could draw on existing contacts within the EP. Two aspects 
were missing from the IRU’s lobbying arsenal: demonstrations and close 
long-term contacts with MEPs through, for example, intergroup activity. 
The IRU did not want to engage in demonstrations and the interviewed 
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representative from IRU119 explained that the IRU has a policy of being 
against demonstrations. The combination of internal disagreement 
within the IRU, slow internal decision-making procedures, and an 
inefficient lobbying approach proved detrimental for the IRU’s ability to 
influence MEPs. Unlike the IRU, the ETF increased their visibility by 
sending the same information to MEPs using numerous tactics (access 
and voice strategies), thereby increasing the salience and urgency of their 
lobbying message. A majority of MEPs bought into the ETF’s main 
argument of road safety, even though the Commission’s impact 
assessment clearly stated the lack of statistics on the link between long 
working hours and road safety. This suggests that the ETF’s lobbying 
success was not only about the information it provided to MEPs but also 
about how this information was conveyed. More importantly, the ETF 
managed to change the frame through which the directive was viewed 
from a labour market issue with concentrated costs and benefits (interest 
group politics) to a public issue of road safety with diffuse benefits and 
concentrated costs (entrepreneurial politics). This appealed to the EP’s 
political face, emphasising its role as an arena for wider public debate. 
However, the type of information provided by the ETF did not amount to 
purely political information. While the ETF put forward value-laden 
claims (such as ‘fatigue kills’), it based its arguments on survey data of 
long haul drivers and road accident statistics. The sources used by ETF 
can be seen as constituting a combination of political information and 
evidence-based information rather than technical information. Similarly, 
the IRU used politically charged arguments – such as referring to self-
employed drivers’ entrepreneurial spirit – rather than purely technical 
arguments. 
 Thirdly, EP committees are often biased towards their own policy 
remit, and MEPs from different committees require different type of 
information to fulfil their legislative and representative roles. All the 
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 Interview, IRU, 17 August 2011 
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interviewed employers’ associations found that EMPL MEPs were 
generally more receptive to the views of employees than that of 
employers. A similar trend could be observed in the case study on the 
vans regulation (Chapter 3) with ENVI often prioritising environmental 
over industry concerns. Unlike the vans regulation, the ‘reinvented 
Hughes procedure’ was not invoked on the road transport working time 
directive, and the issue was primarily viewed through the lens of social 
protection (to avoid social dumping) and road safety rather than a 
through a labour market issue that would focus in on the directives’ 
economic consequences.  
 Lastly, it is questionable whether or not there would have been any 
room for compromises had employers’ been united and had TRAN been 
given associate status (by invoking the Hughes procedure). The nature of 
the road transport directive as an ‘either/or’ issue - for or against 
regulating the working time of the self-employed - made the possibility of 
an inclusive compromise challenging. A typical EU strategy for dealing 
with ‘either/or’ issues is to use various escape routes, most often by 
kicking a controversial issue into the long grass (such as inserting review 
clauses or temporary exemptions). In 2002, the conflict over whether or 
not to include self-employed truckers within the scope of the road 
transport directive was, temporarily, solved by postponing the decision to 
a later stage. This delicate compromise did not reflect a compromise, 
where interest diversity was accommodated through mutual concessions, 
but rather it represented a compromise characterised by ‘subterfuge by 
stealth’ (Héritier, 1999).  In 2008, when the European Commission was 
obliged to return to the issue of the self-employed, the black and white 
nature of the issue did not allow for mutual concessions between 
opposing groups to be granted. While compromises come in various 
shapes and forms, some issues do not easily lend themselves to 
compromises. Without the possibility of escape routes or other forms of 
legislative craftiness (such as kicking an issue into the long grass), 
interest diversity on highly ideological issues cannot easily be 
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accommodated, and consequently results in clear lobbying winners and 
losers.  
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Chapter 6: The Maternity Leave Directive: Who Pays for 
Equality? 
 
What length of maternity leave should employees be allowed to take? 
Should it be fully paid? Should fathers of new-born babies be allowed to 
have mandatory paternity leave? These questions have triggered heated 
and contentious debates in the EU following the European Commission’s 
proposal to amend the existing maternity leave directive.120 Under 
existing EU legislation, female employees are entitled to take at least 14 
continuous weeks’ maternity leave, two weeks of which are compulsory 
before or after confinement. In October 2008, the European Commission 
recommended to improve existing EU maternity leave provision by 
increasing compulsory maternity leave from 14 to 18 weeks, prohibiting 
lay-offs during this time, and granting women more flexibility in working 
patterns when resuming work. It also recommended that member states 
pay women their full salaries during maternity leave but with the option 
of member states to setting a ceiling at the level of national pay during 
sickness leave. 
 Two years later - in October 2010 - a majority of MEPs voted at 
first reading to boost the minimum duration of maternity leave to 20 
weeks on mandatory full pay, to introduce two weeks’ paternity leave, 
and significantly improve the rights of women upon returning to work 
after maternity leave. This was met with stiff resistance from employers’ 
associations and many EU governments (particularly the UK, Malta and 
Germany), who reproached the EP for hamstringing companies and 
national security systems with new payrolls during the economic 
recession, being insensitive to the diversity in national maternity leave 
systems, and setting maximum - not minimum - standards. The EP’s 
ostensibly uncompromising position on the maternity leave directive led 
                                                 
120 Directive 92/85/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in 
the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given 
birth or are breastfeeding 
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to a consortium of eleven member states, spearheaded by the UK and 
Germany, to freeze the directive in June 2011 in the hope that the 
European Commission might later withdraw its proposal (EurActiv, 16 
June 2011). Since the proposed directive is subject to qualified majority 
voting, the consortium holds the right to shelve the proposal indefinitely. 
 The case represents an entrepreneurial politics case in which the 
costs of improving maternity provisions are concentrated on employers 
and the benefits widely distributed to all female employees. The 
theoretical expectation is for employers’ associations to be more active 
during the policy process and to be more successful in leaving their 
fingerprints on Parliaments report than labour unions and women’s 
rights’ organisations. The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to understand 
why the EP took up a rather extreme first reading position on the 
maternity leave directive that was diametrically opposed to the views of 
employers’ associations and several member states. This chapter is 
organised as follows: the next section introduces the European 
Commission’s proposal; I then present the arguments used by employers’ 
associations, member states, labour unions, and social NGOs; followed by 
an in-depth analysis of the impact of lobbying on the EP’s policy process 
and first reading position.  
 
6.1. The European Commission’s proposal 
 
The proposal for a revised maternity leave directive forms part of a 
package of measures to improve work-life balance for all EU citizens. 
This package also includes a directive on the equal treatment of the self-
employed and their assisting spouses, and a report on member states’ 
progress towards the Barcelona targets121 for childcare provisions 
                                                 
121 The Barcelona targets recognise the importance of childcare for economic growth and 
equal opportunities, and call on EU member states to provide childcare by 2010 to at 
least 90% of children between three years old and the mandatory school age, and at 
least 33% of children under three years old.  
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(European Commission, 2008c). The main objective of the European 
Commission’s proposal for a revised maternity leave directive is to 
improve the protection offered to pregnant workers and workers who 
have recently given birth or are breastfeeding. In particular, the proposal 
extends the minimum length of maternity leave from 14 to 18 weeks, and 
recommends payment equivalent to 100 per cent of former salary (with a 
ceiling that cannot go below sickness pay). This increase is aimed at 
helping women recover from the immediate effects of giving birth, while 
also making it easier for them to resume work after ending their 
maternity leave.  
Table 6.1 presents the main changes introduced to the existing 
1992 maternity leave. The table shows that the current directive 
92/85/EC uses the legal basis of health and safety (article 137 of the EC 
Treaty), whereas the proposal for a revised directive extends the legal 
basis to equal treatment (article 141). The European Commission’s 2008 
proposal provides female employees with stronger protection against 
dismissal and a right to return to the same job, or an equivalent post on 
terms and conditions that are no less favourable. The proposal also gives 
women returning from maternity leave the right to ask for flexible 
working patterns, although the employer has no obligation to accept this. 
Lastly, the proposal includes a stipulation that the provisions concerning 
the burden of proof should fall on the defendant (European Commission, 
2008c).  
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Table 6.1: Changes proposed to the existing directive  
Key provisions Directive 92/85/EEC 2008 proposal 
Legal basis Article 137: Health and          
safety at work 
Article 137: Health and safety 
at work + article 141 Equal 
opportunities between men 
and women 
Target group Pregnant workers, workers 
who have recently given 
birth or are breastfeeding  
Unchanged 
Maternity 
leave duration  
14 weeks allocated before 
and/or after confinement       
with two weeks compulsory      
leave allocated before or       
after childbirth 
18 weeks allocated before 
and/or after confinement 
with six weeks compulsory 
leave after the childbirth.  
Dismissal 
prohibition 
 
From the beginning of 
pregnancy to the end of 
maternity leave. If dismissal 
occurs within the above 
period, the employer must      
cite on duly substantiated 
ground for her dismissal in 
writing. 
If dismissal occurs within six 
months following the end of 
maternity leave, the 
employer   must cite on duly           
substantiated grounds for 
her dismissal in writing at 
the employee’s request. 
Payment 
 
Adequate allowance at least 
at the level of sick leave 
Adequate allowance          
guarantees income 
equivalent to the last 
monthly salary or an average 
monthly salary (not 
mandatory); must not be 
lower than sick leave. 
Employment       
rights 
Not mentioned The right to return to the           
same job or an equivalent 
post, and to benefit from    
improvements. 
Flexible 
working 
patterns  
Not obliged to perform          
night work during          
pregnancy and for  a period 
following childbirth 
 
Unchanged + the right to ask        
the employer for flexible        
working patterns/hours 
(non-obligatory) 
 
Burden of 
proof  
Employee Respondent (employer) 
 
Source: Council of the European Union (1992); European Commission (2008c)  
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6.1.1 The cost/benefit profile of the proposal 
 
The costs of improving EU maternity leave provisions differ across 
member states depending on how close member states’ maternity leave 
provisions are to those under consideration in the European 
Commission’s proposal. Maternity leave provisions vary widely across the 
EU in terms of maternity leave length and pay. Maternity leave length 
spans from 14 to 52 weeks, and pay varies from 55 per cent of average 
salary subject to an upper limit, to 100 per cent with no ceiling. Member 
states’ employment regimes span countries where the state has been the 
driving force for comprehensive statutory provisions of workers’ rights 
(such as Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands Luxembourg, Italy, 
Spain, and Greece), through to countries where the state has steered dear 
of regulating industrial relations (such as the UK and Ireland), to those 
where rules are made by corporatist agreements between employers and 
labour unions (such as Nordic states). Appendix 3 provides a full 
overview of all 27 EU member states’ maternity leave provisions and 
financing sources.  
The European Commission’s impact assessment examined the cost 
and benefits of its proposal on four levels: societal, government budget, 
employers, and employees. The impact assessment is based on a study by 
the consultancy companies Cowi and Ideas Consult, who conducted a 
European Commission commissioned study of the costs and benefits of 
reconciliation measures (to read the report, see the appendices of 
European Commission, 2008a). The study categorised the EU’s member 
states according to the main characteristics of their maternity leave 
schemes and their type of welfare scheme. Cowi/Idea Consult then 
selected eight member states (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, France, 
Hungary, Poland, and the UK), considered to be representative of the 27 
member states, to evaluate the costs and benefits of revising the existing 
maternity leave provisions. Table 6.2 lists the costs and benefits 
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mentioned in the Cowi/Idea Consult study as well as in the European 
Commission’s impact assessment.  
 
Table 6.2: Cost/benefit analysis 
 
Level Costs Benefits 
Society  Adjustment costs 
 Tax distortion 
 Improved female economic 
independence 
 Increase in women’s labour 
market participation 
 Enhanced gender  equality in 
family  patterns 
 Improved child health 
(likely) 
 Higher fertility rate  (likely) 
Government 
budget 
 Increased compensation  
payment 
 Short-term lower tax    
income  
 Long term higher tax income 
due to increased female 
labour market participation 
(likely) 
Employer  Increased employer 
compensation payment 
from leave schemes 
 Training costs for       
replacement staff  
 Temporary production 
loss unless the  
beneficiary is replaced by 
another person in her job 
 Increased female labour   
market participation    
(likely) 
 
Female 
employees 
 Risk of discrimination 
against women as 
employers may be 
discouraged to higher    
young women (argument 
used by business). 
 Increased financial 
independence of women 
through income security 
 Lower childcare costs for the 
family and/or for society as a 
whole. 
 Longer periods of breast 
feeding (likely) 
 More family quality          
time 
 Improved parent health 
(likely) 
 
Source: Adapted from European Commission’s impact assessment, European 
Commission (2008a, p. 83) 
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It should be noted that costs in a welfare-political cost-benefit analysis 
are more easily calculated than benefits, as it is difficult to assess the 
benefits in a quantitative way (European Commission, 2008a, p. 84).  
This may obscure other less tangible benefits, such as health effects, cost 
savings of childcare for the number of added weeks, and financial 
independence of women. Indeed, Dutch Green MEP Marije Cornelissen 
called attention to this during an EP debate by saying that ‘costs come 
with nice clean figures, while benefits do not’ (European Parliament, 
2010c). Some of the costs and benefits listed in the table are subject to 
significant disagreement. For example, while centre-right governments 
and employers voice concern about the draft legislation’s possible impact 
on women’s employment opportunities, social NGOs argue that 
extending maternity leave length and pay does not curtail women’s 
chances in the labour market. Rather, social NGOs highlight that it is 
easier for businesses to find a replacement for six month than for a 
shorter period, and that those countries with the longest maternity leaves 
also have the highest female employment rates (such as Denmark and 
Sweden).  
There are two main types of cost related to maternity leave: the 
allowance paid to women on maternity leave and the cost of replacing 
her. Employers face the costs of hiring and training a temporary 
replacement for the worker and temporary decrease in productivity 
(European Commission, 2008a, pp. 32-33). The extent to which the costs 
of increasing maternity leave length and pay depend on the degree to 
which this financed by the state and/or employers. Most countries have a 
mixed contribution scheme in which maternity allowance is financed by 
contributions from employers and employees, as well as taxes and state 
subsidies. The socio-economic costs arising from the European 
Commission’s proposal are estimated to be low, compromising some 
adjustment costs and minor tax distortions needed to cover maternity 
leave pay. These additional costs are estimated to vary from 0.006% of 
GDP in Hungary to 0.05% of GDP in Belgium, and in absolute terms, 
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from €9196 million in France to €101 million in Hungary (European 
Commission, 2008a, p. 32). As shown in appendix 3, many member 
states already pay women 80% to 100% of their average earnings during 
maternity leave, and several member states provide for a maternity leave 
period of 18 weeks or longer. Figure 6.1 shows that most of the eight 
countries included in the Cowi/Idea Consult study have maternity leave 
provisions that are at the same level or above the 18 weeks proposed by 
the European Commission. In fact, only Belgium, France, and Spain 
would be required to extend the length of their maternity leave if the 
European Commission’s proposal is adopted. Remuneration during 
maternity leave is generally fairly high, although both Hungary and the 
UK will have to raise their pay levels considerably (European 
Commission, 2008a, p. 85). No changes are required in Estonia and 
Poland, who fully comply with the provisions proposed by the European 
Commission.  
 
Figure 6.1: Maternity leave provisions in eight EU member states 
 
Source: European Commission (2008a, p. 85). 
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The benefits of strengthened EU maternity leave provisions are manifold, 
although they are difficult to quantify. Benefits include improved 
financial independence of women through income security, enhanced 
gender equality in family patterns122, higher fertility rate as women can 
afford to have children, and possibly result in longer periods of breast-
feeding which will in turn increase protection against many illnesses and 
lower costs to public health services123. Furthermore, the European 
Commission’s suggestion to strengthen women’s right to ask for flexible 
working time upon returning from maternity leave could ease women’s 
return to employment and possibly reduce the need to take other forms 
of leave, such as parental leave. These flexibility measures include the 
possibility to work-part, or full time but with a different distribution of 
hours. Flexible working patterns are also beneficial for companies as it is 
likely to result in less stress and absenteeism among employees, and 
stress-related absenteeism is often a major cost for companies.   
 As mentioned earlier, the costs arising from the European 
Commission’s proposal will be financed either by employers and/or by 
the state (i.e. tax payers) depending on the national welfare system in 
place. This raises the question of whether the costs of strengthening 
existing maternity leave provisions are concentrated on a well-delineated 
constituency, or widely dispersed on tax-payers in general. The answer to 
this question depends on the country in question. In Germany, Malta, 
and the UK - where maternity leave pay is financed by the employer - the 
costs are concentrated on the employer. Contrary to this, in countries 
                                                 
122 The limited compensation paid to women on maternity leave in the UK puts single 
mothers in an extremely disadvantaged position. With only one income, it is very 
expensive for single mothers to keep afloat financially during their maternity leave 
period. On top of this are the exorbitant costs of having your child in full-time childcare 
in the UK. The expensive childcare facilities in the UK are one of the reasons why the 
UK has the highest proportion of women working part-time in the EU. Part-time 
working has proven to have a negative effect on women’s salary, promotion, and career 
prospect (European Commission, 2008a, p.33).  
123 These include: allergies, asthma, cardiovascular disease, coeliac disease, sepsis, 
sudden infant death syndrome, diabetes, breast and ovarian cancer, gastrointestinal 
infection, necrotising enterocolitis, lower respiratory tract infection, acute otitis media 
(Unicef UK, 2012).   
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where maternity leave is primarily financed through taxes (such as 
Austria, Denmark, and Romania), the costs are widely dispersed. For 
analytical purposes, I have chosen to classify the proposal for a revised 
maternity leave directive as a case of entrepreneurial politics, in which 
the costs are concentrated on employers’ associations, and the benefits 
widely distributed to all female employees. In such a scenario, the general 
expectation from the interest group literature is for opponents to have 
strong incentives to block the directive and for beneficiaries to have few 
incentives to press for its enactment. Policy will be blocked by the vested 
interests that benefit from status quo, unless a policy entrepreneur can 
galvanise support by associating the policy’s benefit with the common 
good (Wilson, 1974).  
 It should be noted that labour unions can be regarded as 
representing both specific and diffuse interests depending on the specific 
interests being defended. Labour unions and employers’ associations are 
often seen as a specific interests with concentrates stakes in policy issues 
due to their status as formal social partners with institutionalised 
corporatist access to the policy-making process in the EU and in many 
member states. Employers and employees represent socio-economic 
groups possessing a clear stake in the policy making process. However, 
the categorisation of labour unions as representing either a diffuse or a 
specific cause depends on the type of interest represented. When 
defending interests of sectoral labour unions – such as the ETF 
(European Transport Workers’ Federation) and the European Federation 
of Metalworkers - labour unions represent a specific interest. When 
defending the rights of workers across all sectors - such as maternity 
leave provisions for all employees– labour unions constitute a diffuse 
interest.  
 Although social NGOs (such as the European Women’s Lobby, 
EWL) and the ETUC are both regarded as defending diffuse interests on 
the maternity leave directive, their status within the EU decision-making 
process, resources, and substantive policy interests differ. Interest 
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organisations belonging to the same category do not necessarily share 
substantive policy interests or organisational characteristics. The 
differences between diffuse and specific interests are primarily meant to 
conceptualise whether organisational goals are linked to a specific or 
diffuse constituency. The distinction between diffuse and specific 
interests relates to how organisational goals are linked to constituencies. 
Specific interests pursue goals linked to well-delineated constituencies, 
whereas diffuse interests defend interests benefitting large segments of 
society. On the maternity leave directive, the ETUC aims to realise 
benefits that are not confined to their members only. Improved maternity 
leave provisions accrue for all female employees whether they have 
contributed to its realisation or not. ‘Women’ or even ‘working women’ 
do not comprise a specific interest akin to, for example, sectoral workers 
in the transport sector or producers of the automobile industry. Instead, 
interests defended by the ETUC on the maternity leave directive 
approximates to a public good in that it is non-excludable, albeit 
excluding men, and unrivalrous (one person’s use does not deplete the 
availability of the good for others). 
The categorisation of the ETUC as representing a diffuse interest 
on the maternity leave directive does not mean that the ETUC is 
necessarily worse off in influencing EU decision-making compared with 
European employers’ associations. Both BusinessEurope and the ETUC 
have similar numbers of staff employed in their Brussels secretariats 
(approximately 50 members of staff), and together with the European 
Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation (CEEP) they hold a 
privileged position as EU social partners. Their role as social partners 
makes them significantly better positioned to influence EU policy making 
compared with interest groups (such as social NGOs) who do not enjoy 
institutionalised access to decision-makers in social and employment 
affairs. Under the social dialogue procedure, the social partners act as co-
legislators who may negotiate agreements which, if an agreement can be 
found, translate into a collectively binding EU legislation. In contrast to 
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other policy areas, the European Commission holds a legal (treaty) 
obligation to consult the social partners twice within the policy area of 
employment and social affairs before adopting a proposal. On the 
maternity leave directive, the social partners decided not to deal with the 
dossier in the context of the social dialogue because their views were too 
far apart to find agreement.  
 
6.2. The interest group arena 
 
The revision of the maternity leave directive attracted a large number of 
interest groups: national and European employers’ associations and 
labour unions, European social NGOs, and national governments. The 
positions on the European Commission’s proposal range from employers’ 
associations (supported by the governments of the UK, Malta and 
Germany) supporting the status quo through to the ETUC wanting to 
improve the health and safety dimension of the directive to social NGOs 
advocating longer leave and mandatory full pay. Table 6.3 presents the 
position of employers’ associations, labour unions and social NGOs on 
key provisions of the European Commission’s proposal. 
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Table 6.3: Positions of interest groups 
  
Interest  
Group 
Employers’ 
 associations 
Labour Unions  Social NGOs 
Legal basis Only article 137 Both articles 137   
 and 141 
Both articles 137    
and 141 
 
Target  
Group 
Status quo Status quo +  
domestic workers 
Status quo + all  
women regardless of  
their professional  
status (such as  
students, self- 
employed, assisting 
spouses and domestic 
workers) 
 
Maternity  
leave 
length 
Status quo  
(14 weeks) 
18 weeks  24 weeks + eligibility 
criterion 
Pay Status quo (not  
below sick-leave) 
100 per cent, but 
only relating to 
18 weeks 
 
100 per cent 
Dismissal 
prohibition 
Status quo (not  
during  the 
maternity leave 
period) 
 
Six months after 
returning to work 
One year after 
returning  
to work 
Health and  
Safety 
No position Preventive  
Approach 
 
No position 
Paternity Exclude Exclude  Two weeks on full pay 
 
Source: BusinessEurope (2008); ETUC (2009); EWL (2009); Social Platform 
(2010). 
 
As can be seen from table 6.3, employers’ associations (such as 
BusinessEurope), SMEs (such as UEAPME and the British Federation of 
Small Businesses, FSB), and a number of governments (particularly those 
of Germany and the UK) are opposed to the European Commission’s 
proposal to revise the existing 1992 directive because they find existing 
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rules sufficient to secure the health and safety of female employees. They 
contend that the proposal, if implemented, would risk damaging public 
finances and SMEs’ budgets, as well as discouraging companies from 
employing young women. A representative from UEAPME explained that 
‘the reaction to this is that we [employers] don’t want to employ young 
women anymore. We all know it’s illegal, but this will in practise be the 
result, especially for SMEs’.124 In a similar vein, a representative from the 
British FSB argued that: 
 
It is easier for large businesses to cope [with employees going 
on maternity leave] as they have large human resource 
departments and larger number of staff. But, if you run a small 
business, it is very expensive to have your employees on 
maternity leave.125  
 
Rather than longer maternity leave provisions, employers’ associations 
called for a broader approach on work-life balance combining other 
forms of leave, affordable childcare facilities and flexible working 
arrangements. Employers warned that the proposed changes would be 
too costly during the economic downturn. All employers’ associations 
agreed that maternity leave provisions and pay should be determined at 
the national and not the European level, due to member states complex 
mix of different leave arrangements. The position of employers’ 
associations was supported by the British government, which is 
vehemently opposed to the European Commission’s proposal mainly 
because the UK has a very long period of maternity leave, but at a very 
low level of pay. Hence, introducing 18 or 20 weeks of maternity leave on 
full pay would be very costly for British employers. BusinessEurope 
provided MEPs with figures, provided by their members, showing the 
costs imposed on employers in each EU member state if the European 
Commission’s proposal is adopted.  
                                                 
124
 Interview UEAPME, 8 April 2010 
125
 Interview, UEAPME, 8 April 2010 
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Contrary to employers’ associations, labour unions (such as the 
ETUC) and social NGOs (such as the EWL and the Social Platform) 
welcomed the European Commission’s proposal for a revised maternity 
leave directive. Among social NGOs, mainly the EWL and the Social 
Platform were actively lobbying on the maternity leave directive in terms 
of meeting with MEPs and following the process closely. The EWL seeks 
to promote gender equality in all spheres of public and private life. It is 
one of the oldest and best established NGOs in Brussels, comprising more 
than 2500 organisations across 30 European countries. It was founded in 
1990 ‘from a coalition of traditional and radical feminist groups’ 
(Greenwood, 2011, p. 168), and has since 1995 been a member of the 
Social Platform (an alliance of 39 European NGOs active in the social 
sector). The ETUC is also a member of the EWL, enjoying the status as a 
European member association together with 20 other European and 
international networks126. The ETUC and social NGOs welcomed the 
European Commission’s proposal, although they thought the proposal 
could be strengthened in a number of areas. The ETUC wanted to 
strengthen the proposal’s health and safety dimension and women’s 
rights concerning breast-feeding. The ETUC found that three problems, 
in particular regarding the proposal’s preventive health and safety 
measures, needed to be addressed:  
 
 Currently there is no obligation on the part of the employer to 
consider reproductive risks in the workplace in general, but only 
an obligation to assess the risks as soon as an employee informs 
her employer that she is pregnant. Pregnancy is usually notified to 
the employer between week seven and ten of a woman’s 
pregnancy, but the greatest risk of foetal defects is during the first 
weeks of pregnancy. Thus, taking precautions after notification is 
often too late.  
                                                 
126 For a full list see EWL website at 
http://www.womenlobby.org/spip.php?rubrique67&lang=en (accessed 7 June 2012) 
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 The directive obliges employers to adopt preventive measures 
based on a risk assessment, but there is no obligation to establish a 
hierarchy of actions such as first attempting to eliminate the risk, 
and only in the last instance remove a pregnant employee from the 
workplace by sending her on leave. 
 The directive does not provide for workers’ representative bodies 
to be consulted on preventive measures (ETUC, 2009). 
The absence of the above provisions in the directive was argued to lead to 
a situation where pregnant employees were regarded as individuals in an 
abnormal situation instead of treating the protection of pregnant workers 
as an issue of collective health and safety in the workplace. The ETUC 
called on the EP to take the above measures into account. Another key 
point for the ETUC is to widen maternity protection to any type of 
employment contract, including domestic work (ETUC, 2008). As can be 
seen from table 6.3, the ETUC supports maternity leave of at least 18 
months that ensures payment of women’s full salaries or equivalent to 
100 per cent of the last monthly salary, to ensure that women are not 
suffering from any disadvantage because of pregnancy (ETUC, 2009). 
They argued that ‘the lack of strong guarantees about payment during 
maternity leave can have the negative consequence that women with the 
lowest incomes voluntarily renounce taking the leave to maintain their 
salaries’ (ETUC, 2008, pp. 8-9). Social NGOs shared the ETUC’s position 
to provide full pay for the entire duration of the maternity leave in order 
not to penalise financially women for having children, and to address the 
wider issues of gender pay gap. However, social NGOs wanted to go even 
further, most notably by supporting: 
 
 24 weeks maternity leave to give women who have recently given 
birth the opportunity to breastfeed for a continuous period of six 
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month as recommended by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO);  
 The removal of any eligibility criteria to give all women the same 
entitlement to paid maternity leave at least (as a minimum) during 
the six compulsory weeks of leave as proposed in the revised 
directive. Currently, only employees who have previously 
accumulated a number of days work (i.e. contributed to the social 
security systems) prior to their pregnancy are eligible to benefit 
from the provisions in directive. Eligibility conditions to benefit 
from maternity leave provisions differ between member states, 
which poses a difficulty for women moving country, on short term 
contracts, and women not directly active in the labour market 
(such as students);  
 One year protection of dismissal following the end of pregnancy 
(EWL, 2008; Social Platform, 2009, 2010).  
 
Unlike the ETUC, Social NGOs did not take a view on the health and 
safety at work and lobbied for 24 instead of the ETUC’s 18 weeks of 
maternity leave. Social NGOs and the ETUC did not form any formal 
lobbying coalition. Instead, they lobbied separately but would make 
MEPs aware of that they shared views with each other on the issue of full 
pay. On the contrary, European employers’ associations did not pool their 
resources, but lobbied individually. 
 Both Social NGOs and the European employers’ associations 
appeared to opt for a stronger position in the beginning of the EP’s policy 
process to put pressure on MEPs, while moderating their demands later 
in the process. The EWL, for instance, went from supporting a maternity 
leave period of 24 weeks to 20 weeks. While they genuinely would have 
liked to see 24 weeks in final legislation, they knew that it was unlikely to 
garner support in the EP. When it became apparent that the EP was not 
going to opt for 24 weeks, they chose to adapt their position paper and 
245 
 
show that their support for the FEMM committee report, which 
recommended 20 weeks maternity leave. Similarly, while all European 
employers’ associations officially opposed the European Commission’s 
proposal, representatives from BusinessEurope, EuroCommerce, and 
UEAPME said that they could live with the European Commission’s 
proposal. Indeed, as one interviewee from EuroCommerce confirmed:  
 
One thing is what we fight for in the first reading, another 
thing is what we do in the second reading. To be honest with 
you, we take an extreme position now [day dream interest] but 
will soften up later [compromise position].127  
 
The above quote shows the importance of distinguishing between interest 
groups’ day dreams (ideal outcome), night-mares (worst case scenario) 
and bottom-line position (compromise position) (Van Schendelen, 2010, 
p. 384). As discussed in Chapter 3, interest groups may have good 
reasons to exaggerate their demands to push things in a certain direction, 
especially during the EP’s first reading when new amendments can be 
introduced to the Commission’s proposal. As seen in chapter 1, new 
amendments cannot be introduced in the EP’s second reading and, 
therefore, lobbying in the EP’s second reading is about making sure that 
what was won in the first reading is not lost in the second reading. 
Similarly, the EU institutions might take a more extreme position in 
order to have something to give in during the inter-institutional 
negotiations. Generally, most interviewees thought that the European 
Commission’s proposal steered a middle course between opposing views, 
and constituted a reasonable basis for negotiations. As an interviewee 
from the British FSB remarked: 
 
In general, we are relatively happy with what comes out of the 
European Commission. Our concern is that when these issues 
get to the EP then what was very sensible from the European 
Commission is suddenly changed beyond all recognition. That 
                                                 
127
 Interview, EuroCommerce, 7 April 2010 
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is a wider issue we are working on to make sure that when 
Parliament makes significant amendments that really alters 
the legislation that they must carry out impact assessments as 
well .128  
 
Similar to the interviewee above, most 49 interviewees (except social 
NGOs and the rapporteur herself) thought that the European 
Commission’s ‘legislative pragmatism’ on the proposal for a revised 
maternity leave directive went out the window once the proposal was put 
forward to the EP.  
 
6.3 The EP policy process   
 
The European Commission’s proposal for a revised maternity leave 
directive passed through a long and bumpy journey in the EP, including 
two parliamentary periods and three plenary vote postponements. The 
Commission’s proposal for a revised maternity leave directive was put to 
the EP in early October 2o08. There was significant dispute in the 
Conference of Committee Chairs129 (collectively representing the EP’s 
committee chairs) on whether to allocate the report to the FEMM 
committee or the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) 
as the responsible committee. It is the responsibility of the Conference of 
Committee Chairs to decide which committee should take the lead on a 
dossier, and which committee(s) should be given opinion-giving or 
associate status. It is not uncommon that ‘different interpretations on 
bordering competences often cause clashes between FEMM (gender 
mainstreaming) and EMPL (social and employment policies)’  (European 
                                                 
128
 Interview, FSB, 12 July 2010 
129
 The Conference of Committee Chairs is a supporting body to the EP’s Bureau and the 
Conference of Presidents. It convenes once a month to review progress of work in 
committees and make recommendations to the Conference of Presidents (consisting of 
the EP President and the chairmen of the political groups). The Conference of 
Committee Chairs also settles demarcation disputes between committees if a 
Commission proposal falls within the remit of several committees (for more see Corbett 
et al 2008: 123-4).  
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Parliament, 2009g, p. 14) as to who should take the lead on a dossier  
Most often these conflicts result in EMPL obtaining the lead and FEMM 
being assigned the role as opinion-giving committee. However, on the 
maternity leave directive, FEMM obtained the lead, while EMPL was 
given associate committee status following the enhanced Hughes 
procedure (see Chapter 1 for more information about this procedure). In 
FEMM, Portuguese socialist MEP Edite Estrela was appointed the role as 
rapporteur, and Romanian socialist MEP Rovana Plumb as rapporteur in 
EMPL. Many interviewees thought FEMM was assigned the role as lead 
committee for the wrong reasons: 
 
In terms of content, it was evident that it should have gone to 
EMPL, but as FEMM didn’t have any legislative files in the last 
parliamentary period, they pushed for being the lead 
committee […] a committee like FEMM never gets a legislative 
directive. Suddenly just before the last term they got the 
maternity leave directive. It was for the wrong reasons that 
they got this dossier. FEMM members are not as experienced, 
and they are not the heavy-weights of the EP. [Because of this] 
the FEMM secretariat is less aware of a committee secretariat’s 
strategic role in building compromises both within the house 
and with the Council.130   
 
FEMM has only been responsible for four legislative dossiers in the 
current EP period as it usually deals with non-legislative files (such as 
own-initiative reports). FEMM is a so-called neutralised committee, 
which means that a full FEMM member can also be a full member of 
another parliamentary committee and a substitute member of a third. 
Most MEPs are only full members of one committee and serve as 
substitutes for up to two committees. Some committees are, however, 
given neutralised status which, due to their technical focus (such as the 
Petitions committee), or specialised remit (such as FEMM), would have 
difficulties in attracting members if MEPs were not allowed to be full 
members of another committee (Judge & Earnshaw, 2008, pp. 171-172).  
                                                 
130
 Interview, EMPL policy advisor, 22 October 2010 
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6.3.1 The committee deliberations 
 
On 23 April 2009, the FEMM committee voted for minimum maternity 
leave to be extended from 14 to 20 weeks, and be fully paid. The final 
committee report introduced a number of controversial changes to the 
European Commission’s proposal, most notably: 
 
 Extending the length of the maternity leave to 20 weeks, six of 
which must be taken immediately after childbirth. 
 Paying workers on maternity leave their full salary during the 
compulsory period of six weeks, and 85 per cent during the 
remaining period regardless of the number of days worked prior to 
confinement (commonly referred to as the eligibility criterion).  
 Introducing a new clause on compulsory paternity leave of two 
weeks non-transferable fully paid paternity (so far, there is no EU 
legislation on paternity leave). 
 Allowing women with children time off for breastfeeding: mothers 
who are breastfeeding their child, but have returned to work, shall 
be entitled to two daily breaks to breastfeed, each of which shall be 
of 30 minutes, without losing any privileges connected to her 
employment (European Parliament, 2009d). 
 
The report, furthermore, included provisions on night work, rights for 
parents adopting children, rights for mothers with disabilities, health and 
safety provisions, and the right of women to return to their job or to an 
equivalent post with same pay, duties and professional category as 
before. Throughout the FEMM policy process it could be observed that 
the rapporteur changed her position on key aspects of the European 
Commission’s proposal. Committee scrutiny of a dossier often starts off 
with the rapporteur writing a short working document of five to six pages 
stating his/her initial position of the dossier before writing the draft 
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report. In Edite Estrela’s working document of 22 January 2009, she 
stated that she endorsed the European Commission’s proposal to 
recommend (not oblige) employers to pay women on maternity leave 
their full salary. The duration of maternity leave was unspecified, and the 
inclusion of domestic workers in the target group was not mentioned. 
Table 6.4 shows the policy changes to the European Commission’s 
proposal throughout the committee scrutiny in FEMM in the sixth 
parliamentary term. 
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Table 6.4: Key FEMM changes to the European Commission’s proposal in 
the sixth parliamentary term 
 
Key  
provisions 
Working 
document 
 (Jan 2009) 
Draft report   
 (Feb 2009) 
Report                               
(April 2009) 
Target  
Group 
Status quo  Status quo +  
domestic workers 
Status quo + 
domestic  
and self-employed  
workers 
Maternity    
leave 
length 
Unspecified 20 weeks, 8 of 
which are  
compulsory after 
childbirth +  
eligibility criterion 
20weeks, 6 of which 
are compulsory after 
childbirth + 
eligibility criterion 
Pay Endorses the 
European 
Commission’s     
proposal 
Payment should be 
full salary with no 
less than 80% of 
average monthly 
salary. 
Payment must be 
100% during the 6 
compulsory weeks 
after childbirth, and 
85% during the 
remaining period. 
Dismissal 
prohibition 
From the 
beginning 
of pregnancy to 
1 year after 
maternity leave 
From the  
beginning of  
pregnancy to 1 year 
after maternity 
leave 
From the beginning 
of pregnancy to 6 
months after 
maternity leave 
Health and 
safety 
Unspecified Preventive 
approach 
Preventive approach 
Paternity Mentioned but 
unspecified 
2 weeks compulsory 
fully paid leave 
2 weeks compulsory 
fully paid leave for 
fathers and life-
partners 
Breast- 
feeding 
Mentioned but 
unspecified 
Entitled to one  
hour per day 
Entitled to one hour  
per day 
 
Source: European Parliament (2009b, 2009d, 2009f). 
 
As can be seen from table 6.4, the draft report following the working 
document introduced very specific amendments on pay, maternity 
length, health and safety at work, and target group that had not 
previously been included. While the rapporteur’s mind-change on key 
provisions might be due to a greater familiarity with the issue, many of 
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the amendments were identical to those put forward by the EWL and 
ETUC. Both the ETUC and the EWL had close contact with the 
rapporteur in the period in between the working document and the first 
draft report. As a representative from EWL expressed, ‘we had many 
meetings with Estrela and her assistant, and they took many of our 
concerns on-board’.131 This suggests that both the EWL and the ETUC 
managed to influence the rapporteur’s position on key aspects of the 
proposal, a point returned to later in this chapter. It also shows that the 
rapporteur did not hold a strong view on the dossier from the outset.  
6.3.2 The bumpy road to the EP’s plenary vote 
 
The FEMM report provoked lively debate in the EP and the Council as 
both MEPs and member states views differ widely. This has resulted in 
the EP’s plenary vote on the report being postponed three times. The first 
time was when the first FEMM report (of 23 April 2009) was put to a 
plenary vote on 6 May 2009. Instead of voting on the report, a majority of 
MEPs decided to refer it back to the committee for renewed scrutiny. The 
amendment which suggested that the report should be referred back to 
the committee was put forward verbally by Astrid Lulling on behalf of her 
group, the EPP. According to Astrid Lulling, the EPP did not block the 
report, but simply saved the EPP from looking too ridiculous as she 
thought Estrela’s report was going for a ‘first class funeral’.132 According 
to all 49 interviewees, the decision to refer the report back to the FEMM 
committee was compounded by three interrelated considerations: 
 
 Centre-right MEPs did not want to touch upon the sensitive issue 
of maternity leave provisions ahead of EP elections in June 2009 
as, one interviewee said: ‘the improvement of women’s maternity 
                                                 
131 Interview, EWL, 6 April 2010 
132 Meeting observation between European employers’ association and MEP, 1 June 
2010 
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leave rights is an ugly thing to vote against, especially just before 
an election’.133   
 MEPs were under intense lobbying pressure from employers’ 
associations and several member states to reject the FEMM report. 
 The centre-right was not sure to have a simple majority at the 
plenary against the FEMM report, and therefore delaying the vote 
was seen as the only way to avoid the adoption of the report.  
 
One EMPL committee administrator explained how MEPs and policy 
advisors were, ‘overwhelmed with lobbying from employers and 
members states prior to the plenary vote […] I think the lobbying letters 
from BusinessEurope had an impact [on the EP’s decision to refer the 
report back to FEMM]’.134 In the days preceding the plenary vote several 
European employers’ associations met with MEPs and sent lobbying 
letters to MEPs urging them to either reject or not vote on the FEMM 
report. The quote below shows an extract of a lobbying letter sent to 
MEPs by EuroCommerce on 4 May 2009 – two days before the scheduled 
plenary vote: 
 
EuroCommerce is concerned about the FEMM committee’s 
report on the maternity leave directive […] We still believe that 
the minimum standards which are laid down in Directive 
92/85/ECC are sufficient […] From EuroCommerce’s point of 
view, the FEMM committee’s report is single-sided and 
counterproductive. Therefore, EuroCommerce would like to 
encourage you not to vote for the FEMM report 
(EuroCommerce, 2009). 
 
All 49 interviewees thought that the FEMM report would have been voted 
upon at plenary was it not for the intense lobbying pressure from 
employers’ associations and certain member states (particularly the UK 
and Germany), and the 2009 EP elections looming ahead. The referral 
                                                 
133 Interview, BusinessEurope, 9 November 2010 
134 Interview, EMPL committee administrator, 22 October 2010 
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back of the report to FEMM did not, however, change the main content of 
the report. In September 2010, FEMM restarted its scrutiny of the 
European Commission’s proposal, with the same rapporteur in charge. 
As can be seen from table 6.5, the committee agreed on an almost 
identical report to the one adopted in the previous parliamentary term. 
There were minor differences regarding maternity leave remuneration, 
paternity leave, and a reference to co-maternity leave. Regarding 
payment, a so-called passerelle clause was inserted in the FEMM report 
(in the seventh parliamentary term) stating that when family-related 
leave (such as parental leave) is available at national level, the last four 
weeks of the twenty may qualify as maternity leave. Paternity leave was 
changed from being compulsory to an entitlement fathers can, if they 
wish, avail themselves of. Lastly, a reference to co-maternity leave (the 
right of same-sex partners of pregnant women to take leave) was deleted 
in the FEMM report. 
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Table 6.5: Key FEMM changes to the European Commission’s proposal in the 
seventh parliamentary term 
 
 
Source: European Parliament (2009e, 2010e, 2010i) 
Key 
provisions 
Draft report  
(Nov 2009) 
Report                   
(March 2010) 
Plenary outcome 
(Oct 2010) 
Target group Status quo + 
domestic  a self-
employed 
workers 
Status quo +  
domestic a self- 
employed workers 
Status quo +  
domestic workers 
Maternity  
leave length 
Twenty weeks, six 
of which are 
compulsory after 
childbirth + 
eligibility 
criterion 
Twenty weeks, six 
of which are 
compulsory after 
childbirth + 
eligibility criterion 
Twenty weeks, 6 of   
which are 
compulsory after 
childbirth +  
eligibility criterion 
Pay Payment must be 
100 per cent 
during the six  
compulsory 
weeks after 
childbirth, and 85 
per cent during 
the remaining 
period 
Payment shall be 
100per cent during 
twenty weeks. 
 
When family-
related leave is 
available at 
national level, the 
last four weeks of 
the twenty may 
qualify as 
maternity leave 
Payment shall be 
100per cent during 
twenty weeks 
 
When family- 
related leave is 
available at  
national level, the 
last four weeks of 
the twenty may 
qualify as 
maternity leave 
 
Dismissal  
prohibition 
From the 
beginning of 
pregnancy to one  
year after 
maternity leave 
From the 
beginning  
of pregnancy to six 
months after  
maternity leave 
From the  
beginning of 
pregnancy to six  
months after  
maternity leave 
Health and 
safety 
Preventive 
approach 
Preventive 
approach 
Preventive  
approach 
Paternity Two weeks (non- 
compulsory) fully 
paid leave for 
both fathers and 
life-partners  
Two weeks (non-
compulsory) fully 
paid leave for 
fathers 
Two weeks paid 
leave (non-
compulsory) 
Breastfeeding Entitled to two 
hours per day 
Entitled to two 
hours per day 
Entitled to two 
hours per day 
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Following FEMM’s minor changes to its previous committee report, a 
new plenary vote was scheduled to take place in March 2010. However, 
this was blocked again – this time by a British ECR MEP, Marina 
Yannakoudakis. Marina Yannakoudakis suggested to have an impact 
assessment conducted, evaluating the costs and benefits of the FEMM 
amendments. A request for an impact assessment examining the costs 
and benefits of EP amendments is allowed under the EU’s inter-
institutional agreement on better law-making. The same week as the ECR 
put forward a request for an impact assessment, it could be read on the 
FSB’s (a British SME) webpage, ‘following lobbying by the FSB, European 
Parliament plans to grant pregnant women twenty weeks of maternity 
leave on full pay have been shelved pending on a full impact assessment’ 
(FSB, 2010a) 
 When interviewing MEP Marina Yannakoudakis about how she 
got the idea to propose an impact assessment, she replied, ‘someone 
suggested it to me. I can’t remember who. I have spoken to so many 
[interest] groups’.135 A representative from the FSB explained that ‘I don’t 
know if we had a direct impact on Mrs Yannakoudakis decision to 
propose an impact assessment, but following a meeting with her, where 
we raised the idea of an impact assessment, she put forward the proposal 
to have an impact assessment conducted’.136 The impetus for an impact 
assessment was compounded by lobbying pressure from employers’ 
associations and a general British interest in avoiding a vote on the 
dossier prior to the British general election on 6 May 2010. As one 
interviewee explained, both British Conservative and Labour MEPs ‘were 
quite happy to hold this [the plenary vote] off a bit because of the 
upcoming British general election […] The British government was 
lobbing [MEPs] very hard before the election’.137  
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 The EP’s impact assessment was outsourced to the Danish 
consultancy company Rambøll, which was in charge of assessing the 
social and economic costs and benefits of the amendments proposed by 
the FEMM and EMPL committees. A new plenary vote was scheduled for 
the maternity leave directive in July 2010, which was to follow 
immediately after the publication of the impact assessment. 
Unfortunately, the impact assessment was considered poor, and Rambøll 
was given extra time to improve it. Much to the disappointment of the 
ETUC, the plenary vote was postponed once again.  
 On 7 July 2010, the ETUC’s Confederal Secretary sent a letter to 
the political leaders of the EPP, S&D, ALDE, Greens/EFA, and GUE/NGL 
as well as FEMM and EMPL members in which it expressed serious 
concern about the continued stalling of the EP’s process of revising the 
maternity leave directive. The letter urged the heads of the political 
groups to do everything possible to promote a compromise in the EP 
along the lines of the ETUC’s position on the directive, and to promote 
the vote in plenary to take place at the earliest possible moment. The 
ETUC was not convinced that the current process, led by FEMM, would 
lead to a final text that could be supported by a majority in the EP and 
lead to a constructive negotiating process with the Council. This was – 
according to the ETUC – argued to be because FEMM sought to include 
issues that went beyond the scope of the current directive, such as 
paternity leave. Particularly, the ETUC feared that the revision of the 
directive would risk being stalled for several years because of FEMM’s 
attempt to address too many issues within the framework of one 
directive. Policy advisors from the ALDE and S&D groups thought: 
 
The impetus for the letter came from within the Parliament, 
someone, maybe from our group, asked the ETUC to send the 
letter. It was not a very nifty move. I’m absolutely sure that it 
came from the inside.138  
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The impact assessment was finally completed in September 2010, but 
according to all 17 interviewees working inside the EP, ‘the report didn't 
change anything as MEPs had already made up their minds’.139 Some 
MEPs opposed to the FEMM report were keen on avoiding a plenary vote 
of the FEMM report all together. In a meeting I observed between an 
MEP opposed to the FEMM report and an employer’s associations, the 
MEP discussed possible creative ways of avoiding a plenary vote of the 
FEMM report. As the MEP said during this meeting:  
 
We must try to be creative…maybe we can get the European 
Commission to withdraw its proposal… Talk to Viviane 
Reading [vice-president and European Commissioner 
responsible for justice, fundamental rights and citizenship], 
maybe she could make the European Commission withdraw its 
proposal. I am thinking of solutions. I am thinking of ways out 
of this. This must not come to plenary. MEPs might vote for it 
as they would have a fear that they would be blamed by their 
country. They will be too concerned. We must avoid getting it 
to plenary. Politicians are populists. We will not get an 
agreement with the Council on this report.140  
 
The ETUC’s pressure to speed up the process in the EP (or at least not 
further delay it), and employers’ associations attempts to delay the 
decision-making resonates with Van Schendelen’s observation that ‘those 
in a losing mood want to delay; those in a winning mood want to speed 
up’ (2010, p.159). 
6.3.3 The EP’s first reading outcome 
 
On 20 October 2010, FEMM’s report on the maternity leave directive was 
put forward to the plenary. Both inside and outside the EP, the possible 
outcome of the vote was impossible to predict prior to the vote. Usually, 
alliances between political groups are built before the vote and the 
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outcome known before plenary votes, but that was not the case of the 
maternity leave directive. At interview an EP policy advisor explained: 
 
Usually, we bet on the result and the winner gets a bottle of 
Champagne. We do this with key files, where we have 
undertaken a lot of lobbying. On the working time directive in 
road transport [see Chapter 6], we knew the evening before 
that we would win it, but on the maternity leave directive, we 
had no idea.141 
 
At plenary, MEPs voted to up the minimum duration of maternity leave 
to twenty weeks and require member states to ensure that women receive 
their full salary when on leave. The report was carried with 390 votes in 
favour, 192 against, and 59 abstentions. As can be seen from table 6.5, the 
EP adopted the following amendments: 
 
 Extending the scope of the directive to domestic workers 
 Entitling fathers to two weeks of non-transferable paid paternity 
leave 
 Prohibiting dismissal of female employees from the beginning of 
pregnancy to 6 months after maternity leave 
 Entitling women who are breastfeeding to two hours breaks per 
day designated for breastfeeding 
  
The EP’s legislative resolution (the policy outcome of the plenary) also 
included new provisions, most notably a more detailed account of the 
‘passerelle’ clause, stating that the last four weeks of the 20 may qualify 
as maternity leave and must be paid at least at 75 per cent of the salary. 
The passerelle clause was mainly seen as a solution for Germany (and as 
a way of getting German MEPs on-board). Table 6.6 shows the outcome 
of the final vote on 20 October 2010 at the plenary. Many MEPs voted 
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according to national lines, which most EP interviewees perceived as a 
result of lobbying pressure from national governments.  
 
Table 6.6: Vote on the legislative resolution  
Political Group For Against Abstention  Cohesion  
Scores  
ALDE 39 30 8 25.97% 
ECR 9 35 3 61.70% 
EFD 7 12 6 22% 
EPP 142 67 27 40.25% 
Greens/EFA 45 3 4 79.81% 
GUE/NGL 29 0 1 95% 
S&D 147 15 6 81.25% 
Source: Adapted from (VoteWatch, 2010a). 
 
Only 40.25 per cent of the EPP’s members toed the group line on the final 
vote. Likewise, ALDE was completely divided with only 25.97 per cent of 
its members voting according to the official group line. ALDE MEPs from 
Germany, Sweden and UK diverted from the group line because of 
pressure from their governments.142 The following national delegations 
diverted from the EPP group line: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. ALDE’s and 
the EPP’s official group lines were to support the final EP report as 
amended if the ‘passerelle clause’ was adopted. However, the large 
number of ALDE and EPP MEPs voting against the final EP report 
suggests that the intense lobbying from the governments of Germany, UK 
and Sweden had an impact on MEPs’ decision to divert from their EP 
group line.  S&D had one of the highest cohesion scores, although this 
does not imply that all of its members fervently supported the outcome. 
According to S&D interviewees, many members grudgingly supported the 
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rapporteur in order to display group cohesion. One British Labour MEP 
interviewed prior to the plenary vote felt that his delegation was left 
between a rock and a hard place: 
 
It’s extremely difficult for us. I think Edite Estrela’s position is 
too extreme. It will not win support in Council. But we as a 
group can’t be seen to be adopting a less progressive position 
than her. If she decides to be extreme, then the group will feel 
obliged to be extreme and follow her. Maybe I’m just becoming 
old; maybe I was more rebellious when I was younger. But I’m 
more realistic, and I’m more responsible as a legislator … We 
can’t play these games. We can’t be playing to the gallery, 
which is what Edite is doing. So I suspect what I will be 
recommending to my bureau this week and to the group next 
week is that, okay, we follow Edite’s line, and we go down in 
flames. We will be defeated. I will be uncomfortable with that, 
but it’s the only way forward in my view, politically.143  
 
S&D MEPs found themselves in a dilemma: if they voted with Estrela 
they would risk being defeated in plenary and by the Council, but if they 
diverted from the group line, they would break the norm of group 
discipline. While genuine disagreement existed within the S&D group, 
many S&D MEPs chose to toe their group line rather than following their 
own personal conviction. MEPs’ default behaviour in plenary is usually to 
follow the voting recommendations of their group (except in the case of 
fringe groups) and to adopt the committee report.  
The EP’s first reading position was met with scepticism both inside 
and outside the EU institutions. Outside the EU institutions, in the dense 
web of interest groups, employers’ associations and SMEs regretted that 
the EP had turned a deaf ear to their calls of not imposing extra costs on 
small employers in the present economic climate, and considered MEPs 
to be out of touch with the business reality. Employers also strongly 
opposed the inclusion of paternity leave within the scope of the maternity 
leave directive (UEAPME, 2010c). Social NGOs saw the outcome as ‘an 
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incredibly important victory for parents, both mothers and fathers’ 
(EurActiv, 24 February 2010), although they did not favour the adoption 
of the passerelle clause. Similarly, the ETUC welcomed stronger 
protection for pregnant workers and working mothers, although they did 
not support the inclusion of paternity leave within the scope of the 
maternity leave directive. In the Council, the EP’s first reading position 
was met with scepticism because many member states were concerned 
about the financial consequences of introducing twenty weeks of 
maternity leave on full pay. Given the diversity of maternity protection 
and social security systems across member states, as well as the financial 
implications, the majority of Council delegations considered 20 weeks on 
full pay unacceptable. The majority of member states considered the EP’s 
amendments to be too detailed to be included in the directive.  
 
6.4 The role and influence of lobbying  
 
The EP’s first reading position on the maternity leave directive did not 
reflect a compromise between opposing views. Although the passerelle 
clause provided some flexibility for German employers’ associations, 
employers’ associations were left disappointed. Three factors in 
particular account for employers’ associations’ limited ability to influence 
the EP’s first reading position:  they were faced with an ‘unfriendly’ 
lobbying arena; they adopted a reactive (as opposed to a proactive) 
lobbying strategy; and they took up a rather uncompromising position as 
they did not want to see any revision of the current 1992 directive.  
 Although employers’ associations exerted limited influence on the 
final outcome, they managed to influence the EP’s processing of the 
directive and the issues discussed. Firstly, employers’ associations appear 
to have had an impact on the numerous postponements of the plenary 
vote on the FEMM report. Secondly, lobbying restricted the number of 
issues discussed within Parliament. The question of how much women 
should be paid during maternity leave emerged as one of the most 
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controversial issues, not just in the EP, but also among governments and 
employers. This meant that other important issues got ‘suffocated’, such 
as provisions relating to night work and breast-feeding. For instance, the 
FEMM report and final plenary outcome included an amendment that 
would give women (returning to work after finished maternity leave) the 
right to request two hours break per day in order to breastfeed their 
babies. While this provision could be costly for employers, it did not 
attract attention from employers’ associations or member states. A 
FEMM policy advisor remarked at interview: 
 
The discussion over full pay ‘switched off many fuses’. When 
something big happens, you cannot think about anything else. 
The big issues were full pay for twenty weeks. Before member 
states and employers really started lobbying, the focus was 
much broader and also included issues such as paternity leave 
and night work. Member states started to panic, and the 
debate in an outside Parliament started to evolve around 
money [i.e. the costs of improving existing EU maternity leave 
provisions].144  
 
Lobbying played a key role in the issues being discussed, but, as one 
interviewee explained, ‘many MEPs also had an emotional attachment to 
the dossier and MEPs would often build their arguments around personal 
experiences’.145 The emotional attachment to the dossier could clearly be 
observed during committee meetings. During the FEMM vote on the 
report, MEPs from the Greens wore t-shirts saying ‘I like babies’. When 
voting upon the directive in plenary, a FEMM member brought her new-
born baby with her. Unlike very technical dossiers (such as the vans 
regulation), the maternity leave directive was highly politicised with a 
large number of MEPs being active in the EP debates.  
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6.4.1 Contextual factors: FEMM is an ideological committee 
 
Both inside and outside the EP, FEMM has acquired a reputation for 
being an ideological committee, whose views are often not representative 
of the EP as a whole. This reputation is earned mainly due to its 
composition (with only five male members out of 34 full FEMM 
members), and limited experience in dealing with legislative files. FEMM 
mainly deals with proposals subject to consultation. Interviewees 
generally portrayed FEMM as a committee that did not know the rules of 
the co-decision game. As highlighted in Chapter 3 (the vans regulation), 
the informal rules of the co-decision game entails anticipatory 
compliance’ on the part of the rapporteur by taking up a position 
constituting an appropriate starting point for negotiating with the 
Council. What is understood by ‘appropriate’ is, of course, subject to 
debate, but generally it involves steering a middle path and not taking up 
a position which is too extreme or stubborn. Most interviewees attributed 
the ‘bumpy’ EP policy process to inexperience on the part of FEMM in 
dealing with legislative files. The quote below provides an example of how 
most of the 49 interviewees described FEMM: 
 
They [FEMM MEPs] don’t realise that they are able to achieve 
things. They put too much into the pot, and therefore they are 
not taken seriously. FEMM members always have a secluded 
party among themselves, but it doesn’t work legislatively. They 
are too focused on women, and they have great difficulties 
seeing things from a different perspective.146  
 
Many interviewees expressed either disinterest or direct opposition to the 
committee. One policy advisor working on the EMPL committee thought 
it would be a demotion to be moved to the FEMM secretariat: 
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Everybody knows that if you a moved to FEMM you are ‘dead 
meat’ in the sense that nobody wants to go there. You get 
demoted if you are moved to FEMM. FEMM is one-sighted. 
The MEPs are there because they ‘believe’ […] that has a huge 
impact on who they listen to. It is the role of the FEMM 
committee to be feministic; it has become a real feminist 
committee.147 
  
Often interviewees would use condescending language when talking 
about FEMM. One Conservative MEP called FEMM MEPs ‘a bunch of 
feminists burning their bras’, and during a plenary debate a British MEP 
even went so far as to disparagingly portraying some FEMM members as 
‘lesbian man-haters’.148 Their descriptions show that FEMM is perceived 
as a committee whose preferences differ substantially from those of the 
overall parliament. Even interest groups supporting many of the 
provisions put forward by FEMM found FEMM’s position too optimistic, 
and unrealistic:   
 
FEMM is a playpen for very unserious discussions. They 
[FEMM MEPs] don’t think about getting this through the EP 
as a whole and to gather a majority on this issue. Estrela [the 
rapporteur] is just interested in importing the Portuguese 
model to the EU. FEMM has all the good intentions, but they 
don’t take this directive seriously. 149 
 
Similarly, a representative from a social NGO thought that they had been 
particularly influential in leaving their fingerprints on the FEMM report 
because the rapporteur supported their views from the outset: 
 
We [social NGOs] have been more successful in getting our 
views through in the EP than in the European Commission. 
The EP, especially Estrela, is living in an ideal world being 
more progressive, whereas the European Commission has 
been more pragmatic and taking into account member states’ 
views.150  
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Because the majority of FEMM MEPs are closer to the views of social 
NGOs than those of employers, FEMM provides a particularly fruitful 
lobbying arena for women’s rights organisations. Indeed, several 
interviewees from the European employers’ associations (such as 
BusinessEurope, UEAPME, and EuroCommerce) expressed a loss of hope 
in influencing the committee report when they saw that the dossier had 
gone to FEMM. In the words of a representative from UEAPME: 
 
When we saw the names of the rapporteurs in both the FEMM 
and the EMPL committees, we knew it was a lost call: two 
socialists from Portugal. It made it very difficult for employers 
to put through our arguments. MEPs in the EMPL committee 
are put in the world to defend employees – and MEPs in the 
FEMM committee to protect female workers.151   
 
The general perception of FEMM as a rather zealous committee has 
prompted employers’ associations to shift their lobbying focus away from 
the committee to the plenary. FEMM’s position on the maternity leave 
directive shows that some EP committees are less willing to engage in a 
process of anticipatory compliance. Due to FEMM’s uncompromising 
report in the sixth parliamentary term, the Council had decided to put its 
scrutiny of the proposal on hold until the EP had adopted a formal first 
reading position. This meant that the EP, European Commission, and the 
Council did not engage in an informal trialogue meeting prior to the EP’s 
first reading plenary vote in October 2010. The limited contact between 
the EP and the Council before the EP’s formal first reading position 
illustrates the controversy surrounding the dossier. 
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6.4.2 Proactive versus reactive lobbying strategies 
 
All the ten interviewed representatives from employers’ associations 
regard the majority of FEMM MEPs as being rather impervious to the 
views of employers’ associations. As one interviewee from UEAPME 
noted: 
 
Employers are always seen as the bad guys in both EMPL and 
FEMM. For FEMM and EMPL MEPS it is so obvious that 
they have to defend employees. Whatever employers propose, 
we are per definition seen as the bad guys. It is really difficult 
for us to influence FEMM MEPs, and that is why we are 
much more powerful in the plenary session.152  
 
Employers’ associations find it very difficult to influence the reports in 
FEMM and EMPL because they feel that MEPs from these committees 
tend to take up views closer to the EWL and the ETUC respectively. As 
observed in Chapter 5, employers’ associations’ perception of being an 
unwelcome guest in FEMM and EMPL has led them to divert their 
attention away from these committees to the plenary. Unlike the road 
transport working time directive (Chapter 5), employers’ associations 
were internally cohesive. But similar to the road transport working time 
directive, employers focused most of their lobbying on the plenary stage 
rather than the committee stage. As one social NGO representative noted: 
 
We never saw the business community being active at the 
committee stage, but before the plenary stage, they were 
active. I think they [employers’ associations] don’t view 
Parliament as a decisive decision-maker. They feel that they 
can always act at a later stage. They feel that they have 
enough strong arguments to kill it in the Council. 153 
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A representative from UEAPME explained why they had taken up a 
reactive lobbying strategy: 
 
Parliament is always the most difficult for us in the field of 
social affairs because we are always the bad guys. The MEPs 
have this feeling that they have the mandate to defend citizens, 
meaning to defend workers and women. MEPs sympathetic to 
workers’ rights are all concentrated in EMPL, and FEMM is 
the EWL’s [European Women’s Lobby] committee. Therefore 
we took up a more reactive, rather than proactive, lobbying 
strategy. We knew that we were not heard by members of the 
EMPL and the FEMM committees. This limits the number of 
MEPs we can reach and create an additional handicap.154  
 
Employers’ associations’ limited lobbying of the FEMM and EMPL 
committees compared to the EP’s plenary stage and the Council may be 
regarded as a rational strategy given the (perceived) constraints they are 
operating under in FEMM and EMPL. The ten interviewed employers’ 
associations did not find lobbying FEMM and EMPL resource-efficient 
because they thought they would stand a better chance of influencing the 
dossier at the EP’s plenary and in the Council. As argued by Culpepper 
(2011, p. 190), business groups often have little ability to be successful on 
highly salient issues. When faced with battles that business groups have 
few changes of winning, they may be better off conserving their resources 
to venues, where attention and lobbying may be less intense. The reactive 
lobbying strategy of employers’ associations on the maternity leave 
directive can be viewed as a rationale strategy of conserving ones 
resources to venues, where they stand a greater chance of exerting 
influence, such as the EP’s plenary and the Council. However, one FEMM 
policy advisor thought that employers’ reactive lobbying strategy towards 
the EP on employment and social affairs had led to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, in which FEMM MEPs took up even more extreme positions 
than might otherwise have been the case if they had been subject to more 
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symmetrical lobbying from employers’ associations, labour unions, and 
social NGOs.155 Contrary to employers, the ETUC and social NGOs 
lobbied MEPs as soon as the rapporteur was appointed, whereas 
employers’ associations were hardly active at the committee stage. 
However, once the final FEMM report was adopted, lobbying from the 
EWL and EWL ebbed, and lobbying from employers’ associations 
intensified. The ETUC and social NGOs engaged in proactive lobbying by 
securing that their demands were included in the FEMM report. Once 
that goal was secured, lobbying from the ETUC and social NGOs 
dampened.  
Lobbying in the EP on the revision of the maternity leave directive 
was characterised by two main features: intense lobbying from member 
states and national employers’ associations, and high salience of the issue 
in the national and EU media. Firstly, the general feeling among 
interviewees was that MEPs are often influenced by their national party 
position on social and employment matters, particularly when their party 
is in government. All the interviewed representatives from European 
umbrella organisations, therefore, found it crucial to ‘mobilise [their] 
national associations and ask them to lobby their national MEPs, [and to] 
adopt both a bottom up and a top-down approach’.156 Secondly, the 
Brussels media and national media (particularly in the UK) focused on 
the costs of the European Commission’s proposal. One EP policy advisor 
claimed that ‘the biggest lobbying came from the media’.157 There was 
general agreement among interviewees that employers’ associations 
appeared better at using the media than ETUC and social NGOs. Perhaps 
this was because their arguments of ‘costing billions to business’, ‘not 
employing women’, and ‘making SME’s bankrupt’ were more popular in 
the present context of the financial crisis than the arguments advanced by 
their lobbying opponents.  
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 The UK media reported a figure from a British government impact 
assessment showing that if the FEMM report was adopted, it would cost 
UK businesses £2.2 billion per annum in additional costs (see, for 
instance, BBC news, 2010; Traynor, 2000). The purported cost of £2.2 
billion to British employers was repeated constantly in debates in the EP. 
Much to the surprise of many interviewees, employers’ ‘cost campaign’ 
did not appear to have a significant impact on the voting outcome in 
plenary, although the passerelle clause provided some flexibility for 
employers. Despite the numerous delays of the plenary vote and immense 
lobbying pressure from employers’ associations and national 
governments (particularly the UK and Germany), employers’ associations 
did not manage to swing the vote in favour of their position. As one ALDE 
policy advisor commented: 
 
The employers' organisations were successful up until the 
actual plenary vote! I wonder though who spoke to the Italian, 
Hungarian, and Polish delegations within the EPP, as they 
were the ones that turned the vote in favour of the socialists.158   
 
While the EP’s policy outcome did not favour the views of employers’ 
associations, the stalling of the European Commission in the Council 
certainly did as employers’ associations’ ideal outcome was a ‘non-
decision’ that would retain the provisions in the current 1992 directive.  
 
6.4.3 The type of change sought: technical or directional 
 
The empirical findings of the maternity leave directive show that the type 
of change sought by interest groups plays a role in their potential to 
influence the EP’s policy outcome. The ‘type of change’ refers to the 
degree to which an interest group seeks to change the core of a legislative 
proposal and key MEPs' preferences. Two factors proved important for 
social NGOs and the ETUC’s ability to leave their fingerprints on the EP 
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policy outcome: the rapporteur pursued a strong interest of her own that 
was favourable to social NGOs, and MEPs were receptive to the ETUC’s 
demands because they were uncontroversial and purely technical. 
 The rapporteur’s assistant told me that ‘Estrela’s way of thinking is 
closer to the ETUC and EWL than the employers’ organisations’159, and 
therefore she was more willing to accept the arguments of social NGOs 
than those of employers’ associations. As employers’ associations wanted 
to sustain the status quo (i.e. did not want to revise the existing 1992 
directive), their position ran counter to the political interest of most 
FEMM and EMPL MEPs. One might question whether or not social 
NGOs exerted any influence over the rapporteur given that they had 
similar policy preferences. From the outset, the rapporteur wanted to 
strengthen the European Commission’s proposal in terms of maternity 
leave length and pay. Furthermore, she was particularly inspired by the 
way in which maternity leave is regulated in her home country (Portugal), 
which provides for 24 weeks of maternity leave on full pay. However, she 
also took up and defended many of the specific views advocated by social 
NGOs and the ETUC. Social NGOs, particularly the EWL, helped the 
rapporteur to develop her position and assisted her with drafting 
amendments and justifications for her draft report:  
 
We submitted textual amendments, we had a long discussion 
with her, we gave her some information and documents when 
she was working on her draft report. We provided her with 
very specific textual amendment […] Textual amendments 
with justifications are absolutely key.160  
 
The EWL and the Social Platform showed me a list of amendments they 
had given to the rapporteur, many of which were subsequently included 
in the FEMM committee report (either in the rapporteur’s first draft 
report or in the final FEMM report) with identical wording and 
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justification. S&D, Greens/EFA, and GUE/NGL MEPs in particular took 
up the position of social NGOs and put forward amendments that had 
been sent to them from the Social Platform and the EWL. The FEMM 
rapporteur’s office worked closely with the Social Platform and the EWL 
during the drafting of the FEMM report: 
 
We worked closely with the Social Platform and the EWL. Both 
the EWL and the Social Platform were very good at using and 
encouraging their member associations to lobby their national 
MEPs. The Social Platform and the EWL produced 
amendments for us. This is how it works. You cannot be an 
expert on everything as you have so many things to do all the 
time.161  
 
The ETUC was particularly influential in leaving their fingerprints on 
both the EMPL opinion-giving report and the FEMM committee report 
on areas which were uncontroversial with MEPs:  
 
I must say that we were quite successful. Both Mrs Plumb [the 
rapporteur in the EMPL committee] and Mrs Estrela [the 
FEMM rapporteur] have been receptive to our views, 
especially on issues that were quite uncontroversial, but which 
were very important for us, such as the health and safety 
dimension and the scope of the directive.162 
 
Unlike social NGOs and the ETUC, employers’ associations sought a 
directional change of the European Commission’s proposal because they 
did not support a revision of the existing 1992 maternity leave directive. 
Given that most FEMM MEPs wanted to strengthen the European 
Commission’s proposal, little could be done on the part of employers to 
convince these MEPs not to support the revision of the existing directive. 
The different types of change sought by the ETUC (promoting 
uncontroversial views), social NGOs (supporting the FEMM rapporteur), 
and employers’ associations (wanting a directional change) show the 
                                                 
161 Interview, FEMM rapporteur’s assistant, 22 October 2010 
162 Interview, ETUC, 20 July 2010 
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importance of distinguishing between whether interest groups promote a 
directional or technical change. Interest group influence appears 
particularly likely when interest groups seek to introduce uncontroversial 
amendments, and/or to pursue an interest similar to that of key MEPs 
(Michalowitz, 2007). 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
What factors explain why the EP took up its traditional role as a policy 
champion of the people? As seen in the preceding discussion, three 
interconnected factors account for the EP’s strong position on the 
maternity leave directive, namely: the ideological nature of the FEMM 
committee, the lobbying strategies taken up by affected interest groups, 
and the type of change sought by interest groups. All 49 interviewees 
portrayed FEMM as a very ideological - and at times idealistic - 
committee strongly defending the rights of women. This has provided 
social NGOs, particularly the EWL, with a fruitful parliamentary venue in 
which to advance their demands, but has made it challenging for 
employers’ associations to have their voices heard in FEMM. A key 
finding of this chapter is that interest group influence is contingent upon 
interest groups facing a ‘friendly’ environment within the EP. On the 
maternity leave directive, social NGOs and the ETUC were more 
successful in influencing the FEMM report because the majority of 
FEMM MEPs pursued a strong interest of their own that was favourable 
to their views.  
 Interest groups’ ability to influence EP policy outcomes is highly 
dependent on the committee in charge of a dossier. FEMM is generally 
characterised by a bias against employers’ associations, and a bias 
towards social NGOs and the ETUC. This has led most employers’ 
associations to divert their attention away from the committee to the 
plenary. Some interviewees thought that employers’ reactive lobbying 
strategy had led to a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which FEMM MEPs took 
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up even more extreme positions than might have been the case if they 
were exposed to more symmetrical lobbying. It is doubtful whether the 
policy outcomes in FEMM and at the plenary would have been different 
had employers lobbied EP from an early start. Employers’ opted for a 
directional change of the European Commission’s proposal; they did not 
support any revision of the existing 1992 maternity leave directive. Their 
inflexible position made it even more difficult for them to influence the 
FEMM report as the employers’ view was diametrically opposed to that of 
the majority of FEMM MEPs.  
 Employers’ associations focused their lobbying messages on the 
costs of extending the length of maternity leave to 18 (suggested by the 
European Commission) and 20 weeks (suggested by the EP) on full pay. 
The information provided by employers’ associations was, thus, more of a 
technical nature than political, in terms of focusing on the economic 
feasibility of the policy options discussed. However, all interest groups 
provided highly ideological arguments. For instance, employers’ 
associations argued that increasing maternity leave risked damaging 
SMEs’ budgets and putting a dent on young women’s chances of finding 
employment. NGOs, on the other hand, referred to the possibility of 
increasing equality between men and women. These types of arguments 
do not easily fit with the categories of technical and political information, 
although ideological claims can be seen as a sub-type of political 
information. Ideological claims say something important about the views 
held by different groups of society, and, thus, different support bases. In 
terms of lobbying tactics, none of the involved interest groups used 
manifestations as part of their lobbying arsenal, but mainly relied on 
face-to-face lobbying (access strategies). Employers’ associations were, 
however, successful at getting their lobbying messages parroted in the 
Brussels and national media.  
FEMM’s strong position on the maternity leave dossier has to be 
seen in close connection with the committee’s norms and working 
methods. All 49 interviewees saw FEMM’s preferences as deviating 
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substantially from the median position of MEPs. As seen in this chapter, 
FEMM is perceived as ‘a playpen for unserious discussions’163 with MEPs’ 
‘living in an ideal world’164, who ‘don’t realise that they are able to achieve 
things’ and tend to take up ‘one-sighted’165 views. FEMM’s dealings with 
and position on the maternity leave directive shows that the norms and 
working methods of the ordinary legislative procedures have not yet 
taken root in FEMM. Rather than moderating its’ demands to 
accommodate the views of the Council, FEMM applied ‘consultation 
behaviour’ to a co-decision file.  
 The EP’s working methods and norms are very different under 
consultation and the ordinary legislative procedure; a point returned to 
in Chapter 7. The ordinary legislative procedure entails norms of 
legislative responsibility and pragmatism. Contrary to this, consultation 
provides incentives for the EP to act irresponsibly and take up strong 
positions – or what many interviewees referred to as drawing up a 
‘Christmas wish list’ – as the EP’s political and electoral stakes are low.  
In FEMM, consultation remains the focal modus operandi with the 
ordinary legislative procedure being an exception. FEMM’s limited 
experience in dealing with legislative files suggests that the committee 
has not yet conformed to the new rules under the ordinary legislative 
procedure. As the default behaviour in plenary is to adopt the committee 
report, and for MEPs to follow the voting recommendations of their 
group (see Chapter 1), the plenary largely adopted FEMM’s report. The 
EP’s first reading report supported minimum maternity leave in the EU 
of twenty weeks with full pay, although some flexibility was given for 
countries which already have a form of family-related leave (the so-called 
passerelle clause). The adoption of the passerelle clause was crucial to 
secure a simple majority in favour of the report. 
                                                 
163 Interview, ETUC, 20 July 2010 
164 Interview, COFACE, 19 April 2010 
165 Interview, EP policy advisor, 7 June 2010 
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 Although employers’ associations had limited influence on the 
EP’s final first reading position, they were successful at delaying the 
decision-making process within the EP, and in narrowing down the 
number of issues discussed in the EP. The numerous postponements of 
the plenary vote and the referral back of FEMM’s report to the committee 
for renewed scrutiny show that the EP’s decision-making process does 
not necessarily follow a fixed sequence of phases, but may feed 
backwards and forwards into another phase. This shows that the life of a 
dossier in the EP’s (and EU’s) policy cycle may be highly erratic, 
including several feedback loops. While employers’ associations and 
member states sceptical towards the maternity leave directive lost the 
battle in the EP, they certainly won it in the Council. The maternity leave 
directive shows that sometimes the EP still lives up to its reputation as a 
lobbying venue favouring diffuse interests, at least when issues concern 
process standards and are dealt with by committees with little experience 
with the ordinary legislative procedure. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
For most of its life the EP has had a reputation as a toothless multilingual 
talking shop with no real powers and as an unimportant lobbying 
addressee (Kreppel, 2006b; Lehmann, 2009; Scully, et al., 2012). 
Moreover, the EP has a reputation as being particularly open to diffuse 
interests, which, due to their limited resources, use ‘friendly’ MEPs to put 
pressure on the European Commission and the Council (Dür & Mateo, 
2012; Greenwood, 2011). Paradoxically, the notion of the EP representing 
diffuse as opposed to business interests, conflicts with the broader 
political science literature on interest groups which dwells on business 
bias. As highlighted by Wilson (1974, 1984, 1995), business dominance is 
expected to be particularly prominent in policy areas characterised by 
client (diffuse costs/concentrated benefits) and entrepreneurial 
(concentrated costs/diffuse benefits) politics, and less likely in policy 
areas engendering majoritarian (diffuse costs and benefits) and interest 
group (concentrated cost and benefits) politics. 
 The four cases studied in this thesis correspond to different 
configurations of Wilson's politics of policy typology, and different types 
of EU standard-setting (product and process standards). While the cases 
represent different policy areas – environmental, consumer protection 
and employment policies – they all represent typical areas of EU 
legislation. They are all reviews of existing legislation, and are re-
regulatory policies aimed at tackling the negative externalities arising 
from an imperfect single market. The choice of typical cases increases the 
external validity of my findings and reduces the risk of reaching 
conclusions that are purely idiosyncratic and says little about anything 
lying outside of the borders of the case (Gerring, 2007, p. 248).  While all 
cases hold a degree of individuality, the findings drawn from my case 
studies illuminate more general findings about the institutional 
mechanism at play in the EP, and the nature of EU lobbying. 
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 It is clear from my four cases that the EP is no longer a lobbying 
sideshow attracting disproportionate lobbying from diffuse interests. 
Rather, NGOs and labour unions are completely outnumbered by 
lobbying from business groups, such as large firms and business 
associations. As the powers of the EP have increased, so has attention 
from interest groups. In the four cases studied in this thesis, interest 
groups mobilised significant resources to lobby MEPs, and to convince 
them to modify, preserve, or abolish provisions of the European 
Commission’s proposals. Particularly rapporteurs and shadow 
rapporteurs are dependent on the insight and expert knowledge provided 
by interest groups, and lobbying is a necessity for the functioning of the 
EP as an institution.  
 While the changing powers of the EP have brought more lobbying 
to the EP, they have not changed entirely the balance of power between 
different types of interests in the way predicted by Wilson’s politics of 
policy typology. Policy shapes politics in some cases but not in others. 
The road transport directive was not characterised by a compromise 
between opposing groups, nor did MEPs simply capitulate to the 
economic muscle of industry on the food labelling regulation, and the 
maternity leave directive. Even on issues such as slaughter without pre-
stunning - where the costs and benefits were both widely dispersed - 
significant lobbying occurred. However, policy did to some extent shape 
politics on the vans regulation. The automobile industry was both more 
active during the policy process and more successful at leaving its 
fingerprints on the EP's final report than environmental groups. How 
might we explain the difference in outcomes? Under what conditions 
does the distribution of cost and benefits arising from legislation explain 
interest group influence in the EP? 
 The method of process-tracing has allowed me to gain a detailed 
insight into the different factors contributing to the policy outcomes on 
the four case studies. This has enabled me to assess closely how and 
under what conditions interest groups were able to influence the EP’s 
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policy process and outcome on my four cases. The four case studies show 
that the politics of policy typology sometimes has difficulties explaining 
interest group influence because: 
 
 Some types of regulation are often highly conflictual among 
member states and highly politicised. This is particularly so on 
legislative proposals aimed at harmonising EU process standards.  
 Just because a group bears the cost of regulation, it does not mean 
they will agree on how to fight the measure. 
 Institutional venues can filter out and constrict interest group 
influence.  
 
The above factors are elaborated further in this chapter, bringing to light 
the differences and similarities between the four case studies. First I 
present the conditions under which policy is likely to shape politics in the 
EP, and compare the findings from the four case studies. Lastly, I discuss 
whether or not the qualifications made to Wilson’s typology are so 
fundamental that Wilson is of no use, and if there is something unique 
about the EP that means that my critique is unlikely to hold up anywhere 
else.  
 
7.1 Factors on which the applicability of Wilson’s typology is 
contingent 
 
My empirical findings show that the extent to which policy shapes politics 
in the EP is contingent upon four factors: the level of unity within 
lobbying spectrums, the extent to which MEPs are exposed to balanced or 
uneven lobbying from competing groups, the nature of the issue at hand, 
and the committee in charge of scrutiny. These factors can be grouped 
into three types of explanations: interest group, issue, and institutional 
explanations. Table 7.1 compares how my four case studies relate to these 
three types of explanations. Each of the three explanations and their 
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relevance to my case studies are discussed in the following sections. What 
is interesting to note in table 7.1 is that cases with similar interest, issue, 
and institutional characteristics have similar policy outcomes.  
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Table 7.1: The politics of policy typology applied to the four case studies 
 
                                                 
166  The term, emotiveness, was often used by interviewees to describe debates on issues of an ethical or moralistic nature.  
Explanations Vans regulation Food labelling 
regulation 
Maternity leave 
directive 
Road transport 
working time 
directive 
Interest group explanations: 
 
• Unity within lobbying spectrums 
•  
• Lobbying asymmetry 
 
 
• High 
 
• Biased in favour 
of the automobile 
industry 
 
 
• High 
 
• Biased in favour 
of the food 
industry 
 
 
• High 
 
• Biased in favour 
of labour unions 
and social NGOs 
 
 
• Low 
 
• Biased in favour 
of labour unions 
Issue explanations: 
 
Level of technicality 
 
Level of ‘emotiveness’ 166 
 
 
 
• High 
•  
• Low 
 
 
 
• High 
•  
• Medium 
 
 
 
• Low 
•  
• Medium 
 
 
 
• Low 
•  
• High 
 
Institutional explanations: 
 
• Cooperation between committees 
•  
• Experience of the ordinary 
legislative procedure  
 
 
• High 
 
• Extensive 
 
 
• High  
 
• Extensive 
 
 
• Limited 
 
• Limited  
 
 
• Limited 
 
• Limited  
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The vans and the food labelling regulations (product standards) were both 
characterised by: high levels of unity within lobbying spectrums, a policy 
process dominated by businesses, policy issues of a highly technical nature, 
and high levels of cooperation between the EP committees. In contrast, the 
maternity leave and the working time directives (process standards) were 
characterised by: fragmentation within European trade associations (only on 
the maternity leave directive), policy issues of a more emotive nature, and 
limited cooperation between EP committees. These findings suggest that 
interest groups’ ability to influence policy outcomes in the EP depends on the 
type of regulation in question, namely whether a proposal represents an 
attempt to harmonise EU product or process standards. As will be elaborated 
further in the next section, business groups are more likely to be internally 
divided on process standards than on product standards.  
The distribution of costs and benefits arising from policies are 
particularly likely to explain interest group influence when businesses stand 
united, when issues are highly technical as opposed to political, and when 
mainstream committees167 are in charge of dossiers. This is most likely to 
happen on legislation harmonising EU product standards than process 
standards. It is important to stress that one single factor alone does not 
explain sufficiently the influence of interest groups in my four case studies. 
Rather, the potential for interest groups to influence policy outcomes in the 
EP is contingent upon both interest group characteristics, the nature of 
policy issues, and EP institutional factors. On the road transport working 
time directive, for example, labour unions were both faced with an 
institutional arena favourable to their demands (the EMPL committee), a 
divided lobbying opponent (the IRU), and a policy issue that could be framed 
in ways appealing to the public good (road safety).  
 
7.1.1 Interest group explanations  
 
It is often assumed that policy-making exhibits a bias towards business 
because they possess superior resources compared with NGOs and labour 
unions, and hold structural and technological power (Betsill & Corell, 2001; 
                                                 
167
 Those who are predominantly working under the ordinary legislative procedure 
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Corell & Betsill, 2001; Falkner, 2009). While business groups might, overall, 
be more influential in shaping policy outcomes, both Wilson (1974) and Lowi 
(1964) draw our attention to the likely variance in business influence across 
policy areas.  The likelihood that regulation reflects business dominance – 
and at worst regulatory capture – varies across policy domains. This is 
because policies are affected by the kind of interest group coalitions that 
oppose and support a proposal, and different coalitions form on different 
issues. As Wilson et al (2012, p. 333) says, ‘on any given issue, one or another 
interest group might be powerful, but no group is powerful across all issues’. 
The case studies in this thesis confirm the importance of, and privileged 
position held by, companies and European trade associations in EU decision-
making. However, my case studies also show that business interests are faced 
with a number of countervailing forces that prevent them from becoming 
dominant. European trade associations are often faced with one major 
stumbling block when seeking to influence EU legislation: lack of business 
unity.  
The a priori assumption of a uniform business interest is problematic, 
especially when it comes to setting EU process standards. While most 
business actors are likely to support market liberalisation and unnecessarily 
burdensome regulation, they do by no means represent a monolithic force. 
EU legislation has differential effects on individual businesses, often leading 
companies and national trade associations to compete against each other as 
they each want their national rules to provide the template for EU legislation 
(Falkner, 2001). Disagreements may also occur between companies situated 
at different stages of the production chain, and between market leaders and 
laggards (Dicken, 2003; Henderson, et al., 2002; Jones, 2005). Business 
conflict is a latent reality of lobbying in Brussels, and often serves to prevent 
the risk of business dominance over policy outcomes. To be influential, the 
interests of individual companies need to be aggregated, but lack of business 
unity often leads to collective action problems in which European trade 
associations become paralysed. Although European trade associations claim 
to speak for businesses across the EU, they are often in a weak position to 
influence EU decision-makers due to their need to ‘pursue the lowest 
common denominator position given the wide range of often conflicting 
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interests they speak for’ (Falkner, 2009, p. 41). The oft-occurring conflict 
between companies from different member states means that the universe of 
EU business interests (companies, national associations, and European 
federations) cannot always be cross-read that easily into Wilson’s typology. 
At least, it requires researchers to pay close attention to that some companies 
might benefit from a proposal, while others are worse off. Disagreement 
within the business sector implies that some companies might sometimes 
find themselves fighting on the same side as labour unions and NGOs.  
 Business fragmentation in the EU was most prevalent in my case 
study on the road transport working time directive. As seen in Chapter 5, the 
International Road Transport Union (IRU) was internally divided because 
their Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese associate members were in favour of 
regulating the working time of self-employed bus and lorry drivers. Due to 
internal division and cumbersome internal procedures, the IRU only started 
lobbying the EP when the responsible committee had already finished its 
deliberations on the dossier. The split within the IRU worked in favour of the 
labour unions, who could lobby MEPs from an early stage without 
competition from employers’ associations. This illustrates how costs and 
benefits arising from legislation do not operate in a vacuum. Interest groups 
need time to mobilise and obtain a mandate from their member 
organisations. The costs of obtaining internal unity within an interest group 
can be significant and explain why Wilson’s typology does not always match 
the empirical reality.  
 There was no division between business actors on the maternity leave 
directive, and only a limited rift between different automobile companies on 
the vans regulation. Unlike the passenger cars regulation, there was no 
business war between car manufacturers from different countries because 
the van market is more homogenous than the passenger car market. This 
strengthened the position of the car industry because they could speak with 
one voice on key issues. There was, however, disagreement lurking beneath 
the surface on specific issues, such as the possibility of pooling between cars 
and vans. Some companies were in favour of the possibility of pooling 
between cars and vans (such as Ford), while companies producing only cars 
(such as BMW) were against this because they feared they would be put at a 
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competitive disadvantage and that it would lead to a reopening of the 
passenger cars regulation.  
 On the food labelling regulation, the food industry was united on all 
main provisions of the dossier, but divergent views surfaced on the traffic 
light scheme pitting food producers against food retailers. This highlights the 
importance of distinguishing between firms operating at different stages of 
the production chain. Conflicting economic objectives among members of the 
production chain may give rise to tension. The division within the business 
sector found in the case studies echoes the neo-pluralist approach on 
business power. Similar to neo-pluralism, I do not regard business unity and 
influence as a given (McFarland, 2004; Nowell, 1996). Thus, the Marxist 
belief that business actors represent capitalist interests offers little analytical 
value for this study. Business influence is a contingent concept that needs to 
be studied in specific policy contexts and specific issue areas.  
 In line with the existing interest group literature, my research also 
finds support for the understanding of lobbying as information exchange. 
The currency in the Brussels lobbying field is information. The kind of 
information provided by interest groups to decision-makers differs across EU 
institutions and policy areas. All the 62 interest groups interviewed for my 
thesis explained that the type of information conveyed to MEPs, as well as 
the way in which it was presented, is very different compared with the 
European Commission. Interest groups are aware that they need to use less 
technical language when talking to MEPs, and to keep their message as short 
and precise as possible. Most of the interviewed interest groups would never 
bring more than one page when talking with MEPs, and would always try to 
bring visual aids (such as samples and pictures) that would make it easier for 
MEPs to understand any technical aspects of a proposal. The three interview 
extracts below from interviews with industry representatives highlight the 
main difference between lobbying the EP, the Council, and the European 
Commission: 
 
We don’t make a complete technical argument to an MEP – 
he/she will not be able to follow you. You just try to explain the 
principles of what you want to achieve, but forget the 
technicalities. Only very few MEPs with a technical background 
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will be able to understand it. You have about 20 people in 
Parliament, which understand the car-industry reasonably well. 
With the Commission, it’s different… they know what they are 
talking about.168   
 
The pitch with the Commission is very different than that for the 
European Parliament. For the Parliament, we need to convey 
rather technical issues very succinctly and clearly to generalists, 
using as many visual aids as possible. In meetings with the 
Commission, we are speaking to experts, and will usually have 
more time. While the European Parliament is an increasingly 
important institution, it is also challenging given that nationality 
plays a great role. Therefore we try to engage our national 
associations as much as possible as I think MEPs appreciate 
being contacted by their compatriots in their own language.169 
 
In the Commission we discuss every single line of their proposal; 
the discussions are longer and more into details. For the Council 
we engage our national associations to lobby their national 
governments. We prepare our position and arguments. In the EP, 
we try to adapt our letters to the specific national context and 
interest of MEPs.170  
 
The quotations highlight that interest groups need to pay particularly close 
attention to keeping information short and avoiding couching their lobbying 
messages in overly technical terms when lobbying MEPs. Hence, the need for 
interest groups to translate complex and technical information into brief 
digestible notes is particularly potent in the EP, where time is pressed and 
technical knowledge often limited. This does not mean that MEPs pay less 
attention to technical information than, say, information about public 
opinion and constituency interests. Rather it means that interest groups need 
to present technical information differently to MEPs compared to desk-
officers in the European Commission. The content (message) might, thus, be 
the same, but the packaging it is delivered in differs.  
Moreover, the EP’s internal bifurcation – as both a legislative branch 
in EU decision-making and a public venue for wider political debate – means 
that interest groups often reformulate their arguments when lobbying the EP 
to create wider issue linkages and focus on the wider public good. Lobbyists 
are framers who spend much of their time trying to convince MEPs that their 
                                                 
168 Interview ,car-manufacturer, 14 July 2011 
169 Interview, representative from a European beverage industry, 13 April 2011 
170 Interview, representative from the food industry, 28 April 2011 
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issue should be seen in a particular light. Framing may change the perceived 
costs and benefits of legislation. What is more, policy cases might shift from 
one category to another. The road transport working time directive serves as 
an interesting example. While it represents a typical interest group politics 
case (concentrated costs/ concentrated benefits), the ETF managed to frame 
it as an entrepreneurial politics case by referring to the ‘public good’ of 
increased road safety if working time for truckers was regulated. The 
emotionally charged issue of road safety struck a clear chord with MEPs, 
many of whom took up the role of ‘champion of the people’ in order to secure 
road safety for innocent road users. What is interesting is that the ETF only 
addressed the issue of social dumping when lobbying the European 
Commission, but used the argument of road safety when lobbying the EP. 
This illustrates that the distribution of costs and benefits arising from 
legislation is not static, but that the categorisation of policies depends on the 
framing of the policy problem at stake. This is in line with Wilson’s assertion 
that ‘the value of [costs and benefits], as well as the beliefs about the 
likelihood of their materialisation can change’ (1980, p. 366). Policy issues 
are not intrinsically only about one thing; they are also about the battle for 
framing and deciding the issue at stake. 
MEPs exposed to one frame (interpretation of a policy issue) are more 
likely to take up extreme positions compared with MEPs subject to 
competing frames. This is particularly likely to happen if one side of a 
lobbying camp is internally divided and fails to take early lobbying actions, 
such as the case of employers’ associations in the road transport working 
time directive.  When decision-makers are exposed to a variety of alternative 
understandings, they are likely to reconsider and mould their support for a 
specific policy proposal. Thus, interest group influence is both contingent 
upon internal unity and the degree to which their views are challenged by 
competing interest groups. Lobbying asymmetry exists when MEPs are not 
lobbied equally by interest groups advocating different views (Potters & Van 
Winden, 1992; Smith, 2008).  
On the vans and food labelling regulations, MEPs were mainly 
exposed to lobbying from business groups and, therefore, tilted more 
towards their position than to that of diffuse interests. On the directives on 
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road transport working time and maternity leave, employers were either 
internally divided and/or lobbied very late in the day, which gave significant 
tract for labour unions and social NGOs to influence MEPs’ interpretations of 
the issues in question. The level of lobbying symmetry - the extent to which 
MEPs are lobbied evenly by different interest groups - is important for 
explaining the distribution of influence between groups (Smith, 1984). 
However, once interest groups have mobilised on specific policy issues, they 
tend to supply MEPs with similar types of information and use similar 
tactics. All interest groups had access to MEPs from mainstream political 
groups (ALDE, EPP, and S&D). However, most interest groups refrained 
from lobbying what they perceived to be ‘extreme groups’, such as the 
European Freedom and Democracy group (the EDF). Business groups 
avoided lobbying the Greens and the Confederal Group of the European 
United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) because they felt that they were 
speaking to deaf ears and preaching to the converted. On the food labelling 
regulation, the S&D shadow rapporteur refused to meet with anyone from 
the food industry, as she did not share their view. This staunch position was 
received with some surprise by many interviewees from the food industry, as 
they were not used to being given the cold shoulder from S&D MEPs, 
although their views often differ from these MEPs.    
All interviewed interest group representatives explained that there 
was a clear working division between European federations and their 
members. Whereas the European federations would focus on lobbying key 
MEPs, national associations would focus their lobbying on MEPs from their 
own country, and individual companies would focus on MEPs from countries 
where they have their factories located. Lobbying of MEPs outside the cohort 
of key power-holders (rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs and coordinators) 
became particularly important when lobbying on proposals concerned with 
process standards compared with product standards. The EP’s political 
groups (particularly EPP and ALDE) tend to be more divided when it comes 
to process standards and more heavily lobbied by member states. On 
proposals setting EU process standards, interest groups are able to play on 
the diversity of the EPP and ALDE groups with the aim of bringing these 
groups’ latent divisions on social and employment matters to the fore. The 
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EPP group, for instance, brings together corporatist parties from Benelux, 
France, Germany, and Austria and more free market parties from 
Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. As seen on the road transport working time 
directive, the labour unions (the ETF) was successful in playing on the EPP’s 
underlying group division on social and employment affairs. With the help of 
legislative allies inside the EP (French EPP members), labour unions 
managed to completely split the EPP group by lobbying individual EPP 
national delegations heavily, and winning the Belgian, Greek, Italian, 
Portuguese, and Spanish EPP national delegations over one by one.  
Assumptions in the interest group literature linking particular kinds of 
information and tactics to particular types of groups only found limited 
support in my four cases studies. The expectation from the literature is for 
different types of interest groups to hold a bundle of different informational 
goods, and to prioritise different lobbying strategies. Diffuse interests (such 
as NGOs) are often expected to be limited to the use of outside tactics and to 
the provision of political information, such as information about public 
opinion (associated with input legitimacy). Vice versa, business groups are 
often expected to rely primarily on inside lobbying tactics and be particularly 
adept at supplying technical information, such as information about the 
feasibility of a proposal (associated with output legitimacy). Furthermore, 
outside strategies are often described as outsider strategies that are taken up 
by groups with limited time and money to engage in face to face lobbying (see 
for instance, Eising, 2007).  
As seen from table 7.2, in line with the expectation from the interest 
group literature, political information (such as information about public 
opinion and support), was mainly provided by NGOs and labour unions, and 
less so by business groups. In contrast to the general expectation in the 
interest group literature, the provision of technical information (such as the 
cost-effectiveness and feasibility of policies) was not only confined to 
business, but was also frequently provided by NGOs and labour unions. It is 
important to note that technical information might not be neutral and 
unbiased as interest groups use such information to support their 
(ideological) positions. As we have seen in chapter 4, both the food industry 
and consumer organisations used academic research findings (on how 
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different labelling schemes affect consumer behaviour) to support their 
position. The food industry used science to oppose regulatory measures that 
might affect the sales of their products negatively. Consumer and health 
organisations used science to question the healthiness and safety of food 
products. What is more, some types of information are difficult to classify as 
either technical or political because they say something about wider public 
support for new regulatory measures, as well as these measures’ impact on 
people’s behaviour (such as how different food labels are perceived by 
consumers, and the impact they have on their buying behaviour). It might be 
more useful, therefore, to regard technical and political information as 
tendencies or as ends of two continua rather than two dichotomies. 
Turning to lobbying tactics, all interest groups in my study primarily 
relied on inside lobbying, but also frequently combined this with outside 
lobbying (such as using the media and holding lobbying events). However, 
some outside strategies are used more sparingly than others. While the use of 
the media and lobbying events are used frequently by most groups, petitions 
and manifestations are used less frequently. Demonstrations were only used 
by the ETF on the road transport working time directive, whereas the IRU all 
together refrained from using demonstrations as part of their lobbying 
arsenal. This indicates the importance of distinguishing between different 
types of outside strategies, as all interest groups use some types of outside 
tactics, but not others.   
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Table 7.2: Interest groups’ information and tactics 
 
 
Unlike the general expectation from the interest group literature, outside 
strategies were not regarded as outsider tactics. All the interviewed interest 
groups relied on a combination of outside (voice) and inside (access) 
strategies. This suggests that to distinguish between interest groups in terms 
of their reliance on either voice or access is an oversimplification (Page, 
1999). Most interests groups enjoy access to MEPs, and rely on both access 
and voice lobbying strategies. The combination of these two strategies often 
increases the salience and urgency of the lobbying message expressed by 
interest groups (Chalmer, 2013). This was particularly prominent on the road 
transport working time directive, the maternity leave directive, and the 
discussions over the traffic light labelling and ritually slaughtered meat, 
where interest groups managed to raise MEPs’ attention to issues by getting 
their lobbying messages parroted in the media and/or through large scale 
manifestations outside the EP.  
 Vans 
regulation 
Food 
labelling 
regulation 
Maternity 
leave 
directive 
Road transport 
working time 
directive 
Technical 
information 
provided by: 
All interest 
groups 
All interest 
groups 
Mainly by 
employers’ 
associations 
All interest 
groups 
Political 
information 
provided by: 
Only 
environmental 
groups 
All interest 
groups 
None Only labour 
unions 
Inside 
strategies 
used by: 
All interest 
groups 
All interest 
groups 
All interest 
groups 
All interest 
groups 
Outside 
strategies 
used by: 
None The food 
industry 
Employers’ 
associations 
Labour unions 
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7.1.2 Issue explanations 
 
The preponderance of business in policymaking is most likely in what 
Culpepper calls ‘quiet politics’, characterised by low salience and highly 
technical sector- specific policy problems. On highly salient issues, business 
groups have a limited chance of winning and they might be better off 
conserving their resources to venues where attention is less intense. Several 
interviewees found that MEPs have a tendency to vote with the heart when 
interest groups manage to couch issues in highly emotive and ethical terms. 
As one lobbyist stressed during interview: 
 
Debates and decisions in the European Parliament very easily 
become emotional and MEPs often suggest unrealistic 
amendments. They are not responsible for implementation and 
not forced to be realistic. The Council is more pragmatic. Member 
states are responsible for implementation and they are not going 
to adopt legislation that is impossible to implement.171 
 
As indicated by the quotation, several interviewees considered MEPs to be 
more sensitive to emotional and moralistic lobbying messages - such as 
'fatigue kills' - than the European Commission and the Council. This was 
partly seen as a result of the EP not having responsibility for implementing 
EU policies. When issues are framed in emotive terms, businesses find it 
difficult to get their lobbying messages across to MEPs. Yet, on issues of a 
highly technical nature and characterised by quiet politics, businesses find it 
easier to have their voices heard given that they do not suffer from internal 
division. As Rasmussen and  Alexandrova highlights, business influence is 
particularly likely when ‘the details of EU regulation is being fleshed out’ 
(2012, p. 616). For example, the politics of exemptions look a lot like the 
‘world of capture’ in which regulation does not reflect the public interest but 
rather the immediate concern of specific interests (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012, p. 
101). This was illustrated on the food labelling regulation, where several food 
and drink industries were successful at securing exemptions for their 
products. Many products that had not been excluded from the European 
Commission’s proposal were granted an exemption in the EP’s first and 
                                                 
171
 Interview, Hill Knowlton, 18 May 2011 
292 
 
second reading reports, such as exemptions for chewing gum packages, 
alcopops, gift-wrapping, and non-prepacked food. Due to the very specificity 
of the food sectors seeking exemptions, few consumer and health 
organisations lobbied against the exemptions because the lobbying field on 
exemptions was solely populated by the food industry. 
This thesis’s four case studies have shown that business is more likely 
to shape policy outcomes on legislation concerned with product standards 
(when these attract little public and political attention) than process 
standards. This is because business finds it easier to find common grounds 
on product standards than on process standards (although exceptions can be 
found). Harmonised product standards benefit all member states and most 
companies because transnational firms have much to gain from access to a 
larger market, and product standards create a level playing field between 
businesses operating in one or more member states. Process standards, on 
the other hand, often lead to significant disagreement between member 
states and within European business federations due to the diverse labour-
market policies and welfare state provisions in place in the EU’s 28 member 
states. One only has to look at the European Commission’s recent attempt to 
revise the general working directive to see how difficult it is to come to 
agreement on process standards in the EU. The EU has been more successful 
at adopting legislation on products standards than process standards. The 
main reason for this is that countries with higher process standards prefer to 
retain their high social standards rather than settling on common EU 
minimum standards. Contrary to this, poorer EU countries with lower 
process standards are afraid that common EU social standards would make 
them worse off competitively (Hix & Høyland, 2011, pp. 208-217).  
As seen in the empirical chapters, the type of information (technical 
vs. political) and legitimacy (input vs. output) demanded by MEPs, as well as 
the type of information provided by interest groups, differs across policy 
domains, particularly between product and process regulations. This results 
in unique interest group patterns across the EP’s committees in terms of 
interest group density, diversity, and activity (Coen & Katsaitis, 2013). The 
ENVI (environment), ITRE (industry), and IMCO (internal market) 
committees mainly deal with highly complex regulatory matters requiring 
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niche expertise, such as industry information about the technical feasibility 
and cost-effectiveness of different policy options. This increases demand for 
technical information and output legitimacy rather than demand for political 
information about public opinion, and input legitimacy.  
Process standards usually draw in a wider selection of societal actors, 
and attract more attention from member states. Lobbying from EU 
governments (such as from permanent representations) was intense on the 
maternity leave directive and the road transport working time directive, but 
almost absent on the vans regulation (although the German government 
lobbied German MEPs) and the food labelling regulation. Intense member 
state lobbying of MEPs indicates that an issue is highly divisive among 
member states, often leading to increased media attention and politicization 
of proposals discussed. Directives harmonising EU process standards are less 
complex but tend to be more politicised and involve more member state 
lobbying compared with product standards (Princen & Kerremans, 2008; 
Scharpf, 2009). Vice versa, EP committees dealing with product standards 
attract less lobbying from member states and have a greater concentration of 
business lobbying. What is interesting to observe on the vans and food 
labelling regulations is that diffuse interests (environmental, consumer, and 
health organisations) also relied on technical information (such as research 
on the feasibility of different policy options) to justify their positions. 
Perhaps, this can be seen as a sign of NGOs trying to adapt to MEPs’ demand 
for technical information on product regulations. Unlike the expectation 
from Wilson’s typology, ‘interest group politics’ (usually concerned with 
process standards) did not result in compromises between opposing groups. 
This is because the EP committees in charge of amending European 
Commission proposals on process standards tend to be biased against 
business; a point returned to in the next subsection.     
While business tend to be more influential than diffuse interests on 
product regulations - provided that business is internally united and the issue 
is not highly salient - persistent and absolute business dominance is unlikely 
in Brussels. The nature of EU policies, as often being revisions of existing 
legislation, implies that interest groups can only change proposals on the 
margins rather than the core. The continuous ex-post evaluation of EU 
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legislation means that lobbying is ‘more akin to long drawn-out trench 
warfare than spectacular Pearl Harbour type [battles]’ (Richardson & Coen, 
2009, p. 341). The constant adjustment of past EU legislation also implies 
that any lobbying wins or losses are only momentary, and only last until the 
next revision is due.  
 
7.1.3 Institutional explanations 
 
A key finding of my research is that EP committees are biased towards their 
own policy remit (also confirmed by Smith, 2008). ENVI often prioritises 
environmental over industry concerns, and EMPL members are seen to 
favour the views of employees over those of employers. However, in several 
cases, where a legislative proposal intersects with the policy remit of several 
committees, the EP's Conference of Presidents has responded by invoking the 
reinforced Hughes procedure. When the Hughes procedure is enforced, 
reports from responsible committees are less likely to be carried on the floor 
without taking into account the views of MEPs from associate committees. 
This is because committee members, particularly rapporteurs and shadow 
rapporteurs, act as cue-givers to non-committee members who have less 
information and often less intense preferences (Smith, 1984, p. 46). The 
more that committees are involved in the scrutiny of a legislative proposal, 
the higher the diversity of cues given from expert MEPs to non-expert MEPs, 
rendering the position of the lead committee more vulnerable to changes 
during plenary. Several interviewees found that the Hughes procedure 
provided for better cooperation and communication between the EP 
committees than between the European Commission’s DGs and, therefore, 
saw the EP as a better aggregator of demands. The Hughes procedure was 
applied on the vans regulation, but not on the other case studies. The food 
labelling regulation was, however, characterised by close cooperation 
between the responsible and opinion-giving committees. On the directives on 
maternity leave and road transport working time, there was limited 
cooperation between the responsible and opinion-giving committees. This is 
one of the reasons why the committee reports on those two cases were biased 
against the preferences of employers. The risk of any one interest group 
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dominating the content of committee reports decreases with increased 
cooperation between responsible and opinion-giving committees.   
 Another key finding of this thesis is that the ability of interest groups 
to influence EP policy outcomes depends on responsible committees’ 
experience of the ordinary legislative procedure. The expansion of the 
ordinary legislative procedure to new policy areas (such as agriculture, justice 
and home affairs following the Lisbon Treaty) has not only altered the 
dynamics between the EU institutions, but also brought about new inter- and 
intra-institutional norms and working methods. Different decision-making 
procedures not only change the formal powers held by the EP, but also affect 
MEPs’ behaviour. Different procedures precipitate different norms. Whereas 
the ordinary legislative procedure encourages pragmatism and consensual 
behaviour, consultation fosters free-rider and confrontational behaviour on 
part of the EP (Ripoll Servent, 2011a, 2011b). 
Under the consultation procedure, the EP must be consulted, but the 
European Commission and the Council are under no obligation to follow the 
EP’s recommendations. The EP’s political stakes are, therefore, low under the 
consultation procedure (Costello, 2011; Costello & Thomson, 2011). This 
provides an incentive for MEPs to act irresponsibly and to take up extreme 
positions – or what many interviewees referred to as drawing up a ‘Christmas 
wish list’. What is more, reports drafted under consultation only need a 
simple majority at plenary to pass, giving periphery groups greater chance to 
influence the EP’s position. On the contrary, the ordinary legislative 
procedure entails norms of legislative responsibility, as well as intra and 
inter-institutional compromise. The high majorities required to pass 
legislation under the ordinary legislative procedure has reduced both the 
EP’s and the Council’s room for manoeuvre and ability to forge ahead with 
their own agenda. The EP cannot take up extreme and uncompromising 
positions under the ordinary legislative procedure if it wants to reach an 
agreement with the Council. This reduces the range of possible policy 
outcomes (Burns, 2005; Burns & Carter, 2010; Shackleton, 2000). 
 One of the reasons why researchers find that the EP acts more 
responsibly and pragmatically under the ordinary legislative procedure is due 
to the prominence of informal trialogue meetings. Early informal trialogue 
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meetings between the EP, the Council, and the European Commission have 
allowed the EP to engage in a process of anticipatory compliance, in which it 
can more easily foresee which amendments might be acceptable to the 
Council (Burns & Carter, 2010; Farrell & Héritier, 2003). As seen in Chapters 
3 (the vans regulation) and 4 (the food labelling regulation), this has led the 
EP to moderate its demands to increase the likelihood of reaching an 
agreement with the Council. On the vans regulation, the rapporteur took up a 
position that would serve as a reasonable point of departure for reaching an 
agreement with the Council. The increased cooperation between ENVI and 
ITRE under the Hughes procedure as well as ENVI’s adaption to the norms 
and working methods of the ordinary legislative procedure has made it a 
more compromising committee compared with its positions in the past.  
 While ENVI used to be seen as an environmental champion 
advocating the views of environmental and consumer interests, it has become 
more of an environmental pragmatist. This has in turn reduced the privileged 
position once held by diffuse interests, and provided business interests with a 
more favourable European parliamentary arena in which they can advance 
their demands. Although the EP did not act as a champion of environmental 
and consumer groups on the vans and food labelling regulations, it did act as 
a defender of women’s right organisations on the maternity leave directive 
despite all three cases being subject to the ordinary legislative procedure. 
How could we explain these differences in outcomes? FEMM’s dealing with 
and position on the maternity leave directive suggest that the norms and 
working methods of the ordinary legislative procedure have not yet taken 
root in FEMM. The consultation procedure remains the focal modus 
operandi of FEMM and EMPL with the ordinary legislative procedure being 
an exception. Occasionally consultation committees, such as FEMM and 
EMPL, are assigned a co-decision dossier. When that happens, there appears 
to be a tendency for these committees to apply ‘consultation behaviour’ to a 
co-decision file. As seen in Chapter 6 (the maternity leave directive), 
interviewees generally portrayed FEMM as a committee that did not know 
the rules of the co-decision game. Both FEMM and EMPL are seen as 
committees whose preferences differ substantially from those of the overall 
Parliament. FEMM took up a rather confrontational position on the 
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maternity leave directive that did not allow for compromises to be found 
between opposing views. This left the political groups in a difficult position as 
the default behaviour in plenary is to adopt the committee report and for 
MEPs to follow their group line, which is usually drawn up by the groups’ 
shadow rapporteur and coordinator from the relevant committee.  
Debates in plenary rarely go into details and amendments introduced 
prior to the plenary do not usually seek to change the main thrust of a 
committee report (Marshall, 2010; McElroy, 2006; Neuhold, 2001). On the 
maternity leave directive, S&D MEPs found themselves between a rock and a 
hard place: if they voted with the rapporteur they would risk being defeated 
in plenary and by the Council, and if they diverted from the group line they 
would break the norm of group discipline. In the end, S&D MEPs chose to 
follow the rapporteur’s position and in the mind of most interviewees ‘went 
for a first class funeral’172 and ‘went down in flames’.173 The EP’s first reading 
position did not provide a suitable starting point for negotiating with the 
Council, leading to the Council freezing the directive indeterminately. 
 My study shows that the decision to assign a dossier to a committee 
strongly determines policy outcomes, and the potential for different types of 
interest groups to influence the process and the outcome. Whenever 
proposals go to either the FEMM or EMPL committees, the outcomes are 
likely to be biased against employers’ associations. This has led employers’ 
associations to divert their attention away from FEMM and EMPL to the 
plenary when it is often too late to change the course of a dossier. Many 
interviewees thought that the reactive lobbying strategy of employers’ 
associations when lobbying on employment issues had led to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, in which EMPL and FEMM MEPs have taken up more extreme 
views than would have been the case if they were subject to more balanced 
lobbying from opposing groups. Employers’ associations reactive strategies, 
when lobbying on social and employment issues, can also be seen as a 
rationale strategy, in which they seek to conserve their energy and resources 
for venues (such as the Council), where they stand a greater chance of being 
heard.  
                                                 
172 Meeting observation between BusinessEurope and a EPP MEP, 1 June 2010 
173 Interview, S&D MEP, 31 August 2010 
298 
 
7.2 Is the politics of policy typology still of analytical value? 
 
The findings in this thesis do not render Wilson’s typology useless in the 
context of the EU. Instead they complement, rather than fundamentally 
challenge, Wilson’s typology. Wilson’s typology has enabled an assessment 
and qualification of some of the most fundamental contentions in the interest 
group literature – that business dominates politics to such an extent that the 
policy outcome reflects its interests (Permanand, 2006, p. 90). Wilson’s 
typology offers an important insight into the types of conflicts that are likely 
to arise across policy domains, and highlights that the preponderance of 
business in policymaking only pertains to certain policy domains. Much of 
the existing literature on interest group influence does not highlight how the 
risk of business capture only pertains to certain types of policies but not to 
others (for an exception, see Coen & Katsaitis, 2013).  
As expected from the politics of policy typology, interest groups faced 
with a prospect of shouldering concentrated costs were more active in 
pressing their demands before the EP than interests facing diffuse benefits 
on the vans and food labelling regulations. This was, however, not the case on 
the directives on maternity leave and road transport working time, as 
European trade associations were faced with internal fragmentation and an 
unfriendly EP institutional arena. The findings of this thesis show that the 
applicability of Wilson's politics of policy typology to the EP is contingent 
upon three main conditions: (1) unity within lobbying spectrums, (2) limited 
member state lobbying (i.e. low levels of politicization), and (3) dossiers 
being dealt with by the EP's mainstream committees. 
 Firstly, just because an industry bears the cost arising from 
legislation, it does not mean that it will agree on how to fight the measure. 
Businesses and trade associations from different member states often 
compete against each other because they want their model to provide the 
template for EU legislation.  Wilson does not take into account that business 
groups often need time to mobilise on specific issues. Costs and benefits do 
not operate in a vacuum. Firstly, interest groups need time to mobilise and 
obtain a mandate from their member organisations. The costs of obtaining 
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internal unity within an interest group can be significant and explain why 
Wilson’s typology does not always match the empirical reality.  
Secondly, since Wilson’s framework is not formulated in an 
international/European context, he does not incorporate the possibility of 
national divisions into his typology. My research has shown that some EU 
issues are more prone to conflict and politicization than others, particularly 
when it comes to process standards tinkering with member states’ diverse 
welfare systems and labour market relations. Legislation concerned with 
harmonising EU process standards tends to attract increased attention from 
member states, and often divides the EP politics groups along national lines. 
To some extent, national conflict on process standards can be incorporated 
into Wilson’s typology. Most directives aimed at setting process standards 
spark, what Wilson calls, interest group politics (concentrated costs and 
benefits), associated with significant levels of conflict between opposing 
groups. However, depending on the cost-benefit profile, process standard 
directives might also be classified as entrepreneurial politics (diffuse 
benefits/concentrated costs).  Wilson does acknowledge that entrepreneurial 
politics sometimes attract significant public and political attention 
(particularly in the advent of a focusing event), which limit the potential for 
interest groups facing concentrated costs to shape policy outcomes. However, 
Wilson sees such situations as short-lived as decision-makers are assumed to 
find themselves in an environment where much of the technical information 
they need is in the hand of an interest group opposed to its goals. My 
research has shown, however, that directives concerned with process 
standards tend to be characterised by long-lasting public and political 
attention because they create significant national divisions between MEPs 
and member states. Furthermore, decision-makers are less dependent on 
technical information (and, thus, business lobbying) on directives 
harmonising EU process standards, but more dependent on information 
about public support (often provided by NGOs and labour unions). This 
shows that within Wilson’s four politics categories, a further distinction 
needs to be made between product and process standards.  
Thirdly, Wilson’s typology does not account for institutional factors, 
but focuses solely on how costs and benefits arising from legislation affect 
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interest groups’ incentives to become active on an issue. My thesis has shown 
that institutional factors are crucial for understanding interest group 
influence in the EP for two reasons. Firstly, the ability of any one interest 
group to influence EP policy outcomes diminishes when proposals are 
examined by mainstream committees and when the Hughes procedure is 
invoked. Secondly, national and European trade associations find it 
immensely difficult to influence EP policy outcomes whenever proposals go 
to committees with limited experience of the ordinary legislative.  
Furthermore, Wilson’s criticism of Lowi’s model - that it is difficult to 
assign policies to just one category - also applies to Wilson's own typology. It 
is not always possible to classify costs and benefits as either diffuse or 
concentrated. As seen on the maternity leave directive, there are 
‘intermediate cases and the high-low (concentrated-diffuse) measurement is 
inevitably a relative one’ (Permanand, 2006, p. 88). What is more, policy 
issues might shift from one category to another, such as the road transport 
working time directive, depending on how interest groups frame issues. 
Despite these short-comings, Wilson’s typology: sheds important light on 
interest groups’ incentives to become active on an issue; helps to identify the 
constraints decision-makers are working under (such as lobbying pressure 
from specific interests, such as business groups); and highlights how 
divergent interests may give rise to different types of politicking. By viewing 
policy-making through the theoretical lens of the politics of policy typology, I 
have explained under what conditions common assumptions in the interest 
group literature - how policy shapes politics - find resonance in the EP. This 
thesis has provided key insights into how and why certain policy outcomes 
come about, and why some interest groups are more successful at leaving 
their fingerprints on the EP’s reports than others. The thesis has also shown 
that the EP’s interest group system is far from the élite pluralist label often 
assigned to the European Commission (see for instance, Coen 1997; Eising, 
2007). Nor does the EP live up to its traditional role as champion of diffuse 
and electorally popular causes. Rather, the EP’s interest group system can be 
characterised as what Coen and Richardson (2009) call ‘chameleon 
pluralism’, in which interest group density and activity is a function of the 
type of policy in question. In the EP, interest groups’ mobilisation on specific 
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issues and their likelihood of winning particular conflicts is a function of the 
policy issue at hand, issue salience, and the committee in charge of amending 
the proposal in question.  
 
7.3 Would my findings on interest group influence hold up 
elsewhere? 
 
Although my study is limited to the EP, many of my findings are likely to go 
beyond the institutional venue studied. Firstly, the thesis highlights how the 
general assumption in the interest group literature on business dominance 
must be modified and studied in the context of specific issue areas. In any 
democratic political system, business groups can be expected to be 
particularly influential whenever ‘quiet politics’ kicks in (that is, low salience 
and highly technical issues), but less influential when issues become salient 
and politicised. Client and entrepreneurial politics are particularly likely to 
be characterised by quiet politics in the long run (unless it involves setting 
EU process standards). In the short term, increased media attention to an 
issue might be enough to set the cat among the pigeons and turn an issue into 
a moralistic crusade, in which politicians try to fend off the pressures of the 
cost-bearing industry. However, Wilson acknowledges that ‘noisy politics’ is 
often short-lived because decision-makers often find themselves in an 
environment in which much of the technical information they need is in the 
hands of industry. Thus, the influence of interest groups representing the 
wider public is expected to be momentary and involves entrepreneurs who 
only temporarily surf the public wave. However, when public interest fades, 
politics return to normal and business groups tend to dominate politics. In 
the EU, however, directives harmonising EU process standards tend to be 
characterised by constant high levels of issue attention from member states 
and fragmented European business federations.  
Secondly, business fragmentation is not a phenomenon solely 
confined to the EU, although it is likely to be more frequent and severe in the 
EU due to the high number of national interests that need to be reconciled 
within European trade associations. Fragmentation within trade associations 
is also the reality at the national level, where national trade associations have 
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a diverse membership basis. The Confederation of British Industries (CBI) is 
often said to suffer from a ‘stifling breadth’ because it has a diverse 
membership consisting of both small and large companies, importers and 
exporters, and retailers and financers (Grant, 1989, p. 121). Most national 
confederations have a large and diverse membership often leading to internal 
tension and conflict.  
What about the role of institutional factors; do they hold up outside 
the EP? Although the EU’s legislative branch is not a typical legislature 
because of the unique decision-making procedures and rules in place in the 
EU, the EU’s institutional design does resemble other strong bicameral 
systems, such as the US, Germany, and Switzerland (Costello, 2011, p. 122). 
My finding that interest group influence is contingent upon the committee in 
charge and the level of cooperation between committees – might, therefore, 
find resonance in other bicameral systems. Studies on the US Congress, for 
example, find that committees have a tendency to be biased towards their 
own policy remit (Gilligan & Krehbiel, 1997; Hall, 1989; Shepsle & Weingast, 
1987; Smith, 2008; Smith, 1984). While individual committees might favour 
some interest groups over others, increased cooperation between committees 
decreases the risk of biased policy outcomes. However, the degree to which 
committee bias matters for final policy outcomes depends on how strong 
committees are vis-à-vis the full chamber. Almost all democratic legislatures 
depend on committees to scrutinise proposals put forward by the executive, 
but the role and importance of committees varies across legislatures. At one 
end of the continuum are the EP and the US Congress, where the bulk of the 
legislative work takes place in highly specialised committees. The former US 
President Woodrow Wilson’s description of the US Congress as a government 
by the standing committees of Congress also finds resonance in the EP 
(National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1996, pp. 5-6). The 
EP’s 20 standing committees are described as the EP's ‘legislative bone’ 
(Neuhold, 2001; Westlake, 2007), where a substantial amount of legislative 
work and negotiations are done - ‘the EP in committee is the EP at work’ 
(McElroy, 2006, p. 180). At the other end of the spectrum is the British 
Parliament, where ‘committees conduct only a cursory review of draft 
legislation, and permanent committees have a limited oversight function’ 
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(National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1996, p. 6). In the 
middle are legislatures such as the French National Assembly, the German 
Bundestag, and Scandinavian Parliaments, where committees play an 
important and active role in the decision-making process, although they lack 
the teeth of the committees in the EP and US Congress (Kreppel, 2008).  
In most national parliaments, where governments hold the majority, 
the outcome of a proposal put forward by the government is usually clear. 
‘Some people even claim that certain national parliaments are little more 
than rubberstamps of their government’s legislation’ (Corbett, 2012). This is 
certainly not true in the EP, where MEPs shape the details of legislation in 
ways that MPs do not. All MEPs have the potential to shape legislation by 
suggesting amendments. Because of committees’ key role in debating and 
amending the European Commission’s proposal, plenary outcomes rarely 
alter committee reports significantly. Therefore, the choice of responsible 
committee matters a great deal for the policy outcome and for interest 
groups' ability to influence final EP policy outcomes. This means that my 
finding of ‘committee in charge’ is less likely to be upheld in national 
parliaments with weak committee systems. The ‘committee in charge’ may be 
expected to serve as an even stronger explanation of policy outcomes in the 
US Congress given that committees in the Congress, unlike the EP, can bury 
proposals from the executive.   
The second institutional factor – committees’ experience of the 
ordinary legislative procedure – might not find prominence outside the EU 
setting, although most national parliaments operate under different 
legislative procedure according to the policy issue in question. For example, 
most countries’ budgetary procedure is different to procedures used on 
ordinary proposals. Furthermore, most federal states have different decision-
making procedures and voting rules in place according to whether or not 
provinces/regions are affected, such as Belgium, Canada, Germany, South 
Africa, Switzerland, and the US. One could, therefore, also imagine that MPs’ 
legislative behaviour and openness to certain types of interest groups vary 
according to the decision-making procedure in place.   
In the EP, Wilson’s politics of policy typology is most likely to find 
resonance on product standard regulation, where European business 
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federations usually stand more united and dossiers are dealt with by 
mainstream committees. Mainstream committees tend to be more 
compromising in order to increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement 
with the Council. Because of this, extreme policy outcomes are unlikely in 
these committees, but this has not always been the case (Burns & Carter, 
2010). For much of the EP’s existence - when its legislative powers were 
limited - it saw itself as being part of a long-term power battle, where it was 
prepared to adopt challenging amendments that would go to conciliation, or 
even sacrifice legislation to boost its legislative powers vis-à-vis the European 
Commission and the Council (see, for instance, Burns & Carter, 2010; 
Shackleton, 2000). The EP’s previous role as a champion of diffuse and 
electorally popular causes is likely to have been tied, partly, to its quest for 
more powers, and its past tendencies to take up more extreme and idealistic 
positions that would be challenging for the other EU institutions. Today, the 
EP is faced with a larger amount of legislative work and a Council who is 
prepared to engage in informal dialogue earlier in the legislative process, as 
well as increased business lobbying (Shackleton, 2000).  
With the application of the ordinary legislative procedure to most 
areas under the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has won many of its battles for more 
legislative powers. This has in turn led the EP committees - at least those 
primarily working under the ordinary legislative procedure - to moderate 
their demands in order to be seen as a credible and serious legislative player, 
and reduced the privileged position once held by NGOs and labour unions. 
For committees still subject to consultation, the quest for more power is not 
yet accomplished, and the old working methods and norms of idealistic and 
uncompromising behaviour still prevail. Perhaps with time, if consultation 
ceases to exist, these committees will also adapt to the norms underpinning 
the ordinary legislative procedure, and opt for more compromising policy 
positions. However, committees dealing with process standards will still be 
faced with intense national pressure and fragmented European business 
federations, preventing business from becoming too dominant in the 
lobbying process. Yet, as long as some EP committees are trapped between 
old and new procedures, members of these committees are likely to continue 
taking up more extreme positions biased against business. Regardless of 
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what the future holds, interest groups’ mobilisation on specific issues, and 
the likelihood of them winning particular conflicts, will most likely continue 
to be determined by the type of policy issue in question. As seen in this 
thesis, the activity and influence of interest groups largely depend on 
whether legislation is concerned with product or process standards.  
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Appendices: 
 
Appendix 1: Semi-structured interview guide for interest group 
representatives 
 
Introduction 
 
 Presentation of my research 
 I am interested in understanding how [insert organisation name] has 
sought to influence the EP on [insert name of legislation], and with 
what result. 
 Anonymity  
 Can I record the interview? (I will suggest that the tape recorder can 
be switched off at any time if they do not want to have certain 
statements recorded). 
 
Importance of the proposal for the organisation (my own notes are 
written in brackets): 
 
 How important is the [insert name of proposal] for your organisation 
compared to other issues you are currently working on? 
 How many people within your organisation have been working on the 
case? (resources) 
 
 Preferences  
 
 What kind of changes to the Commission’s proposal would you have 
liked the European Parliament to introduce? (directional or technical 
changes) 
 How and when was your organisation’s position on the proposal 
[insert proposal name] decided?  
o Was there any disagreement between your member 
organisations that made it difficult to decide on a common 
position, and take early action? 
o Which aspects of the dossier are most important for [insert 
name of interest group]? 
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o How well do you think the Commission’s proposal addressed 
your concerns?  
 
 Do you think the Commission’s proposal would have been any 
different had you not lobbied? 
 What was your organisation’s main purpose of lobbying the European 
Parliament on [insert proposal name]? (for instance, unsuccessful 
lobbying in the Commission, counter-active lobbying, changing the 
political direction of the proposal or changing technical details) 
 Did you raise the same concerns to the European Parliament as you 
did to the European Commission? 
 
Lobbying strategies: 
 
 Open question: Could you tell me a bit about how your organisation has 
sought to influence the European Parliament on the proposal on [insert 
proposal name]? 
 What impediments did you face in achieving your objectives on lobbying 
Parliament on this issue [insert proposal name]?  
 Has your way of lobbying the European Parliament on [insert proposal 
name] been different to that of the Commission and the Council? (capture 
the EP intricacies) 
o For example, have you had to pitch the issue in a different way?  
o Have the type of information and views put across to MEPs 
differed from those put forward to the Commission and the 
Council? 
o How important do you think the European Parliament has been 
compared to the Commission and the Council for [insert 
organisation name] lobbying on [insert proposal name]? (Is the EP 
a side-show or of major importance to interest groups?) 
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 Timing of lobbying the EP 
 
 When did you first contact the staff and members of the European 
Parliament? 
o Why was it decided to contact the EP at this point in time? 
o Would you have contacted the European Parliament at an earlier 
stage if you had more time and resources available?  
o Is [insert name of interest groups] running any parliamentary 
intergroups/forums/delegations? 
 If so, did you discuss [insert name of dossier in question] in 
[insert name of the intergroup/forum/delegation mentioned 
by the interviewee]? 
 
 EP lobbying target  
 
 Which MEPs do you think have had the biggest impact on the committee 
report?  
o [Show the interviewee a list of all the committee members in the 
responsible and opinion-giving committees] Who have you been in 
contact with [insert name of dossier in question]? (If the interest 
group has not been in contact with key MEPs, ask why that was the 
case). 
o Why did you contact this/these MEP(s)? How did you decide on 
which MEPs and staff to contact?  
 
 If you know in advance that an MEP opposes the position of your 
organisation, to what extent, if any, does this prevent you from contacting 
this MEP? 
 Do you have better relations with some MEPs than others?  
 Do you usually target the same MEPs when lobbying in the [insert name] 
committee?  
 Did you find that most MEPs had a clear position on the proposal on 
[insert name] from the outset? (Lobbying may be about shaping rather 
than about changing MEPs’ opinions) 
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Lobbying coalitions  
 
 To what extent have you cooperated with other interest organisations 
when lobbying on [insert proposal]? 
o If the organisation has lobbied alone: 
 Why did you choose to forge ahead alone? 
 Have there been any disadvantages of lobbying alone? 
 
o If the organisation has participated in some form of lobbying 
network: 
 Why did you choose to band together with this/these 
organisation(s)? (For example, divvying up tasks, sharing 
information, or signalling to MEPs that there is a broad 
support basis etc.) 
 Have you been cooperating with this/these organisation(s) 
before? (Ad hoc or more formalised networks) 
 Did you cooperate with this/these organisation(s) 
throughout the whole policy-making process, or only when 
lobbying the EP? 
 What do you think the benefits have been of cooperating 
with this/these organisation(s)?  
 How effective did you consider this strategy to be 
(compared to lobbying alone)? 
 
 Interest group influence on the EP policy outcome 
 
 On the committee report: 
 
 How did you seek to influence the committee report (e.g. sending 
amendments to MEPs, helped with writing the report etc.)? 
 Have you been in contact with the rapporteur [insert name] during 
his/her preparation of the draft report?  
 Did you send amendment suggestions to MEPs?  
 Have you been contacted by any MEPs or Parliament staff regarding the 
proposal on [insert name]? 
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o Why did they contact you? 
o Did they take your position into account? (such as launching an 
amendment reflecting your view) 
 
 Do you think the committee report on [mention relevant dossier] would 
have been any different if [insert name of interest group] had not lobbied? 
o Can you point out any specific parts of the committee report where 
your organisation has had an impact?  
o Did you manage to get any amendment included in the committee 
report?  
 If yes: How did you manage to get it included? Can you 
show me the draft of the amendment(s) that you gave to the 
MEP? 
 If no: Why do you think you were unsuccessful in getting the 
amendment included in the report? 
 
 
On the EP’s final vote (the political groups’ voting lists and plenary 
amendments) 
 
 Did you seek to influence any of the political groups’ voting lists? 
o If no: Why not? 
o If yes: How did you seek to influence the voting lists? What impact 
did it have? 
 
 Did you seek to influence any MEPs prior to the vote at plenary? Who, 
how, and with what result? 
 In your opinion, does the final EP policy outcome reflect a compromise 
between interest groups?  
 Do you think that the policy outcome would have been any different if you 
had not lobbied Parliament?  
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General questions:  
 
 Has your lobbying strategy on [insert proposal name] been any different 
to your organisation’s usual way of targeting Parliament?  
 Does [insert organisation name] have any overall guidelines on how to 
lobby the EP?  
 Is there any lobbying behaviour that you consider to be unacceptable, or 
inappropriate in the European Parliament?  
 What does it take to lobby successfully in the European Parliament?  
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Appendix 2: Semi-structured interview guide for rapporteurs 
 
Stakeholder consultations 
 
 Why did you decide to become rapporteur on [insert name of dossier]? 
 How did you go about consulting stakeholders? 
 Do you have guidelines within [insert name of their EP political group] or 
your national delegation of how to go about consulting interest groups? 
 How did you decide on which interest groups to consult? 
o Are there some groups that you do not talk to?  
 If so, why? 
 
 What role did your national party at home and [insert MEP’s country] 
permanent representation to the EU have for your work on this dossier? 
o Did they assist you? 
 
 
Opinion-formation 
 
 Did you already have a fairly good idea of what changes you wanted to 
introduce to the Commission’s proposal before consulting stakeholders? 
 This dossier [insert name] is highly technical and complicated in terms of 
[refer to specific aspects/provisions] – what did you do to become more 
familiar with these aspects? 
 Do you think you would have been able to fulfil your role as rapporteur 
without information provided by interest groups? 
 Did any interest groups point to new angles of the proposal that you were 
previously unaware of? 
o If yes: Could you provide an example of this?  
o To what extent did information provided by interest groups shape 
or change your position on specific provisions? 
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Lobbying activity levels 
 
 What interest groups did you find to be most active in lobbying 
Parliament on this dossier? 
 What role do you think lobbying played on this dossier? 
o Do you think there are certain issues that would not have been 
discussed without interest groups alerting MEPs to them? 
o Do you think there are amendments that would not have been 
launched without interest groups suggesting them to MEPs? 
o As a guess, how many amendments tabled in the EP on this 
dossier do you think stem from interest groups? 
 
Changes introduced to the Commission’s proposal in the draft 
report (here I talk about the amendments the MEP has put forward) 
 
 Why did you decide to put forward these amendments (refer to specific 
amendments put forward by the MEP)? 
 Interest groups often play an important role in terms of providing 
technical information about the impact of the Commission’s proposal. 
What role did information provided by [refer to specific interest groups 
active on the dossier, such as the car industry or green organisations] 
have for your decision to put forward these amendments [refer to specific 
amendments]?  
 In general, do you think your draft report would have been any different 
if you had not had the opportunity to seek advice from interest groups? 
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Appendix 3: Maternity leave provisions in the EU member states 
Member 
States 
Length 
(weeks) 
Payment level Contributions: 
Austria 16 100 % of average 
net earnings in the 
previous 13 weeks 
(three months) with 
no ceiling 
Statutory health insurance  
  
Belgium 15 Usually 82 %, but         
depends on sécurité       
sociale 
Compulsory social insurance 
scheme mainly financed by 
contributions by employees 
Bulgaria 32 90 % of the average 
daily wage or of the 
insured income 
Social insurance 
contributory scheme 
financed by employers     
and insured person 
Cyprus 18 75 % of average 
income is paid by 
the state &      
common practice 
the other 25 % to be 
paid by the 
employer (not   
obligatory) 
Social security scheme,      
financed by contributions 
from employers, the insured 
persons, and the state 
Czech      
Republic 
28 69 %  Social security contributions         
financed by employers, 
employees, and self-
employed 
Denmark 20 100 % Tax financed (but state's 
expenditures are reimbursed 
by a labour market fund,    
financed by contributions by          
employees and self-
employed 
Estonia 20 100 %  Social security: Health 
insurance fund with        
contributions made by the 
state and employers  
Finland 21 Usually 70% of 
previous earnings 
depending on 
collective 
agreements; 
minimum amount 
is 15.20 EUR 
Social insurance system          
financed by statutory      
contributions from the 
insured, employers, and 
with funding from the public 
sector 
France 16 100 %  Social security: Health         
insurance funds financed by 
statutory contributions from 
the insured, employers, and 
with funding from the public 
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sector.  
Germany 14 100 %  Statutory health insurance      
scheme financed by         
contributions from the 
insured, employers, and 
taxes 
Greece 17 100 %  Pregnancy and confinement 
benefits: social security 
based on three-party 
financing (employee, 
employer, and the state) 
Hungary 24 70 %  Health insurance, finances 
by insured persons, 
employers, and taxes 
Ireland 42 80 % (only 26 out 
of 42 weeks are 
remunerated) 
Social insurance fund, 
financed by employees and 
employers  
Italy 22 80 %  Social security, financed by 
employers 
Latvia 16 100 % Social insurance fund, 
financed by insured persons 
and employers 
Lithuania 18 100 % Social insurance, financed 
with contributions from the 
employers and the insured  
Luxembourg 16 100 % Social Security, financed         
through contributions made 
by employees, employers, 
and the state 
Malta 14 100 % Social Security (overall 
contributions from 
employers, employees, self-
employed persons, and the 
state) 
Netherlands 16 100 % Social security funds 
financed through 
contributions 
Poland 20 100 % Compulsory social insurance 
scheme providing earnings-     
related benefits to all 
employees 
Portugal  24 100 % Compulsory social insurance 
scheme for the active 
population (employees and 
self-employed) with benefits 
related to the registered 
earnings 
Romania 18 85 % Paid from the state’s health    
insurance budget 
Slovakia 28 55 % Social insurance, financed 
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Source: Authors own table based on information from the International Labour 
Organisation. For a more detailed account of each member states’ maternity leave 
provisions, see: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=858&langId=en (last 
accessed 26 August 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by insured persons, 
employers, and state subsidy 
Slovenia 15 100 % Social insurance, financed 
by insured persons, 
employers, and taxes 
Spain 16 100 % Social security system, 
financed by contributions 
from the state, the insured, 
the employers, interests, 
fines, and other income 
Sweden 14 80 % Social insurance funds, 
mainly funding by 
employers 
United   
Kingdom 
52 90 % for the first 6 
weeks paid by the 
employer, followed 
by 33 weeks at      
the flat rate of 
£124.88 per week. 
The remaining      
13 weeks are unpaid 
Financed through 
contributions (employees 
and employers), taxes, and 
employers 
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Appendix 4: Interview list 
A. General interviews 
 
1. Policy officer, the European Public Health Alliance, EPHA, 28 April 2009 
2. European Commission official, DG for Environment, responsible for 
relations with other EU institutions, 27 April 2009 
3. MEP, ALDE, 27 November 2008 
4. Director, the Confederation of Danish Industries, DI, Brussels, 20 April 
2009 
5. European Parliament assistant to ALDE MEP, 30 April 2009 
6. Director, Burson Marsteller, 23 April 2009 
7. EP liaison officer, Business Europe, 30 April 2009 
8. European Commission official, DG for Agriculture, responsible for 
relations with other EU institutions, 21 April 2009 
9. Representative, the European Association for Bio-industries, Europe-Bio, 
20 April 2009 
10. MEP, EPP, 27 November 2008 
11. Vice Secretary General of the EP’s S&D group, 29 April 2009 
12. EP policy advisor, cabinet of Jerzy Buzek (EP president 2009-2011), 28 
April 2011 
13. EP policy advisor, cabinet of Jerzy Buzek (EP president 2009-2011) 4 May 
2011 
 
B. The reduction of CO2 emissions from vans 
 
14. European Commission official, DG for Environment, 2 March 2010 
15. European Commission official DG for Climate Change, 17 August 2011 
16. MEP, EPP, member of ENVI, 6 October 2011 
17. EP assistant to EPP MEP, 23 July 2011 
18. MEP, ECR, member of ENVI, 13 July 2011 
19. EP official, ENVI committee administrator, 10 July 2011 
20. EP official, ENVI committee administrator, 9 August 2011 
21. MEP, Greens/EFA, 24 May 2011 
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22. MEP, ALDE, 22 September 2011 
23. EP official, ALDE advisor,9 September 2011 
24. EP official, EPP advisor, 24 March 2011 
25. Diplomat, the German Permanent Representation to the EU, 21 
September 2011 
26. Diplomat, the Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU, 15 September 
2011 
27. Hartmut Baur, Daimler, 9 September 2009 
28. Director, FIAT’s delegation to Europe, 11 July 2011 
29. Head of Corporate Communications, FIAT’s delegation to Europe, 11 July 
2011 
30. Policy advisor, FIAT’s delegation to Europe, 11 July 2011 
31. Executive Director, Governmental Affairs, Europe at Ford Motor 
Company, 18 July 2011 
32. Senior Manager, Toyota, 14 July 2011 
33. Public affairs manager, Renault, 11 July 2011 
34. Director of Parliamentary Affair, European Automobile Manufacturers’ 
Association, ACEA, 23 September 2011 
35. Senior Campaigner, Transport and Environment, T&E, 11 July 2011 
36. EU transport policy campaigner, Greenpeace, 18 July 2011 
37. Head of Brussels office, German Association of the Automotive Industry, 
VDA, 9 September 2011 
38. Head of European Government Affairs, Jaguar Land Rover, JLR, 11 July 
2011 
 
C. Food labelling to consumers 
 
39. EP official, Greens/EFA advisor, 17 Feb 2011 
40. EP official, S&D advisor, 22 February 2011 
41. EP official, EPP advisor, 24 March 2011 
42. EP official, ALDE advisor, 23 February 2011 
43. EP assistant to EPP MEP, 26 May 2011  
44. EP assistant to S&D MEP, 22 February 2011  
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45. MEP, Greens/ EFA, member of ENVI, 24 May 2011 
46. EP assistant to ECR MEP, 27 April 2011. 
47. EP assistant to ALDE MEP, 18 February 2011 
48. EP assistant to ALDE MEP, 14 September 2011 
49. Policy officer, the European Public Health Alliance, EPHA, 25 February 
2011 
50. Policy officer, the European Public Health Alliance, EPHA, 25 February 
2011 
51. Head of Department, the European Consumers’ Organisation, BEUC, 16 
March 
52. Director, European heart network, EHN, 6 April 2011 
53. Policy officer, Eurocare, 17 May 2011 
54. Veterinary Advisor, European livestock and meat trading union, UECBV, 
12 April 2011 
55. Deputy Director, FoodDrinkEurope, 19 July 2011 
56. European public affairs manager, Unilever, 18 February 2011 
57. European Affairs Manager, Nestle, 13 April 2011 
58.  Senior officer, European Dairy Association, EDA, 8 June 2011 
59. Director, European Spirits organisation, CEPS, 28 April 2011. 
60. Regulatory Affairs Manager, The Brewers of Europe, 15 April 2011 
61. Manager public affairs Europe, Kellogg, 25 May 2011 
62. Account manager, Keller and Heckman, lobbied on behalf of European 
Natural Soyfoods manufacturers, ENSA & Wrigley, 18 May 2011 
63.  Secretary General, the International Margarine Federation of the 
Countries of Europe, 5 July 2011.  
64. European Natural Sausage Casings Association, Ensca, 26 September 
2011 
 
D. The working time directive in road transport 
 
65. Political Secretary, European Transport Workers’ Federation, ETF, 20 
July 2010 
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66.  Political Secretary, European Transport Workers’ Federation, ETF, 13 
October 2010 
67. EP assistant to EPP MEP, 22 July 2010 
68. MEP, EPP, member of EMPL, 22 July 2010 
69. Head of social affairs, the International Road Transport Union, IRU, 17 
August 2010 
70. EP assistant to S&D MEP, 19 August 2010 
71. EP official, S&D administrator, 19 August 2010 
72. EP official, EMPL committee administrator, 24 August 2010 
73. EP official, ALDE policy advisor, 26 August 2010 
74. MEP, S&D, 31 August 2010 
75. EP official, GUE/NGL policy advisor, 31 August 2010  
76. Policy advisor, European Small Business Alliance, ESBA, 1 September 
2010 
77. EP official, ECR policy advisor, 1 September 2010 
78. EP official, EPP policy advisor, 3 September 2010 
79. EP official, ALDE policy advisor, 26 August 2010 
80. European Commission official, policy officer, DG for Transport and 
Mobility, 13 September 2010 
81.  EP assistant to S&D MEP, 21 September 2010 
82. Secretary General, UETR, European Association of Road Hauliers, 
UETR, 27 September 2010 
83. EP assistant to EPP MEP, 28 September 2010 
84. Advisor, the European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises, UEAPME, 29 September 2010 
85.  EP assistant to Green/EFA MEP, 1 October 2010  
86. EP assistant to EPP MEP, 1 October 2010 
87.  EP official, EFD advisor, 12 October 2010 
88. EP assistant to ECR MEP, 12 October 2010 
89. Manager European Affairs, the Dutch association for transport operators 
and logistics service providers, TLN, 2 November 2010 
90. Director EU Affairs, Danish Association for Transport Operators and 
Logistic Service Providers, 10 November 2010  
91. MEP, EPP, member of EMPL, 16 November 2010 
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92. MEP, S&D, member of TRAN, 16 November 2010 
93. EP assistant to EPP MEP, 16 November 2010  
94. EP official, Greens/ EFA advisor, 17 November 2010 
95. EP official, S&D advisor, 13 December 2010 
E. The maternity leave directive 
 
96. European Commission official, DG for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Equal,  24 March 2010 
97. European Commission official, DG for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Equal,  5 November 2010 
98. Diplomat, the Danish Permanent Representation to the EU, 25 March 
2010 
99. Policy officer, European Women’s lobby, EWL, 6 April 2010  
100. Policy advisor, Eurochambers, 6 April 2010 
101. Policy advisor, EuroCommerce, 7 April 2010 
102. Policy advisor, Confederation of Family Organisations in the EU, 
COFACE, 7 April 2010 
103. Social Affairs Policy Director, the European Association of Craft, Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises, UEAPME, 8 April 2010 
104. Social Affairs Policy Director, the European Association of Craft, Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises, UEAPME, 13 December 2010 
105. Advisors, European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC, 9 April 2010; 
25 November 
106. Advisor, European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC, 25 November 
107. Advisor, Business Europe, 9 April 2010 
108. Advisor, Business Europe, 9 November 2010,  
109. Senior Adviser for EP Affairs, BusinessEurope, 9 November 2010  
110. EP assistant to S&D MEP, 15 April 2010 
111. EP assistant to S&D MEP, 22 October 2010 
112. EP official, EPP advisor in FEMM, 15 April 2010 
113. EP official, EPP advisor in FEMM, 28 October 2010 
114. EP official, Green/EFA advisor in FEMM, 15 April 2010 
115. EP official, FEMM administrator, 16 April 2010  
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116. EP official, FEMM administrator, 9 November 2010  
117. Advisor, Business Europe, 19 April 2010 
118. Policy officer, European Disability Forum, EDF, 20 April 2010 
119. Director, the Social Platform, 20 April 2010  
120. EP official, ALDE advisor in FEMM, 21 April 2010 
121. EP liaison officer, European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC, 22 
April 2010 
122.  MEP, GUE/NGL chair of FEMM, 31 May 2010 
123. MEP, GUE/NGL, member of FEMM, 2 June 2010 
124. EP assistant to EPP MEP, 3 June 2010 
125. EP assistant to EPP MEP, 7 June 2010 
126. EP assistant to EPP MEP, 7 June 2010 
127. MEP, ECR, 7 June 2010 
128. MEP, ALDE, 8 June 2010 
129. MEP, EPP, 8 June 2010 
130. EP official, EMPL administrator, 9 June 2010 
131. EP official, EMPL administrator, 21 September 2010 2010 
132. EP official, EMPL administrator, 22 October 2010 
133. EP assistant to ALDE MEP, 11 June 2010 
134. EU and international affairs policy officer, Federation of Small 
Businesses, FSE, 12 July 2010 
135. Policy officer, European Anti-poverty network, 16 July 2010 
136. EP assistant to EPP MEP, 16 July  
137. Confederal Secretary, European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC, 
20 July 2010 
138. Intern, European Women’s lobby, EWL, 3 November 2010  
139. EP official, ALDE policy advisor in FEMM, 29 October 2010 
140. Head of European Representation, British Chamber of Commerce, 11 
November 2010 
141. Social policy advisor, Confederation of German Employers, BDA, 5 
November 2010 
142. EP assistant to ALDE MEP, 20 December  
143. EP official, S&D advisor in FEMM, 14 January 2010 
144. EPP MEP, 1 June 2010 
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